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3Preface
The idea of this book dates back to many years ago. As is often the case, at its origins
it  was  a  far  more  ambitious  project.   Its  completion  has  been  delayed  by  a  great
variety of other pursuits and commitments. When it began, its central concerns were
– or seemed to me – fresh and relevant. I can only hope that during the long gestation
period not all of the freshness and relevance has been lost.
 The debts I have incurred while working on this book are commensurate with
the  length  of  time  spent  on  it.  The  research  and  writing  has  been  supported  by
gratefully received grants from the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA), the
Central European University Research Fund, and fellowships from the Herzog
August Bibliothek at Wolfenbüttel, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the Deutsches
Akademisches Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, the European
Commission (Marie Curie Fellowship). Their generous support has enabled me at
variouis periods to do library and archival research, and enjoy the academic
ambience, as a guest of the Herzog August Bibliothek (Wolfenbüttel), the Max-
Planck-Institut für Geschichte (Göttingen), the Institute for Advanced Studies in the
Humanities (Edinburgh), the University of Cambridge, and the European University
Institute  (Florence).  I  would  like  to  express  my  thanks  for  their  logistic  help  to  the
excellent staff at each of these institutions, as well as at the National Library of
Scotland and the University Library in Edinburgh, the University Library at
Cambridge, the Niedersächsiche Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek and the
Universitätsarchiv at Göttingen, the Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv in Wolfenbüttel,
and the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna. While in Budapest, I have been
able to continue research on the topics of this book mainly thanks to the collections of
the Library of Eötvös Lóránd University,  the Library of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, and the Library of my own institutional home, Central European
University, with its remarkable journal holdings and smooth inter-library loan
services.
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4Over the years, at each of these places and elsewhere – including CEU, with its
ever-challenging intellectual atmosphere – I have benefited enormously from general
support or specific feedback, in the form of conversation or correspondence, from
many wonderful colleagues and friends. Some of them may not be aware of their
imprint on this manuscript (though hopefully they would not repudiate it), and some
of them, sadly, have not lived to see it in full. I would like to specifically mention and
express  my  thanks  to  Guido  Abbattista,  Thomas  Ahnert,  Éva  H.  Balázs,  György
Bence, Gillian Bepler, Hans Erich Bödeker, Stuart J. Brown, Roger Emerson, Harry T.
Dickinson, Martin van Gelderen, Istvan Hont, Ferenc Horkay Hörcher, Edward J.
Hundert,  Girolamo  Imbruglia,  Peter  Jones,  Anthony  LaVopa,  Mária  Ludassy,
Rolando Minuti, Fania Oz-Salzberger, László Péter, Mark Salber Phillips, Nicholas
Phillipson, John Pocock, János Poór, John Robertson, Antonella Romano, Gordon
Schochet, Silvia Sebastiani, Richard B. Sher, Sabine Solf, Endre Szécsényi, István
Szijártó, Zoltán Gábor Sz?cs, Zsuzsanna Török, Balázs Trencsényi, Benedek Varga,
Rudolf Vierhaus and Hanna Orsolya Vincze. Needless to say, none of them hold any
responsibility for any of the shortcomings of the ensuing text.
As always, those closest to the author have borne the bulk of the burden of
completing this book, with indulgence and understanding. It is dedicated to them: to
the memory of my parents, and to my wife and two daughters.
*     *     *     *     *
Earlier versions of several portions of this manuscript have been published as journal
articles or contributions to collective volumes. Each of these portions has been
severely revised, both in substantive aspects, and with a view to monographic
consistency. The details are as follows:
The second section of the Introduction has been revised from “Introduction:
What Is the (Historians’) Enlightenment Today?”, in Enlightenment and Communication:
Regional Experiences and Global Consequences, ed. László Kontler = European Review of
History / Revue d’histoire européenne, special issue 13:3 (2006), 337-355.
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5Chapter One amalgamates material from “Translation and Comparison: Early-
Modern and Current Perspectives”, Contributions to the History of Concepts 3:1 (2007), 71-
102, and “Translation and Comparison II: A Methodological Inquiry into Reception in
the History of Ideas”, Contributions to the History of Concepts 4:1 (2008), 27-56.
Chapter  Three  has  its  origins  in  “Time  and  Progress  –  Time  as  Progress:  An
Enlightened Sermon by William Robertson”, in Tyrus Miller (ed.), Given World and
Time. Temporalities in Context (Budapest, CEU Press, 2008), 195-220.
Chapter  Four  builds  on “William Robertson’s  history  of  manners  in  German
1770-1795”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1997/1, 125-144.
Chapter Five has been expanded from “Germanizing Scottish Histories: The
Case of William Robertson”, Cromohs, 12 (2007), 1-9. <URL:
http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/12_2007/kontler_robertson.html>
Chapter Six includes material from “William Robertson and his German
audience on European and non-European civilisations”, Scottish Historical Review 80
(2001), 63-89, and “Mankind and its Histories. William Robertson, Georg Forster and a
Late Eighteenth-Century German Debate”, Intellectual History Review, forthcoming in
2013.
Unless otherwise indicated, translations of German quotations into English are
mine throughout the text. German originals are provided in the footnotes.
Budapest, September 2012 László Kontler
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6Introduction
“The work I have had in preparing this new edition of Robertson’s History of
Charles V, has not been very agreeable. To compare an already existing
translation line by line with the original, in order to be convinced of its accuracy;
to alter a deficient phrase in a period while retaining the idiom already used,
instead of deleting it  altogether;  to be ceaselessly alert,  in order to avoid being
led astray by the old translation and becoming familiar with its defects to such a
degree as to overlook them; all this costs more trouble than a new translation
would require. I do not flatter myself that I have noticed everything that could
have been improved, and would hardly again undertake such a task, which
causes more difficulties than it would seem at first sight.”1
Anybody who is familiar with the frustrating side of editorial work can only
sympathize with the sentiments expressed in the above sentences by Julius August
Remer, the editor of the second German edition of William Robertson’s History of
Charles V in 1779. What makes this complaint somewhat peculiar is that, shortly earlier,
its author had spoken very highly about its target: “The translator, the late councillor
Mittelstedt had too much wisdom and common sense, and was too proficient in both
languages ... to produce a translation that is not faithful”, and the “excellent book” only
needed to be supplemented with a handful of notes in order to improve its accuracy.2
1 “Die  Arbeit,  die  ich  bey  dieser  neuen  Ausgabe  der  Robertsonschen  Geschichte  Carls  V.  gehabt  habe,
gehört nicht zu den angenehmsten. Eine schon daseyende Uebersetzung Zeile vor Zeile mit dem Original
zu vergleichen, um von ihrer Richtigkeit überzeugt zu seyn, einen fehlerhaften Ausdruck in einer Periode
abzuändern, mit Beybehaltung der einmal gebrauchten Wendung, und ohne sie ganz wegzustreichen,
und stets auf seiner Hut zu seyn, von der alten Uebersetzung nicht irre geleitet und mit ihrer Fehler so
bekannt zu werden, daß man sie übersiehet, alles dieses verursacht mehr Mühe, als eine neue
Uebersetzung erfordern würde. Ich schmeichele mich nicht, daß ich alles, was verbessert werden könnte,
beobachtet  habe,  und würde zum zweyten male mich schwerlich einer  solchen Arbeit  unterziehen,  die
mehr Schwierigkeit hat, als der erste Anschein ergiebt.” Herrn Dr. Wilhelm Robertsons Geschichte der
Regierung Kaiser Carls des Fünften. Nebst einem Abrisse des Wachstums und Fortgangs des gesellschaftlichen
Leben in Europa bis auf den Anfang des sechszehnten Jahrhundert, trans. Theodor Christoph Mittelstedt, notes
by Julius August Remer, 2nd ed. (Braunschweig: Waisenhaus, 1778-1779), III. Vorrede, by Julius August
Remer. The first edition was published, without Remer’s collaboration, in 1770-71.
2 Ibid., I. Vorrede.
               dc_444_12
7Nevertheless, just over a decade later Remer decided to revise the second edition, too.
The revision concerned especially the book’s celebrated introductory volume, A View of
the Progress of Society in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman Empire, to the Beginning of
the Sixteenth Century: in the 1792 German edition its structure and organizing principles
became radically transformed, and its size was also substantially expanded.
Remer’s complaint and his procedure – whose context, causes and
consequences will be examined in detail in Chapter 4 – serve as a forceful illustration
of the central themes and endeavours of this book. The eighteenth century signalled
the advent of multilingual modernity in European culture, in which there arose a
sizeable body of literate men and women, with adequate schooling and an appetite
for novelties in all areas of learned and polite letters, who could comfortably read but
one language, their own mother tongue. Humans may have been forced to “live by
translation” ever since the confusio linguarum.3 But making available texts originally
conceived in one vernacular rendered into another had never before seemed so
essential as in the Age of Enlightenment – which, at the same time, was fashioned
and understood by its adherents and many later students as a unitary intellectual
and cultural universe, conjoined by shared values and a dense network of print
communication. However, Remer’s grumblings express some concern, even doubt
about the potential of translation as a suitable vehicle of the processes of
transmission on which the constitution of modern learning seemed to depend. In  a
more remote sense, it also points to the question of the transferability of intellectual
products across linguistic and cultural barriers in a supposedly unified world of
ideas – still further, how unified that world actually was.
My book addresses this dilemma by way of a case study in comparative
intellectual and conceptual history, reception and intellectual communication. In
particular, it aims to contribute to the study of cultural and ideological unity versus
diversity in the European Enlightenment by assessing the limits and possibilities of
intellectual transfer through translation and commentary of the works of one of the
central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment in contemporary Germany. It elaborates
3 Cf.  Paul  Ricoeur, Sur la traduction (Paris: Bayard, 2004), 23-4, 43-4; also Franz Rosenzweig, “The
Impossibility and Necessity of Translation”, in André Lefevere, (ed.), Translating Literature: The German
Tradition (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977), 110 ff.
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8on, and hopes to enrich a research tradition which emphasizes that besides the
approximate unity of endeavours and questions shared by “the enlightened” of the
eighteenth century across Europe, the answers depended on a great variety of
contingent and context-dependent factors and pointed, therefore, in rather different
directions.
William Robertson (1721-1793)4 wrote some of the historical bestsellers of the
eighteenth century,  and his  thought  developed in  close  dialogue with  the  foremost
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, including David Hume, Adam Smith, John
Millar, Adam Ferguson, Henry Home Lord Kames and others. He emerged as a
central figure of the Edinburgh intellectual scene in the company of several of these
friends in the famous Select Society, founded in 1754 for civilised discussion and
debate on literary, scholarly and social matters; about the same time he was also one
of the founders and authors of the short-lived Edinburgh Review, the embodiment of
the same endeavours in printed media. Besides being a financially uniquely
successful author and an intellectual celebrity of public and official recognition,
appointed to the newly revived office of Historiographer Royal for Scotland in 1763,
he was also a remarkably powerful man. As Principal of the University of Edinburgh
(where he took his degree in 1741) from 1762 to his death, he promoted several
successful projects – from the creation of a botanic garden and a natural history
museum through the overhaul of teaching premises to implementing a routine of
merit based appointment to professorial chairs – that consolidated the university’s
status as a leading European institution of higher learning. Starting his career in the
Scottish Presbyterian Kirk as a minister in 1743, by the early 1760s he emerged as its
uncontested leader, whose “administration”5 asserted the values of the “Moderate
4 A full scale modern biography is still missing. As other Scottish literati, Robertson received his due
from Dugald Stewart, in his Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith, L.L.D., of William Robertson, D.D, and of
Thomas Reid, D.D. (Edinburgh: George Ramsay, 1811). Robertson as the life and soul of the Moderate
Party has been discussed by Jeremy J. Carter, “The Making of Principal Robertson in 1762: Politics and
the University of Edinburgh in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century”, Scottish Historical Review,
49:1 (1970), 60-84; and Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate
Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). For an excellent, concise overview of
Robertson’s career, see Stuart J. Brown, “William Robertson and the Scottish Enlightenment”, in idem.
(ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7-
35.
5 Stewart, Biographical Memoirs, 265. The phrase refers to Roberston’s authority resting on skills in
organization and management. Thanks to such skills, his was a dominant voice in the General
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9Party” – briefly: preserving authority, order and discipline within the Church, and
making it an instrument of promoting civility, sympathy and benevolence outside –
until his retirement from ecclesiastical politics in 1780.
Robertson was thus both an establishment public figure, and a participant in
some of the most interesting intellectual innovations in the arising social and human
sciences.   His  works  on  themes  from  national,  European  and  global  history
addressed major questions of the Enlightenment as an intellectual movement which
embraced the whole spectrum of efforts to confront the challenges of commercial
modernity, and of the erosion of the Christian and republican ethical foundations of
western  societies  from  the  late  seventeenth  century  to  the  era  of  the  French
Revolution – at least those segments of the spectrum that were not confined to a mere
repudiation  or  negation  of  these  challenges.  How  is  it  possible  to  alleviate  the
religious and political conflict inspired by the extremes of “superstition” and
“enthusiasm” that had marred the social and political atmosphere of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries? How is it possible to accommodate commerce, which had
become inevitable and indispensable for modern societies, but equally inevitably
reinforced the self-regarding impulses inherent in human nature, with the moral
imperatives of cooperation, sympathy, public spirit  and the pursuit of happiness in
human collectives? How is it possible to enshrine the dignity of man in constitutions
that also allow for strong government and stability? These, and a great many other
questions defined themes, fields, and endeavours in eighteenth-century intellectual
inquiry that were central to what we now know as Enlightenment: religious
toleration and the “natural history” of religion, political economy and conjectural
history, natural law, and so forth.
Such an understanding of the Enlightenment as the sum of the debates
provoked by these questions and many more, conducted with considerable ardour
and sometimes even venom but for the most part imbued on all sides with the values
of “humanity,” is spacious and open-ended, allowing for many borderline cases that
will always be cited with relish by those who prefer tighter definitions (and also
Assembly  of  the  church  even  without  holding  the  important  position  of  its  “moderator”  (elected
annually) on a permanent basis.
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those irremediably sceptical of the possibility of such definitions).6 The  answers  to
the questions were diverse, and this is what introduces plurality amidst unity in the
Enlightenment. Those developed or implied in Robertson’s contributions to the
enlightened “narratives of civil government” (John Pocock) and “cosmopolitan
history” (Karen O’Brien)7 were conceived from the vantage point of one of the most
influential men in an economically and politically, but especially culturally ever
more robustly emerging “minor partner” within a composite monarchy, itself
struggling with major challenges of arising as a leading imperial power in
commercial and military terms between the 1750s and the 1790s. These decades
coincided both with Robertson’s activity as a historian and the heyday of the Scottish
Enlightenment. The main historical themes presented by this vantage point included
the internal dynamics that led to the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707; the phenomenon
of international competition and balance of power within the emerging European
commonwealth recognized as a system of states; and the broadening global interface
between the civilization peculiar to this system and its counterparts in other
continents that were now opening themselves to the gaze of Europeans. Robertson’s
oeuvre addressed each of these themes extensively. In the History of Scotland (1759),
he sought to show how and why Scotland, although already making its appearance
on  the  horizon  of  European  history  by  the  sixteenth  century,  did  not  share  in
processes that were taking place elsewhere, such as the curtailing of feudalism,
which in Scotland was in effect postponed until the parliamentary union with
England. By doing so, he attempted to refocus Scottish historiography, to supersede
its shallow ancient constitutionalism, insularity and the partisan debates between the
adherents and adversaries of Mary Queen of the Scots,  and endeavoured instead to
place Scottish history on the map of Europe. The chief ambition of The History of
Charles V (1769) was  to  show how Europe in  the  same period ? before high-taxing
territorial monarchies maintaining large standing armies could have become
internally mitigated by checks and balances and externally by balance of power, and
6 For more details, see the synoptic overview of the recent historiography of the Enlightenment in the
second section of this Introduction.
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the idea of toleration reconciled people to religious plurality ? experienced the trials
of absolutism, universal monarchy and religious wars. Robertson then explored the
ties forged through commercial and cultural exchange as well as imperialism
between  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  globe  (History of America, 1777; An Historical
Disquisition of the Knowledge which the Ancients Had of India, 1791) in terms that, while
certainly “Euro-centric”, were marked by a great deal of sensitivity towards cultural
difference as well as by empirical richness and theoretical sophistication. As far as
theory is concerned, it must be added that while the writing of history was, both for
Robertson himself and his environment, still conceived as a literary pursuit as well as
a form of political discourse, he was a pioneer in grafting on it the qualities of a field
of inquiry with the claims of a scientific discipline, anxious as he was to cultivate it
with the methodological tools provided by the new “science of man” that was
becoming an Edinburgh trade mark during his lifetime.
All over Europe, Robertson’s combination of narrative and philosophical
history evoked widespread interest. After a relatively “measured response” by the
public to the 1764 French translation of the History of Scotland by N. P. Besset de La
Chapelle, largely thanks to the good offices of Hume and his philosophe friends, the
History of Charles V and the History of America were translated into French (and
published in 1771 and 1779, respectively) by the renowned encyclopédiste Jean-
Baptiste-Antoine Suard.8 Each of Robertson’s four great histories were also made
available in Italian (some of them translated from the French) soon after their
publication in the original, and he was made a foreign member of the Academy of
Sciences of Padua.9 As  the History of Charles V and  the History of America tackled
subjects of central concern for Spain, they were avidly discussed both in the Iberian
kingdom and its colonial dependencies. A Spanish translation of the latter book was
prepared by Ramón de Guevara Vasconcelos, a member of the Real Academia de
Historia de Madrid (of which Robertson also became elected as a foreign member). It
7 The  character  of  Robertson  as  a  historian  is  explored  in  the  context  of  eighteenth-century  Scottish
and European (naturally enough, mainly German) historical writing in Chapter 2; his individual
works are assessed in more detail in the first sections of Chapters 3 to 6.
8 John Renwick, “The reception of William Robertson’s historical writings in eighteenth-century
France”, in Brown (ed.), Robertson and the expansion of empire, 145-63.
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received King Charles III’s authorization for publication on 8 January 1778, but was
never published, because a strong opposition within the Academia convinced the
king of the need for a “Spanish” perspective on the history of the New World. Juan
Bautista Muñoz, who was commissioned to execute this work, published a volume of
his Historia del Nuevo Mundo in 1793, but then interrupted his work. His
interpretation was very close to that of Robertson.10 In  Central  Europe,  parts  of  the
History of America appeared (based on the French translation) in Polish in 1789 and in
Hungarian  in  1809.  But  more  lively  interest  was  shown  in  Robertson’s  oeuvre  in
Russia,  where  Catherine  II’s  Scottish  physician  John  Rogerson  reported  to  the
Principal that “[a]ll your historical productions have ever been favourite parts of her
reading.”11 The Tsarina’s admiration undoubtedly played a part in the permission for
Rogerson to supply Robertson with ethnographic information culled from Russian
expeditions to the Far East, to be used by the historian in the History of America.
Robertson also became an external member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences of
Saint Petersburg, and a Russian translation of the History of Charles V (based on the
1775 French edition) was published in 1775-78. Even before then, Catherine
commissioned the German tutor of Grand Duke Paul,  Ludwig Heinrich Nicolay, to
translate the introductory volume of the History of Charles V, the View of the Progress of
Society in Europe, into German to serve as a tool for the political education of the heir
to the Russian imperial throne.12
 Yet, perhaps nowhere in the continent was the reception of Robertson as
enthusiastic as in contemporary Germany. All of his books (both the English editions
and the German translations) became valued items on the shelves of public and
private libraries,13 and were nearly immediately reviewed in important journals.
9 Gianfranco Tarabuzzi, “Le traduzioni italiani settecentesche delle opera di William Robertson”,
Rivista storica italiana, 91:2-3 (1979),  486-509.
10 Robin A. Humphreys, “William Robertson and His History of America” [1954], in idem., Tradition
and Revolt in Latin America and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 34-36.
11 Stewart, Life of Robertson, 306..
12 The View of the Progress seems to have been Catherine’s absolute favourite: “[the History of Charles V]
C’est le compagnon constant de tous mes voyages; je ne me lasse jamais à le lire, et particulièrement le
premier  volume.” Ibid.,  306.  Cf.  Edmund Heier,  “William Robertson and Ludwig Heinrich Nicolay,
His German Translator at the Court of Catherine II”, Scottish Historical Review, 41 (1962), 135-40.
13 While  my  study  does  not  belong  to  the  genre  of  the  “history  of  the  book”,  this  point  will  be
illustrated below in the case of Robertson’s individual works with reference to the borrowing lists of
the library of the University of Göttingen. As for private collections, see a very thorough study on an
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Translations appeared just a few months after the publication of the originals in each
case (some of them in several versions simultaneously by different hands, others
being revised again and again during the course of several decades). German authors
exploring similar themes demonstrated a keen awareness of the work of Robertson,
referring to it and engaging with it critically. On account of his moderation and
strong Protestant credentials, he was considered in Germany as a respectable
alternative to like-minded skeptical historians, such as Voltaire or Hume or Gibbon,
and enjoyed great popularity among princes and authority among the educated.14
The  political  and  moral  theorist  Thomas  Abbt  planned  to  write  a  history  of
Braunschweig on the model of Robertson’s History of Scotland,15 while Julius August
Remer, who edited, annotated and adapted The History of Charles V for the German
public,  dreamed  of  writing  a  “View  of  the  Progress  of  Society”  about  the  post-
Reformation period that would be a match to Robertson’s tableau of the growth of
European civilization before it.16 The young Friedrich Schiller, whose uncle
translated Robertson’s History of America into German, thought that Robertson wrote
history “in a poetical spirit”, and confessed to a friend that he was keen on preparing
a universal history following the path of Robertson, besides Gibbon and (oddly
enough) Bossuet. He also invoked Robertson as an authority in notes to the preface
of his 1783 play Verschwörung des Fiesco zu Genua (Fiesco’s Conspiracy in Genova),
and solutions used in Mittelstedt’s translation are echoed in this republican tragedy
as well as in Mary Stuart of 1800.17
emblematic eighteenth-century book collector, who possessed the full range of Robertson’s histories,
some of them in English as well as German (though the author of this monograph wrongly attributes
the History of Ancient Greece, published by a namesake of Robertson’s, also to the historiographer
royal). Gabriele Crusius, Aufklärung und Bibliophilie. Der Hannoveraner Sammler Georg Friedrich Brandes
und seine Bibliothek (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2008), 95-7, 170-2,  183.
14 See  Ludwig  Wachler, Geschichte der Kunst und Wissenschaften seit Wiederherstellung derselben bis an
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1818), II. 642.; Bernhard Pier, William
Robertson als Historiker und Geschichtsphilosoph (Radbod: Weitfeld, 1929), 100. ff.
15 Franz X. Wegele, Geschichte des deutschen Historiographie seit dem Auftreten des Humanismus (München
and Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1885), 786.
16 Herrn Dr Wilhelm Robertsons Geschichte der Regirerung des Kaiser Carls des Fünften. Nebst einem Abrisse
des Wachstums und Fortgangs des Gesellschaftlichen Lebens in Europa bis auf den Anfang des 16. Jhs., trans.
and rev. by Julius August Remer, 5 vols. (Vienna: Härter, 1819, based on the edition at Braunschweig:
Schulbuchhandlung/Waisenhaus, 1792-1796). I. Vorrede.
17 Pier, William Robertson als Historiker, p. 109.
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For the modern historian, the chief interest of “Robertson in Germany” lies
elsewhere. Arguably, the translations and the interpretation of his works contributed
to as well as reflected the shaping of the linguistic and analytical tools employed to
cope with the complexities of modernity in the German Sattelzeit. Robertson’s grand
theme ? the simultaneous growth of the commercial and colonial system; the
resulting advance of enlightenment and improvement of manners in the western
world; their contribution to a better understanding of the Christian revelation; the
rise of modern national (as against universal) monarchy which accommodated the
rule of law; the combination of monarchical and republican states in Europe as a
system whose internal relationships were based on emulation as well as cooperation
? had a specific relevance to the German experience and predicament. For different
reasons, but on the whole not unlike in the case of post-1707 Scotland, the challenges
of an age of mercantile and maritime expansion caused uneasiness in the economic
backwaters that constituted most of Germany throughout most of the early modern
period. At the same time, the settlement of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years’
War, which thwarted the Habsburgs’ endeavour to impose political and religious
homogeneity to the Holy Roman Empire, raised the issues of universal monarchy
versus territorial state, of balance of power, and of religious moderation, in a highly
complex manner. Robertson’s texts were, therefore, particularly suitable for
generating interest and reflection in Germany.
The fact that amidst this extensive attention, the amount of “impact”
Robertson had in Germany, especially on the character of German historical studies,
remained rather limited, is all the more noteworthy, and by itself indicative of the
above-mentioned complexities of intellectual communication and reception in the
Enlightenment. These complexities are examined on several levels in my book, both
in general terms and by reference to the particular texts of Robertson. The first level
is that of translation as the “construction of comparables” with the aim of both
linguistic and cultural transmission, and the pursuit of goals peculiar to the recipient
environment.18 In full compliance with a broad range of theoretical reflection on the
tasks and methods of translation in the period, and similarly to widely pursued
18 To be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
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translating practices, some of the German translators of Robertson took extensive
liberties in rendering his texts, tacitly or explicitly putting them in the service of
indigenous academic, intellectual, political or personal agendas. This leads to the
second level of analysis, which is constituted by the personal character, the academic
and institutional allegiances, and the specific endeavours of the individuals involved
in the process of reception. Most of these individuals derive their significance from
representing socio-cultural types. These include Protestant pastors, mainly interested
in Robertson’s providentialism; professionals of the expanding German publishing
business, for whom translating was part of earning a livelihood; provincial university
professors, for whom the engagement with the text was an exercise in emulation; as
well as academics and intellectuals of national stature, including one emblematic,
hard-to-classify figure of the German Enlightenment whose participation in this story
is as astonishing as it is predictable: the Anglophile, cosmopolitan,  circumnavigator,
“Jacobin” Georg Forster. Together, these figures and types represent an interesting
cross-section of the contemporary German academic-intellectual scene. The scope
and the genre of my book hardly allows a full scale reliance on the recently revived
biographical approach in historical studies. Still, at this level of the investigation I
also attempt to provide glimpses into the range of the highly variegated aspirations
and stakes that prompted the respective agents, in a remarkably contingent manner,
to  participate  in  a  shared history  of  intellectual  transfer.  The fact  that  among all  of
these figures the restless and radical Forster was the one to demonstrate the greatest
amount  of  intellectual  empathy  in  engaging  Robertson  also  places  the  above-
mentioned “unity versus diversity” issue in a particularly interesting light.
However, the transformations which Robertson’s texts underwent in the
process of translation arose not only from intended interventions by consciously
acting agents,  but also from the differences of the linguistic and conceptual tools at
their disposal. In investigating these aspects of the topic, I rely on “linguistic
contextualism” (the “Cambridge” or “Collingwoodian” approach to the history of
ideas),  the  history  of  concepts  (Begriffsgeschichte), and reception history
(Rezeptionsgeschichte).  If  the  capacity  of  language to  provide  tools  for  the  competent
user to attain specific goals is asserted in the act of translation as described above, its
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character  as  a  paradigm  imposing  constraints  by  defining  the  range  of  what  is
capable of expression, can also be fruitfully studied in the rich history of Robertson’s
German reception. This aspect of the level of exploring “transmission through
translation” brings us to the consideration of the compatibility of the conceptual
apparatus, together with the coherence of the vocabulary employed to give
expression  to  this  apparatus,  that  was  available  for  Robertson  in  his  contemporary
Scottish setting on the one hand, and for his German interlocutors on the other hand.
It is argued that no degree of inventiveness of the part of the latter would have
served  fully  to  convey  the  consistency  of  the  etymological  associations  possible  to
detect in the language of Scottish stadial and conjectural history, with which even the
purely narrative portions of Robertson’s oeuvre are interspersed.
Next, beyond individual agency and the linguistic barrier, differences of
perspective also arose from the different modes of historical inquiry, and the
differences  in  its  place  on  the  contemporary  map  of  learning,  tied  up  with  its
different public-political valence, in eighteenth-century Scotland and Germany. An
examination of the socio-cultural practices associated with the production of
historical knowledge constitutes yet another level of analysis.19 In both cases, history
was cultivated predominantly in order to show how the present arose from the past,
and,  consequently,  how  the  nature  of  the  present  –  and  the  future  –  can  be  better
understood through the study of the past. What was different was the present, or
rather the vision of the present, and its aspects, which history was expected to
highlight. These stakes were “enlightened” in both cases, concerned as they were
with the growth and the chances of political stability, denominational peace, legal
security and material improvement. For many eighteenth-century Germans, such
chances seemed to be predicated to a considerable extent on the specific structure of
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as it became consolidated, indeed
enshrined, after the traumas of the Thirty Years’ War, in the peace settlement of
Münster and Osnabrück in 1648. As a counterpart of Robertson’s modern Europe on
a broader scale, the Westphalian system was conceived as one of the equilibrium of
larger and smaller states within Germany, characterized by the plurality of political
19 See Chapter 2 below.
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and religious establishments, for which the existence of an “imperial constitution”
that eschewed universal monarchy and vested the composite parts of the assemblage
with considerable powers to provide for the civil, spiritual and material well-being of
their subjects, was deemed essential. From Robertson’s continent-wide
preoccupations it followed that the assumptions of large-scale sociological analysis
underlay most of his works, and history’s closest neighbour-disciplines were the
Edinburgh-style sciences of man. While the latter were also emerging in Germany,
the main genres in which history was cultivated in there – whether Landesgeschichte,
Reichshistorie, or Universalgeschichte – had their gaze on public law and the state
sciences.  The  demand  for  both  an  anthropological  perspective  informed  by  the
arising sciences of man, and a literary quality in historical work came to Germany
with a phase displacement, while the early signs of the emergence of the “critical-
philological method” made Robertson’s somewhat cavalier treatment of the sources a
target of criticism even among sympathizers of his grand design.
Finally,  yet  another  level  of  analysis  is  introduced  by  the  approach  to  the
Enlightenment in regional perspective, and the implicit presence throughout the
book of Edinburgh and Göttingen as “cities of Enlightenment”20 with a special status
both on the British and German intellectual and cultural scene, respectively, and in
the European network of communicating enlightened knowledge.21 Many of the
individuals  involved  in  the  German  reception  of  Robertson’s  works  as  translators,
reviewers, or independent authors who were regarded as the Scottish historian’s
counterparts, maintained more or less intimate ties with the University of Göttingen.
The list includes former students, professors of various faculties, as well as their
friends and family members. Both Edinburgh and Göttingen were medium sized
urban centres, and seats of prestigious universities with tightly knit academic
20 For an introductory overview of the emerging field of study of the interconnections between urban
space and practices of knowledge formation, see Antonella Romano and Stéphane Van Damme,
“Sciences et villes-mondes : penser les savoirs au large (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)” Revue d'Histoire Moderne
et Contemporaine, 55 :2 (2008), 7-18, English version idem., “Science and World Cities: Thinking Urban
Knowledge and Science at Large (16th–18th century)” Itinerario,  33:1 (2009), 79-95.
21 Cf.  Roger Emerson,  “The Enlightenment and Social  Structures”,  in  Paul  Fritz  and David Williams
(eds.), City and Society in the 18th Century (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), 99-124; Stéphane van Damme, “La
grandeur d’Édimbourg. Savoirs et mobilization identitaire au XVIIIe siècle”, Revue d’Histoire Moderne
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communities, modernized curricula, and scholars of international renown, a
combination which represented a considerable appeal far and wide. The two cities
were also alike in their capacity to exploit strategic advantages in their cultural-
intellectual emulation with regional rivals (Glasgow, Aberdeen, St Andrews, and
Halle and Jena, respectively), and in regard of the integrity they maintained vis-à-vis
metropolitan centres of the broader cultural area (London and Berlin). The two
universities therefore deserve some attention in the account that follows.
The University of Edinburgh22 – or “college”, as the jealous town councillors
who formally still possessed administrative authority over the school preferred to
call it in order to downplay its corporate academic status – was the emblem as well
as the instrument of the “Moderate revolution” carried out by Robertson and his
associates in the early 1760s.23 “Moderatism” has been characterized as the
Enlightenment  of  Presbyterian  clerics  who  sought  to  revamp  the  Kirk  –  one  of  the
two instituional frameworks that still embodied Scotland’s integrity after the Union
of  Parliaments  –  as  a  community  of  a  tolerant  and undogmatic  patriots  whose  zeal
was of a non-confessional kind and aimed at national unification on the basis of
erastianism and improvement. These enlightened churchmen, significantly aided by
intellectual ammunition from their extra-ecclesiastical comrades, promoted polite
manners, rational religious practices, rights secured by the rule of law, and “a
cosmopolitan species of nationalism that sought to raise the status of Scotland in the
eyes of the world by demonstrating its superiority according to universally accepted
standards of morality and taste.”24 They found no difficulty in accommodating a
Stoic, Ciceronean – moralist, rather than constitutionalist – commitment to civic
virtue and an emphasis on the public duty of clerics with an appreciation for the
et Contemporaine, 55:2 (2008), 152-81; Luigi Marino, Praeceptores Germaniae. Göttingen 1770-1820
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995  [Italian original: Torino: Einaudi, 1975]), 1-89.
22 For a comprehensive account, see David Bayne Horn, A Short History of the University of Edinburgh,
1556-1889 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967); Roger Emerson, “Scottish Universities in
the  Eighteenth  Century”,  in  James  A.  Leith  (ed.), Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 167
(Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1977), 453-74. On the university in the context of the Edinburgh urban
community, and its transformations during the eighteenth century, see Nicholas Phillipson,
“Commerce and Culture: Edinburgh, Edinburgh University, and the Scottish Enlightenment”, in
Thomas Bender (ed.), The University and the City. From Medieval Origins to the Present (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 100-16.
23 Sher, Church and University, Ch. 2 and 3.
24 Ibid., 324.
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progressive, civilizing functions of self-interest, commerce and luxury. The degree of
control which the Moderates gained in the early 1760s over Scotland’s academic and
ecclesiastical establishment enabled them to vigorously disseminate these cultural
values. Several of them were invested in prestigeous parish churches, and besides
Robertson’s taking over as Principal in 1762, Hugh Blair and Adam Ferguson were
appointed to the important chairs of rhetoric and belles lettres and moral philosophy,
respectively, at the University of Edinburgh. They were soon joined by furtehr
sympathizers, and also had influential allies at other Scottish universities. As the
universities were entitled to send a considerable number of delegates into the
General  Assembly  of  the  Kirk,  the  national  “program”  of  the  Moderates  could  be
pursued not only by shaping the profile of the future educated elite of the country,
but also via direct engagement in church politics.
This synoptic characterization of the University of Edinburgh under the
Moderate regime of the decades after 1760 has been inserted here on the basis of the
now respectable amount of literature in order to point to some possible parallels with
the outlook of the Georgia Augusta in Göttingen. Founded by decree of George II of
Great Britain in his capacity as Elector of Hanover in 1734 and opened for studies in
1737, the new university was in many ways a natural home for the reception of an
author whose oeuvre, personality and career stands for much that was distinctive
about the Edinburgh Enlightenment. From the very outset, the Georgia Augusta was
deliberately and explicitly conceptualized and planned as a “modern” university,
which in the given circumstances meant a university serving the goals of a society
ordered by post-confessional secular governments. This was in strict conformity with
the  idea  that  the  university  was  a Staatsanstalt, a state institution to be supervised
through the Polizey (ordering) functions of the state, expressed by the famous
cameralist thinker Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771).25 The principal goal
of the Enlightenment university in the German lands was to supply students with a
sufficient understanding of scholarship and theoretical principles in order for them
to succeed in the professions and perform socially useful service in their office (Amt).
25 William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), 238 ff.
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Relegating religious concerns into the background, and especially suppressing
extremist  and  intolerant  as  well  as  ignorant  forms  of  religion,  was  crucial  to  this
agenda of supplanting bureaucratic rationality for traditional forms of authority.
Germany already had a university whose foundation was motivated by such
concerns of a rising state, and therefore “offered academics extraordinary intellectual
latitude in relation to Lutheran orthodoxy, yet inside an institution that was strictly
controlled by a monarchical court bent on using it to provide the state with a
deconfessionalizing ruling elite.”26 That university was Halle, founded in 1694 by
Frederick I of Prussia, where the Hanoverian prime minister Gerlach Adolph von
Münchhausen, the spiritus movens behind the foundation of the Georgia Augusta,
and several of the first Göttingen professors received their education or worked
during the earlier stages of their career. To a considerable extent, the Georgia
Augusta was patterned after Halle, with its emphasis on academic praxis, vocational
training, freer theological atmosphere and the abandonment of the medieval
Autoritätsprinzip. However, it strove to avoid falling victim, as Halle did, to the
tensions of three “rival Enlightenments” represented by the anti-scholastic civil
philosophy of Christian Thomasius, the Pietist  “theological Enlightenment”, and the
neo-scholastic Leibnizian metaphysics of Christian Wolff.27 If institutional
cohesiveness, an indispensable condition for the cohesiveness of the social elite
which the university strove to secure, was to be achieved, such tensions were
impermissible.
Therefore, a kind of philosophical and theological irenicism was central to the
founders’ vision. At Göttingen, the theological faculty did not possess the right of
censorship: it was controversy, faction, rancour, excessive disagreement inspired by
religious polemic that came subject to censure. Controversial ideologies (“naturalism,
indifferentism, Socinianism, enthusiasm, chiliasm, the doctrine of apocatastis,
mystical theology, Machiavellianism, Hobbesianism, alchemy, Ramism,
26 Ian Hunter, “Multiple Enlightenments: Rival Aufklärer at the University of Halle, 1690-1730”, in
Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf and Iain McCalman (eds.), The Enlightenment World
(London: Routledge, 2007), 576-95.
27 Ibid.
               dc_444_12
21
Cartesianism, or pure Aristotelianism”) were to be kept at bay.28 Apart from this, the
Georgia Augusta secured an unprecedented degree of academic freedom for its
teaching faculty (the Lehrfreiheit also including the suppression of scholarly
monopolies: professors were free, even encouraged, to try themselves outside their
disciplines and experiment with courses in non-traditional fields like statistics or
ethnography). This was partly also a means of avoiding compartmentalization and
“factionalism” (though not one to preclude personal jealousies29), and partly a trade
mark of the Enlightenment university as the seat of rational, open-ended inquiry. The
implications were twofold. On the one hand, Göttingen took pride in being a
“research university”, one whose fame is based on the excellence of the academic
output of the celebrity professors it assembled.30 On the other hand, as far as the
recipients of its educational program are concerned, the purpose of the abandonment
of scholasticism, overarching systems and traditional disciplines, and the focus on
new, practical disciplines dictated by the current needs of the social and political
order, together with the ethos and method of instruction applied, the higher end was
Bildung:  education  and  formation  for  the  whole  person,  in  which  the  specific
technical competences to be acquired were closely wedded to the virtues of public-
mindedness and social adeptness – to which professors themselves were supposed to
set an example by their own commitment to human betterment under a rational
order. In their ideals, the lettered statesman Cicero took precedence over Plato the
dogmatist,  as  explained  by  Samuel  Christian  Hoffmann,  the  first  professor  of
philosophy in his inaugural lectures of 1734 (still held in a temporary building).31
Göttingen occupied an important place in the path towards the full
Verwissenschaftlichung, Professionalisierung, Entkonfessionalisierung and Verstaatlichung
28  Götz  von  Selle, Die Georg-August Universität zu Göttingen 1737-1937 (Göttingen:  Vandenhoeck  &
Ruprecht, 1937), 24.
29 The tension between Christoph Gatterer and August Ludwig Schlözer, who both” claimed”
universal history by launching parallel courses after 1770, is a well known case. As the conflict was
not  only  an  existential  one  but  went  together  with  different  understandings  of  the  epistemological
grounds  of  inquiry  into  world  history,  it  is  also  somewhat  relevant  to  the  subject  of  this  book.  See
below, 126.
30 The survival of “charisma” in the form of institutional self-regard and the resulting esprit de corps
as a constitutive factor of Göttingen as a modern research university is emphasized in Clark, Academic
Charisma, 245 ff and 377 ff.
31 Von Selle, Die Georg-August Universität, 43.
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of the German (Protestant) university scene.32 While “scientization” and
“professionalization” are by no means negligible, in the present context the
relationship between “de-confessionalizaton” and “statization” seems to be of
greater importance.33 At Göttingen, the de-confessionalization of academic life by
removing it from the orbit of the churches, understood as crucial for creating the
conditions of the rational government of society with a view to public happiness by a
cohesive elite, could be plausibly carried out by founding a university “under the
sway of the state.” The absence of a Scottish state is, of course, only one reason
among many why this was inconceivable in Edinburgh. There enlightened
churchmen, with similar ends in mind, embarked on the de-confessionalization of
their own church – whose significance as a national institution loomed especially
large because of the lack of an independent political state – by pursuing the same
agenda within the educational establishment. Yet, to a striking extent, the
enlightened professors who were Staatsbeamter in the one case and clerics in the other
shared an ethos that emphasized order and moderation combined with improvement
and enlightenment.
Further differences between the two environments must be mentioned, too.
These include the fact that while in addition to the academic elite, Edinburgh also
had sizeable elite groups in the legal, military and ecclesiastical professions to an
extent with which Göttingen could not compete. To some extent at least this may
have been due to the fact that in the latter there were no traditions of a national
capital, even though both universities were closely integrated with the establishment
of the day, and both of them issued a steady supply of well-trained professionals an
specialists who populated public services and bureaucratic machineries, educational
and medical institutions in an entire imperial space – the British colonial empire in
the one, and the German Reich in  the  other  case.  The  stimuli  deriving  from
Edinburgh’s identity as representing a Scottish Lowland culture, dramatically
wedged between the underdeveloped Highlands and a dynamic England, were also
32 Thomas Albert Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 11 ff and Ch. 5.
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lacking in the German town. Nevertheless, in addition to the parallels mentioned
above, there were two other factors that offered opportunities as well as incentives
for a substantial critical reception of an author like Robertson. One of these was the
superb library resources of the University of Göttingen, growing from c. 12,000
volumes in 1737 and 60,000 in 1764 to about 200,000 in 1802 (double he holdings of
the University of Cambridge), including virtually all the important works of the
Scottish Enlightenment.34 The other was the unique mechanism provided by the
review journal Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen for the wider dissemination
of knowledge accumulated on the library’s shelves: it was one of the obligations of
the university’s professors to systematically give an account of the library’s new
acquisitions in the journal (and all books received by and reviewed in the journal
went into the library).35 Altogether, in view of the amalgam of commonalities as well
as  differences,  the  two  cities  constitute  an  ideal  unit  of  comparison,  both  as  a
background  through  which  Robertson’s  reception  could  be  approached,  and  as  a
topic in its own right that can be better understood in light of that reception.
This multi-layered investigation is carried out below in an attempt to enrich
our understanding of some important themes in the intellectual history of the
Enlightenment, in particular the problem of unity versus diversity, in several ways.
First, the inherently comparative framework adopted in it puts into sharper relief the
work and character of a figure of the Edinburgh Enlightenment whose importance is
now widely acknowledged, but who still lacks a monographic study. The profile that
emerges from this comparative analysis is closer to the avant-garde historian we
have been accustomed to recognize in Robertson than the more traditionalist one
33 This is an admittedly awkward phrase, but in the present case the standard “nationalization” would
obscure more than it would explain. Verstaatlichung is, roughly, “becoming an aspect of the state” or
“moving under the sway of the state”.
34 Karl Julius Hartmann and Hans Füchsel (eds.), Geschichte der Göttinger Universitäts-Bibliothek
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1937), 19, 33; Marino, Praeceptores Germaniae, 9; Bernhard
Fabian, “Die Göttinger Universitätsbibliothek im achtzehnten Jahrhundert”, in Göttinger Jahrbuch
(Göttingen: Heinz Reise Verlag, 1980), 115; Graham Jefcoate, Karen Kloth, Bernhard Fabian (eds.), A
catalogue of English books printed before 1801 held by the University Library at Göttingen (Hildesheim:
Olms-Weidmann, 1988).
35 William Clark, “On the bureaucratic plots of the research library”, in Marina Frasca-Spada and Nick
Jardine (eds.), Books and the Sciences in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 201. Cf.
Martin Gierl, “Compilation and the Production of Knowledge in the Early German Enlightenment”, in
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which he has been described to be in some more recent studies. The cultivation of
narrative and character analysis undoubtedly remained central to Robertson’s
historical endeavours, and his political and ecclesiastical commitments may have
been closer to the Scottish patriotic and Presbyterian mainstream than it has been
often represented. Nevertheless, his intellectual distinctiveness arose from his
determination both to enrich his professional pursuits, and to enhance the credibility
of his consequent public agendas, by the application of methodological principles
derived  from  the  Scottish  “sciences  of  man”.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that
besides many other interesting themes in the history of the German reception, this
was the aspect of Robertson’s oeuvre that constituted the greatest challenge – in
some cases leading to perplexity, in others to critical response, and in yet others
providing fruitful intellectual stimuli. Second, beyond the person of the protagonist,
through  tracing  the  reception  of  Robertson  in  Germany  the  book  offers  new
perspectives on the history of eighteenth-century historiography, an intellectual
pursuit whose practitioners voiced in the period of the Enlightenment ever more
forceful, but culturally complex and varied claims on its behalf for the status of a
scientific discipline with its own theory and methodology. By means of a
contextualized case study, it also provides some correctives to the received
interpretation of and theoretical assumptions about processes of intellectual
transmission and reception across linguistic and cultural frontiers. Finally, all these
various aspects of the investigation point towards a refinement of the spatial
structures in which the varieties in the production and consumption of enlightened
knowledge are conceptualized.
*   *   *   *   *
In the first section of this Introduction I outlined an ambitious, perhaps even immodest
agenda,  whose  seriousness  ought  to  be  put  to  test  by  taking  stock  of  a  number  of
relatively recent developments in Enlightenment studies that are clearly relevant to
Hans Erich Bödeker, Peter Hanns Reill and Jürgen Schlumbohm (eds.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis
1750-1900 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 100-1.
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this  project,  and much of  the  continuing dynamism of  the  field  may be  ascribed to
them.  The  first  of  these  is  the  view  of  the  Enlightenment  not  as  a  sterile  forward
movement of ideas but as a complex web of communicative processes: “the
Enlightenment as communication.” Second, it is inevitable to place Robertson and his
German reception within the discussion about the plurality of – regional, ideological
and other – contexts of the Enlightenment. Third, recent applications of
postcolonialist studies and the concept of orientalism to research on the
Enlightenment are also of obvious relevance to discussing the implications and the
impact of the output of an author who dedicated two out of his four great historical
works to the problem of encounter between European and other civilizations. I shall
report and illustrate the major trends, rather than analyze them in any detail, but at
the end of this survey the present study will  be related to them in an unambiguous
manner. Providing even the most rudimentary bibliography would be a vain effort
here, but a small portion of the relevant literature will be referred to, somewhat
impressionistically, in order to illustrate the points made.
(1) The Enlightenment as communication. Thanks to its association with the
French  Revolution  and  the  animosities  it  created,  for  a  century  and  more  after  the
revolutionary  period  the  subject  of les lumières, Aufklärung, i lumi, or – when they
came into use, characteristically, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries –
“Enlightenment” and l’Illuminismo, were hardly dicussed in terms other than heavily
ideological. When, in the inter-war period, such ideological overtones in its
investigation, while never completely abandoned, became more tacit and derivative,
the Enlightenment was predominantly located in the history of philosophy and
literature  and,  more  broadly,  the  history  of  ideas.  It  was  studied  as  a  purely
intellectual movement,  though capable of  being spread across society and thus of
determining seminal social and political transformations. It was also invested with a
clear-cut identity as well as the cultural coherence of a “project”. Beyond this
commonality of perspective, judgements on the character of the Enlightenment
differed wildly. From one angle it was viewed and hailed as the great adventure of
the European mind, a central chapter in its emancipation from secular and
ecclesiastical tyranny, a project of “progressive self-liberation”. Alternatively, but
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from essentially the same perspective, it was fiercely criticized as the consummation
of that fatal conceit under whose spell man seemed capable, through the
“instrumentalization of knowledge”, of bringing nature and the created world under
his  dominance  –  even,  this  was  presumably  his  calling.  In  this  kind  of  master
narrative, depending on the intellectual tastes and ideological stances of those who
employed it (roughly, liberal idealists in one camp and an assemblage of rather
strange bedfellows: conservative heirs to the eighteenth-century counter-
Enlightenment tradition, critical Marxist of the “Frankfurt School”, Foucauldians,
and communitarian philosophers in the other), the significance of the Enlightenment
lay in its heralding modernity in either of two guises. The one was that of humanistic
and liberal democracy, while the other a dictatorial tyranny of the most lethal sort. It
was portrayed either as a “modern paganism” and the “science of freedom” that
appealed to reason to pronounce welcome criticism over traditional truths,
institutions and authorities (denouncing those that failed to stand the test), or as the
self-destructive triumphal march of critical reason.36
While these approaches have bequeathed an important scholarly legacy, today
they may equally legitimately be revisited as topics which themselves form episodes
36 I  am  conflating  (and,  at  the  given  length,  inevitably  caricaturing)  the  rich  and  diverse  positions
represented by Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932); Carl Becker, The
Heavenly City of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers [1932] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960);
Daniel Mornet, Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française. [1933] (Paris: Colin, 1967); Paul
Hazard, La crise de la conscience européenne (Paris: Boivin, 1935); Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung [1947] (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1988); Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An
Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1967-1969). While Jürgen Habermas in Strukturwandel der
Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962)
signalled and to a very large extent inspired the subsequent reorientation towards studying the
Enlightenment as social and cultural practice, he remained indebted to its conception as the paradigm
of ongoing emancipation; and the same is true, with opposite connotations, on the more conservative
side for Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise: eine Studie zur Pathogenese des bürgerlichen Welt (Freiburg –
München: Karl Albert, 1959). More recently, the criticism of the ethically hollow rationalism of
“Enlightenment project,” especially its spurious claims to universalism which only serve to mask its
extreme subjectivism, has been a red thread in the oeuvre of Michel Foucault; in Alasdair MacIntyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre  Dame:  University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  1984);  and  in
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989). The “illusory” character of the emancipatory humanism of the Enlightenment
has been exposed with similar overtones by John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the
Close of the Modern Age (New York: Routledge, 1995). On the continuities between the eighteenth-
century “counter-Enlightenment” and the more recent critiques, see Graeme Garrard, Counter-
Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  2006);
Darrin N. MacMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford
Uniuversity Press, 2001)
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in the intellectual history of a period whose experience was vitally shaped by
twentieth-century “totalitarian” regimes, the Second World War as well as the Cold
War. By perhaps the most conspicuous shift of emphasis, however, many historians
of the past two generations have come to study the Enlightenment, without a
positive  or  a  negative  denominational  mark,  rather  as  a  set  of  cultural  and
communicative practices whose “reason” was an endeavour to accumulate and
systematize useful knowledge about man’s physical and social-moral environment in
order to improve that environment. Iconoclasts as the majority of the encyclopédists
were, it would be hard to deny that this was the ultimate common ground both
amongst themselves, and between them and an entire public that we call
“enlightened”. This endeavour, however, is seen today as not necessarily antithetical
to social harmony and moderation, a notion which, as antithetical to passion, was
interchangable with reason in many Enlightenment texts. The tendency of
Enlightenment in this sense may or may not have been subversive of established
authorities, but in many cases depended on skilful negotiation with them and a
creative use of existing infrastructures, besides building new ones.37 One might recall
the case of the “new science”, formerly known as the “scientific revolution” and
recognized since at least d’Alembert’s “Discours préliminarie” to the Encyclopédie as
a fountainhead of the Enlightenment. The Advancement of Learning of Bacon – one of
d’Alembert’s heroes –, or the Boyle papers, or Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal
Society furnish plenty of evidence to the effect that this “movement” was not about
the disenchantment of the world and, by implication, undermining revealed religion,
but about polite and informed conversation among gentlemen on topics capable of
demonstration claire & distincte, and therefore of  fostering agreement: hence the
37 The writing of the history of science and knowledge production in the eighteenth century became
reoriented  along  such  lines.  See  George  Rousseau  and  Roy  Porter   (eds.), The Ferment of Knowledge:
Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980); Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).;  Rudolf Vierhaus (ed.), Wissenschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1985); Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in
Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); William Clark, Jan
Golinski and Simon Schaffer (eds.), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe. Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1999); Bödeker, Reill and Schlumbohm (eds.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis;
Richard Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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emphatic recommendation to avoid inherently divisive political and religious
subjects.38 As Stephen Shapin, Simon Schaffer and others have shown, knowledge
was “instrumentalized” not  so  much in  the  interest  of  technological  utopia,  but  for
the sake of social harmony in an environment whose dominant experience was civil
strife arising from religious dispute and denominational conflict.
Thus, while toleration, anti-clericalism, scepticism, deism and atheism have
remained centrally important topics of research on the Enlightenment, their study
became more systematically contextualized. Today, interest in eighteenth-century
secularism is not primarily motivated by its philosophical aspects that supposedly
anticipate a “modern” agnostic way of thinking. It has been suggested that the
Enlightenment arose from a reinterpretation of revealed religion within the
theological controversies of the age, and thus “was a product of religious debate and
not merely a rebellion against it.”39 Religious questions and dispositions have come
to be embedded more firmly in the socio-cultural and political scene;40 as  a  part  of
this  process,  eighteenth-century  theology  and  biblical  scholarship  have  come  to  be
recognized as forms of enlightened knowledge, and religious networks of
communication as vehicles for exchanging and possibly reforming knowledge.41
Radical French abbés who actually lost their religious convictions have always
fascinated dix-huitièmistes, but now even a genuinely “Catholic Enlightenment,” let
38 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
39 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999-2005), I.
5.
40 Martin Pott, Aufklärung und Aberglaube: Die deutsche Frühaufklärung im Spiegel ihrer Aberglaubenskritik.
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992); Michael Hunter and David Wootton (eds.), Atheism from the Reformation to
the Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Dale Van Kley, Religious Origins of the French
Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996);
Isabel Rivers, Reason,  Grace  and  Sentiment:  A  Study  of  the  Language  of  Religion  and  Ethics  in  England,
1660-1780, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991-2000); Knud Haakonssen (ed.),
Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.) Toleration in Enlightenment Europe.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Knud Haakonssen, Enlightenments and Religions
(Athens: Instutute foir Neo-Hellenic Research, 2010).  For a highly perceptive literature review on the
subject, see Jonathan Sheehan, “Religion and the Enigma of Secularization”, American Historical
Review, 108:4 (2003), 1060-1080.
41 Martin Gierl, Pietismus und Aufklärung: Theologische Polemik und die Kommunikationsreform der
Wissenschaft am Ende de 17. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1997); Jonathan
Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible. Translation, Scholarship, Culture (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005); David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment. Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London To
Vienna (Princeton: Princeton Universty Press, 2008).
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alone a “theological Enlightenment” has ceased to be a contradiction in terms.42
Historians inspired by such perspectives no longer ask what the Enlightenment was,
but rather where and how it  was.  For  them,  assigning  the  place  of  seminal  thinkers
and an entire period hallmarked by their names in the European intellectual canon as
a pursuit has been overshadowed by a growing interest in the “civilizing process” as
it came to be manifested in the emergence and diversification of the “public
sphere”.43 They study the ways in which the public sphere promoted sociability, and
both provided alternatives to and opened new avenues for politicization.44 In all  of
this, a decisive source of inspiration is, of course, the work of Jürgen Habermas, itself
laden with ambiguities: while coming from the Frankfurt school, Habermas provided
an account of the Enlightenment and its legacy diametrically opposed to that of his
mentors.45 It  has  been  recognized  that  while  in  some  situations  the  criticism
expressed through the  venues  of  the  public  sphere  (whether  bourgeois  or  not)  was
capable of bearing upon institutionalized politics, in others such venues simply
42 See e.g. Harm Klueting (ed.), Katholische Aufklärung – Aufklärung im katholischen Deutschland
(Hamburg:  Felix  Meiner,  1993);  Ulrich  Lehner  and  Pichael  Printy  (eds.), A Companion to the Catholic
Enlightenment in Europe (Leiden:  Brill,  2010);  Ulrich  Lehner,  “What  Is  the  Catholic  Enlightenment?”,
History Compass 8:2 (2010), 166-78; Jeffrey D. Burson, The Rise and Fall of the Theological Enlightenment:
Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France (Notre Dame:  University
of Notre Dame Press, 2010).
43 Habermas’ Strukturwandel opened up a vast field, including a lot of critical reflection on his work.
Randomly, see Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Margaret C. Jacob, Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry
and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Dena
Goodman, “Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current Historiographical
Approaches to the Old Regime”, History and Theory 31:1 (1992), 1-20.; Anthony LaVopa, “Conceiving a
Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe”, Journal of Modern History 64:1 (1992), 79-116.;
Hans-Wolff Jäger (ed.), Öffentlichkeit im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1997); James
Van Melton Horn, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); H. Barker and S. Burrows (eds.), Press, Politics and the Public Sphere in Europe and North
America 1760-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
44 Richard  Van  Dülmen, Die Gesellschaft der Aufklärer. Zur bürgerliche Emanzipation und Kultur in
Deutschland (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1986);  Hans Erich Bödeker and Ulrich Hermann (eds.), Aufklärung als
Politisierung, Politisierung der Aufklärung (Hamburg:  Felix  Meiner,  1987);  Eckhart  Hellmuth (ed.), The
Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990); Daniel Roche, La France des Lumières (Paris: Fayard, 1993); Dena Goodman, The
Republic of Letters. A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994);
Arlette Farge, Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France (University Park, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Daniel Gordon, Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and
Sociability in French Thought , 1670-1789 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
45 For a concise statement of such complexities, cf. Dorinda Outram, “The Enlightenment Our
Contemporary”, in Clark, Golinski and Schaffer (eds.) The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 32-42.
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provided paths of asserting civic virtue in ways other than participation in
institutions of the political process.
It is further being explored how this socio-cultural scene rested on a new
sensibility and inspired the science of man – referring to both men and women – in
the eighteenth century.46 The perception of the Enlightenment as dedicated to “cool
reason” or as “the Renaissance with a sober face” (Paul Hazard) is being
undermined, and the centrality of notions such as “sympathetic identification” in
genres of fiction and historiography is emphasized.47 Contextualised and
comparative analyses of eighteenth-century moral and political theory, especially
political economy, are being offered, as attempts to make sense of human
relationships within the local, national and the international community, which
looked increasingly complex, even chaotic.  Underlying this pursuit is an inquiry into
the Augustinian and Epicurean foundations of the Enlightenment’s philosophical
approach to the understanding of human nature, and the proposition that the
resulting tensions were attempted to be resolved in political economy, as a science
capable of attaining social harmony through the improvement of this world.48 A
sociability arising from needs has been identified as central to the Enlightenment
view of the human predicament, and the fact that such sociability intrinsically
depends on available tools of communication, establishes a link – perhaps an
unintended one – between the history of ideas of the Enlightenment, and its socio-
46 John Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland.
(Edinburgh:John Donald, 1987); John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Londa Schiebinger, Nature’s Body: Gender in the
Making of Modern Science (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility: Race,
Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.;
Christopher Fox, Roy Porter and Robert Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science. Eighteenth-Century
Domains (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996).; Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment
and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-century France (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998); Carla Hesse, The Other Enlightenment: How French Women Became
Modern (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
47 Mark Salber Phillips, Society and Sentiment. Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
48 Istvan  Hont  and  Michael  Ignatieff  (eds.), Wealth  and  Virtue:  The  Shaping  of  Political  Economy  in  the
Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1983);  Donald  Winch, Riches and
Poverty. An intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the
Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade.
International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2005).
               dc_444_12
31
cultural history which  traces communication networks within the republic of letters:
discussion within the public realm, infused with a specific ethos and relying on
infrastructures of printing and publishing, learned and critical journals, besides
correspondence. 49 The  methods  of  a  “social  history  of  ideas,”  championed  by
scholars like Robert Darnton, Roger Chartier and Daniel Roche, have been applied to
the deeper diffusion of texts and the dynamics of politicization this process
generated; in Darnton’s case this alse includes the “low life of literature”, i.e. the
vulgarization of the Enlightenment, which is even claimed to have played the truly
determining impact on the downfall of the ancien regime. 50 To  move  back  to  the
history of ideas again, excellent studies aim to reconstruct the meaning and intention
of authors while pursuing the transmission, reception and appropriation of their
texts.51
(2) The Enlightenment in a plurality of contexts. The topic mentioned last leads us
to the question of unity and diversity within the European Enlightenment. While this
is a line of inquiry with a respectable pedigree, within the older scholarly paradigm
outlined above the “unity” of the Enlightenment used to be conceived as
49 Robert Darnton, The Business of the Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the “Encyclopédie,” 1775-
1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1979); Giles Barber and Bernhard
Fabian (eds.), Buch und Buchhandel in Europa im 18. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981); Daniel
Roche, Les républicains des lettres: gens de culture et des lumières au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1988);
Lorraine Daston, “The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of Letters in the Eighteenth Century”, Science
in Context 4 (1991): 367-386.; Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning. Conduct and Community in the Republic of
letters, 1680-1750 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Hans Bots, Françoise Waquet
(eds.), La république des lettres (Paris  –  Berlin  –  Bruxelles:  De  Boeck,  1997);  Richard  B.  Sher, The
Enlightenment and the Book. Scottish Authors and their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland and
America (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006.
50 Robert  Darnton,  “In  Search  of  the  Enlightenment:  Recent  Attempts  to  Create  a  Social  History  of
Ideas”, Journal of Modern History 43 (1971): 113-132.; idem., The Literary Underground of the Old Regime.
Cambridge (Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French
Revolution.  (Durham,  NC:  Duke  University  Press,  1991);  Haydn  T.  Mason  (ed.), The Darnton Debate:
Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998); Hans-Jürgen
Lüsebrink and Jeremy Popkin (eds.), Enlightenment, Revolution and the Periodical Press (Oxford: Voltaire
Foundation, 2001).
51 “Montesquieu in Germany”, “Voltaire in Russia”, “Rousseauism” just about anywhere have been
staples  of   the  literature  on  the  Enlightenment  for  a  long  time.  But  the  old  paradigm  of
metropolitan/élite masters versus lesser lights and peripheral disciples has been transformed almost
beyond  recognition  in  studies  that  draw  on  linguistic  contextualism  and Begriffsgeschichte.   For  two
exemplary studies of intra- and inter-cultural reception of political ideas in the eighteenth century,
respectively, see  Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution. Essays on French Political Culture
in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Fania Oz-Salzberger.
Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995).
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overwhelmingly defined by its presumed predominantly francophone character, and
its “diversity” was characteristically measured by the degree of divergence from the
standard  set  by  Parisian  salons  and philosophes.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the
study of the Enlightenment in geographic areas peripheral to those that were in the
forefront of socio-economic transformation towards commercial and industrial
modernity in Western Europe, compared to which those “less happy” regions were
only deemed capable of producing more or less faint and belated replicas of the “real
thing”.
Such reductionist perceptions seem to be in need of revision in the light of the
above-mentioned shift of emphasis towards a notion of the Enlightenment as an
“echo chamber” in which various networks of communication facilitated a reciprocal
exchange of voices.52  Today  the  Enlightenment  is  more  keenly  studied  as  a  multi-
centred and multi-layered movement in which similar sets of questions about man
and the universe were answered in different ways,53 depending on a fair diversity of
contextual elements. Since the publication of a now emblematic volume edited by
Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich, to some such contexts seem to be most appropriately
defined in “national” terms54 – one of the most striking developments, and also a
rather controversial one, given the fact that it is predicated on a notion (i.e., the
nation) that assumed the meaning in which it is now used only later on, and thus it
threatens to essentialize it. What remains nevertheless true is that the earlier over-
emphasizing of the cosmopolitan character of the Enlightenment tended to conceal
the fact that precisely the cosmopolitan character of its ethos, focused on the values
of universal humanity, inspired by a specific blend of patriotism whose exertion and
52 This vivid metaphor is employed in Lorraine Daston, “Afterword: The Ethos of Enlightenment.” In
Clark, Golinski, Schaffer eds. The Sciences in Enlightened Europe. 498.
53 Although Franco Venturi considered the Enlightenment a single intellectual movement, his broadly
comparative contributions to its study did a lot to inaugurate this thrust of research. See Franco
Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment. Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century (New York: Knopf, 1972); idem.
Settecento riformatore, 6 vols. (Torino: Einaudi, 1969-1990). See also the assessment of Venturi’s work in
John Robertson, “Franco Venturi’s Enlightenment”, Past and Present, no. 137 (1992), 183-206; idem.,
“The Enlightenment above National Context”, The Historical Journal, 40 (1997), 667-697.
54 Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (eds.), The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981). Porter, who wrote the article on England for this collection, later devoted a
bulky volume to the specificities of the insular Enlightenment, Roy Porter, The Enlightenment: Britain
and the Creation of the Modewrn World (London: Penguin, 2001). See also Siegfried Jüttner and Jochen
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chances indeed heavily depended on local circumstances. In addition, the idea of
lumières sans philosophes,  which  is  at  the  heart  of  many  of  the  current
conceptualizations of the plurality of the Enlightenment and dovetails nicely with a
preoccupation with the communicative practices, rather than the stellar figures of the
period, has greatly enriched not only Enlightenment studies in general, but has also
opened new avenues for them in “peripheral” areas like Northern, Southern and
Eastern Europe.55
Equally strikingly, among those who rather discover the fudamental
alignments within the Enlightenment along an ideological axis, it is now possible to
talk  of  a  conservative  Enlightenment.  This  notion,  which  to  many  still  looks
oxymoronic, was initially introduced by John  Pocock in order “to save England for
Enlightenment”, by pointing to the origins of Enlightened dispositions in the polemic
against intellectual fanaticism or “enthusiasm” among the latitudinarians, Erastians
and Platonists in or associated with the late seventeenth-century Church of England.
It then became extended to the moderate Protestants or “Arminians” elsewhere in
Western Europe and understood as the defense of a modern, continent-wide ancien
régime: “Europe” as a system of states regulated by commercial interest rather than
confessional allegiance. The notion of the conservative Enlightenment is also
employed by Pocock to argue for a plurality or “family” of Enlightenments marked
Schlobach (eds.), Europäische Aufklärunge(en): Einheit und nationale Vielfalt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1992).
55 For an exciting book that combines the study of science as a cultural practice and the Enlightenment
in regional context, see Lisbet Koerner, Linnaeus: Nature and Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University  Press,  1999).   As  for  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Balkans,  while  the  study  of
enlightened absolutism continues to  be a  thriving field,  steps are  also being taken beyond ascribing
Enlightenment merely to reforming rulers. See Samuel Fiszman (ed.), Constitution and Refrom in
Eighteenth-Century Poland: The Constitution of 3 May 1791 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: University of
Indiana Press, 1997); Hugh Lecaine Agnew, Origins of the Czech National Renascence (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Ji?í Kroupa, “The Alchemy of Happiness: The Enlightenment in
the Moravian Context”, in Mikuláš Teich (ed.), Bohemia in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 164-181; Éva H. Balázs, Hungary and the Habsburgs 1765-1800: An Experiment in Enlightened
Absolutism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1997); Paschalis Kitromilides, The
Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992); Isabel De Madariaga, Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-century Russia.
Collected Essays (London and New York: Addison, Wesley Longman, 1998); Richard Butterwick, Simon
Davies and Gabriel Sánchez Espinosa, Peripheries of the Enlightenment (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation,
2008).  The redrawing of  the “symbolic  maps” of  Europe in the Enlightenment also belong here,  the
pioneering work is Larry Wolff, Inventing  Eastern  Europe:  The  Map  of  Civilization  on  the   Mind  of  the
Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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by often intense internal quarrels.56 In a prespective similar to Pocock’s to the extent
that it also places the issue of intellectual hubris in the centre of the debate about the
Enlightenment, Ian Hunter has identified the fundamental cleavage within it as
existing between the “civil” and “metaphysical” schools of eighteenth-century
(primarily German) philosophy. Pufendorf and Thomasius are set against Leibniz,
Wolff and Kant, with the former, although recognizing the claims of a moral
theology  based  on  transcedent  universals,  yet  rejecting  a  reason  whose  passion  for
transcendence makes its claims non-negotiable and thus threatening with
confessional-social warfare.57
As regards the radicalism of the Enlightenment, once presumed the differentia
specifica of  the  movement  as  a  whole,  it  has  also  been back in  full  armour since  the
exciting though controversial work of Margaret C. Jacob in the early 1980s, though it
has tended to be limited to a fascinating and influential iconoclastic minority,
carefully distinguished from the “magisterial” wing.58 More recently, the concept of
the “radical Enlightenment” has been employed by Jonathan Israel to combat the
proposition about “the end of Enlightenment,”59 ascribed by Israel to “postmodernist
philosphers” (as he styles MacIntyre, Taylor,  Gray and others). 60 One of the central
56 J.  G.  A.  Pocock,  “Conservative  Enlightenment  and  Democratic  Revolutions:  The  American  and
French Cases in British Perspective”, Government and Opposition, 24 (1989) 82-101.; idem., “Clergy and
commerce:  the conservative Enlightenment in England”,  in  R.  Ajello  et  al.  (eds.), L'etá dei lumi: studi
storici in onore di Franco Venturi (Naples: Iovene Editore, 1985), I. 523-62. The notion of a conservative
Enlightenment is linked to that of the plurality of Enlightenments in J. G. A. Pocock, “Enthusiasm: The
Antiself of Enlightenment”, Huntington Library Quarterly, 60:1/2 (1997), 7-28; idem., “Enlightenment
and Counter-Enlightenment, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: A Eurosceptical Enquiry”, History
of Political Thought, 20 (1999) 125-139; and in the same author’s magnum opus on Edward Gibbon,
Barbarism and Religion, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999-2005). The same
argument is framed concisely, this time in terms of the “conversion of theology into history”, in idem.,
“Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of Their History”, Modern Intellectual History, 5:1 (2008),
83-95.
57 Michael Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early-Modern Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
58 Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1981); Helmut Reinalter (ed.), Freimaurer und Geheimbünde im 18. Jahrhundert im
Mitteleuropa (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983).
59 The title (with a question mark) of issue 2006:1 of the Americal Behavioral Scientist.
60 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001). This book forms the first part of what is now a trilogy further exploring the
same themes. See idem., Enlightenment Contested. Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man
1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and idem., Democratic Enlightenment. Philosophy,
Revolution and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford University Press, 2011). For a concise statement, see
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claims in this vast canvas – acknowledged as “a feat of historical recovery” even by
its critics61 – is chronological: the heyday of the radical Enlightenment, hallmarked by
the provocative force of the philosophy of Spinoza and the assault on the
foundations of the Christian religion associated with it, was the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth century. The existence and the importance of a “moderate”
Enlightenment (which together with its radical counterpart was exposed to the
offensives of a conservative Counter-Enlightenment) is not called into question by
Israel. But he suggests that while the Moderates were willing to make compromises
with  the  status  quo  in  church  and  state,  it  was  the  Radicals  who  laid  the
philosophical foundations of modernity understood as egalitarian and secularist
democracy – and thanks to their commitment and vigour, by 1740 “the real business
over.”
Israel’s rehabilitation of the radical, freethinking strain of the Enlightenment
has  been  identified  as  one  of  the  important  contributions  not  only  to  a  better
understanding of “the embodied life and impact of its ideas”, but also to a wholesale
“return of the Enlightenment” during the 2000s – a “recovery of nerve” and “an
embarrassment of admiration” among commentators beyond the historical
profession.62 Within the profession, it has evoked compliments on its erudition and
its excavation of half-forgotten but exciting and important texts and authors, but also
criticism on account of its modus operandi. The features challenged include Israel’s
unhistorical “privileging” of certain ideas over others as representing the only
philosophically “correct” way of thinking rationally; his oversimplified classification
of thinkers into “radical” and “moderate” camps and the attribution of a false
coherence to “radical” thought;  and thus posing a danger to Enlightenment studies
also idem., A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
61 Anthony J.  LaVopa,  “A New Intellectual  History? Jonathan Israel’s  Enlightenment”, The Historical
Journal, 52:3 (2009), 717-38, here 717.
62 The phrases  in quotation marks are  from Karen O’Brien,  “The Return of  the Enlightenment”, The
American Historical Review, 115:5 (2010), 1426-35, referring to Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to
Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments (New York: Knopf, 2005); Stephen Eric
Bonner, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement (New  York:  Columbia
University Press, 2004); Tzvetan Todorov, In Defence of the Enlightenment (London,  Atlantic  Books:
2009).
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by producing an essentially presentist argument.63 The critics include John
Robertson, who has also put forward his own proposition for a synthetic perspective
on the Enlightenment. 64 Like Israel and others, Robertson is also concerned by a
“crisis of the Enlightenment,” which, however, he diagnoses not as occasioned by the
polemical attacks of “postmodernist philosophers” on abstractions created by
themselves ratyher than contextual analyses of eighteenth-century texts, but the
dilution of the Enlightenment by historians into discursive and cultural practices, a
series  of  concerns  and  debates,  and  its  fragmentation  into  encyclopedias.  As  a
remedy, in a piece of comparative intellectual history that owes as much to Marc
Bloch as it does to Franco Venturi and Cambridge-style linguistic contextualism,
Robertson  has  forcefully  reasserted  the  case  for  a  unitary  Enlightenment  as  an
intellectual movement focusing on the quest to understand human nature and on the
betterment of the human condition in this world through political economy and
other social and moral philosophies that aimed at human “happiness” but did not
necessarily constitute a challenge to existing structures of authority. One of the
important reasons was that experience showed establishments to be capable of a
great deal of resilience as well as accommodation, rendering “radicalism” either
unpracticable or unnecessary.
(3) The Enlightenment and global perspectives. At one level the Enlightenment
was an intellectual and socio-cultural movement within Europe and its overseas
extensions, and produced discourses about Europe and her identities. At the same
time, the “enlightened narrative”,65 put forward by some eighteenth-century
historians sensitive to the contemporary advances in social and moral philosophy,
was  to  a  very  considerable  extent  predicated  on  an  idea  of  Europe  formulated  in
contradistiction not only to its temporal but also to its spatial others, i.e., both its own
former self and its civilizational alternatives. This was the idea of a Europe that was
an improper area for aspirations of empire in the sense of “universal monarchy”
(political and military control over a large contiguous territory): Europe understood
63 See especially LaVopa, “A New Intellectual History?”.
64 John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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as a “commonwealth” of medium-sized and even small states which exercised over
themselves “imperial” authority (in the sense inherited from medieval usage: in
more modern terminology, sovereignty, the plenitude of the power to command and
the  exclusion  of  external  forces  from  it),  but  which  were  regarded  as  proper
metropolitan centres of  new style, maritime and commercial empires.
From a different angle, Europe’s ever more sophisticated commercial relations
and cultural interaction with the non-European world were essential for the
Enlightenment, whose influence on that world and those relations was also profound
and lasting. The centrality of commerce as an organizing concept and an overarching
metaphor in enlightened moral philosophies of “unsocial sociability”, is worth
stressing  here:  supposedly  taming  the  violent  passions  and  thus  fostering  the
unfolding of humanity, commercium, in all of its meanings,  also assumed the quality
of a “mission”, similar to, complementary with, and even perhaps gradually
replacing that of spreading the Gospel. At the same time, overseas exploration and
encounters provided indispensable material for the discovery of new truths and the
re-valuation of old ones about human and physical nature, and thus became central
not  only  to  the  self-recognition,  but  also  the  power  aspirations  of  Europeans  in  the
Age  of  Enlightenment:  indeed,  the  study  of  man  and  nature,  the  collection  of
specimens, the broadening of astronomical and cartographic knowledge came to be
closely intertwined with, and was itself a form of, exercising power vis-à-vis
European rivals as well as colonial subjects.66 It is sufficient to recall the well-known
65 Karen O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment. Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
66 Peter J. Marshall and  Glyndwr Williams (eds.), The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New Worlds
in the Age of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); David Mackay, In the
Wake of Cook: Exploration. Science, and Empire, 1780-1801 (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Urs Bitterli,
Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures (Cambridge:  Polity  Press,
1989); George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds.), Exoticism in the Enlightenment (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1990); Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical
Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995); David Miller, David Philip and Peter Hanns Reill (eds.), Visions of empire. Voyages, botany and
representations of nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Gascoigne, Science in the
Service of Empire. Joseph Banks, the British State and the Use of Science in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998); David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers (eds.), Geography
and the Enlightenment (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Roy MacLeod (ed.),
Nature and Empire. Science and the Colonial Enterprise = Osiris 15 (2000); Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How
to Write the History of the New World: Historiographies, Epistemologies and Identities in the Eighteenth-
century Atlantic World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science:
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examples of the voyages of exploration, heavily subsidized from the public purse, of
Cook or La Perouse into the Pacific, or the experiment of Linnaeus to build an
“internal empire” through scientifically underpinned transplantation. As the wealth
of “truths” generated by Europe’s global enterprise was translated into terms of
progress and civilization, and from thence into discourses of universalism versus
cultural pluralism, they also came to imbue intellectual attitudes and responses to
European expansion and imperialism, even policies relating to the same.67 There was
(or rather, further developed) an imperialist stance, arguing from Roman and natural
law that human equality required the application of universal civilized standards and
their disregard by “savages” resulted in a “forfeiture of rights”; there was the
“anomaly” of anti-imperialism,  premising the equal dignity of all humans, combined
with cultural diversity and the consequent negation of any superiority and
inferiority, and setting a limit to expansionist intervention with reference to civilizing
mission; and there was the critique of the abuse of empire while support for the idea
of “benevolent empire”. In this sense – to relate this theme to the previous two – the
Enlightenment presents a case of communication among and about macro-regions in
a world on its path towards the first global era.
Besides specialized studies, concise as well as more bulky syntheses now exist
that attempt to do justice to the enormous diversification of Enlightenment studies.68
Amidst the variety of approaches to the Enlightenment represented even in the
highly selective survey attempted above, one question that certainly might be asked
with good reason is whether the term still preserves any other meaning that a generic
reference to “the eighteenth century”.  But it may equally be asked whether this were
Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2007); James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew (eds.), Science and Empire in the Atlantic World (New York:
Routledge, 2008)
67 Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1993);  idem., Lords of All the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Frederick G. Whelan, Edmund Burke and India:
Political Morality and Empire (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996); David Armitage, The
Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Sankar Muthu,
Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
68 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Thomas
Munck, The Enlightenment: A Comparative Social History 1721-1794 (London: Edward Arnold, 2000);
Alan  Charles  Kors  (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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an unwelcome development at all. Students of the eighteenth century have recently
been urged to provide “a sound and stable sense of the Enlightenment” for their
colleagues focusing on different periods, even in different disciplines, to work with.69
This purpose is served well if any attempt to answer such calls by proposing “strong
points” is made against a canvas depicting the richness of contemporary thought and
experience.
A study of the contemporary reception of Robertson’s works in Germany has
a  solid  potential  to  provide  an answer  of  this  kind.  The questions  which Robertson
the historian asked about the past of his own nation in the context of continent-wide
developments,  and  about  the  past  of  Europe  in  its  global  entanglements,  were
typically “enlightened” in the sense that they were highly relevant to the assessment
of the chances of human betterment. They were ultimately questions about the
persistent features of human nature, the contingencies of individual character and
the determinants of sociability as fundamental conditions of such betterment. The
questions and the solutions which he proposed reflected not only his intellectual
commitments, but also his personal inclinations, positions and distinctions in church
and university, as well as his intense presence on the scenes of enlightened sociability
in eighteenth-century Edinburgh.  His practice as an author of historical works – the
research,  the  writing  and  the  promotion  of  these  works  –  depended  in  part  on  the
social capital he possessed thanks to his status in the establishment of the day:
members of the diplomatic and colonial service as well as expatriate Scots – from
Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts Bay, through Robert Waddilove,
chaplain  to  the  British  embassy  in  Madrid,  to  John  Rogerson,  the  physician  of  the
Empress of Russia in Saint Petersburg – assisted him in obtaining answers to his
famous questionnaire on native civilizations in the Americas and in Siberia.70 But
2002); Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf and Iain McCalman (eds.) The Enlightenment
World (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).
69 David A. Hollinger, “The Enlightenment and the genealogy of cultural conflict in the United States”,
in Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (eds.), What’s Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern
Question  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 7-18, here 17-18.
70 Jeremy Black, “The Enlightenment Historian at Work: The Researches of William Robertson”,
Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, 65 (1988), 251-60; Mark Duckworth, “An Eighteenth-Century
Questionnaire: William Robertson on the Indians”, Eighteenth-Century Life 11 (1987), 36-49; Jeffrey
Smitten, “Robertson’s letters and the life of writing”, in Brown (ed.), William Robertson and the
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equally important was the role of the opportunities opened by the Enlightenment
culture of communication. On the one hand, Robertson actively used such
opportunities in a highly proficient manner: it has already been mentioned that his
success in France depended to a considerable extent on the inlets through Hume and
other Scottish mediators to the Parisian le monde.71 The same types of connections
also rounded off the information network Robertson built for collecting material for
the History of America, and as we shall see, he had them in Germany, too.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the German reception it was a different
aspect of the Enlightenment public sphere that was paramount. Thanks to the
immensly increased volume and accelerated pace of the circulation of printed works
and commentary on them in publications specifically destined for this end, as a
practice which at least in its endeavour was systematic and all-embracing, there was
also an increase in the likelihood that the text of an author would be reviewed,
evaluated,  appreciated  or  criticized,  even  turned  to  purposes  different  from  his  or
her own, by someone at a geographically remote location, unconnected with and
unknown to him or her. The consequences of what has been illustrated by the above-
mentioned “echo chamber” metaphor of Enlightenment communication operated
powerfully in the case of the history of Robertson’s works in Germany – significantly,
without the active promotion encountered in the French case. This is a factor which
not even a study in purely intellectual history, such as the present one, can afford to
disregard entirely.
But as this is a study in intellectual history, in the empirically based chapters
of this book I shall be preoccupied with the ways in which Robertson’s
confrontations with the challenges of moulding his Scottish, European and global
topics into the frame of the “enlightened narrative” were engaged by enlightened
men in a different cultural and linguistic environment, in which his questions were,
by and large, shared, but in which several aspects of his texts started to live their own
lives, and the texts as wholes were understood to contribute to debates and
expansion of empire,  36-54;  Bruce  Lenman,  “’From  savage  to  Scot’  via  the  French  and  the  Spaniards:
Principal Robertson’s Spanish sources”, in ibid., 196-209.
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dilemmas with a local flavour. Before the specific texts are examined in detail,
however, two chapters will continue the general line of inquiry pursued in this
introduction. Having made in it an attempt to contextualize this study against the
state of the art in Enlightenment research, in Chapter 1 – as prompted above – I shall
discuss the theoretical aspects and the methodological requirements of the study of
translated texts as vehicles of transmission and reception during the early-modern
period, including the Enlightenment. The task of Chapter 2 is further to embed the
central theme, this time in the universe of eighteenth-century historical writing in
relation to its three different, but interlocking forms: as political thought, as literary
pursuit and aesthetic expression, and as a branch of knowledge with the nascent
claim to the status of a scientific discipline. The sketch attempted in this chapter is
intended as an overall framework of interpretation for the case studies that follow:
each of its paragraphs call for further elaboration, which I hope to provide by tracing
the reception of Robertson’s individual texts in late eighteenth-century Germany.
Chapter 3 is the first of four sections of the book devoted to detailed textual analysis.
On the  basis  of  Robertson’s  first  published work and his  only  sermon to  appear  in
print, it assesses Robertson’s status as a Christian thinker who was at the same time
embarking on a career as a secular historian, ambitious to employ recent advances in
the Enlightenment science of man to enrich the providentialist account of human
progress (and vice versa). It then attempts to place the German translation of this text
in the context of contemporary German religious thought. Somewhat in violation of
the chronology, Chapter 4 traces translations and responses to Robertson’s overview
of European development from late antiquity to early-modern times in A View of the
Progress of Society in Europe, the voluminous introduction to the History of Charles V.
This piece receives separate treatment from the main text of the three-volume work
in part as the text which established Robertson’s reputation for the combination of
historical narrative with the perspectives opened by stadial history and structural
analysis; and also because of the particular vicissitudes it underwent in the course of
the  very  complicated  German  translation  history.  In  Chapter  5  I  turn  to  the
71 Renwick, “The reception of Robertson in France”; Richard B. Sher, “Charles V and the book trade:
an episode in Enlightenment print culture”, in Brown (ed.), Robertson and the expansion of empire, 164-
95, here 181 ff.
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translations and the reception of the History of Scotland and  volumes  2  and  3  (the
narrative portions) of the History of Charles V, with a special emphasis on Robertson’s
treatment of the context provided for national histories by the rise of the
international  European  state  system,  his  account  of  political  agency,  relations  and
institutions, as well as his representation of religious and civil conflict. His
commitment to a peculiar ideal of “impartiality” and the ways in which this
resonated in the German reception receives attention, as well as the work on the
same range of topics by some scholars who were proposed by contemporaries, some
of them active in mediating Robertson, as his counterparts on the German intellectual
scene.  Confronting  the  character  of  the  works  of  these  authors  with  those  of
Robertson gives occasion to reflecting on the peculiar political-constitutional
conditions of the Holy Roman Empire as a further context for the history of
reception. My last case study, in Chapter 6, is the most extensive because of the rich
complexity both of the texts of Robertson explored in it and the story of their German
reception. It brings together in a common discussion the translations and reception of
Robertson’s works devoted to the history of Europeans’ relations with non-European
peoples: the History of America and the Historical Disquisition on … India. Salient topics
such as expansion, empire, race etc., which Robertson explored in stadial-conjectural
as well as narrative terms, are placed in the course of the reception into an interesting
light by the fact that Germany as a geographic and cultural entity was sealed off from
a direct confrontation with these issues, while demonstrating a steadily increasing
interest in them. The involvement of Johann Reinhold and Georg Forster,
Anglophiles and experts (also as field workers) in natural history and ethnology, in
this episode of the complicated story of reception, receive special attention, and is
exploited to add further colour to the exploration of “unity and diversity” in the
Enlightenment.
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Chapter One
Translation and comparison, translation as comparison:
aspects of reception in the history of ideas
In the Introduction above, this book has been described, among other things, as an
exercise in the comparative intellectual history of the European Enlightenment. This
definition is not unproblematic. Ideas lay outside the classic terrain of comparative
history, and there is a reason for this: non-quantifiable and hardly amenable to being
approached  in  terms  of  institutions  and  rules  of  operation,  they  look  at  first  sight
resistant  to  comparison  in  the  sense  in  which  it  has  been  cultivated  in  social,
economic or political history. For the most part, “comparison” in this field has taken
the form of the study of “influence”, whose elusive nature once evoked much, and
not  amiss,  criticism  “from  within”  –  for  instance,  students  of  the  “social  history  of
ideas”.72 Yet, in another sense, though in ways certainly different from those in the
fields mentioned above, intellectual history itself is inherently and by definition
comparative.  No  text  stands  entirely  isolated:  there  is  no  text  that  is  not  a
commentary on and an interpretation of other texts; no text that does not “translate”
the terms of others into its own. The interpreter and the interpreted, together with
their extra-textual environments or contexts, define a unit of comparison as precisely
as one might wish: predictably, there will be a sufficient amount of similarity as well
as difference for the comparison to be relevant.
To be sure, and this has been one of the major objections to “influence”
studies, the identity of the “influencing” side – which would be the interpreted side
in the model just hinted – cannot always be established with certainty. But, I suggest,
this difficulty is very substantially offset if one replaces the loaded term “influence”
with the more neutral “reception” and, at the same time, focuses on inter-lingual
72 Robert  Darnton,  Roger Chartier  and others  have championed an approach in the history of  ideas
that concentrates on the consumers, rather than the producers, and traces “diffusion” to some extent
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translation as perhaps the most important single avenue of reception in the history of
ideas. In this case, whatever the intention behind the translation, the very fact of
translation obliges the scholar seriously to regard the interpreted text as a source of
inspiration  for  the  interpreter,  and  thus  a  comparison  of  the  source  text  and  the
target text to be a legitimate pursuit. And whatever the intention, again, the path to
execute  it  for  the  translator  is  through comparing meanings  found (or  assumed)  in
the source text with possible meanings offered and constraints imposed by the
peculiarities of the target language and its cultural context. It is by virtue of these
features that translation has been described as “the construction of comparables”.73
In this chapter I would like to assess the benefits that may accrue to the
comparative intellectual history of early modern times from the transfer of some of
the methods and findings of translation studies, when applied in conjunction with
linguistic contextualism (the “Cambridge school”) and conceptual history
(Begriffsgeschichte).  In  particular,  I  shall  sketch  some  of  the  most  striking  ways  in
which the problem of translation has been conceptualized in European culture,
especially between the late fifteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. This period
has  not  only  received  the  greatest  amount  of  interest  from  Quentin  Skinner,  John
Pocock and their followers on the one hand, and Reinhart Koselleck and his
colleagues on the other. It has also seen some of the most intensive engagement with
the problem of translation – its theory as well as its practice – by humanist scholars,
neo-classical and early Romantic writers, and Enlightenment philosophers. The
sketch below in intended to underpin an attempt to refine our understanding of the
requirements of the analysis of translated texts, and to some extent of the approach to
reception in the history of ideas in this period in general.
*   *   *   *   *
precisely because it is found “measurable”. See Darnton, “In Search of the Enlightenment” as a
manifesto, and countless studies by the same author and others.
73 Paul Ricoeur, Sur la traduction (Paris: Bayard, 2004), 63. Cf. Antoine Berman, L’Épreuve de l’étranger.
Culture et traduction dans l’Allemagne romantique (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 8.
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Translation studies is a relatively new field, described by some of its leading
practitioners as a “success story” since the early 1980s.74 Emancipating itself from
linguistics and literature, it established its separate identity largely through shifting
its focus of interest from word and text to culture as its “operational unit”:
“Faithfulness … does not enter into translation in the guise of ‘equivalence’ between
words and texts but, if at all, in the guise of an attempt to make the target text
function in the target culture in the way the source text functioned in the source
culture.”75 In a somewhat different formulation, “translators and translation scholars
…  are  tending  to  consider  the  relative  function  of  the  text  in  each  of  its  two
contexts.”76 Avowedly, translation studies has drawn a great deal of inspiration from
anthropology, where translation came to be used as a metaphor for the entire field
(inspired, in turn, by the idea of linguistics that while languages are different, they
are all entities guided by rules and the task of the scholar is to make these rules
visible). The most important references are Edward Evans-Pritchard, who first
suggested that what the anthropologist does is “translate from one culture into the
other”, followed by Clifford Geertz and later by Edmund Leach.77
Let it be noted immediately that, as a matter of fact, in this metaphor the
anthropologist is not regarded as mediating between two cultures but as giving an
account of one to the other: when s/he converts the incomprehensible into
meaningful, the different into similar, what s/he does is producing knowledge of the
one and preserving it for the other – to a considerable extent, defining what is to be
preserved and, thanks to his authority, legitimates and canonizes it. It is in the same
spirit that translation scholars recall the paradigm of the Septuagint as revealing the
basic categories of translation: authority (of Ptolemy II, King of Egypt, exerted in
“commissioning” the enterprise), expertise (of the seventy or seventy-two translators
who created identical translations), trust (by  the  Jewish  communities  who  had  no
74 Susan Bassnett, André Lefevere, “General Editor’s Preface”, in André Lefevere (ed. and trans.),
Translation / History / Culture. A Sourcebook (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), xi.
75 Susan Bassnett, André Lefevere, “Introduction: Proust’s Grandmother and the Thousand and One
Nights. The ‘Cultural Turn’ in Translation Studies”, in Susan Bassnett, André Lefevere (eds.),
Translation, History and Culture (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 8.
76 Ibid., 11.
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longer access to the original, in the fairness of the image represented to them). Each of
these are socio-cultural categories, shared with other types of texts that, like
translation, create images of other texts and canons of texts (criticism, historiography,
commentary, anthologizing, etc.). It is recommended that each of them should be
studied in conjunction with translation.78
It is within the interpretative space defined by these categories that translation
scholars propose to investigate approaches to the fundamental questions of
translation that have surfaced during its variegated history. Why does translation
occur? This larger question itself concerns several issues that are related to one
another  in  peculiar  ways:  first,  it  inquires  whence  the  universal  need  and/or
obligation to translate arises, and, second, what specific intentions are involved when
translation is undertaken. Similarly, the next overall question – what happens in the
act  of  translation?  –  is  complex.  It  is  a  descriptive  question  with  a  strong
psychological and epistemological component. However, equally important and on
many occasions inextricably linked with these descriptive aspects, a normative one
arises, which brings upon the translator and his work ideological, professional and
other expectations or requirements. In the latter regard, answers to the second
question will, of course, heavily depend on the second element in the first one,
namely, the intentions, agendas and strategies manifest behind the act of translation.
It  must be added that most of the theories referred to below, as well  as most of the
examples from the history of translation, are those of “literary translation” (partly
because historian have only begun to discover the importance and the benefits of
studying the phenomenon of translation). Should this bother the historian of ideas
whose subject matter may include a lot else than “literature” as we know it? I think
it  should  not.  One  of  the  reasons  is  that  contemporary  translation  scholars,  as  we
have just seen, juxtapose (literary) translation to historiography, criticism,
commentary, anthologizing etc. as another branch of image creation and canon
formation, and that “literary translation” in their parlance embraces translation
77 See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology (London: Cohen & West, 1951), 80; cf. Clifford Geertz,
The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Harper and Collins, 1973);  Edmund Leach, Social Anthropology
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1982).
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generally in the human sciences.79  Second, it must also be remembered that into the
nineteenth century, when the growth of literary history as a discipline demarcated
the study of belletristic texts from other forms of “polite learning” (and indeed
learning altogether),80 written  texts  within  each  of  these  branches  passed  for
literature: they were reviewed in the same critical journals, often by the same
individuals, according to standards that were in many respects also similar.
As regards the first aspect of the “why” question, at the most fundamental
level  the  need  for  translation  of  course  arises  simply  from  the  difference  of
languages, the most compelling metaphor for expressing it in Western civilization
being  the  “confusion  of  tongues”.  The  drama  of  Babel  has  been  most  frequently
understood as the irreparable catastrophe of original fragmentation: the fact that the
universality of the human capacity for language is “demented” by the local character
of performance. There is, at the same time, also an alternative reading, recently
expressed by Paul Ricoeur in recognizably Kantian enlightenment terms.81 Under
this view, the confusio linguarum is  not  regarded as  a  catastrophe but  as  part  of  the
divine  plan for  man’s  emergence  from his  minority  and acceding to  maturity.  Like
the Expulsion, or the Fratricide, it is an episode in the process of acquiring
responsibility for and mastery over one’s acts – in the development of the moral in
human relationships. From then on, men have “lived by translation”, described as an
ethical as well as intellectual, theoretical and practical problem. Always taking the
risk of “serving two masters”,82 the foreign text with its claim to integrity and the
reader  with  his  desire  of  appropriation,  the  translator’s  job  is,  in  effect,  a  matter  of
“linguistic hospitality” which constitutes a model for other forms of hospitality – for
instance, religious tolerance. In the one case just like the other, “perfect translation” is
impossible: un-translatability is an almost obligatory conclusion from the ethno-
linguistics of Sapir and Whorf. According to their perspective, “every language is a
78 André Lefevere, “Translation: Its Genealogy in the West”, in Bassnett, Lefevere (eds.), Translation,
History and Culture, 14-5.
79 See e.g. ibid., and Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility. A History of Translation (London and
New York: Routledge, 1995), 40.
80 Menno Spiering (ed.), Nation Building and the Writing of Literary History (Amsterdam and Atlanta,
Rodopi, 1999), several studies.
81 Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, 23-4, 43-4.
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vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms
and  categories  by  which  the  personality  not  only  communicates,  but  also  analyzes
nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his
reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.” Or, put more simply from a
different angle:  “Facts are unlike to speakers whose language background provides
for  unlike  formulation  of  them.”83 Yet,  Ricoeur’s  conclusion  is  pragmatic:  as
translation  has  existed,  it  must  also  be  possible  as  a  desire,  an  endeavour,  and  an
approximation – in a word, as the attitude of “hospitality”.84
It will not be amiss to juxtapose these thoughts to the natural history of
linguistic fragmentation, and the consequences of this story to translation, advanced
over  two-hundred  years  before  Ricoeur  in  Johann  Gottfried  Herder’s Fragments on
Recent German Literature (1767-68) and Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772). In
answer to the second part of the Berlin Academy’s prize question, “in what way the
human being was most suitably able and obliged to invent language for himself?”,
Herder  formulated  four  natural  laws,  the  third  one  addressing  the  problem  of
linguistic fragmentation. “Just as the whole human species could not possibly remain
a single herd, likewise it could not retain a single language either.”85 It  is  precisely
from the universality, the global character of the human being as “earth-dweller”
that Herder posited the necessary difference of languages. While he was strongly
critical of both polygenetic theories and climate theory, the physical distance and
natural  barriers  that  separate  men  in  their  various  habitats,  to  his  mind  gave
sufficient account of the separation of tongues as well. “A new language in every new
world, a national language in every nation … language becomes a Proteus on the round
surface of the earth.”86 He even went as far as to claim, in a somewhat post-modern
fashion, that “[i]n the real metaphysical sense, it is already never possible for there to
be a single language between man and wife, father and son, child and old man. … As
82 Cf.  Franz Rosenzweig,  “The Impossibility  and Necessity of  Translation”,  in  André Lefevere,  (ed.),
Translating Literature: The German Tradition (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977), 110 ff.
83 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings, ed. John B. Carroll
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956), 252, 235.
84 Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, 29, 38.
85 Johann Gottfried Herder, Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772), in Philosophical Writings, trans. and
ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 127, 147.
86 Ibid., 150.
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little as there can be two human beings who share exactly the same form and facial
traits,  just  as  little  can there  be  two languages  in  the  mouths  of  two human beings
which would in fact still be only one language…”87 This latter observation recalls the
increasingly popular ideas on authorship that were inspired by Edward Young’s
Conjectures on Original Composition (1759) and gave expression to the author’s identity
and the peculiar character of composition by “original genius” through the metaphor
of  the  human  face  as  bearing  the  mark  of  individual  personality.88 The  story  in
Genesis 11 was also interpreted by Herder in human-natural terms: in his view it was
the sheer magnitude of the undertaking that caused the “rapid embitterment and
quarrel” and “division over a great common purpose”, resulting in the confusion.89
We shall see in some detail below that this natural history of rather dramatic
fragmentation did not imply un-translatability for Herder, quite on the contrary: it
became the underpinning of the sort of “linguistic hospitality” characteristic of the
Sturm und Drang, one that campaigned for the closest possible approximation of the
sense of translated texts through literal rendering, with the ultimate purpose of  the
“expanding” (Erweiterung) of the resources of a still underdeveloped German culture.
For  the  time  being  let  us  return  to  Biblical  images  relevant  to  the  problem  of
linguistic particularity, this time the forceful representation of Moses as a sequester
(mediator) or interpres (interpreter), the Hebrew nuntius (emissary) of divine
language and will. The significance of this image is threefold: it invests translation
with a somewhat sacramental status; it dismisses any real separation between
translation as an inter-lingual act and translation as interpretation; and it places the
translator in a neutral, medial space. The story of Moses receiving the laws highlights
the possibility of man being brought back to the presence of God and the linguistic
archetype being rekindled90 – the possibility of returning to the pre-Babel world. We
may recognize the strong presence of, and a serious engagement with, this idea in the
search for the “universal” and “perfect language” in European culture from the early
87 Ibid., 148.
88 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993), 117-24.
89 Herder, Treatise on the Origin of Language, 153-4.
90 Glyn  P.  Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation in Renaissance France and their Humanist
Antecedents (Genéve: Droz, 1984), 13.
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Middle  Ages  (when  artistic  representations  of  the  tower  of  Babel  started  to
proliferate),91 or in the Renaissance fascination with the Septuagint story which
“historicizes a deep linguistic conviction that translation, like any other technical
discipline, could be made to respond to an infinitely replicable code of procedures
supported by one all-encompassing theoretical model.”92
At bottom, in all  of these massive pursuits,  a paradox of two conspiring and
competing images is involved. On the one hand, languages, like men, are seen as the
offspring of a primitive archetype. Accordingly, the study of words is experienced as
a work of reunification, a path to the transcending of the confusio linguarum. On the
other hand, it is recognized that lexical multiplication is a constant of our linguistic
condition, and, because of the “perpetual falling away from the original, any venture
to reconstruct bridges back to that language is ultimately doomed.”93 And the
paradox leads further to the dilemma whether translation, albeit a necessity of the
human condition, can in any but the most relative terms methodized.
Post-modern relativists are as perplexed by this question as early-modern
theorists of the universal language. The way in which students of translation
confronted it has had profound implications for their conceptualizations of the
mental and epistemological processes taking place in, and the principles that should
govern, translation (however different such principles turn out to be). Before looking
at  these  descriptive  and normative  problems,  let  us  briefly  turn to  the  other  “why”
question, that which addresses the specific reasons why translation is undertaken,
and the goals it proposes to attain. This is obviously a heavily context-dependent
issue, with a significant historical dimension: besides a permanence of certain inner
tensions, there have been marked changes of perspective within the European
tradition over the past two millennia.
The tensions derive from the fact that cultures tend to be more or less resistant
to translation, while they also perceive themselves to be dependent on being placed
in  a  correspondence,  put  down  in  writing,  with  the  Other,  and  on  being  fertilized
through the mediation of the Foreign. In a narcissistic fashion, they aspire to be self-
91 Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 17.
92 Norton, Ideology and Language of Translation, 9.
93 Ibid., 10.
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sufficient Wholes, which they cannot attain but by appropriating parts of the heritage
of others.94 In medieval and early-modern contexts, when the sacralization of the
mother tongue was not a universal standard, multilingualism was natural and
translation both an emotional and practical need. A striking example is the epitaphs
to a deceased lover by a sixteenth-century Dutch poet, at first in Dutch, then in Latin,
then in French, in Latin again, then in Italian, and finally once again in Dutch: to
arrive at the proper expression of his grief, he re-translated himself in several
languages before returning to his mother tongue. On the more pedestrian level, one
needed  to  know  more  languages  in  the  streets  of  Paris  and  Antwerp  then  than  in
Manhattan today.95 From a different angle and on another level,  however, from the
Romans to the Enlightenment (with changes in some of the more literate
environments in the early-modern period) Europe was, by and large, a bi- or even
multilingual “coterie culture” in which translations, if any, were not primarily
produced and read for information but for exercise: either in the pedagogical sense,
or exercises in cultural appropriation, often in a thoroughly ideological fashion. 96
Among these appropriative functions of translation, that of emancipating
vernaculars started to appear among sixteenth-century humanists and religious
reformers.
The Romans translated from the Greek without, in the strictest sense, any
need to do so. The central motivation for them in building a literature in Latin was
rivalry with the Greeks: Cicero famously claimed in the Fourth Tusculan that
translation consisted not in the imitation of a given work but that of “outstanding
qualities” – it was aemulatio by bending the techniques of another author to one’s
own subject and language. In this spirit, his Homer was completely Roman, a
forerunner of Virgil.97 Seventeen centuries later, Virgil’s Aeneid was  an  equally
suitable vehicle for cultural appropriation in John Denham’s English translation
(1656). In a critical period of English history – Denham was a royalist who spent
94 Berman, L’Éprouve de l’étranger, 16.
95 Leonard Forster, The Poet’s Tongues. Multilingualism in Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), 32. On “mixing languages” in early modern Europe, see Peter Burke, Languages and
Communities in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 5.
96 Lefevere, “Translation: Its Genealogy in the West”, 16 ff.
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several years in exile in France – the selection of the text evoked a nationalistic legend
of  medieval  origin:  the  fiction  that  Brute,  Aeneas’  grandson  was  the  founder  of
Britain. The evocation of glory was accompanied with devices to appropriate the text
for a demonstration of the continuing vitality of an aristocratic culture and the Stuart
monarchy after the regicide. These devices include, for instance, generalization and
addition: the death of Priam is rendered by Denham with the words “thus fell the
King” – and he adds, “who yet survived the state.”98 As for the pedagogical uses of
translation, a relatively late but striking example is the case made for “double
translation” – from Latin into the vernacular and then back – in the education of
young gentlemen in Roger Ascham’s The Schoolmaster (1570). In a paraphrase from
the Epistles of Pliny, Ascham argues that this practice will improve the pupil’s
eloquence and engender in him a true understanding and a right judgement. On a
larger plan, in humanist thought translation was valued on account of its developing
points of exchange with the classical text, a feature that was already crucial to early
treatises on translation by Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni and Giannozzo
Manetti.99 Finally, let us mention briefly what is perhaps the best known argument in
favour of translation in the period: its use as a means for the enrichment of
unevolved vernaculars. This was a goal not harboured by the early humanists
because they saw translation as a negotiation between two fully developed systems
of expression, the text and its discourse remaining ends in themselves for them. From
Luther onwards, however, Verdeutschung was  conceived  as  a  constitutive  act  of
German culture which even posited the intensive confrontation with the foreign
through translation as a fundamental path towards the progress of national culture
in more general terms.100 Similarly, Étienne Dolet’s Manière de bien traduire d’un
langue en autre and Joachim Périon’s (somewhat ironically, Latin) De Optimo Genere
interpretandi Commentarii (both 1540) conceptualized plans of “total translation”
97 L.  G.  Kelly, The True Interpreter. A History of Translation Theory and Practice in the West (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1979), 44.
98  Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, 52-4.
99 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 15, 25.
100 Berman, L’Éprouve de l’étranger, 44-56.
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inspired  by  the  rhetorical  tradition,  mainly  with  a  view  to  the  improvement  of  the
vernacular.101
Important changes in the intentions that guided translation were introduced
during the eighteenth century, when (despite the dominant position of French) a
“democracy of letters” began to arose in Europe, in which an increasing number of
people  could  read,  but  only  one  language,  their  mother  tongue.102 This  resulted in
different potential audiences for translation, with differing ways and strategies of
translating to match their needs. Those who did not know the language of the
original were now supplied with translations for information and mediation. Those
who knew the language of the original still consulted translation as a shortcut:
several figures of the Enlightenment who did read French also perused translations,
or, even more characteristically, read originals in other European vernaculars but still
preferred  to  quote  more  accessible  French  editions.  David  Hume,  for  instance,
reportedly read Beccaria in Italian, but also in Morellet’s French translation. It was
also in the eighteenth century that, besides and because of the rise of a sizeable
reading audience variegated in terms of its interests and proficiency in foreign
languages (or the lack of it), and the consequent strengthening of the infrastructure of
the book trade with fairs, agents, specialized publishers, critical journals etc. that
market considerations first started to make a really significant impact on the
translation business and the motivations involved.103
The Enlightenment saw the rise of multilingual modernity, a process to which
the aims of translation related in ambivalent ways. On the one hand, its cosmopolitan
notions of progress, freedom of thought, universal humanity and critical reasoning
proved to be eminently translatable, and translations became, more than ever before,
vehicles of passing on, and communication about, information and ideas. On the
other hand, but inextricably linked with the growing concern with such
101 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 216 ff.
102 Fania Oz-Salzberger, “The Enlightenment in Translation: Regional, Cosmopolitan and National
Aspects”, European Review of History / Revue européenne d’histoire, 13:3 (2006), 385-410.
103 Besides the excellent concise overview in Oz-Salzberger, “The Enlightenment in Translation”, see
Paul  Korshin  (ed.), The Widening Circle: Essays on the Circulation of Literature in Eighteenth-Century
Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976); Giles Barber and Bernhard Fabian
(eds.), Buch und Buchhandel in Europa im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, Wolfenbüttler Studien zur Geschichte
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communicative functions, this emerging European translation culture served not
only to bind together individual national cultures, but also helped emphasizing their
differences.104 In other words, the appropriative functions of translation retained
their importance – ironically, the most forcefully in situations when the imperative of
“faithfulness” to the source text was the most keenly emphasized. A case in point is
the German reaction to the more “aggressive” French practices of appropriative
translation, which culminated in Herder, but was in a broad sense embedded in the
whole tradition going back to Luther. Its more immediate antecedents included
Leibniz’s claim that the richness or poverty of a language reveals itself in the
translatability of good foreign books into it: the most evolved language, supposedly,
it the one capable of effortlessly receiving literal translations of foreign texts.105 This
in  fact  contrasts  with  the  logic  behind the  determination to  seek and find the  most
faithful equivalent of the foreign word and phrase in the mother tongue – frequently
a highly creative pursuit,  whose effect consists in transforming the target language,
instead of the source text.  As the target language is stretched out to fit  in it  foreign
ideas, translation becomes a means of the expansion (Erweiterung) of the linguistic
space  (Sprachraum) available for cultural expression. Klopstock saw the significance
of translation in these terms;106 and when Goethe proposed that the highest stage or
the last “epoch” in the history of translation is the one “where one would like to
make the translation identical with the original, so that one is not instead of the
other, but in place of the other”, he traced a development away from the kind of
translation which only receives the foreign text without doing violence to the
receiving language towards one which allows the source language to affect the target
des Buchwesens 7 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981); Bernhard Fabian, The English Book in Eighteenth-
Century Germany (London: British Library, 1992).
104 This  phenomenon  is  discussed  with  reference  to  the  whole  of  the  past  two  centuries  in  Wolf
Lepenies, “Die Übersetzbarkeit der Kulturen. Ein europäisches Problem, eine Chance für Europa”, in
Anselm Hawerkamp (Hrsg.), Die Sprache der Anderen. Übersetzungspolitik zwischen den Kulturen
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997), 95-121.
105 Johann Gottfried Leibniz, Unvorgreiffliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausübung und Verbesserung der
Teutschen Sprache, cited in Winfried Sdun, Probleme und Theorien des Übersetzens in Deutschland vom 18.
bis 20. Jahrhundert (München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1967), 21.
106 K.  A.  Schleiden, Klopstock’s Dichtungstheorie als Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Poetik
(Saarbrücken: West-Ost, 1954), 36-8.; Sdun, Probleme und Theorien des Übersetzens, 25.
               dc_444_12
55
language.107 This is what also Herder had in mind when he approvingly quoted
Thomas Abbt and added his own observations. “The true translator has a higher
intention  than  that  of  making  foreign  books  intelligible  to  his  readers  …  this
intention is none other than that of fitting to his mother language excellent thoughts
according  to  the  example  of  a  more  complete  and  perfect   language.  …  Such  a
language already represents to us in a clear way many concepts for which we have to
look for words, and presents these concepts in such juxtapositions that we develop a
need for new connections.”108 It was the prospect of elevating the vernacular culture
that led both Herder and Goethe employ the metaphor of a journey in the course of
which one becomes enriched precisely through getting “reconciled to the condition”
of the foreign author.109 Friedrich Schleiermacher’s famous recommendation, which
is discussed below, to “leave the author in peace” is already within reach from this
position.
It is noteworthy that the post-World War II process of “monolingualization”,
with English becoming the “language of authority” and developing a global regime
through being massively translated in other languages and “domesticating” texts
translated into  it,  is  currently  evoking critical  voices  that  echo such premises  of  the
Sturm und Drang. Before recalling these briefly, however, it is time for us to turn from
the “why” to the “how”: answers to the question what is and what should be
happening in the act of translation, ideas on the nature of that act, and the
methodological obligations under which this places the translator. In view of the
above, it should not be surprising that apart from the current debates, translation and
its proper method was the object of the broadest and most profound theoretical
reflection in the period c. 1500-1800.
Amidst the infinite variety of approach, translation methods can be classified
along two kinds of axis: one ranging from “literal” to “free” and the other from
“domesticating” to “foreignizing”, related to one another in ambivalent ways.
107 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Übersetzungen”, in Werke,  ed.  Erich Trunz (München:  Beck,  1988),  II.
255.  For  the  translation  of  Goethe’s  text  and  the  comment  on  it  I  have  relied  on  Charlie  Louth,
Hölderlin and the Dynamics of Translation (Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre, 1998), 6.
108 Herder, Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-68), in Philosophical Works, 37-8.
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Another possible classification focuses on the disciplinary affiliation of translation
theories.110 First  and  most  frequently,  translation  has  been  conceived  as  a  literary
craft, with a focus on its creative aspects and with little attention to the linguistic
operations performed (apart from the rights and wrongs of free or literal translation).
Second, linguists and grammarians have identified translation theory with the
analysis of precisely those semantic and grammatical operations neglected by the
former approach: from this perspective, translation is an application of linguistics
with the aim of creating an equivalent text (whether in the more general sense of a
language structure that would evoke the same reaction in the target language
audience as in the readers of the original, or more specifically an utterance that
would fit in the same social context as the original). Third, in hermeneutics, language
and  its  signs  are  regarded  as  possessing  (or  indeed,  themselves  constituting)  a
creative energy, and the priorities of sign theory are reversed: the word (in the sense
of the Platonic logos)  does  not  exist  merely  as  an  index  to  a  concept,  but  it  shapes
concepts and cultures. Translation is seen as a transfer of the creative vigour of great
writers  of  other  languages  into  the  target  language:  not  primarily  a  production  of
text, but an interpretation and contemplation of Language at work. A modern classic
working largely  within  the  latter  paradigm has  suggested that  there  are  essentially
four stages in the “hermeneutic motion”, each of them offering options for free and
literal, domesticating and foreignizing translation as well.111 Preliminary to any
attempt to penetrate the original, is the moment of “trust”: the degree of confidence
placed by the  translator  in  the  good sense,  taste,  accuracy etc.  of  the  original.  Next
comes “aggression”, most forcefully encapsulated in Saint Jerome’s image of taking
the translated text “captive” in the course of a clash between two languages as two
forms  of  thought  within  the  intuition  of  the  translator.  In  this  somewhat  Hegelian
confrontation between thesis and antithesis, the synthesis is reached in Steiner’s third
and fourth stages, “incorporation” and “restitution”. The former reflects the shared
109 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Zu brüderlichen Andenken Wielands”, fragments in Hans Joachim
Störig (ed.), Das Problem des Übersetzens (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 35.  For
Herder, see Louth, Hölderlin and the Dynamics of Translation, 24.
110 Kelly, The True Interpreter, 2 ff.
111 George Steiner, After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975), 296. ff.
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conviction that the universally human can only be understood in the familiar terms
of  one’s  own  society,  often  resulting  in  an  egocentric  reduction  of  everything  to
contemporary vision, while the latter is a compensation for the loss in the passage
between the two languages by “putting back what was already there”.
Recent as this formulation is, its preoccupations and underlying principles
would have been familiar to thinkers who struggled with the problem of translation
for many centuries. In Renaissance theories, themselves building extensively on
Cicero,  Quintilian  and  Horace,  the  above-mentioned  paradox  arising  from  the
confusio linguarum, was resolved in the hope (and endeavour) that translation is
absolutely assimilable from a mastered program of rhetoric and meta-language, and
the sobering awareness that translation takes form in the interpretative activity of our
thought as it moves, through re-reading, to intensify again the uniqueness of the
text.112 It  was  in  the  same  period  that  the  concept  of traductio was introduced by
Leonardo Bruni, De Interpretatione Recta (c. 1426), the first systematic renaissance
treatise on translation, as a more “creative” counterpart of the more “conservative”
translatio.113 The  latter,  in  the  words  of  Antoine  Berman,  was  regarded  as  a  mere
“exchange of signifieds”, performed on supposedly unresisting texts in the
conviction  that  language  is  a  vehicle  for  the  exchange  of  thoughts  and  the  same
thoughts could be conveniently “dressed” in different languages. By contrast,
traducere came to be understood as an energic physical displacement through the
exercise of the vis traducatur,  the  power  of  transporting,  and,  when  executed
correctly, it also quite inevitably implied a degree of transformare.  Thus, in terms of
the emerging paradigm, the faithful translator was one who used his intellectual
faculties to explore the relative resources of the source and target languages, and
then  to  transform  the  one  into  the  expressive  fabric  of  the  other.114 Grammar,
interpretation and translation appeared as neighbour disciplines, inseparable from
philology, the fundamental humanist science. A good illustration is the French
112 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 14.
113 In  doing  so,  Bruni  himself  followed  the  ancient  grammarian  Aulus  Gellius  who  used traductum,
“transported”, in connection with translation. Antoine Berman,  “De la translation à la traduction”, in
T.T.R. Traduction et culture, ed. Jean-Marc Gouanvic, 5:1 (1988), 25, 30. See also Lefevere, “Translation:
Its Genealogy in the West”, 17.
114 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 42.
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humanist Guillaume Budé’s De Philologiae (1533), in which philology itself was
described as instauratrix atque interpolatrix, restorer and interpreter. In this
perspective, “meaning simply does not stand still, and every act of translation,
though based in a gesture of piety towards the source, seems to push irresistibly
towards iconoclasm.”115
From this it was possible to construct a model of the act of translation that no
longer conceived of its successive stages on the basis of a strict separation of contents
and style, but boldly penetrated the issue of substance. While medieval translators
did take substantial liberties, especially when “translating” oral materials into
written text,116 a principle and tradition of literality was strongly cultivated
throughout the Middle Ages. Again, the story of the Septuagint suggested that as the
Scriptures contained an objective historical account expressed in a most adequate
way, there was a wording which corresponded with the matter and therefore was the
only one fully acceptable.117 Such “translation as symbol” – the endeavour of
subjection to the expository modalities of the original and extraction of mere raw
information – as both a rejection of classical rhetoric and an expression of caution in
times and situations when the definition of norms of conduct and belief was at stake,
was as prominent for the early Christians as for the Protestants and their adversaries.
In his preface to Calvin’s Institutes (1561), Thomas Norton stressed that “[i]f I should
leave the course of words, and graunt myself libertie after the natural manne of my
own toung, to say in English which I conceived to be his meaning in Latine, I plainly
perceived how hardly I  might escape error,  and on the other side in this manner of
faith and religion, how perilous it  was to erre.”118 The only widely accepted way of
meddling  with  the  text  was  the  practice  of  “construing”,  a  legacy  of  the  medieval
language classroom whereby, first, a series of exact lexical and grammatical
matchings were produced, and then these were polished both for the sake of sense
115 Ibid., 30.
116 See Maria Tymoczko, “Translation in Oral Tradition as a Touchstone for Translation Theory and
Practice”, in Bassnett and Lefevere (eds.), Translation, History and Culture, 50 ff.
117 Even so, Bible translators from the Septuagint masters to Luther have been invested with a halo of
immediate  inspiration  by  the  Holy  Spirit  as  a  condition  to  understand  God’s  word  –  until  the
translator as scholar replaced the paradigm of the translator as prophet, from Luther onwards.
Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible, 5 ff.
118 Kelly, The True Interpreter, 69-72.
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and elegance. Widespread in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century language teaching,
construing appeared as a principle of translation in Charles Rollin’s De la manière
d’enseigner et d’étudier les belles lettres (1726), which recommended, first, seeking a
translation that is “simple, claire et correct”, and then “working “à l’orner et à
l’embellir” (leading, among others, to Pope’s Homer “declaiming in a powdered wig
in a baroque theatre”).119
Many humanists,  however,  went  beyond “orner  et  embellir”.  The process  of
the translation act as modelled in Fausto da Longiano’s Dialogo del modo de lo tradurre
d’una in altra lingua (1556) also contained two stages,  but ones rather different from
those of the “construing” technique. In the first, the translator was viewed as a
reader, exercising analytical and perceptual skills, while in the second he was
supposed to transpose the insights gleaned as reader into the articulative functions of
a writer. Even before Longiano, Ètienne Dolet in his already mentioned Manière du
bien traduire (1540) claimed that at this stage translation was analogous to
composition:  a  new autonomous art  form abandoning all  reference  to  its  origins  in
the source text. Similarly, for Abel Mathieu, author of the Devis de la langue françoyse
(1559), translation occurred when, after the concerted ingestion of the author’s
sententia, the translator could retrieve the text in the virtual autonomy of the target
language. In a compelling image, the translator is portrayed as an usurpateur engaged
in a process of selective, enlightened acquisition.120
In the course of the following century-or-so, rationalist theories of language
put forward by Descartes and by the Jansenists Claude Lancelot and Antoine
Arnauld in the Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660), did a great deal to reassert the
universal similarity between all human languages and, by inference, the inter-
translatability of languages in principle.121 Nevertheless, the humanist groundwork
outlined above became consolidated into a paradigm that subjected translation to the
aesthetic and literary canons of the host culture. Spreading from France, it became
119 Ibid., 41, 59. Rollin’s text is excerpted in French Translators 1600-1800: An Online Anthology of Prefaces
and Criticism, Paper 84. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/french_translators/84 , last accessed 12 June
2011.
120 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 202, 214, 313-4.
121 For details on these theories, see Garon Wheeler, “Port Royal Tradition of General Grammar”, in E.
F. K. Koerner (ed.), Concise History of the Language Sciences (Oxford: Pergamon, 1995), 169-174.
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the dominant paradigm of neo-classicist and Enlightenment Europe.
Notwithstanding the formative influence of Descartes on the encyclopaedists, so
vividly  expressed  in  the Discours préliminaire by  D’Alembert,  his  remark  that
languages “cannot all be used to express the same idea” and his reference to the
“diversity of their genius”122 pointed in the contrary direction, and underscored a
tradition of translation theory in which all aspects of the original – from structure,
verse and meter,  through terminology and metaphor, to ideas and opinions – were
suitable objects of transformation.123
Perhaps the beginning of this tradition was an especially forceful statement by
the French translator of Cicero (1638), Tacitus (1640-44) and Lucian (1654-55), Nicolas
Perrot d’Ablancourt,  who stressed that the end of translation was a living work. To
this  end,  he  boldly  and  confidently  claimed:  “I  do  not  always  stick  to  the  author’s
words,  nor  even to  his  thoughts.  I  keep the  effect  he  wanted to  reach in  mind,  and
then I arrange matters according to the fashion of our time.” Because of the different
linguistic tools, but also because of the different cultural contexts, changes were
needed in order to represent the “spirit” of the author “faithfully”, and perhaps even
more so in order to make it acceptable to the “spirit” of the audience. Even in the case
of authors like Tacitus or Thucydides, who were respected both as literary artists and
as historians, it was the translator’s responsibility to retain eloquence as well as fact,
and to render the sublime character of the whole work rather than the mere words, in
a noble contest of genius between the author and the translator whose purpose was
still largely altruistic: to do proper justice to the true greatness of the original. To be
sure, this also implied the right and, indeed, the obligation, to clear up obscurities
and sometimes to reorganize the text for the sake of clarity.124
In France, this tradition of les belles infidèles, the “beautiful unfaithful”,
culminated in the classic renderings of Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch and Horace by Anne
122 Jean le Rond d’Alembert, “Remarks on the Art of Translating” (preface to his translation of
Tacitus), in Lefevere (ed.), Translation / History / Culture, 108.
123 Cf. Oz-Salzberger, “The Enlightenment in Translation”
124 On  D’Ablancourt,  see  Roger  Zuber, Les ‹‹Belles Infidèles›› et la formation du goût classique. Perrot
d’Ablancourt et Guez de Balzac (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), esp. II and III. But cf. Julie Candler Hayes,
Translation, Subjectivity, and Culture in France and England, 1600-1800 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University  Press,  2009),  where  it  is  argued  that  translators  of  the  times  were  more  open  to  cultural
“otherness” than is has been generally supposed.
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Marie Dacier at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Early on,
however, D’Ablancourt’s ideas were also brought to England, among others, by John
Denham, already mentioned above. In his preface to The Destruction of Troy (1656)
Denham admitted to presenting a naturalized Virgil, which, however, to his mind
did not amount to having “offered it violence”. Like D’Alembert a century later, he
argued that there were “certain Graces and Happinesses peculiar to every Language,
which give life and energy to the words,” and added that he “conceive[d] it a vulgar
error in translating Poets, to affect being Fides Interpres.”125 Forty years later, taking
the  same  text  as  his  material,  John  Dryden  explained  his  similar  approach  in
explicitly domesticating terms: “I have endeavour’d to make Virgil speak such
English, as he wou’d have spoken, if he had been borne in England, and in the
present Age.”126 In this period, scientific translation, which is normally more resistant
to acclimatizing practices that the literary field, also displayed more proclivity
towards them: as science came to be regarded as a gentlemanly pursuit, “Royal
Society prose” placed an emphasis on graceful reporting as well as on good research.
“The book being for subject and design chiefly for gentlemen, I have been careless of
using a studied pedantry in my style, and careful in contriving a pleasant and
beautiful impression”, wrote Thomas Salisbury in his preface to Galileo’s Massimi
sistemi in 1661.127
The extremes to which the eighteenth century went in the propagation of
domesticating translation could be illustrated by countless examples. One of the most
striking may be William Guthrie’s preface to his translation of Cicero’s Orations
(1741). Guthrie thought that it was “the habitual Acquaintance with the Manner
which characterizes  his  Original,  that  alone can give  [the  translator]  any success  in
his Attempts to translate” and therefore he should “make it his business to be as
125 John Denham, “Preface to The Destruction of Troy (1656)”, in T. B. Steiner (ed.), English Translation
Theory 1650-1800 (Assen and Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1975), 64 f.
126 John Dryden, “Dedication of the Aeneis (1697)”, in Steiner, English Translation Theory, 72. Dryden’s
contribution to the theory and practice of translation has been studied extensively. See William Frost,
Dryden and the Art of Translation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) and Judith Sloman, Dryden:
The Poetics of Translation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
127 Kelly, The True Interpreter, 85. On the “gentlemanly” character of the new science as a cultural
practice in the seventeenth century, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in
Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and idem, The Scientific
Revolution.
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conversant  as  he  cou’d in  that  Study and Manner  which comes nearest  to  what  we
may suppose his Author, were he now to live, wou’d pursue.”128 In the given case,
Guthrie chose to do this as the Gentleman’s Magazine’s reporter of debates from the
British Parliament, where he assumed to have found the contemporary equivalent of
the Roman Senate, and sought to conceive how some great MP would formulate and
express Cicero’s thought. Others in the same period took excessive liberties by
reference to the requirements of good taste. In the Abbé Prévost’s translation, Samuel
Richardson’s novel Pamela was reduced from the original seven volumes (that would
have been fourteen in French) to four, with the following justification: “I have
suppressed English customs where they may appear shocking to other nations, or
else made them conform to customs prevalent in the rest of Europe. It seemed to me
that those remainders of the old and uncouth British ways, which only habit prevents
the British themselves from noticing, would dishonor a book in which manners
should be noble and virtuous.” Similarly, the Abbé De la Motte in his translation of
the Iliad reduced Homer’s text from twenty to twelve books not only by eliminating
repetitions and cutting tedious speeches, but also (lest bourgeois sensibilities were
hurt) the anatomical details of wounds – and yet claimed that no important features
of the epic were lost.129
Such practices received, retroactively, the stamp of theoretical authority in one
of the most remarkable full-length treatments of translation theory, published by
Alexander Fraser Tytler in 1791. “I would … describe a good translation to be, That,
in which the merit of the original work is so completely transfused into another language, as
to be as distinctly apprehended, and as strongly felt, by a native of the country to which that
language belongs, as it is by those who speak the language of the original work”, Tytler
claimed early on in his treatise.130 While  his  “laws  of  translation”  required  the
translator to “give a complete transcript of the ideas of the original work” and
prescribed that “the style and manner of writing should be of the same character
128 William Guthrie, “Preface to the Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero” (1741), in Steiner (ed.), English
Translation Theory, 98-9.
129 Lefevere, “Translation: Its Genealogy in the West”, 20-1; for the texts see Antoine Horguelin,
Anthologie de la manière du traduire (Montreal: Linguatech, 1981).
130 Alexander Fraser Tytler, Essay on the Principles of Translation, ed. J. F. Huntsman (Amsterdam: John
Benjamins, 1978), 15.
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with that of the original”, he also made an important distinction between “an
ordinary  translator  [who]  sinks  under  the  energy  of  his  original”  and  “the  man  of
genius [who] frequently rises above it;”131 and such a translator of “exquisite feeling”
and “correct taste” was invested with the privilege of “adding to or retrenching the
ideas  of  the  original”  and “correcting what  appears  to  him a  careless  or  inaccurate
expression of the original, where that inaccuracy seems materially to affect the
sense.”132 Although  Tytler  seems  to  prescribe  for  the  translator  a  sympathetic
identification with the author whose “very soul” he must adopt in order to make it
“speak through his own organs”, what gets expressed in the translation – if it is the
work of the sort of artist Tytler, after all, had in mind – is less the soul of the author
than that of the translator whose “good taste … invariably covers the defects of the
original.”133
Before Tytler’s theory is dismissed as a neglect or abandoning of all principles
of authenticity, and the practices mentioned previously as eccentric distortion or
simple inaccuracy, it is important to remind that, first, such ideas and practices are as
deeply anchored in and as naturally responding to the dilemmas that have attended
the  history  of  translation  as  any  possible  alternative;  and,  second,  that  those  who
employed  them  were  highly  conscious  of  the  losses  and  the  gains  implied  by  their
decision  to  do  so.  Dryden  saw  himself  as  “steer[ing]  betwixt  the  two  Extreams,  of
Paraphrase, and literal Translation.”134 While this claim may not be borne out by his
translations when judged according to our contemporary standards, what mattered
to him was the fact that the gain in domestic intelligibility, secured by transparent
translation, certainly outweighed the loss suffered by the foreign text and culture.135
There were many parallel cases. Christian Garve, eminent German translator of
Roman and Scottish works from Cicero to Ferguson in the latter eighteenth century,
was  equally  profoundly  aware  of  the  nature  of  the  choices  at  stake,  and  made  no
131 Ibid., 16, 42.
132 Ibid., 54.
133 Ibid., 88, 89. 212.
134 Dryden, “Dedication of the Aeneis”, 72.
135 Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, 68.
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secret of the fact that loyalty to his readers, or what he saw as their best interest, for
him preceded that to the authors quoted and translated.136
By Tytler’s time, however, there were also alternative voices, and not only in
Germany, with which this shift is usually associated. True, it was there that in the
late Enlightenment the desire of emancipation from French cultural dominance
included the most forceful and theoretically most sophisticated critique of prevalent
French translation practice and theory. However, already in 1750, Philip Francis, a
successful translator of Horace’s lyric poetry into English, complained that “our
translators … have only one style”, which he found most “unnatural”.137 Shortly
later, reaction was growing in France itself, too. The task of the translator is variously
compared to that of the historian: “Un traducteur ne peut plus supprimer les défaults
de son auteur qu’un historien ne doit taire les fautes de son héros” (as Sélis put it in
the Satires de Perse in 1776); and the painter copying a masterpiece: just as he is not at
liberty to change the smallest detail, “de même un traducteur doit rendre avec
fidelité  les  images,  les  phrases,  et  jusque  à  la  ponctuation  de  son  auteur.  Les  point
sont au discourse ces que sont aux tableaux les contours qui fixent les formes” (wrote
Maximilien-Henri, marquis de Saint-Simon in his Essai de traduction littérale et
énergique in 1771). Saint–Simon also campaigned for literal translation in his preface
to Temora, a fragment of Ossian he published in French in 1774.138 But perhaps it is
even more instructive to recall the multiple paradox of The Poems of Ossian
themselves,  in  regard  of  which  no  other  than  Macpherson  himself  write  in  the
preface to the revised edition of 1773: “when a composition cannot bear the test of a
literal version, it is a counterfeit which ought not to pass current … A translator, who
cannot  equal  his  original,  is  incapable  of  expressing  its  beauties.”  The  use  of
“translatorese” for the sake of creating an estranging effect, the call for “foreignizing
translation  is  made  here  in  a  striking  fashion  the  condition  of  meeting  the
136 Oz-Salzberger,  “The  Enlightenment  in  Translation”;  Johan  van  der  Zande,  “The  Microscope  of
Experience: Christian Garve’s Translation of Cicero’s De Officiis (1783)”, Journal of the History of Ideas,
59 (1998), 82.
137 J. W. Draper, “The Theory of Translation in the Eighteenth Century”, Neophilologus, 6:4 (1921), 248.
138 C.  B.  West,  “La  théorie  de  la  traduction  au  XVIIIe  siècle  par  rapport  surtout  aux  traductions
françaises des ouvrages anglais”, Revue de litterature comparée 12 (1932), 346-9.
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requirement that the translator should possess creative genius.139 No wonder Herder
and  Goethe,  who  developed  similar  views  around  the  same  time,  were  so
enthusiastic about Ossian, and it has been suggested that the latter’s own translation
from the Gaelic Ossian both inspired and reflected his commitment to a fashion of
translation in which the reader is deliberately exposed to the idiom of another
language while the possibilities of the target language are explored.140 The attempt to
“compete” with the original, a quest that characterized a great deal of translation
literature in the eighteenth century, was rejected by Goethe as “mere learned
diversion” in Dichtung und Wahrheit. Translation could only become an experience
that changes a language if it relates the basic energy of “pure speech”.141
In translation practice this approach would culminate in translations of
ancient classics that aimed to show in them the foreign poets as they were, the Homer
of  Johann  Heinrich  Voss  (published  from  1781  onwards)  being  the  first,  and
Hölderlin’s word-for-word rendering of Pindar perhaps the most notable example.142
Elsewhere an early case – still a rather neglected dissenting voice – for one who
actually did follow the path recommended here was John Nott, the English translator
of Petrarch (1777), and then a host of Latin and even Oriental poets. As his prefaces
and  books  on  love  lyric  show,  Nott  conceived  of  his  work  as  one  of  cultural
restoration and as a revision of the canon of foreign literature in English, for which
purpose he consciously endeavoured to preserve the difference of the foreign text.
Nott’s frequent and extensive travels in the European continent and, as a physician
on a  vessel  of  the  East  India  Company,  in  China,  perhaps  disposed him more  than
others to resisting domestic values in his work as a translator.143 In general, however,
it took some time before the excessive respect of “Wardour Street translators” to the
author led to a parody of the resources of the target language. Robert Browning, as
he  professed  in  the  preface  to  his  rendering  of  Aeschyles’ Agamemnon, “spared no
139 Howard Gaskill, “Introduction: ‘Genuine poetry … like gold’, in Howard Gaskill (ed.), The
Reception of Ossian in Europe (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2004), 9-12.
140 Catríona Ó Dochartaigh, “Goethe’s Translation from the Gaelic Ossian”, in ibid., 156-175.
141 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, in Sämtliche Werke, ed. Ernst Beutler (Zürich:
Artemis, 1948), vol. 10. 541.
142 Louth, Hölderlin and the Dynamics of Translation, ch. 4.; Günter Häntzschel, Johann Heinrich Vo?: Seine
Homer-Übersetzung als Sprachschöpferische Leistung (München: Beck, 1977).
143 Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, 93 ff.
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effort to be literal at every cost save the absolute violence to our language” and
added that he would be “tolerant … of even a clumsy attempt to furnish me with the
very turn of each phrase in as Greek a fashion as the English will bear.”144
This was certainly more than just retaining “a certain colour of foreignness”
(eine gewisse Farbe der Fremdheit), as Wilhelm von Humboldt recommended. What
Humboldt had in mind was that “the translator must exercise abnegation and self-
discipline”  in  the  sense  of  using  the  resources  of  the  target  language  closest  to  the
source, rather than “write the way the author of the original would have written in
the language of the translator” – because such self-discipline is indispensable if
translations are to become, as they ought to, “works which should examine, define,
and influence the state of a language at a given point of time.”145 Humboldt’s
contributions, together with Schleiermacher’s definitive statement on the issue in his
Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens (1813) are the culmination of a long
debate in German cultural life already triggered by Johann Jakob Bodmer’s
translation of Milton’s Paradise Lost in 1732.146 Bodmer’s translation came under
heavy criticism by Johann Christoph Gottsched, with reference to the “French”
enlightened standards later expounded in his Ausführliche Redekunst (1743). These
standards had to do not merely with the fashion in which a translation is executed,
but also its subject matter: in Gottsched’s view suitable authors were those who
conformed to his critical norms, for the most part French.147 Bodmer, who has
recently been claimed to deserve “most of the praise which is usually lavished on
Goethe and Schleiermacher as theorists of translation”, launched a counterattack,
arguing that “[w]hoever takes the trouble of literally translating a piece of writing …
will find that most locutions which seem strange and unusual to us not only have
nothing indecent about them, if they are well analysed, but often represent things by
very appropriate images and therefore arouse the reader’s attention in a very special
144 Kelly, The True Interpreter, 59, 78.
145 Wilhelm von Humboldt, “A Theory of Translation” [Introduction to Aeschylos’ Agamemnon, 1816],
in Lefevere (ed.), Translating Literature, 42, 45.
146 Oz-Salzberger, “The Enlightenment in Translation”.
147 Thomas Huber, Studien zur Theorie des Übersetzens im Zeitalter der deutschen Aufklärung (Meisenheim
am Glan: Hain, 1968), 14. For fragments of Gottsched’s treatise in English see Lefevere (ed.),
Translating Literature, 15 ff.
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way.”148 Bodmer’s fellow Swiss Johann Jacob Breitinger advanced similar views in
his Critische Dichtkunst (1740), based on the idea that different languages are merely
“so many collections of completely equivalent words and expressions which can be
exchanged with one another.”149 Bodmer, Breitinger and later on Friedrich Gottlieb
Klopstock joined in a polemic against host-oriented elegance in the name of source-
oriented accuracy,150 while this approach received the philosophical underpinning
shortly outlined above, in Herder’s essays on literature and language. It must be
stressed though that this is not at all an approach in which translation is reduced to
the  status  of  a  mechanical  craft,  quite  the  contrary:  as  the  goal  of  turning  it  to  the
enrichment of the target language and culture can only be attained if the intellectual
and cultural content of the original is faithfully conveyed, besides the indispensable
philological skill the translator must also possess the talent of the artist (Klopstock),
even a creative genius equal to that of the original author (Herder).
Herder’s idea that historical cultures have “gravity centres” (Schwerpunkte)
which, along with the languages in which they are expressed, must be respected,
implied the inviolability of original texts and, in the above sense, a fundamentally
source-oriented approach to translation in the communication between such cultures.
Somewhat  paradoxically,  the  theories  and  practices  that  aimed  to  signify  the
foreignness of the foreign text, in which such ideas culminated in the early
nineteenth century, were parts of the German (Prussian) national movement, usually
associated with a condescending attitude towards ultimately inferior foreign
cultures. Nevertheless, translation became an important element in this movement
through its potential of enriching the German language, and thereby enabling
German culture to realize its historical destiny of achieving hegemony through
148 Johann Jakob Bodmer,  “The Ninety-Fourth Letter” [Der Mahler  der  Sitten (1746),  94],  in  Lefevere
(ed.), Translating Literature, 18, 22.
149 Cited in Louth, Hölderlin and the Dynamics of Translation, 14.
150 Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the distance between Gottsched on the one hand and Bodmer
and Breitinger on the other, has been over-emphasized in dichotomous representations. Even for the
latter, the demand for fidelity and accuracy only entailed also the desirability of literality in so far as it
promoted the rendering of the „spirit” of the source. See W. Fränzel, Geschichte des Übersetzens im 18.
Jahrhundert, Beiträge zur Kultur- und Universalgeschichte 25 (Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1914). Some
scholars neglect altogether a discussion of both Bodmer and Gottsched by reference to the proposition
that  their  theories  differ  from  those  of  Breitinger  and  Klopstock  only  to  a  very  small  extent.  Sdun,
Probleme und Theorien des Übersetzens, 24-5, 114. Cf. Louth, Hölderlin and the Dynamics of Translation, 15.
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synthesis – therefore, the latter in the first place had to attend to the difference of
those  other  cultures  and show respect  to  them,  if  it  was  to  develop.  Using also  the
metaphor of the transplantation of foreign fauna, Friedrich Schleiermacher wrote in
the concluding passages of his Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens (1813):
“Our nation may be destined, because of its respect to what is foreign and its
nature which is one of mediation, to carry all the treasures of foreign arts and
scholarship, together with its own, in its language, to unite them into a great
historical whole, so to speak, which is to be preserved in the centre and heart
of  Europe,  so  that,  with  the  help  of  our  language,  whatever  beauty the  most
different times have brought forth can be enjoyed by all people, as purely and
perfectly as is possible for a foreigner. This appears indeed to be the real
historical aim of translation.”151
Previously in the text Schleiermacher established that the genuine translator is a
writer “who wants to bring those two separated persons, his author and his reader,
truly  together,  and  who  would  like  to  bring  the  latter  to  an  understanding  and
enjoyment of the former as correct and complete as possible without inviting him to
leave the sphere of his own tongue;” and that out of the two ways of achieving this –
“[e]ither the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the
reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves
the  author  towards  him”  –  he  preferred  the  former  as  avoiding  the  evils  of  both
“paraphrase” and “imitation”.152 Finally, if “ease”, still the ultimate distinguishing
feature of a well-executed translation for Tytler, looked indifferent to the point of not
heeded at all by them, this had to do with the question “why translate” – hardly
asked by Tytler, and answered implicitly, as before him, with reference to the sheer
interest of translating as a literary task, or its potentials for cultural appropriation.
However, if it was, as for Schleiermacher and his fellow early Romantics, to
dynamize and to replenish the language by stretching the limits set by convention, it
151 Friedrich  Schleiermacher,  “On  the  Different  Methods  of  Translating”  [Über  die  verschiedenen
Methoden des Übersetzens (1813)], in Lefevere (ed.), Translating Literature, 88.
152 Ibid., 73-4, 76.
               dc_444_12
69
was inevitable that translation was ridden with a benevolent tension, arising from
the alterity of a different age, civilization and language which it intimated. “Who
would willingly force himself to appear in movements less light and elegant than
those  he  is  capable  of,  to  seem  brutal  and  stiff,  at  least  at  times,  and  to  shock  the
reader as much as is necessary to keep him aware of what he is doing?”, is only one
of so many questions in similar vein Schleiermacher asks rhetorically, concluding
that such “sacrifices every translator must needs take upon himself.”153
Contemporaries were conscious of witnessing, indeed effecting “a true
turning-point in the art of translation.”154 It has been suggested that the cultural
political agenda behind Schleiermacher’s canonical statement of resistance to
dominant cultural values in German at the turn of the nineteenth century opposed
both French cultural hegemony among the aristocracy and the literary discourses
favoured by the largest segments of readers, the middle and working class, thereby
consigning  control  over  the  formation  of  national  culture  into  the  hands  of  an
educated elite.155 Before turning to the broader methodological implications of this
sketch of the rich tradition of reflection on translation in pre-nineteenth century
Europe, it is relevant to recall that in spite of such elitist and nationalist, as well as
limited and context-specific aspects, Schleiermacher’s concept and advocacy of
“foreignizing” translation has been enlisted in recent revisionist translation studies to
challenge the “domesticating” tendency perceived as prevalent in current, especially
English-language translation, whose genealogy is traced back into early-modern
times in association with the “free” translating practices highlighted above.
The specific target in these endeavours of Lawrence Venuti156 is  the  practice
and universal approval of what he calls “fluent translation,” the result of a multiple
paradox. “A translated text,” Venuti claims, “… is judged acceptable by most
publishers, reviewers, and readers, when it reads fluently, when the absence of any
linguistic or stylistic peculiarity makes it transparent, giving the appearance … that
153 Ibid., 79.
154 Friedrich Schlegel, quoted in Andreas Huyssen, Die frühromantische Konzeption von Übersetzung und
Aneignung: Studien zur frühromantischen Utopie einer deutschen Weltliteratur (Zürich: Atlantis, 1969), 112.
155 Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, Ch. 3., especially 100-116.
156 Both in The Translator’s Invisibility and in The Scandals of Translation . Towards and Ethics of Difference
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
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the translation is not in fact a translation, but ‘the original’.” The illusory effect of
“fluent discourse” conceals the conditions under which the translation is made,
starting with the translator’s own crucial intervention: the translator is supposed to
remain “invisible” through a “weird self-annihilation,” partly caused by the
individualistic conception of authorship in whose terms writing is an original and
transparent self-representation of the writer. Venuti argues that thus, first,
“translation is defined as a second-order representation: only the foreign text can be
original, an authentic copy, true to the author’s personality or intention, whereas the
translation is derivative, fake, potentially a false copy;” and, second, that “translation
is required to efface its second-order status with transparent discourse, producing
the illusion of authorial presence whereby the translated text can be taken as the
original” – an effect which, however, can only be achieved by employing devices of
“domestication”, peculiar to the target language and culture.157
Sharp as these observations are, their chief interest for the present purposes
lies  not  in  the  programme  for  an  ethics  of  translation  constructed  on  their  basis  in
order to counter such tendencies in a world of globalized cultural communication of
unequal  trade-off,  but  in  the  analytical  tools  used  to  give  an  account  of  the  strong
epistemological foundations and the resulting persistence of the “domesticating”
approach. Venuti relies on Jacques Derrida in explicating translation as a process in
which the chain of signifiers that constitutes the source language text is replaced by a
chain  of  signifiers  in  the  target  language,  which  the  translator  provides  on  the
strength of an interpretation. Meaning is thus represented as an effect of relations
among signifiers, always differential and never present in the original unity: “the
foreign text is the site of many different semantic possibilities that are fixed only
provisionally in any one translation, on the basis of varying cultural assumptions and
interpretative choices, in specific social situations, in different historical periods.
Meaning is a plural and contingent relation …”158 The  foreign  text  is  always
susceptible to many different interpretations, while the translator’s interpretive
choices will most likely answer to a domestic cultural situation: translation is the
157 Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility, 5-8, cf. Idem., The Scandals of Translation, 81 ff.
158 Jacques Derrida, “Différence”, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1982), 23.
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“reconstruction of the foreign text in accordance with values, beliefs and
representations that pre-exist in the target language … [it is] the forcible
replacement of the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text that
will be intelligible to the target language reader. … The aim of translation is to
bring back a cultural other as the same, the recognizable, even the familiar;
and this aim always risks the wholesale domestication of the foreign text,
often in highly self-conscious projects, where translation serves as an
appropriation of foreign cultures for domestic agendas, cultural, economic,
political.”
One does not necessarily have to follow Derrida in his heavily contested
scepticism concerning the very possibility of recovering what an author intended or
meant, while still recognizing that the appreciation of such intentions or meanings
was hardly a priority for many of those who thought about translation or produced
translations. The survey of Renaissance to early Romantic reflections on translation I
attempted above amply illustrates this, and lead us back to my initial point. If the
goal of comparative history (and comparative studies in general) is to discover and
interpret features fundamental to one culture by setting it against another, then the
study of translations is an especially promising avenue on account of its putting such
distinguishing features within the condition of the target culture, as it were,
automatically, into especially sharp relief. Besides, the material covered so far in this
article should also serve as a reminder of the proper level of expectations concerning
the qualities of translated texts when studying them as vehicles of “reception” in the
history of ideas.
It is very tempting to carry out such investigations with the underlying
assumption that the source text represents a standard and enjoys a status of primacy
vis-à-vis the translated text which, in this casting, unless carried out with the sort of
impeccable fidelity that according to most of the approaches sketched above is a vain
hope  at  best,  assumes  the  role  of  a  belated  and  more  or  less  faint  replica  of  the
original. In such representations, reception itself tends to assume the character of a
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movement from a “perfect” towards an “imperfect” manifestation of ideas and thus
to become instrumental in the creation of hierarchies among cultural phenomena. To
contest this approach it is again not necessary to follow Derrida, or Walter Benjamin,
who argue that translation, rather than being secondary to the original, is its
condition in the sense that in order to be “original” a text must be translatable.159
What  is  necessary  to  point  out,  however,  is  simply  that  each  of  the  said  cultural
phenomena possesses an equally legitimate claim to be regarded as a distinct
product of its specific context, only in this case they are brought into a comparative
relationship by the fact of translation.
To be sure, in many cases such relationships were recognized as unequal by
no other than the recipients themselves. But once this has been duly acknowledged,
along with the often vastly important relations of power and subordination between
source and target language cultures, the student of translation should focus on the
extent to which it is itself an “original” contribution in the sense of being a subject
carrying interpretative value in its own right. For translation in history is not
primarily, as we tend to regard it in our better moments today, an instance of inter-
cultural communication, aiming to penetrate the Other in its fullness and make it
intelligible  in  its  otherness,  but  a  communicative  act  whose  purposes  are
predominantly intra-cultural and consist in supporting domestic agendas to which
the translated text looks instrumental – almost an “excuse”.160 Such communicative
acts may affect, sometimes very profoundly, the Other in what have been described
as translingual acts of transcoding cultural material – most characteristically in the
situations created by European colonialism, which have inspired much recent work
on translation in history,161 but largely falls outside the chronological scope of the
present study – but there is nothing in the nature of translation itself that would
159 “The structure of the original is marked by the requirement to be translated” is Derrida’s
formulation  in  “Des  Tours  de  Babel”,  in Difference in Translation,  trans.  and  ed.  Joseph  F.  Graham
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 184. There is an equally concise formulation of the same idea
in Walter Benjamin’s famous “The Task of the Translator”: “Translation is a mode. To comprehend it
as  a  mode  one  must  go  back  to  the  original,  for  that  contains  the  law  governing  the  translation:  its
translatability.” Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Fontana, 1973), 70-1.
160 Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Translation and the Colonial Imagery: Ibn Khaldûn Orientalist”, History
and Theory 42 (February 2003), 65.
161 See  Douglas  Howland,  “The  Predicament  of  Ideas  in  Culture:  Translation  and  Historiography”,
History and Theory 42 (February 2003), 45-60, and the literature reviewed there.
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make this inevitable. More importantly, this is not the kind of communicative
function  commonly  associated  with  translation  and  in  whose  terms  the  success  or
failure of translation is usually assessed.
During the period in focus here, however, the casting is, in a certain sense, the
very reverse of the above, and what matters in the first place is not the extent to
which the translated text succeeds or fails in making the source text and its “original”
ideas accessible in the target language. Rather, it is the extent and the way in which
the source text is instrumental for pursuing the agenda set by the translator or set for
him by others in compliance with specific contexts (including the testing of the limits
of such contexts). For these are the elements that will determine the adjustments to
the “original” which the translator perceives as necessary to carry out, or, conversely,
the studied avoidance of such adjustments and an endeavour at “fidelity” – shortly,
the general strategies perceived by him as necessary to follow, and the particular
choices  made in  order  to  succeed in  that  agenda.  Such a  perspective  on translation
looks more appropriate to a climate of inquiry in the cultural and intellectual history
of early-modern and Enlightenment Europe in which the focus is no longer on the
construction of canons, on assigning the place of periods and intellectual heroes in
them, and on following their “impact” – necessarily, on an ever weakening scale as
we move from “centres” to “peripheries” –, but on the communicative and cultural
practices (translation being one of them) employed in a series of active and context-
dependent engagements with a pool of ideas available within the “echo chamber” of
the republic of letters,162 with  the  goal  of  transforming  them  into  ways  of  living  in
local life-worlds.
*   *   *   *   *
I  now  proceed  to  relating  these  thoughts  to  the  methodological  directions  in
intellectual history that have arguably inspired the greatest amount of work as well
as debate over the past generation or so, namely, linguistic contextualism and
162 For  this  metaphor  see  Lorraine  Daston,  “Afterword:  The  Ethos  of  Enlightenment”,  in  William
Clark, Jan Golinski, Simon Schaffer (eds.), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press), 495–504.
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Begriffsgeschichte. This is a vast topic, and my perspective will be necessarily limited
to the reciprocal relevance of these approaches and the interpretation of translated
texts. Critiques of both schools will also receive some attention.
As  to  the  “Cambridge”  view,  for  a  concise  statement  of  a  highly  complex
programme one might  turn to  Quentin  Skinner’s  preface  to  the  collection of  his  re-
published and revised articles:
“I argue that, if we are to write the history of ideas in a properly historical
style, we need to situate the texts we study within such intellectual contexts
and frameworks of discourse as enable us to recognise what their authors
were doing in  writing  them.  To  speak  more  fashionably,  I  emphasise  the
performativity of texts and the need to treat them intertextually. My aspiration
is … to use the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry to grasp their
concepts,  to  follow  their  distinctions,  to  recover  their  beliefs  and,  so  far  as
possible, to see things in their way.”163
Similarly, it is possible to find a précis of methodological priorities at many points
within the immense output of John Pocock in the field – for instance:
“our understanding of ‘what [the author] was doing’ when he made his move
thus depends in a considerable measure on our understanding of the practical
situation he was in, of the case he desired to argue, the action or norm he
desired to legitimate, and so on … But the practical situation also includes the
linguistic situation: that arising from the constraints and opportunities
imposed on the author by the language or languages available for him to use
… the historian looks for ways in which [the move] may have rearranged, or
sought to rearrange, the possibilities of language open to the author and his
co-users of language.”164
163 Quentin  Skinner,  “General  Preface”,  in Visions of Politics. Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), vii.
164 J. G. A. Pocock, “Introduction: The state of the art”, in Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on
Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Texts are regarded by both scholars as the chief vehicles that enable articulate and
literate individuals to act socially, and language as the principal means to bring such
vehicles into motion. They both recognize that as any means – of production, of
transport, and so forth – language provides such individuals with the opportunity to
realize their intentions, and at the same time determines the orbit within which this is
feasible; though at their most ingenious, they are also seen as capable of stretching
such boundaries. Pocock and Skinner both conceive of texts as speech acts, in the
style of Austin and Searle (both drawing on Wittgenstein), in which the expressive
functions of language are turned to realizing intentions which thereby are
transformed into meanings, while both of them also readily attribute to language –
more specifically, to the “vocabularies”, “discourses”, indeed “languages” into which
clusters of verbal expression consolidate through the accumulated meanings
intended by users – the quality of a paradigm which, in the fashion of Thomas Kuhn,
sets certain limits to what is “doable” by speech acts, i.e., the thinkable.
Undoubtedly, Skinner has been more interested in the former, and Pocock (whose
orientation in linguistic theory also embraces Saussure’s distinction of langue from
parole) in the latter aspect, but the overall methodological allegiances are not
dissimilar.
I deliberately chose the above synoptic representations, instead of the more
sophisticated statements, of the methodological allegiances of Skinner and Pocock as
thez  are  more  fit  to  withstand  the  objections  advanced  by  their  latest  and  perhaps
most  trenchant  critic:  Mark  Bevir.165 Bevir has labelled and challenged them as
Press,1985), 14-5. Several of Pocock’s early methodological writings appear in his Politics, Language and
Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (New York: Atheneum, 1973). See also “The concept of a
language and the métier d’historien:  some  considerations  on  practice”,  in  Anthony  Pagden  (ed.), The
Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
19-38.  Pocock’s  old  and  more  recent  studies  of  theory  and  method  have  been  collected  in Political
thought and history: essays on theory and method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
165 The main thrust  of  earlier  objections was that  their  approach reduces the study of  the history of
political thought to antiquarianism and divests its of  contemporary “relevance”, and that their
empirical work does as radically surpass their predecessors as it is claimed in their methodological
manifestos. For a few examples, see Charles D. Tarlton, “Historicity, Meaning and Revisionism in the
Study of Political Thought”, History and Theory 12 (1973), 307-328.; the exchange between Pocock and
John  G.  Gunnell,  “Political  Theory,  Methodology  and  Myth”, Annals of Scholarship I, 4 (1981), 3-62.;
several studies in James Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge:
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representatives of “soft” and “hard linguistic contextualism”,166 and more recently
dubbed their approaches “conventionalism” and “contextualism” (without a
qualifier),167 respectively. Taking advantage of some of the more radical statements
of Pocock and Skinner – which are undoubtedly not too difficult to find and select,
especially in their earlier writings168 – Bevir construes them as equally fallacious
opponents of “intentionalism”, the one (Skinner) supposed to suggest that “authors
must follow the ruling conventions since they want to be understood”, the other
(Pocock), even worse, restricting authors to “bit parts as the mouthpieces of the
script-writing paradigms which constitute their conceptual frameworks.”169 On the
basis  of  this  caricature  of  their  positions,  they are  more  or  less  flatly  thrown in  the
same  camp  with  Michel  Foucault  –  to  whom  their  relationship  is  in  fact  rather
evidently ambivalent170 – and other representatives of “structural idealism,” who
supposedly reduce individual ideas to copies of a collective episteme or knowledge
structure.171 Bevir presumes to redress such errors by making a distinction between
semantic meanings, which are determined by language, and hermeneutic meanings,
which are not, and, while they are intentional, are also the only ones that concern
historians  as  they are  the  meanings  that  exist  for  specifiable  people,  come from the
ideas the author intended to express when making it, and therefore have a historical
existence. In proposing that texts in general cannot signify anything without
individuals’ intentions and that all meaning-giving activity in the world is
intentional, Bevir’s overall approach, which he builds on this basis and calls “weak
intentionalism”, dilutes a position more nuanced than his, namely, that which,
besides agency, also takes account of the role of culture as a scheme able to exercise a
Cambridge University Press, 1988). As these are of less immediate concern to the present subject, I do
not discuss them at length. More recent discussions of the contributions of Skinner and Pocock to the
field include D. N. DeLuna (ed.), The Political Imagination in History: Essays Concerning J. G. A. Pocock
(Baltimore:  Owlworks,  2006);  Annabel  Brett  and  James  Tully,  with  Holly  Hamilton-Bleakley  (eds.),
Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
166 Mark Bevir, “The errors of linguistic contextualism”, History and Theory, 31 (1992), 276-298.
167 Idem., The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. Ch. 2.
168 But,  for  instance,  in  the  preface  to  his  re-edited  methodological  writings,  among  many  other
changes Skinner avows to have “toned down the noisy polemics [he] used to enjoy.” Skinner, Visions
of Politics, I. vi.
169 Ibid., 34-5, 41
170 See, for instance, Skinner, Visions of Politics, I. 90-1, 117-9.
171 Bevir, Logic of the History of Ideas, 177-264.
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constraining effect on action by providing a background for beliefs – without
necessarily subscribing to a model of infinite cultural reproduction.172 Bevir’s
contentions  in  no way seem to  constitute  a  plausible  challenge to  an approach that
combines the exploration of speech acts, performed by individuals with sovereign
intentions  but  dependent  for  this  performance on a  stock of  tools  that  they may or
may not wish or be able to modify – but they certainly can, and occasionally do
modify them.
However, Bevir also makes a point that is – no doubt, unintentionally –
helpful in approximating the survey of translation theories and practices, and
linguistic contextualism, to one another. “We have to conceive of an intention not as
the prior purpose of the author, but rather as the meaning an utterance has for a
particular individual, whether he be its author or reader” (italics added).173 The
proposition that it is legitimate to attribute to readers intentions that constitute
meanings, is in fact not at all either unfamiliar or untenable to Pocock and Skinner.
As the former argues, “[t]he history of discourse is concerned with speech acts that
become known and evoke response, with illocutions that are modified as they
become perlocutions by the ways in which recipients respond to them … The reader
himself becomes an author [italics added], and the complex mode of Rezeptionsgeschichte
is required of the historian.”174 Pocock  invokes  Stanley  Fish  and  his  argument  that
“the text can be said to exert no authority over those who interpret it, but rather
becomes dissolved in the continuum of interpretation to which it once gave rise.”175
Skinner also refers to Fish, besides other theorists of interpretation working within
the “reader-response” framework. These include Wolfgang Iser and his proposition
that “one must take into account not only the actual text but also, and in equal
172 Bevir’s book evoked a torrent of critical response, almost – and perhaps a bit undeservedly – in the
fashion of the exchanges between Pocock and Skinner and their critics in the 1980s. Concerning this
polemic,  I  have  relied  on  the  contributions  of  Mark  Erickson,  Austin  Harrington  and  Andreas
Reckwitz to “Constructing the past: review symposium on Bevir’s The Logic of the History of Ideas”,
History of the Human Sciences, 15 (2002), 99-133.; the articles of Robert Stern, Melissa Lane and Brian
Young in the History of European Ideas, 28 (2002), 1-12, 33-41 and 101-117.; and also the Llyod S.
Kramer’s review article on Bevir’s book and Donald Kelley’s The Descent of Ideas, in Modern Intellectual
History, 1 (2004), 81-95.
173 Bevir, Logic of the History of Ideas, 67.
174 Pocock, “Introduction: The state of the art”, 18.
175 Ibid., 2.; Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 305.
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measure, the actions involved in responding to that text.”176 They also include Paul
Ricoeur and his suggestion that because of the polysemic and metaphorical features
of language, any text will acquire “an autonomous space of meaning which is no
longer  animated  by  the  intentions  of  its  author”,  and  therefore  in  the  act  of
interpretation “[w]hat the text says now matters more than what the author meant to
say” – hence, interpretation should assume the character of appropriation.177
Reflecting on these possibilities, Skinner clearly distinguishes between three
kinds of meaning: first,  that of the words or sentences in a given text;  second, what
the text means to “me”, i.e., the reader; third, what a writer means by what is said in
a given text. Though not inattentive to meaning 2, he has always shown himself more
interested in meaning 3 –  perhaps because concerned more “with the pointillist
study of sudden conceptual shifts” than conceptual change over “the slower march
of time,”178 as he avows in comparing his own work to that of Reinhart Koselleck. On
the  other  hand,  Pocock’s  classic  explorations  of  the  language  of  the  ancient
constitution, or the Atlantic republican tradition179 can be plausibly interpreted as a
reconstruction of series of “acts of reading”180 performed on the “texts” of these
traditions by the protagonists, who are competent enough in using the extant
vocabularies to turn them into new “speech acts” and thereby pursue agendas
specific to their own political, social and cultural contexts. As in the period in focus
the principal medium of passing down a tradition was the printed text, and the ticket
to  membership  of  the  community  of  speakers  of  a  political  language  was  the
absorption  of  such  texts,  these  speakers  –  authors  –  were  also  readers  who,  in
176 Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”, New Literary History, 3:2
(1972), 279.
177 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 174, 201. For Skinner’s references to Iser, Ricoeur and Fish, see
“Motives, intentions and interpretation”, in Visions of Politics, I. 92-3.
178 Quentin  Skinner,  “Retrospect:  Studying  rhetoric  and  conceptual  change”,  in Visions of Politics, I.
180.
179 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in
the Seventeenth Century. A Reissue with a Retrospect [1957] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987); idem., The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, revised ed. 2003).
180 Cf. one of the most influential studies in literary reception theory (to be considered in some detail
below), Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
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Skinner’s terms, first construed “meanings 2” and then, on condition of having done
so, went on to construing “meanings 3”.
Insofar as these processes remain within the boundaries of a single discursive
tradition, like civic humanism or natural law, they would mainly resemble “intra-
lingual” translation, a notion introduced by Roman Jakobson to describe the
interpretation of verbal signs by other verbal signs of the same language.181 In  a
certain sense, redescription, the use of synonyms whose effect, either as a result of a
deliberately chosen rhetorical strategy or by way of unintended consequences, is
conceptual change, is a case of “intra-lingual translation.”182 But  as  the  history  of
political discourse has been convincingly shown to involve a great deal of interaction
among  the  various  available  vocabularies,  in  the  terms  just  used  it  is  not  very
dissimilar from inter-lingual translation, and on several occasion Pocock was
tempted to describe it as such:
“The history of discourse now becomes visible as one of traditio in the sense of
transmission  and,  still  more,  translation.  Texts  composed  of langues and
paroles, of stable language structures and the speech acts and innovations that
modify them, are transmitted and reiterated, and their components are
severally transmitted and reiterated, first by nonidentical actors in shared
historical contexts, and then by actors in historically discrete contexts. Their
history is, first, that of the constant adaptation, translation, and reperformance
of the text in a succession of contexts by a succession of agents …”183
Elsewhere he urges that “[w]e should pay more attention than we have done to the
phenomenon of translation [this time inter-lingual]”, and suggests that “much
depends upon Rezeption and reader response; the reader and interpreter may have
the resources of rhetoric at his disposal too. Many an author has found himself a
more radical innovator than, or even than, he intended to be or ever admitted he
181 Roman  Jakobson,  “Linguistic  Aspects  of  Translation”,  in Language and Literature, ed. Krystyna
Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 428-35.
182 Redescription is a crucial category in Skinner’s reinterpretation of Hobbes, see Quentin Skinner,
Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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was.”184 Thus, inasmuch as Bevir’s above-mentioned point – which is not developed
further  by  him  –  is  also  a  tacit  criticism  of  linguistic  contextualism,  it  seems  to  be
misplaced. Similarly, while preoccupied with intentions as they become manifest in
speech acts,  Skinner  and especially  Pocock in  no way imply that  authors  possess  a
sort of monopoly over the meaning of the texts they produce,185 and their approaches
are capable of extension towards the incorporation of reader response.
Martyn P. Thompson has in fact proposed such a refinement of what he calls
“the ‘new’ history of political thought.” He has examined the methods of Pocock and
Skinner in comparison with the interpretation of historical meaning in literary
Rezeptionsgeschichte. While Thompson’s summary judgment that by the former “the
reader has been largely neglected” is somewhat exaggerated (and attenuated by
Thompson himself later on),186 it is certainly acceptable that the historical
understanding of texts aimed bz linguistic contextualism would stand to gain in
sophistication by incorporating some of the insights of reception theory, in which
“the reader as creator of textual meanings occupies the central position.”  Launched
as a “provocation”187 to both the marginalization of historical studies in literature,
and its canon-centred approach (in this sense sharing some of the main concerns of
linguistic contextualism), reception history dismissed substantialist text theory,
which restricts any meaning a text might have to what could have been intended by
the author, and embraced the pragmatic theory, which attributes to the text merely a
potentiality for meaning.188 It  is  worth  remembering  that  speech  act  theory,  also  a
pragmatic approach to language, significantly inspired Rezeptionsgeschichte in
183 Pocock, “Introduction: The state of the art”, 20-1.
184 Pocock, “The concept of a language and the métier d’historien”, 20, 34.
185 Cf.  the objection to Skinner by Dominick LaCapra,  “Rethinking Intellectual  History and Reading
Texts”, History and Theory, 19 (1980), 245-276, revised version in Dominick LaCapra and Steven J.
Kaplan (eds.), Modern European Intellectual History. Reappraisals and New Perspectives (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1982), 47-85, here esp. 57-60.
186 Martyn P. Thompson, “Reception Theory and the Interpretation of Historical Meaning”, History and
Theory, 32 (1993), 248-72, here 248 and 271.
187 As  the  very  title  of  a  book  by  its  central  figure  reveals,  Hans  Robert  Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als
Provokation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970).
188 On the allegiance of Rezeptionsgescichte to pragmatic, rather than substantive text theory, see ibid.,
154-67.; Günter Grimm, Rezeptionsgeschichte (München: Beck, 1977), 117-44.
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conceptualizing reception as both a reproductive and creative activity.189 On this
view, the intended meaning of the author, even if recoverable, matters little in
comparison with the specific meanings (Konkretisationen),  which  arise  in  the  act  of
reading and depend on its understanding by the reader according to the context of
reading – time and place, historical and cultural circumstances, and the resulting
“horizon of expectations” (Erwartungshorizont). While it is not clear why it should be
necessary, as Hans Robert Jauss claims, that historians also ought to place themselves
within a tradition of interpretations by adopting the role of the critic, and his studied
neglect of intended meanings altogether involves a contradiction,190 the contention
that historians should pay more attention to reconstructing the changing stock of
experience, expectations and purposes with which readers approached texts and
(re)constructed their meanings, is very valid. While the text to a considerable extent
determines the range of meaningful questions to be asked by its readers, they are the
ones who decide, in terms of their “horizon of expectations”, what exactly they will
ask – not to speak of the possible answers. The reader as co-author certainly harbours
intentions which come into play when “[t]he convergence of text and reader brings
the literary work into existence.”191 To recall Skinner’s categories once more, the
“meaning 2” which the reader creates inevitably reflects these intentions, before, in
case s/he is also an author in the more usual sense, such “meaning 2” itself is
moulded into intentions and thereby turned into “meaning 3”. This is also a useful
perspective on authors preparing a revised edition of their own work, in an act of re-
reading, taking place with intentions and a “horizon of expectations” different from
that with which it was first conceived.
As Thompson suggests then, “the history of receptions is constantly involved
with as many attempts to elicit the recipients’ intended meanings as there are pieces
189 See, for instance, Iser, The  Act  of  Reading, 54 ff. Other sources, again, similarly to linguistic
contextualism, included hermeneutics, associated with Gadamer, and the approach to the philosophy
of science reperesented by Kuhn. For a survey, see Robert C. Holub, Reception Theory: A Critical
Introduction (London and New York: Methuen, 1984).
190 Cf.  The  theses  put  forward  in  Hans  Robert  Jauss,  “Literary  History  as  a  Challenge  to  Literary
Theory”,  in  R.  Cohen  (ed.), New Directions in Literary History (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,
1974), 28.; and the objections of Thompson, “Reception Theory”, 257 ff.
191 Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach”, 285.
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of textual evidence available.”192 If it is desirable that a correlation exists between the
character of the source material and the methodology whereby it is interpreted,
Thompson’s proposition that Rezeptionsgeschichte provides useful strategies for
intellectual history, is both reinforced by the survey of translation theories and
practices from the Renaissance to early Romanticism presented above, and ought to
be taken seriously when dealing with the role of translation in this period. One need
only to recall the humanists who, to a very considerable extent, set the framework in
which translation was conceptualized and pursued into the eighteenth century.
Fausto da Longiano explicitly defined two levels of the translating act, the translator
being a reader at the first and writer at the second; similarly, in Étienne Dolet’s work
reading and analysis, aiming at the full comprehension of the author’s “sense and
subject,” are processes distinct from, and preceding that of composition and
articulation, the conceptual distinctiveness of these phases also being reflected in the
character of rules and procedures to be followed by the translator in them. In terms
of  the  second  phase,  criteria  of  a  new  autonomous  art  form  are  promoted,
abandoning reference to the origins in the translated text, which has “forgotten its
beginnings, not to mention its stated purpose.”193 The humanists did not raise the
issue of Erwartungshorizont, because they were convinced that their enthusiasm for
the ancients guaranteed that their questions were the same as theirs. But if this
element is added, translation may be seen as an act of reading inspired by a quest for
the  author’s  “sense  and  subject”  but  in  terms  of  questions  asked  by  the  translator,
whose coincidence with those of the author is contingent. This is then followed by a
speech act, which consists of a conversion of the “meaning 2” resulting from the act
of reading into “meaning 3”, whose overlap with that of the author is even more
contingent because the translator acts no longer only as an interrogator but as an
author with at least partially independent claims. It must be added that the “partial”
character of the independence of such claims, i.e., the boundaries within which the
translator’s intentions can be realized, arise not only from any constraints that the
original text (both authorial intentions and the discursive traditions or “language”, in
192 Thompson, “Reception Theory”, 257.
193 Norton, The Ideology and Language of Translation, 200-16.
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the Pocockian sense, manifest in it) might place on the translator: his/her own
natural language to some extent also possesses and exerts the force of a paradigm.
Let us imagine the encounter of the Abbé Prévost, an habitué of Parisian polite
society, with Richardson’s Pamela.   The  Abbé  would  certainly  be  taken  by  the
effective representations of middle class sensibility and morality, and also taken
aback  by  what  look  to  him  manifestations  of  a  rusticity  –  still  perceived  as
characteristic of the English – that would seem out of place in such a literary work.
He nevertheless recognizes in the novel a suitable vehicle for the advancement of an
agenda, apparently shared with Richardson, and decides to weed out “remainders of
the  old  and uncouth British  ways”  that  to  him would seem to  hamper  this  pursuit.
Furthermore, this would be done in the full conviction that this is also the most
appropriate way of doing justice to the qualities inherent in the original. To all
intents and purposes, in this case the horizon of expectations with which the
translator performs the act of reading is the same as the range of intentions that can
be detected in the original. Also, the translator’s agenda, while shaped independently
from and prior to the encounter with the original text, consists of intentions not very
different from those of the author – only to the extent that they also include the
intention of improving the original performance for the sake of reaching shared
objectives through an act of re-composition. Even in this case, while Prévost’s
“meaning 2” is not substantially different from Richardson’s “meaning 3”, the
former’s  “meaning  3”  in  the  French  translation  is  somewhat  removed  from  that  of
the latter in the English Pamela.194 In a rather different case, Christian Garve was fully
aware that Cicero’s De Officiis was  written  for  “persons  of  the  higher  classes  who
participated in the affairs of the state” for whom “moral prescription often
transformed  into  political  instruction.”  Yet  he  recognized  that  the  book,  when
translated into German and equipped with a proper philosophical commentary,
might forward the cause of German popular philosophy, a philosophical theory of
moral and aesthetic action educating the private citizen to virtuous life and
194 To be sure, contemporary discussions of the issue fully licensed him to consider his own reputation
as  well  as  that  of  his  model  to  interfere  with  the  original.  Sir  Samuel  Garth,  “Preface”  in Ovid’s
Metamorphoses (London, 1720), 1. Steiner, English Translation Theory, 53.
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sociability.195 Here, Garve’s Erwartungshorizont very substantially determines the
sense he makes of Cicero through reading the De Officiis, and the latter’s “meaning 3”
is hardly more important than the arising “meaning 2” in developing Garve’s own
“meaning 3” in the translation. We shall see that there are more extreme cases too.
Even these are sufficient for the time being to argue that while it is certainly possible
to  propose  that  in  translating  X,  Y  “got  him/her  wrong”,  this  also  entails  an
imposition of our current “horizon of expectations” vis-à-vis translation practices in
the past, when such expectations did not exist. Such “mistranslations” carried a value
for their producers and intended consumers, and that should be the primary concern
for  the  historian of  translations.  What  is  more,  even when the  plea  for  fidelity,  and
the case for “foreignizing” translation appeared towards the end of the eighteenth
century, such translations were also conceived to be instrumental, rather than an end
in themselves, and their underlying domestic agendas are of as much interest and
consequence as the philosophical underpinnings, or the fact that they “anticipate”
(some of) our contemporary standards.
Valuable studies now exist on chapters in the history of reception through
translation, and I shall present a few examples below. Before that, it will be also
helpful to relate the methodological endeavours outlined above to the German study
of the history of concepts as it has emerged since the 1960s. Begriffsgeschichte has been
usually, and certainly not without merit, associated with the towering figure of
Reinhart Koselleck and the emblematic undertaking of the Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe, the multi-volume lexicon of social and political language in
Germany.196
The initial methodological commitments of Begriffsgeschichte can be identified
in Koselleck’s introduction to this project. “Basic concepts” are clusters of words
which constitute a field of meaning and express goals and expectations as to the
nature of the organization of society and the polity, and thereby function as vehicles
of the movement of history. As such, they do not merely indicate and register social
and political change, but also affect it, because it is through concepts that a horizon of
195 Van der Zande, “The Microscope of Experience”, 75.
196 Otto  Brunner,  Werner  Conze,  Reinhart  Koselleck  (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches
Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, I-VIII (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1978).
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expectations is conceived, against which structural transformation is conceptualized
and  acted  upon.  The  character  of  being  contested  is  essential  for  a  concept  to  be
“basic”: in times of social and political conflict, the clash of interests is accompanied
by a semantic struggle to define and control positions and settle disagreements about
usage and rules to one’s advantage. The methodological principles of
Begriffsgeschichte that arise from these features comprise, besides the application of
traditional historical criticism, historical semantics, i.e. the diachronic and synchronic
analysis of language using both semasiology (the study of all meanings of a single
term) and onomasiology (the study of all terms for the same concept, and the reliance
on an unusually broad range of sources discrepant in origin and appeal,  from texts
by classic thinkers, through products of the press, government, administrative and
bureaucratic  documents,  reports  of  speeches,  private  papers,  to  contemporary
dictionaries. Some of these are seen as distinguished by their unique and time-bound
character, others by their greater amount of normativity. Such complexity is required
by  the  fact  that,  similarly  to  social  history, Begriffsgeschichte is concerned with
“iterative structures” or the “repeatability” of phenomena, for it is from the
juxtaposition of these to the historically unique that the momentum of change can be
demonstrated.197
The  editors  of  the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe also posited a time period and
subject matter they regarded especially appropriate to the methodological principles
of the history of concepts: the so-called Sattelzeit, the period of the transformation of
Alt-Europa into modern Europe between c. 1750-1850, which is marked by accelerated
conceptual shifts. The hypotheses being tested included that of Verzeitlichung (the
tendency to use notions of historical time for creating a horizon within which
concepts are to function – the imposition of temporal patterns upon social and
political thought); Demokratisierung (the spread of the use of political and social
vocabulary beyond the elite); Ideologisierbarkeit (the  increasing  incorporation  of
197 Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte”, in Christian Ludz (ed.), Soziologie
und Sozialgeschichte = Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 16 (Opladen,
1972), 116-31, English translation as “Social History and Conceptual History”, in idem., The Practice of
Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel Presner et al. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2002), idem., “Begriffsgeschichtliche Probleme der
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concepts into “isms” that record the tension between experience and expectations);
and Politisierung (the tendency of concepts to be caught up in political mobilization).
However, given that the study of continuity and change in the semantic coverage of
basic social and political concepts requires a concern with the “time layers”
(Zeitschichten) manifest in them, i.e., leftovers of earlier meanings whose permanence
varies, the majority of the 118 entries in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe take a longue
durée approach and reach back and forth in time according to the character of the
concept under scrutiny.
The programme of Begriffsgeschichte arose from reservations towards
traditional Geistesgeschichte and Ideengeschichte in a similar fashion to the Cambridge
scholars’ critique of a history of ideas hallmarked by the names of Lovejoy and
Sabine, and both have long been recognized as parts of the general movement in the
1960s towards a heightened awareness of the significance of language for historical
analysis.198 Nevertheless,  the  approach  taken  in  the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe has
been criticized not only because, supposedly, the thesis of the Sattelzeit (of  which
Koselleck has acknowledged to have obscured rather than advanced the project,
though without any consequence for the method)199 more or less predetermined the
findings of the project’s contributors.200 And the method itself has been regarded
with some suspicion not only by social historians, to whom it seemed to represent an
older, historicist and hermeneutical style of historiography. After all, Koselleck
himself has repeatedly emphasized the social and political function of the
Verfassungsgeschichtsschreibung”, in Gegenstand und Begriffe der Verfassungsgeschichtsschreibung = Der
Staat, Beiheft 6 (Berlin, 1983), 7-21.
198 For a recent discussion of the inspiration behind the project of Begriffsgeschichte and its relation to
previous  schools  of  inquiry  in  the  history  of  ideas,  see  Elías  José  Palti,  “From  Ideas  to  Concepts  to
Metaphors:  The  German  Tradition  of  Intellectual  History  and  the  Complex  Fabric  of  Language”,
History and Theory, 49 (2010), 194-211.
199 Reinhart Koselleck, “A response to comments on the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe”  in  Hartmut
Lehmann, Melvin Richter (eds.), The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts. New Studies on
Begriffsgeschichte (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1996), 69. Again, I shall not be
concerned here with an important line of criticism which attributes any shortcomings Begriffsgeschichte
might have to its provenance from an inter-war “radical conservative” intellectual disaffection, not
with German modernity but modernity as such;  and with the the study of concepts was not a methid
that generated the notion of Sattelzeit but the notion of Sattelzeit that provided a framework for
conceptual history to be practised. But see for a concise statement Daniel Gordon, “Modernity and its
discontents: some critical thoughts on conceptual history”, History of European Ideas 25 (1999), 23-29.
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relationship between words and things, and has warned against the dilution of
history in discourse: “no speech act is itself the action which it helps prepare, trigger,
and enact;” or elsewhere: “even though all speech is action, not all actions are speech
acts.”201 However, precisely this feature has seemed too narrow from the angle of a
programme of social-historical semantics, inconceivable without the inspiration from
the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, yet formulated at some critical distance to it. Its
initiator, Rolf Reichardt has suggested that the “reality content”
(Wirklichkeitscharakter)  which  concepts  possess  is  not  less  than  that  of  material
relations, and therefore ought to be considered as independent socio-political factors
in the construction of consciousness and the motivation of conduct. He has proposed
to abandon “walks to the summits of the history of ideas” (i.e. the study of canonized
texts – still a widely pursued path in the articles of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe)
altogether, and explore collective linguistic usages and ways of thinking strictly on
the  basis  of  sources  whose  character  is,  appropriately,  equally  collective,  but  which
also include visual sources, collective symbols and rituals.202 At the same time,
linguists have reminded that the theoretical eclecticism of Begriffsgeschichte tended to
undermine its methodological clarity.203
One  of  the  reasons  for  the  uneasiness  with  the  Koselleckian  brand  of
conceptual  history,  also  not  entirely  offset  by  Reichardt’s  intervention,  is  the
allegation that it studies the history of language without speakers, and indeed this is
the line which has been overwhelmingly taken in the engagement with
Begriffsgeschichte by scholars working within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of intellectual
history. Skinner’s own attitude for a long time was summed up in the claim that
200 For criticism of the practice of Begriffsgeschichte even when its approach was applauded, see Helmut
Berding, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte”, Historische Zeitschrift, 223 (1976), 98-110.; James
Sheehan, “Begriffsgeschichte: Theory and Practice”, Journal of Modern History, 50 (1978), 312-19.
201 Koselleck, “Sozialgeschichte und Begriffsgeschichte”, 94 (25 in the English edition, cf. n. 123); idem.,
“Feindbegriffe”, Jahrbuch der Deutschen Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1994),
84.
202 Rolf Reichardt, “Einleitung”, in Rolf Reichardt, Eberhard Schmidt (eds.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer
Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820, 1/2 (München: Beck, 1985). See also idem., “Historische Sematik
zwischen lexicométrie und New Cultural History. Einführende bemerkungen zur
Standortsbestimmung”, in Aufklärung und Historische Semantik. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur
westeuropäischen Kulturgeschichte = Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, Beiheft 21 (Berlin, 1998), 7-28.;
for the research tendencies inspired by Begriffsgeschichte in the broader sense, Günter Scholtz (ed.), Die
Interdisziplinarität der Begriffsgeschichte = Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Sonderheft (Hamburg, 2000).
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“there  can  be  no  histories  of  concepts;  there  can  only  be  histories  of  their  uses  in
argument”, while Pocock, though finding the idea (and reality) of a historical lexicon
of principal terms and concepts “a genuinely interesting possibility”, he also queried
to  “which  history”  the  terms  collected  in  such  a  lexicon  are  basic,  and  what
morphology of “life forms” is uncovered in tracing their history.204 What is at issue is
agency,  without  which,  from  the  “Cambridge”  perspective,  there  can  be  no
historicity. More recently, Skinner has claimed that he is not “unhappy” with the
suggestion that much of his own research “might be regarded as a contribution to
one aspect of the vastly more ambitious programme pursued by Reinhart Koselleck”,
which is “nothing else than the entire process of conceptual change”, while he
himself is interested in “one of the techniques by which it  takes place”, adding that
the two endeavours do not seem incompatible.205 Yet, “[h]ow far one can capture the
historicity of concepts by adopting Koselleck’s approach remains a question” to him,
as to several other scholars.206
It might be, and it has been, objected that as “basic concepts” are by definition
contested ones, Begriffsgeschichte cannot avoid a strong concern with interests, which
can only belong to specific groups of speakers, and hence the issue of agency cannot
be circumvented. It can also be argued that familiarity with the history of the
conceptual resources available to a thinker is a prerequisite for identifying the uses to
which they were put by him. Finally, while the imaginative use of the philosophical
theory of speech acts, combined with the identification of political languages, might
be recommended as an avenue to refresh Begriffsgeschichte, the perspective of the
latter might be a welcome corrective to the lack of interest, detected in Pocock and
203 See Dietrich Busse, Historische Semantik, Analyse eines Programms (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987).
204 Quentin Skinner, “Reply to My Critics”, in Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, 283.; and John Pocock,
“Concepts and Discourses: A Difference in Culture?”, in Lehmann, Richter (eds.), The Meaning of Terms
and Concepts, 50, 52, 54.
205 Quentin  Skinner,  “Retrospect:  Studying  rhetoric  and  conceptual  change”,  in Visions of Politics, I.
186-7. For the distinction between Skinner’s and Koselleck’s approach to conceptual change, see Kari
Palonen, “Quentin Skinner’s Rhetoric of Conceptual Change”, History of the Human Sciences, 10 (1997),
61-80; idem., “Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives on Conceptual Change”, Finnish Yearbook of
Political Thought, 3 (1999), 41-59.
206 Most particularly perhaps, James Schmidt, “How historical is Begriffsgeschichte?”, History of
European Ideas, 25 (1999), 9-14, even claiming that especially the use of contemporary dictionaries and
encyclopaedias as sources suggests that the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe “is  concerned  not  so  much
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Skinner, in the way groups, movements, or parties evaluate and perceive social
changes.
Based on such considerations, and many more, over the past twenty years or
so Melvin Richter has tirelessly urged a “closer understanding” between these two
approaches.207 There are also numerous other attempts to examine them in a
comparative perspective. Some share Richter’s goal, namely, methodological cross-
fertilization, while others choose to stress the difficulties involved.208 It has also been
suggested209 that, if such an endeavour is to yield results, it ought to rely not merely
on the achievement of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe itself, but rather on case studies
that emerged from the same research context but fed into social-historical discourse
analysis210 – a line of inquiry which, besides the already mentioned German
initiatives, has also been emerging in France since the 1970s, inspired by the
linguistic theories of Michel Pêcheux, and whose proposition to interpret each
utterance  as  a  concretised  usage  of  concepts  and  arguments  deriving  from  the
general themes and conventions of socio-political discourse,211 is highly relevant.
with  what  individuals  are  doing  to  a  concept,  but  rather  with  what  a  concept  is  doing,  behind  the
backs and above the heads of individuals.”
207 Melvin Richter, “Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas”, Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987),
247-63.; idem., “Pocock, Skinner and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe”, History and Theory 19 (1990), 38-
70. also republished as Chapter 6 of idem., The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); idem., “Reply to Comments”, History of European
Ideas 25 (1999), 131-37.; idem., “Conceptualizing the Contestable: Begriffsgeschichte and Political
Concepts”, in Scholtz (ed.), Interdisziplinarität der Begriffsgeschichte, 135-43. Other Anglophone scholars
have been embracing conceptual history in an attempt to move beyond Pocock and Skinner, arguing
“that the reconcepotualization f the state means that the scope of that context has to be drawn far more
widely [than textually]”. See Mark Knights, “Towards a Social and Cultural History of Keywords and
Concepts by the Early odern Research Group”, History of Political Thought, 31:3 (2010), 427-48, here 432.
208 Iain Hampsher-Monk, “Speech Acts, Languages or Conceptual History?” and Terence Ball,
“Conceptual History and the History of Political Thought” tend to take the latter approach, while the
former is represented by Martin van Gelderen, “Between Cambridge and Heidelberg. Concepts,
Languages and Images in Intellectual History”, each in Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank
van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 1998), 37-50, 75-86, 227-238.
209 Hans Erich Bödeker, “Ausprägungen der historischen Semantik in den historischen
Kulturwissenschaften” and “Reflexionen über Begriffsgeschichte als Methode”, both in Bödeker (ed.),
Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 7-28, 73-122.
210 For instance, Willibald Steinmetz, Das Sagbare und das Machbare. Zum Wandel politischer
Handlungsspielräume: England 1780-1867 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993), for the methodological
considerations see 30-44.
211 See, among a huge number of studies, Régine Robin, Histoire et linguistique (Paris: Armand Colin,
1973); idem., Jacques Guilhaumou, Denise Maldidier, “Effets de l’archive. L’analyse de discours au
côté de l’histoire”, Langages 81 (1986), 43-56.; Jacques Guilhaumou, Denise Maldidier, Régine Robin,
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The space devoted here to the polemics around Begriffsgeschichte is
considerably less than a satisfactory discussion would require, and somewhat more
than a mere signalling of relevance would make necessary. The reason why this
account serves the present purpose is that it intends to identify a significant gap in
both the criticism levelled at Begriffsgeschichte and the attempts to build bridges
between it and the “Cambridge school”: the centrality of the phenomenon of
reception. While neither the fact nor its value has been disputed, nor has it appeared
as a possible common platform between the two approaches. While this may have to
do with the apparent insensitivity of Pocock and Skinner to the issue of reception, I
hope to have demonstrated that this is not the case, and wish to argue that (contrary
to the more general suggestions of Richter) this is a specific field in which clearly
identifiable methodological pursuits in Begriffsgeschichte may make a mutual impact
with linguistic contextualism, in a fashion similar to that of Rezeptionsgeschichte.
Scholars have called attention to the fact that both Jauss and Koselleck
encountered the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer in Heidelberg, and this
became a shared intellectual legacy which was put to highly creative uses by them.
“In its own way, Begriffsgeschichte is a form of Rezeptionsgeschichte, charting the course
of the reception of concepts, and examining the experience that they both contain and
make possible”, writes the English translator and editor of Koselleck’s essays on
historical theory.212 The  term Erwartungshorizont,  which  Jauss  appropriated  for
literary studies from sociological literature (notably Mannheim),213 and its
counterpart Erfahrungsraum,  serve  remarkably  similar  purposes  in  the  two
approaches, and in both of them were perhaps the keys to taking philosophical
hermeneutics “from its ontological and epistemological heights to make it relevant
for the practice of history.”214 It is through them that the historicity of concepts
evolves: the idea that texts, on the one hand, cease to operate as stable entities but
become subject to transformation by the readings, re-readings, commentaries etc.
Discours et archive. Expérimentations en analyse du discours (Liége: Mardaga, 1994); Jacques Guilhaumou,
“De l’histoire des concepts à l’histoire linguistique des usages conceptuels”, Genèses 38 (2000), 15-38.
212 Keith Tribe, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of
Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xviii. Cf. Richter, The History of Social and
Political Concepts, 34-5.
213 Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory”, 36.
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which constitute the process of reception, while on the other hand they emerge as
elements in the modification of the experience of readers. The notion of the existence
of different Zeitschichten,  “time layers” in any given concept,  has the same effect by
suggesting that, independently of their initial application, concepts are capable of
acquiring and accumulating a variety of meanings, some of which are sifted out
relatively soon but others survive long and converge or conflict with new ones. To
put it bluntly, then, concepts do not have histories, only their reception has a history,
and it is only by recognizing this that it becomes possible to grasp conceptual
change.215
Closely related to the framing of the history of concepts as the history of
reception, is Koselleck’s “fascination” with translation and his stress on the
importance of the comparative study of concepts in different languages, explained by
reference to the fact that semantics concerns not language in general,  but particular
languages.216 He briefly points to a few examples that open up an immense field for
such comparisons, such as the virtual un-translatability of Bildung, or the difficulty of
Germanic and Slavic languages in rendering terminology of Latin derivation.
However, a more systematic attempt to highlight the possibilities of the inter-lingual
comparison of concepts inherent in translation is made by Ulrich Ricken in an article
following Koselleck’s in the same collection. Ricken discusses the discrepancy
between Aufklärung and lumiéres, immediately visible in the hopeless struggle of
French translators with the German term – for instance, Mendelssohn’s famous 1784
title Was hei?t aufklären has been rendered as Que signifie ‘aufklären’.  Part  of  the
difficulty stems from the fact that while in French, lumiéres was  one among several
important terms to denote the concept, Aufklärung had  no  rival;  a  fact  which  arose
not from the different character of the phenomenon itself, but from the greater
capacity of the German language to organize the lexical field in a “mono-centric”
fashion, thanks to the infinite possibility of crafting composite words from the same
root. Thus, Kant’s subtle distinction between in einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter and in
214 An image used in Van Gelderen, “Between Cambridge and Heidelberg”, 229.
215 For a concise statement, see Reinhart Koselleck, “Hinweise auf die temporale Strukturen
begriffsgeschichtlichen Wandels”, in Bödeker (ed.), Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte,
Metapherngeschichte, esp. 33-8.
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einem Zeitalter der Aufklärung –  result  and  process  –  is  only  possible  to  render  in
French by paraphrase. Next, and related, while aufklärer and Aufklärung were
neologisms, lumiéres and éclairé belonged to the basic French vocabulary, frequently
used in their concrete and complex sense, with the result that their application to the
concept of enlightenment required (and still requires) additional contextual means.217
To be sure, the mere fact that Was ist Aufklärung? was  put  as  a  prize  question
demonstrates  that  the  field  of  meaning itself  was  unstable  –  or,  heavily  contested –
even  within  one  community  of  speakers,  so  it  should  be  even  less  surprising  to
discover barriers in the way of the relevant vocabulary when transposed into a
community of speakers with a different natural language. But the difference in each
between the connecting terms of the field, the relationships of synonymity,
antonymity and complementarity that exist between them, shows nothing less than
the difference of those contests themselves, which is very nearly what comparative
history is about.
*   *   *   *   *
The recognition that historians of ideas should seriously reckon with translation as a
path of reception in the history of ideas is certainly not new. Nevertheless,  the past
fifteen years or so have witnessed an intensification of this interest, and in several
studies some of the methodological assumptions outlined above have been explicitly
or implicitly applied. Let us briefly examine three such studies, very different in
scope, in the chronological order of their subject matter.
The first one is an article by David Saunders on the translations of the works
of Samuel Pufendorf by the Huguenot émigré Jean Barbeyrac, which established the
latter’s reputation as a pre-eminent translator of seventeenth-century Latin natural
216 Ibid., 40 ff.
217 Ulrich Ricken, “Zum Verhältnis vergleichender Begriffsgeschichte und vergleichender
Lexikologie”, in Bödeker (ed.), Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte, 49-72. See also
Rolf Reichardt, “Die Revolution – ‘ein magisches Spiel’. Historisch-politische Begriffsbildung in
französisch-deutschen Übersetzungen”, in Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, Rolf Reichardt (eds.),
Kulturtransfer im Epochenumbruch. Frankreich-Deutschland 1770-1805 (Leizig: Universitätsverlag, 1997),
879-999.
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law texts into French.218 The title itself leaves no doubt that translation is regarded as
adjustment, “a strategic art, a weapon for serious struggle”, in which the stake for the
Protestant refugee was the rejoining of “civil duties to religious morality and delimit
state  authority  in  the  face  of  individual  conscience”  –  a  rather  far  cry  from
Pufendorf’s radical separation of natural law from moral theology and his
consequent secularization of civil authority for the sake of the protection of public
peace. Saunders takes adjustment, explained by him with reference to the
heterogeneous character of early-modern natural law, to be overwhelmingly a matter
of deliberate intervention by the translator, and illustrates this in several ways. First,
some lexical and syntactic choices adopted, not primarily in Barbeyrac’s own 1707
translation, but in the English edition  of  Pufendorf  in  1717,  which  relied  on
Barbeyrac’s French version for revising the 1691 English text. Second, we are
presented  with  Barbeyrac’s  1718  translation  of  and  especially  his  response  to
Leibniz’s  critique of  Pufendorf,  which show him to  be  ambivalent  between the  two
contenders: while distancing himself from Leibniz, by allowing conscience to pre-
empt civil authority these texts also jeopardize Pufendorf’s strategy of legitimating
an absolutist state that would not subordinate civil authority to confessional ends,
and tend to re-insert natural law into moral theology. Third and last, Saunders
discusses Barbeyrac’s discourses on morality and civil laws, published as appendices
in the 1718 edition of Pufendorf’s Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoien, to arrive at a
similar conclusion.
The article successfully undermines the view that Barbeyrac was a mediator,
both in the sense of mediating Pufendorf in a medium different from Latin, and in
the sense of occupying “middle ground” between the “voluntarism” of Pufendorf
and the “rationalism” of Leibniz. It also enhances our appreciation both of the variety
of natural law in the early Enlightenment, and adds to our understanding of the
nuances of “rival Enlightenments” along the cleavage between “civil” and
“metaphysical” philosophy.219 What it does not, of course, do is analyse the function,
218 David Saunders, “The Natural Jurisprudence of Jean Barbeyrac: Translation as an Act of Political
Adjustment”, Eighteenth-Century Studies 36:4 (2003), 473-490.
219 Cf. T. J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000); Hunter, Rival Enlightenments.
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the process, the instrumentality of the very “act” of translation in all of this.
Translation indeed functions as an “excuse” here, most probably not for Barbeyrac
but definitely so for Saunders, and could be safely deleted from the title of an article
which treats Barbeyrac as an independent natural law theorist polemicizing both
with the author he happens to translate and his chief opponent, a polemics presented
as  taking place  largely  outside  the  translated text.  It  is  not  asked why and to  what
extent this exercise of “adjustment” should seem to Barbeyrac himself as depending
on his very substantial investment into translating Pufendorf, nor is it shown how it
is pursued by the act of translation itself. Under such circumstances the question how
far the linguistic and conceptual tools available for the translator played a role,
besides his well-documented intentions, in determining the meaning of the
translated text, cannot even be raised.
Such questions certainly occupy an important place in Fania Oz-Salzberger’s
ambitious book that traces the trajectories of Scottish “civic discourse” in eighteenth-
century Germany.220 In many ways, this is a pioneering study bringing together
developments in Enlightenment studies (such as the flourishing of eighteenth-
century Scottish studies and the debate over the “plurality” of the Enlightenment in
“national” contexts) with the aim to provide a comparative history as it can be
evolved  from  reception  largely  through  translation.  It  explicitly  relies  on  the
Cambridge-style analysis of “political languages” (mainly its Pocockian version),
with some inspiration also drawn from Begriffsgeschichte,  for  its  methodology.  The
substantive achievement of the book is defined by Oz-Salzberger as having shown
that “religious language was capable of transforming a vocabulary of political action
into a spiritual and inward-looking discourse, as part of an inadvertent shift of
meaning in translated texts,”221 while she strongly disclaims any affinity with the
Sonderweg thesis: the story presented is one “of the depoliticization of political ideas,
but it is not a story of a straightforward rejection of ‘liberal’ or ‘radical’ political
theory  in  favour  of  a  ‘conservative’  or  ‘reactionary’  status  quo.  …  [it  is]  a
transformation of a moderate statement of republican activism into a language of
220 Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment. Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-Century
Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
221 Ibid., 27.
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spiritual perfectibilism.”222 In defining her unit of comparison, she shows that so
many similarities between Scotland and Germany in the field of national and
historical consciousness, problems of identity, traditions of learning, social profiles
and intellectual character were “affinities bordering on dissimilarities”, which
congealed especially in the different character of politicization in the two countries,
with the result that Germans lacked the contexts of a terminology that was new and
controversial in Scotland too.
This observation gives Oz-Salzberger the occasion to introduce her
methodological principles. “The concept of ‘political language’ is vital for studying
the German reception of Scottish texts”, she argues, for “‘translation’ in this case
involves problems of transmitting a vocabulary – and indeed a blend of several
vocabularies – of interdependent terms denoting particular traditions of thought.”223
Elsewhere, a vocabulary is defined as “a group of terms which are frequently
repeated together, mutually elucidating, often syntactically or rhetorically
complementary”, its effect being that it “gradually familiarizes the reader with a set
of ideas which the author develops in the work” and elicits “verbal associations” in
which the meaning of the text is, in a way, encapsulated.224 Oz-Salzberger’s project to
study translation focusing on the question whether such vocabularies retained their
integrity  and  inner  connections,  is   proposed  to  go  beyond  earlier  models  of
reception – or rather, “misreception”, which she takes most or all of the examined
cases to have been. Indeed, she flatly rejects Rezeptionsgeschichte (identified as a
positivist account of circulation, reading or reaction) as well as post-modernist
reception theories “because they render the concept of misreception meaningless”.
Misreception is approached by her in terms of the author’s intended meaning and is
understood as its subversion or neglect by the translators, arising not as a
“necessary” corollary of reading, nor linked to bad reading or bad translation, but
quite likely an outcome of multiple transmission, or the “impossible, or limited,
translatability, of certain key terms” (while it is also acknowledged that “various
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mishandling”).225 Several “models of misreception” are then presented. These
include Gadamer’s “deterministic model” of how socio-political “backwardness”
prevented Germans from grasping the moral meaning of the concept of common
sense; Isaiah Berlin’s “liberal model” of  the uses of Hume’s “belief”, in which he was
made an “ally against himself” by German anti-rationalists portrayed as radically
free  (and  malicious)  agents;  Rudolf  Vierhaus’  more  nuanced  approach  to  the
selective reading of Montesquieu in Germany, which was partly intentional and
partly conditioned by socio-political realities; and Peter Michelsen’s analysis of the
intensification of Lawrence Sterne’s sentimental language through the German
translator’s choice of words. Oz-Salzberger attempts to absorb the last two
approaches into her own, defined by the study of political language.
In putting this framework to motion, Oz-Salzberger is specifically concerned
with three concepts crucial for Ferguson who “wrote his works in a linguistic context
of which he was very conscious, and evidently expected similar awareness from his
readers.” The concepts of “civil society”, “public / national / political spirit”,
“(active) pursuit”, together with their corollaries (polished, polite, civil, civilized etc.)
constituted a “terminological battlefield” in contemporary Scotland, with Ferguson
trying to bring out (restore) their distinctly (originally) political meaning: “civic
language” was utilized by him “to appropriate and redefine both jurisprudential
terms (civil society, civil liberty) and ‘Addisonian’ language (politeness, polished,
civility, refinement).”226 Against this background the question in regard of the
reception concerns “the extent to which a German reader in 1768 could follow [such]
linguistic transactions.” Oz-Salzberger’s answer is, first, that besides mere
carelessness, and uncertainty and instability of terms, the use of vaguely resembling
alternatives disrupted the tight logic of connotations and associations, resulting in a
confusing multiplicity and a mollification of thorny issues. Only because of these,
already a lot of Ferguson’s critique of non-civic vocabularies was lost in the German
translations. In addition, words used from the recognizable German terminologies of
Pietism, mainstream Protestantism and sentimentalism to render Ferguson’s key
225 Ibid., 77-8, 84.
226 Ibid., 150.
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terms that define civic activism, further contributed to their depoliticization and a
shift towards spirituality: they introduced “a new system of mutually elucidating
terms which caused a gradual distancing from the author’s original vocabulary.”
This was in particular the case with the terminology around Ferguson’s “pursuit”:
the main factor responsible for the overall “misreception” became the “cumulative
misunderstanding of Ferguson’s idea that political life is a worthy object of pursuit
for citizens exercising their free will.” The translation helped
“to detach pursuit [Streben]  from politics,  make the citizen into a Mensch, his
mind into a Seele, and his immediate goals into Endzwecke.  The insertion of a
spiritual  striving  towards  a  distant  perfection  was  an  easy  move  within  the
same  vocabulary….  the  Scottish  civic  vocabulary  was  lost  in  the  process  of
German translation and reception … not only because several terms were very
difficult to translate into German … but also, and primarily, because it no
longer formed a vocabulary.”227
As my chief interest here is the proper method employed in the interpretation
of  translated  texts,  I  shall  not  be  concerned  with  some  of  the  aspects  of  Oz-
Salzberger’s work that have been contested by other scholars.228 As  to  the
interpretative tools, her analysis is distinguished by a hardly paralleled sensitivity
among historians towards the subtleties of the linguistic resources of the
vocabularies available for each community of speakers, and in this sense is a fine
example to follow. This sensitivity, however, sits awkwardly together with her rather
surprising description of Rezeptionsgeschichte as “positivistic”, and her strong views
on “misreception.” Discrepancy can be noticed between the notion of “mis”-
reception and the accent on the author’s “original intention” on the one hand, and
the subject matter of the book on the other hand, which cannot be disentangled from
prevailing contemporary conceptions of translation and the translator’s roles, not to
227 Ibid., 165-6.
228 These include her unqualified construing of Ferguson as a representative of “republican” civic
activism within his Scottish context, and the concomitant assumptions that if Germany was to possess
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speak of the intentions on the recipient side, when the agents of reception first take to
the text. Why did they translate Ferguson? What did they expect to bring out of him?
Oz-Salzberger, who takes due notice of the standards of translation in the eighteenth
century, also gives compelling answers to these questions in the subsequent chapters
of  her  book.  These  answers  do  not  seem  to  depend  in  any  way  on  the  notion  of
misreception, which, at the same time – by the nature of its semantics – tends to
represent the recipients as “mistaken” or “wrong”.
My third example is somewhat beyond the chronological scope of this study,
yet it is highly instructive in a variety of ways. In his article on “Translation and the
Colonial Imaginary”,229 Abdelmajid Hannoum aims to show how a fragment of Ibn
Khaldûn’s ‘Ibar, translated in the early 1850s by William de Slane as Histoire des
Berbères,  was discovered by French Orientalism in the context of the colonization of
Algeria and converted into a text with colonial categories. More generally, Hannoum
investigates how colonialism introduced and established a specific imaginary by
transforming local knowledge into “colonial knowledge,” which also assured
colonial domination after the collapse of the colonial enterprise and shaped
postcolonial identities. Hannoum draws a great deal of inspiration from theories of
language and translation – Ricoeur, Whorf and Jakobson figure prominently in his
citations – in arguing that the activity of translation is not to be understood as the
reproduction of a foreign text, nor as the transmission of a message, nor its betrayal,
but as domestication: an interpretation in which canons articulated by the recipient
culture are applied. As such, it is not only an interpretation but also the production
of a new text, the foreign text and the translated text being expressions of imaginary
structures that are products of different historical moments.
In the given case, Hannoum argues, colonial questions and answers are
regulated by a European epistemology specific to the nineteenth century, as distinct
from that  found in  the  foreign text  translated.  He shows how a  discourse about Ibn
Khaldûn  emerged  to  create  this  context,  in  which  he  was  distanced  from  his
environment on account of his “rationality” and “modernity” – qualities attributed to
such  a  tradition  it  depended  on  the  “import”  of  Ferguson  for  it,  and  failing  this  it  was  and  was  to
remain bereft of it.
229 For the full reference, see n. 87 above.
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him on the authority of European standards held superior by French scholars. The
intervention required for this “canonization” was performed in De Slane’s
introduction, to which Hannoum pays considerable attention: the introduction,
which reveals the “rectification” and the “correction” of the author as an avowed aim
of the translation, is represented as a discursive strategy to determine the reading of
the text – a cognitive manipulation to make the reader understand the text as
intended by the translator. De Slane’s narrative in the introduction, stressing that
before  being  subjugated  to  the  Arabs,  North-Africa  had  been  part  of  the  Roman
Empire, and expressing the opposition between Occident and Orient, is claimed in
the article to have become fundamental for French colonial historiography.
Hannoum, however, is not content with the translator’s explicit claims made
in the meta-discourse of the introduction. He also ventures to analyze some of the
implicit arguments made through the use of specific keywords in the translated text
itself. These include, in the first place, “race” and “domination”, which are suggested
to represent quite unambiguously a language of conflict and conquest, superiority
and hierarchy which hallmarked the racial ideology of Gobineau – overtones which
are, however, missing from the original terminology of Ibn Khaldûn, whose account
was polemical in his time precisely because of being inclusive and integrative in
representing the Arab conquest of North-Africa as a reunion of two groups of the
same origin(the other being the Berbers). By contrast, the translatorial strategy was to
make the history of North-Africa that of a struggle between the Arabs and the
Berbers, with the latter being consistently represented by contemporary
ethnographers as primitive Europeans who have retained their “racial” specificity as
well as numerical superiority. Ibn Khaldûn, as it were, is turned inside out in the
translation.
On the whole, this conclusion is not unconvincing. Hannoum’s article has
formidable strengths in the consistent and fruitful application of language and
translation theories to his subject matter, and in the subtle analysis of the translator’s
introduction as a “genre” with features that can be generalized. It stands on less firm
ground when it comes to examining De Slane’s use of the central categories,
especially  race.  It  is  simply  taken  for  granted  that  when  using  this  term,  the
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translator had in mind Gobineau’s idea of races as marked by inherent, hereditary
and permanent qualities, as well as inequality and antagonism vis-à-vis one another.
The potential objection that Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, first
published  in  1853,  could  hardly  have  been  available  for  De  Slane  before  he
completed his translation, is offset by the claim that Gobineau’s views became
influential “not so much because they were novel, but because they were widely
accepted even before he articulated them” – a claim supported from an article by
Hannah Arendt published in 1944, hardly a time when the notion of race could have
been a subject of dispassionate academic inquiry. On these grounds, existing
alternatives within the contemporary European discourse on race, potentially
available for De Slane,230 are neglected, and it is Gobineau’s concept that is
contrasted to the semantics of the Arab terms conveyed in the translation by “race”
(mainly jîl, in Ibn Khaldûn a human group defined in time and by culture) – with
predictable results.  But definitions of race not too remote from those of jîl inherited
from the eighteenth century could have been still available to De Slane, and before
the above-mentioned conclusions are reached, it ought to be shown that he decided
not  to  avail  himself  to  these  options.  To  be  sure,  in  the  lack  of  a  sketch  of  the
Begriffsgeschichte of  “race”  in  the  early  to  mid-nineteenth  century  context,  this  is
hardly possible to show.
A survey of three highly respectable pieces of scholarship on translation in the
history of ideas reveals that the methods applied in the study of this field is still
capable of refinement and in need of some tightness and discipline, especially in
regard of its suitability to the peculiar features of the field itself. Let me conclude this
chapter by presenting a brief proposal of an approach to reception in the history of
ideas  based  on  my  sketch  of  translation  theories  in  the  early  modern  period,  of
linguistic contextualism, of Begriffsgeschichte and  of Rezeptionsgeschichte.  It  is  an
approach which takes intentionality seriously, but because it regards translation as
an act of reading filtering into an independent speech act substantially conditioned
by the translator’s historical circumstances, it prioritizes the intentions of the
230 Robert Bernasconi and Tommy Lee Lott (eds.), The Idea of Race (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Robert
Bernasconi (ed.), Concepts of Race in the Eighteenth Century (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001).
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translator over those of the author of the text in its interpretation. This may be
common sense, but there are important consequences. I suggest that even a decision
on the part of a translator to confine him/herself to the re-enactment of the author’s
intention,  first,  is  an  exception  rather  than  the  rule  and,  second,  must  also  be
understood in terms of an agenda specific to the translator’s historical context. Even
in such cases it is at best only partially true that the original text sets a standard for
the translator; therefore, any interpretation that explicitly or implicitly assesses
translations in terms of such a standard, seems to disregard an important reality.
Whether a translation is “faithful” or represents a case of “misreception” – a heavily
loaded term that carries some value judgement and therefore I should prefer to avoid
it –, besides and beyond identifying them as such, what one should be concerned
with is the grounds on which texts arising from the author’s realm of experience
(including his/her being embedded in discursive traditions and intentions to use,
promote or challenge them) and shaped to answer questions and offer solutions
belonging to his Erwartungshorizont, still seemed suitable for pursuing agendas
peculiar  to  the  translator’s  time  and  place;  and  the  extent  to  which  the  reasons  for
selecting such texts as vehicles for different strategies have to do with properties
inherent in the text, or with the translator’s agenda. It must be further considered
that besides the conscious endeavour of translators to perform the act of translation
in adjustment to their space of experience and their horizon of expectations, in many
cases the character of the vocabulary, the idiom and the grammatical structures of the
natural language which is the target language of the translation would leave them at
a loss in rendering those structures which provide the discourse of the original with
any degree of coherence it might possess, and compel them to look for substitute
solutions. These substitutes, however, may well belong to discursive (“ideological”)
traditions different from those in which the original text was conceived, resulting in
its  transposition through the  subversion either  of  its  consistency,  or  its  purpose,  or
both. The analysis of synonyms, antonyms, complementary terms, terminological
correspondences and discrepancies within and between “fields of meaning” or
concepts,  as  they  become  objects  of  reception,  is  a  feasible  path  to  trace  such
transpositions.
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Chapter Two
Politics, literature and science:
William Robertson and historical discourses
in eighteenth-century Scotland and Germany
In the previous chapter I have attempted to lay down a few principles, derived from
the theory and practice of translation in sixteenth to eighteenth-century Europe, and
from some recent theoretical approaches to the history of ideas, which should prove
helpful in the study of the reception of Robertson’s historical works in eighteenth-
century Germany. But translation constitutes only a part of the intellectual contexts
in which this process of reception took place. As a matter of fact, such contexts also
comprise  the  various  modes  in  which  history  was  engaged  in  Robertson’s  Scottish
environment  and in  which it  was  practiced in  contemporary Germany.  It  is  from a
comparative assessment of such variables that one might expect to arrive at the
understanding of an apparent paradox. The German reception of Robertson, in
regard both of its extent and immediacy – the volume of translations, of critical
response and reference – was, if anything, avid. Each of the four great histories
appeared in, and was borrowed from, important academic libraries in Germany
within a few months of its publication. Each of them was equally promptly reviewed
in German periodicals,  and became swiftly  translated into  German,  occasionally  by
several different hands simultaneously, and was re-published and re-edited in new
versions over a period of several decades. The intensity of reception apparently
contradicts the fact that it would be difficult to claim for Robertson a dramatic
influence on the character of contemporary German historiography. This
contradiction, however, makes the history of reception no less instructive.
In seeking to resolve this paradox, which is far from being exceptional in
histories of reception, I propose to delve into the character of eighteenth-century
historical writing in three different, but interlocking forms: as political thought, as
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literary  pursuit  and  aesthetic  expression,  and  as  a  branch  of  knowledge  with  the
emerging  claim  to  the  status  of  a  scientific  discipline.  These  forms  of  appearance
converged in Robertson’s histories,  while each of them were equally relevant in the
Scottish environment where those histories were produced, and the German one in
which they were appropriated. The paradox both arises from, and is explained by,
the rather different substances that filled each of these forms of cultivating history in
the two cases. In unravelling such complexities, I shall predominantly rely on “state
of the art” research on eighteenth-century Scottish, German and European
historiography. But the comparative perspective I adopt may refine our
understanding of the broader subject of this book: the possibilities and the limits of
communication and transfer across linguistic and cultural boundaries within the
enlightened republic of letters. I shall start by a discussion of intellectual
developments on the wider European and the Scottish scene relevant to the shaping
of a historical sensibility shared by Robertson with many contemporaries,  and then
move on to consider some peculiar features of German historical scholarship.
To begin with, it  is important to remember that a great deal of historical writing in
eighteenth-century  Scotland  continued  to  be  conceived  in  terms  of  the  themes  of
virtue and corruption, familiar from the humanist historia magistra vitae tradition.
Philosophical history, the exploration of war, politics and the arcana imperii in  the
style of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, with a view to inculcating the principles of
conduct best suited to the preservation of the public good,231 was alive and well, and
formed part of Robertson’s own initiation into the profession. It has also been argued
forcefully that in regard of its commitment to the teaching of moral precepts and its
“obsession” with providential determinism, Enlightenment historical writing owes a
great deal to traditions of Scottish scholarship established in the aftermath of the
231 The classic statements on Machiavelli and Guicciardini as “philosophical historians” are Felix
Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965) and J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, ch. 7-8.
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Calvinist reformation, themselves perpetuating much of the humanist principles,
vocabulary and conceptual toolkit.232
However, the historical culture that informed Robertson’s oeuvre was marked
by an attempt to understand these concepts against the background of, and make
such traditions functional amidst, the new political, socio-cultural and international
circumstances that emerged in Europe (which, in a well-known passage, he defined
as “one great political system”233) as the seventeenth century was fading into the
eighteenth. The rise of the United Provinces, the Peace of Westphalia, the Glorious
Revolution, and – certainly, in a very different way – even the revocation of the Edict
of Nantes contributed to the ebbing away of religious and civil  strife that had been
almost the order of the day in Western European societies for the century and a half
that followed the “protestation” of a part of the German estates at the imperial diet of
Speyer in 1529. The peace settlement of Utrecht in 1713 seemed to have signalled the
ultimate frustration of two centuries of attempts – by Holy Roman Emperors, but
also Kings of Spain and then of France – at re-establishing “universal monarchy” in
Europe. Having resisted the dynastic ambition to exercise political and military
control over extensive territories, the old continent came to be recognized as an
assemblage of medium-sized states. In spite of the diversity of political, religious and
commercial interests that quite often threw them, individually or in coalitions, into
armed conflict,  they could be  understood as  constituting a  neatly  balanced system,
even “commonwealth” or “confederation” knit together by a strange blend of
cooperation and emulation. In their conflicts as well as their conflict-management
practices, “jealousy of state” was being replaced by (or transformed into) “jealousy of
trade”, and political survival became dependent on success or failure at international
markets. This was a development that gave rise to concerns, especially given that it
seemed to contradict the enlightened topos about the inherently civilizing and
232 David Allan, Virtue, Learning, and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of Scholarship in Early Modern
History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993); see also idem., “Protestantism,
Presbyterianism and national identity in eighteenth-century Scottish history”, in Tony Claydon, Ian
McBride (eds.), Protestantism and National Identity. Britain and Ireland, c. 1650-1850 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 182-205.
233 William Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V. With a View of the progress of
society in Europe, from the subversion of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the sixteenth century (4 vols.;
Routledge/Thoemmes Press: London, 1996, reprint of the 1792 edition), I. x.
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pacifying potential of “sweet commerce” and material improvement.234 To further
complicate the picture, some of these “imperial” (in the ancient sense of sovereign)
states  proved,  and  all  of  them  were  anxious  to  prove,  themselves  fitting  cores  of  a
type of  empire  well-suited to  the  times  in  being not  continental  and territorial,  but
overseas and commercial-colonial. All of this served to underline the significance of
the economic realm for the social realities behind these historic developments,
including the patterns of the production, consumption, circulation and distribution
of goods, the agents of such processes, together with the cultural practices, habits,
beliefs and lifestyles peculiar to them.
Historical reflection in the eighteenth century could have hardly afforded not
taking into account such conditions of emerging modernity. Even among these
circumstances,  history’s  traditional  concern  with  and  for  public  life,  and  the
consequent endeavour to derive normative judgment and moral purpose from
narrative, was not abandoned. But its horizons became broadened, to include,
besides politics, a social narrative responding to new interests among the potential
readership.  In  the  focus  of  such  interests  were  the  histories  of  “learning,  arts,
commerce, and manners”, subjects that seemed “most useful and agreeable by
themselves, or most suitable to their respective ways of life”.235 These interests
indicate a preoccupation with specific modalities of social-civil life among the
circumstances of modern refinement that were difficult to integrate in traditional
historical narration, chiefly concerned with the chances and the hazards of vita activa.
What was at stake was the self-image and self-esteem of a society, or rather its
intellectually sophisticated and articulate members, who were increasingly aware of
its indebtedness to commerce, together with the complex and invisible relations it
created on the shifting boundaries between public and private life: relations which
on the one hand set various kinds of limitations to the scope of political action, but at
the same time also expanded that scope by redefining action deemed capable of
generating civil virtue.
234 See Sheila Mason, “Montesquieu’s vision of Europe and its European context”, in Studies on Voltaire
and the Eighteenth Century, vol. 341 (1996), 61-87; and especially Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade.
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With respect to the civic sphere, commerce and the material well-being it
brought about was traditionally regarded as producing one of two dispositions, both
of them conceived as forms of “corruption”: a decrease of commitment to the public
weal, or a propensity to expropriate civic institutions for private aggrandizement.
Such threats did not cease to haunt public moralists,,  which historians continued to
be, throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. It was nevertheless keenly
realized that as an antidote to its role in the lapse of civic institutions, commerce in
both the strict and the metaphorical sense – as the exchange of material goods in the
market  hall  as  well  as  that  of  ideas  and  sentiments  in  the  coffee  house  or  the
assembly  room  –  performed  valuable  civilizing  functions.  By  enhancing  men’s  and
women’s character as sociable and communicative creatures, “commerce” enabled
them to promote each other’s well-being in a way that was different from, but not at
all inferior to participatory activism, and was better suited to the conditions of the
eighteenth-century. Given this awareness among some of its most outstanding
practitioners, history began to drift away from its ultimately civic foundations, and
its gaze began to incorporate the category of the social, a realm in which such
interactions occurred. It did so by appropriating the perspective of what has become
known as the enlightened “science of man”.
At the core of this vast intellectual enterprise was the Augustinian-Epicurean
anthropology of Robertson’s fellow Edinburgh literati, Hume and Smith in the first
place, which portrayed man as an essentially self-regarding and pleasure-seeking
being guided by interests and passions in his conduct and attitudes, and challenged
them to ask fundamental questions about the apparent paradoxes of the relatively
orderly and peaceful conditions they observed in the ever more complex societies of
contemporary Europe.236 Their explanations for the abatement of the “violent
235  Robert Henry to Horace Walpole, March 3, 1783. The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole’s Correspondence,
ed. W.S. Lewis et al. (48 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1952) XV. 169. Cited in
Phillips, Society and Sentiment, 5.
236 The  “Augustinian-Epicurean  understanding  of  man”  is  indeed  the  most  prominent  set  of  ideas
inherited from the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries in the portrait of the Enlightenment as
unfolding from Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment. For a classic genealogy of the central notions
of self-interest and self-love in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Albert Hirschman, The
Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977); for a more recent one,  Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith. A genealogy
of Economic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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passions” of man, conceived in the terms of moral psychology and political economy,
pointed towards a refined understanding of the notion of “unsocial sociability”
which seemed to govern the realities of commercial modernity. Ungesellige Geselligkeit
was, of course, Kant’s later succinct formula for a whole paradigm of thought, nearly
two centuries old by his time.237 It  was  first  bred  by  the  painful  experience  of
religious and civil strife in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but was
eminently capable of application to more stable social situations whose chief
regulative mechanism was commerce, depending on emulation as well as
accommodation.
Methodologically, this inquiry into the human and the social constituted itself
as a counterpart of seventeenth-century natural philosophy as cultivated by the
members of the Royal Society, in the sense that as “empiricists and experimentalists”,
its practitioners disavowed the precepts of Aristotelian metaphysics and logic and
presumed to arrive at first principles from the observed “facts” of nature – which in
the case of the study of politics and society would be human nature. It is worth while
adding here  that  the  new natural  philosophy inaugurated by Francis  Bacon is  now
widely recognized as much more than a set of innovative approaches to and
revelations about the physical universe, with the ultimately utilitarian purpose of
mastering it. It is also viewed as a set of social and cultural practices whose intended
goal was the alleviation of the civil and confessional division of contemporary
European societies through proposing subjects and fields for public debate capable of
“clear and distinct demonstration”, thus – unlike political and religious issues – of
the discussion and confrontation of arguments in a dispassionate and sociable
manner, and through creating appropriate venues for such discussion. Scientific
sociability thus presented itself as an interesting counterpart of commerce: besides
practical benefits – useful knowledge promising technological advancement in the
one case and greater material affluence in the other –, intellectual exchange at the
academy and commercial transaction at the marketplace both seemed to be vehicles
237 For important reconstructions, see Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius
to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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whereby the irresistible human propensity for emulation and self-assertion could be
channelled into peaceful avenues conducive to the preservation of social harmony.238
 Building on scepticism and stoicism as well as historical and natural
jurisprudence, thinkers in the paradigm of “unsocial sociability” conceived of men
and women as interest-driven and sensual creatures, motivated by fear and
suspicion,  vanity,  or  greed,  but  still  –  even,  as  a  result  –  inclined  to  behave  in  a
sociable manner. Humans were portrayed as refraining from causing “wanton
injury” while competing for mere subsistence by Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and
Samuel Pufendorf, because this would have authorized others (or the sovereign,
instituted precisely for this purpose) to resort to even violent retaliation in order to
maintain mutual security.239 Besides and beyond the safety of life and limbs, vanity
was also discovered as a fundamental type of self-regarding motivation by the Port
Royal Jansenist Pierre Nicole, who suggested that for the sake of obtaining the
recognition of their fellows, self-loving men were inclined to conform to virtuous
codes of conduct. Montesquieu moulded this idea into a comprehensive theory of
monarchical government whose cement or “principle” was the quest for “honour” on
the part of an ambitious aristocracy, and thus explored a distinctively historical
dimension of “unsocial sociability” as an active force in shaping European
modernity, in a broad comparative perspective. The paradoxical divorce of the
selfish motivation of an act from its potentially charitable effects was most openly
stated in Bernard Mandeville’s formula about “private vices, publick benefits”.240 The
notion of  the  quest  for  material  wealth  through satisfying the  daily  needs  of  others
238 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 15; Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London
(1667), in Seventeenth-century England. A Changing Culture, vol. I. ed. Ann Hughes (London: The Open
University, 1980), 330-32; Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution; Clark, Golinski and Schaffer (eds.),
The Sciences in Enlightened Europe.
239 On  Grotius  and  Hobbes,  see  Tuck, Philosophy and Government and Haakonssen, Natural Law and
Moral Philosophy;  on  Pufendorf,  Istvan  Hont,  “The  Language  of  Sociability  and  Commerce:  Samuel
Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages Theory’”, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The
Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
253-276; Fiammetta Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996) and
Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, esp. ch. 2 and 4.
240 Mandeville’s  thought  is  contextualized within this  trend in Edward Hundert, The Enlightenment’s
‘Fable’: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
See also the same author’s edition, including texts by Nicole and Pierre Bayle, of Mandeville, The Fable
of the Bees and Other Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
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(an “unintended consequence”) then became the cornerstone of Smith’s observations
on the lack of “benevolence” among the primary motives of the butcher and the
baker  in  serving  their  customers  –  but  also  including  the  idea  of  the  “impartial
spectator”, which would evoke the desire, even in the butcher or the baker, not only
to earn praise, but also to be “praiseworthy”.241
In the sophisticated intellectual stances summarized in an unduly synoptic
fashion above, it is possible to detect a style of thinking which also informed
eighteenth-century secularist, stadialist-materialist types of historical causality. For
indeed,  the  theories  which they put  forward,  and the  realities  which these  theories
meant to interpret, also called for a spacious analysis of the historical dynamics
leading to the emergence of the modern commercial societies they analyzed. The
perspective which they offered allowed a notion of the past as a series of continuities
from which the  present  has  unfolded,  and it  was  by tracing this  unfolding that  the
study of history could contribute to the science of man. Campaigns and battles,
treaties and edicts, transgressions and assassinations, had hitherto been chiefly
regarded to be the main substance of history as a chronological succession of events
understood as exempla, and often also as providing a pedigree or justification for the
present. Now they came to be viewed as dependent on and arising from processes of
material and cultural progress or decline, as well as the operations of the mind, in
which the role of human agency was a far more complicated matter to assess than in
essentially political histories of virtue and corruption. On the one hand, the contexts
in which action was taking place required an ever more complex effort at exploration
and explanation, to the extent that such contexts began to form, to a very great
extent, the substance of history itself. On the other hand, even as the constitutive
elements of contexts, the histories of agents commonly regarded as lacking the
capacity for “action” in the traditional (political) sense – primitive communities,
women, and “private persons” in general – became discussed by authors with ever
increasing frequency.
241 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,  ed. R.H. Campbell and
A.S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), I. 26-7; Idem., The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed.
D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), III.1-2. esp. 112. 117. Cf. Knud
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The  outcome  was  twofold.  We  tend  to  celebrate  conjectural  history,  the
theoretically stringent, materialistic study of the “great movements” of history
through “stages” defined in terms of the dominant “mode of subsistence” towards
“refinement”, as the great contribution of Enlightenment historical thought and the
practice of historical writing.242 At  the  same  time,  such  macro-sociological  pursuits
were in permanent dialogue with the quasi-biographical representation of the
immediate environment of individual lives and the forces that shaped them. The
success of the one enterprise, stadial history, depended on the consistency of
methodological principles and their application, which made it possible to develop a
distance from the subject of investigation characteristic of the sciences. As regards the
other, it was also realized that in order to cultivate narrative history in the new style,
sensibility, empathy and an appeal to emotion, the properties of creative literary
genius, as well as the insight of the moral philosopher, were indispensable. Political
history, and the political relevance assigned to history, underwent thorough changes
that reflected these shifting emphases in the study of the past. Let us briefly examine
these changes one after the other.
On the one hand, it was an important consequence of the preoccupation with
the structural that instead of (or at least besides) the ups and downs, the glories and
the scandals, the heroes and the villains of the political histories of individual
nations, often represented in strongly partisan terms, there developed an increasing
interest  in  locating such histories  on the  map of  the  “commonwealth”  of  European
states and societies. This was described as a balancing system marked by a great deal
of  complementarity:  its  composite  parts  were  drawn together  by a  complex  web of
Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
242 The  academic  study  of  the  social  scientific  embeddedness  of  eighteenth-century  Scottish
historiography seriously began with Roy Pascal, “Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School
of the Eighteenth Century”, Modern Quarterly, 2 (1938), 167-79; it became more pronounced in Gladys
Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1945); it grew into a torrent with (and included critical assessments of) Ronald L. Meek, Social
Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); “conjectural history”,
famously coined by Dugald Stewart in his retrospect to the golden age of the literati of Edinburgh, first
appeared in the title of an article in Harro M. Höpfl, “From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History
in the Scottish Enlightenment”, Journal of British Studies, 17 (1978), 19-40. The literature on the subject
since then is endless.
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ties resulting from political, religious and commercial cooperation and emulation.243
In this discourse “Europe” replaced “Christendom”, its history being understood as
the progress of commerce and manners, of religious plurality and the rise of the rule
of law in strong (predominantly monarchical) states, and it was in such terms that its
exploration was set into a comparative framework with its significant, colonial
“others”. The “Enlightenment narrative” was a narrative of civil governments, more
precisely of the processes whereby they emancipated themselves from the real or
attempted universal monarchy of popes and emperors, and established their own
character as “imperial” (as above – i.e., sovereign) entities.244 The Neapolitan Pietro
Giannone provided, in his Istoria civile del regno di Napoli (1723) a history of largely
unsuccessful resistance to usurpation by the Ecclesiastical State, which intruded into
the Empire and established one “empire” within another. In Le Siécle de Louis XIV
(1751) Voltaire showed the significance of the “Ludovican moment” in its seeking
foundations for the neo-classical perfection of courtly manners in the commerce and
useful  arts  of  the  middle  classes,  and  the  subsequent  emergence  –  under  the
leadership of France, but in emulation with it – of a plurality of strong and cultivated
states (états policés), a “confederation of Europe” succeeding the age of religious
warfare and the threat of universal empire. William Robertson’s History of Charles V
(1769) was an important and influential variation on the same theme, and one of the
chief messages of Edward Gibbon’s six thick volumes exploring The History of the
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1788) was also the ultimate frustration, in
the long run, of the model of universal monarchy represented by Rome through the
social and political system introduced by the barbarians.
Empire in the sense of political and military control over a vast territory was
thus historically shown to be incompatible with European conditions. At the same
time,  the  small  or  medium  sized  states  of  the  old  continent  –  as  “imperial”  or
sovereign states, in possession of the plenitude of the power of command over their
populations and resources, whether monarchies or republics – were regarded as
243 Cf., also with a view to Robertson’s contribution, Frederick G. Whelan, “Robertson, Hume, and the
Balance of Power”, Hume Studies XXI (1995:2), 315-332.
244 O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment; Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, especially Vol. II: Narratives of
Civil Government.
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proper core areas of empires established on the principle and the practice that was
newly recognized to provide for their unique dynamism as well as precarious
equilibrium: the principle and the practice of commerce. The spread of commercial,
mercantile and maritime empires into regions previously unexplored by Europeans
naturally stimulated the further deepening and sophistication of an already long-
standing interest in the comparative and historical exploration of the patterns of
socio-economic development and cultural-anthropological differences. Accounts of
the habitat,  customs and manners,  beliefs,  occupations, arts and crafts of noble and
ignoble savages filled the pages of travelogues from the early-eighteenth century
accounts of Baron de Lahontan and Joseph François Lafiteau onwards (themselves
looking back to eminent predecessors, such as the sixteenth-century Jesuit
missionary José Acosta). In combination with the intellectual patterns provided not
only by social scientific inquiry, but also the rival systems of natural historical
taxonomy put forward by Buffon and Linnaeus, they became used as source material
in large-scale systematic treatments of “the history of man” (“in rude and cultivated
ages”,  as  some  of  them  added  in  their  titles)  by  Cornelius  de  Pauw,  or  indeed  the
Scots Lords Kames and Monboddo, and James Dunbar.245 The process of European
expansion was usually acknowledged to be compatible with the values of civilization
and  modernity,  now  being  propagated  globally.  Yet  there  were  doubters,  like  the
Abbé  Raynal  or  Denis  Diderot,  who  seems  to  have  contributed  the  most  polemical
portions to the former’s Histoire des deux Indes, as well as Edmund Burke. They were
concerned that the physical removal of the agents of this process from the cradle of
these values might turn them into “tigers” in the colonial jungle, whose depredation
of local cultures and brutalization of native populations also threatened to
undermine civilized conditions – including not only polite manners and sociable
245 In  a  vast  literature,  see  especially  Michèle  Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1971); Antonello Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World. The History of a Polemic 1750-
1900 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973); Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of
Mankind; Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative
Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); idem., European Encounters with the New
World; Roxann Wheeler, The Complexion of Race. Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British
Culture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Silvia Sebastiani, I limiti del progresso.
Razza e genere nell’Illuminismo scozzese (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008).
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humanity  but  also  civil  liberty  and  security  under  the  law  –  in  their  home
countries.246
The Enlightenment narrative was cosmopolitan in the sense that while it
endeavoured to promote “patriotic” goals – encouraging types of civic attitudes
suited to the eighteenth-century realities, hinging upon the commitment to material
improvement and to the preservation of sociability amidst competing interests –,
exactly in support of this pursuit it could not afford operating in any other than
broad European and global contexts. In a well-known comment on his own History of
England, Hume distinguished between his account of “things”, i.e., events, processes,
institutions and structures, and “persons”, adding that his views on the former were
“more conformable to Whig principles” and on the latter to “Tory prejudices”.247 This
is  a  very  subtle  distinction,  in  more  ways  than one.  The two Stuart  volumes of  the
History,  which were  the  first  to  appear,  seem to  present  a  rather  narrowly confined
English history. This was a history chiefly preoccupied with the classical Tacitean
and Thucydidean theme of prudent or – more often – imprudent statecraft exercised
by “persons” for whose predicaments Hume indeed harbours a toryish sympathy.
Even  in  these  volumes,  however,  a  broader  scheme  of  “things”  emerges,  which  is
marked by the endeavour of the English people to preserve – or obtain –
constitutional liberty, and is cautiously whiggish. This scheme, however, can be fully
appreciated when the Stuart volumes are read in conjunction with the subsequently
published Tudor and medieval parts, in which there is a greater emphasis on
“things” and the distinctive, even anomalous character of the English quest for
liberty  receives  its  proper  perspective  from the  placement  of  England within  (or,  at
least partly, precisely outside) European developmental patterns. In regard of
“things”, both the completeness and the impartiality of representation depended on
the adoption of a cosmopolitan and comparative perspective.
246 Whelan, Edmund Burke and India; Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire; Jennifer Pitts, A  Turn  to
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005);
Guido Abbattista, “Empire, Liberty and the Rule of Difference. European Debates on British
Colonialism in Asia at the End of the Eighteenth Century”, European Review of History / Revue
européenne d’histoire, 13:3 (2006), 473-498.
247  Hume to John Clephane, ?1756, The Letters of David Hume, ed. John Young Thomson Greig (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1932), I. 237.
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Besides and in complement to “things”, however, it was also essential for the
historian to consider “persons”, which Hume cultivated mainly, but not at all
exclusively,  in  the  Stuart  volumes.  The interest  in  the  “personal”,  the  human,  even
psychological, generated an endeavour to understand character in a dynamic
relationship with situation (as against, and beyond the motive and effect of action).
In a highly subtle fashion this also contributed to the neutralization of the themes of
vice and virtue, and thus the tone of partisanship, familiar from patriotic renderings
of history.248 Progress, improvement and public happiness, as well as manners,
sympathy and politeness emerged as important threads in such histories, now
marked by an effort at “impartiality” in this latter sense, too. Robertson’s History of
Scotland, conceived in an attempt to challenge ancient traditions of Scottish liberty
and patriotism and to lay the foundations for an alternative one, better adjusted to
the realities, imperatives and opportunities created by the Union of Parliaments in
1707,249 operated likewise at the level of large scale comparative structural inquiry as
well as personal-psychological analysis, with both endeavours arising from the same
inspiration and pointing in the same direction. While its backbone was a narrative of
statecraft and political action in a century of endemic trouble for Scotland, the
character and the dimension of the trouble was impossible fully to assess without the
introductory canvas of socio-cultural developments in contemporary Europe. The
account of these developments showed the public scene of Scotland, presented in the
subsequent narrative, almost irredeemably captive to the rude passions of
resentment and revenge,250 and thus to be following a rhythm entirely different from
the  countries  in  the  vanguard  of  the  progress  of  civilization.  Equally  indispensable
for the desired effect of a realistic and responsible understanding of the national past
was, however, a view of historical figures that, without condoning their frailties or
248 Nicholas Phillipson, “Providence and progress: and introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson”, in Brown (ed.), Robertson and the expansion of empire, 55-73; idem., Hume (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), ch. 2-3;  O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, ch. 3-4; Colin Kidd, “The
ideological significance of Robertson’s History of Scotland”, in Brown (ed.), Robertson and the expansion
of empire, 92-121; Phillips, Society and Sentiment, esp. ch. 2, 5-6.
249 The standard account of the conflicting historical identity discourses in post-Union Scotland is
Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s past. Scottish whig historians and the creation of an Anglo-British identity,
1689-c. 1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
250 Neal Hargraves, “Resentment and History in the Scottish Enlightenment”, Cromohs, 14 (2009): 1-21
< URL: http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/14_2009/hargraves_resentment.html >
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crimes, divested them of the increments of party sentiment and thus their status as
political emblems, and focused on their character as necessarily imperfect human
beings facing complex, even unsolvable situations.
It has been argued that the claims about the intellectually innovative character
of historical scholarship in the Scottish Enlightenment are to a considerable extent
based (1) on the self-fashioning (and self-congratulation) of a handful of thinkers
who constituted an “inner circle” and (2) on a kind of reading history backwards by
later thinkers who picked the former as their own predecessors.  It  has been further
pointed  out  that  (3)  even  this  “vanguard”  was  in  fact  far  more  indebted  to  native
traditions of historical inquiry than it cared to acknowledge, and (4) inasmuch as it
departed from those traditions, it also found itself seriously challenged. In other
words, we must appreciate the degree of continuity in several crucial respects. First,
no fundamental change is supposed to have occurred in regard of the status which
history had held in humanism in and Calvinism as an edificatory discourse and a
form of knowledge intended to inculcate values of political leadership. History thus
preserved its polemical commitment and the desire to articulate moral and social
purposes. Second, historical methodology, especially causality, was also of interest,
still, for moral and public, as much as for purely scientific or philosophical reasons.251
In several crucial respects, Robertson was no exception. We have been
reminded that his forays into the apparently more avant-garde domains of
“theoretical history” have obscured the fact that the bulk of his output is conceived in
terms of (predominantly political) narrative, with “the character of men and
manners” at its centre. Moreover, even though it is important to observe that
“character” for him no longer serves an exemplary function but is historicized, thus
becoming a tool for social analysis as well as a literary device, Robertson’s
“philosophical” discussions (which seem to break up the unity of some of his works)
essentially served such newly conceived narrative purposes. At the same time it is
also suggested that in his narrative of action Robertson transcended the limitations
251 Allan, Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment.  See  also,  for  a  fine  monographic  study  of  a
figure  of  the  “outer  circle”  and  the  challenge  he  and  his  likes  constituted  to  the  new  mainstream,
William Zachs, Without Regard to Good Manners: A Biography of Gilbert Stuart 1743-1786 (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1992).
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imposed by stadial forms of history, with which his name is usually associated; and
that,  in  fact,  he  wrote  an  enriched  and  innovative  version  of  narrative  history  at  a
time when it  was  subject  to  critical  pressure.  In  the  process,  marked by a  quest  for
“truthful ways of writing” about history, he also realized that the principles of
historiography are not immutable and allowed the theoretical assumptions of his
work to be modified by the qualities of the subject.252 It must also be re-emphasized
that stadialism was by no means incompatible for him as a principle of causality with
providentialism.253 Finally, given his titles and roles as Principal of the University of
Edinburgh, as Historiographer Royal, and especially as Moderator of the General
Assembly of the Scottish Kirk, he could have hardly afforded an aloofness vis-à-vis
the public-political debates of the times. It is a matter of course that the agendas he
pursued in these debates infiltrate the themes he addressed and the arguments he
developed as a historian, and while each of these, in general, can be readily
associated with “moderatism”, on some subjects his position is found close to
traditional Presbyterianism.254
Robertson’s  character  as  an  essentially  political  historian,  who  derived  the
very topic of his major works from developments and challenges experienced on the
scene  of  contemporary  domestic  and  international  politics,  has  also  been  re-
emphasized. His own and his fellow Moderates’ views were powerfully shaped by
the experience of populist evangelical fervour and the atmosphere of theological
252 D. J. Womersley, “The Historical Writings of William Robertson”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 47
(1986), 497-506; Neal Hargraves, “National history and ‘philosophical’ history: character and narrative
in William Robertson’s History of Scotland”, History of European Ideas, 26 (2000), 19-33; Idem., “The
‘Progress of Ambition’: Character, Narrative, and Philosophy in the Works of William Robertson”,
Journal of the History of Ideas, 63 (2002), 261-282; Idem., “Enterprise, adventure and industry: the
formation  of  ‘commercial  character’  in  William  Robertson’s History of America”, History of European
Ideas, 29 (2003), 33-54; Idem., “Beyond the Savage Character: Mexicans, Peruvians, and the
“Imperfectly Civilized” in William Robertson’s History of America”, in Larry Wolff and Marco Cipollini
(eds.), The Anthropology of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 103-118.
253 Phillipson,  “Providence  and  progress”,  esp.  68  ff.;  see  also  in  greater  detail  below  in  Chapter  3.
Besides providentialism, but closely related to the paradigm of stadialism, the centrality of
“unintended consequences” to Robertson’s causal explanations has been argued in Daniele
Francesconi, “William Robertson on Historical Causation and Unintended Consequences”, Storia della
Storiografia, 36 (1999), 55-80.
254 Mary Fearnley-Sander, “Philosophical History and the Scottish Reformation: William Robertson
and the Knoxian Tradition”, Historical Journal, 33 (1990), 323-338; Alexander Du Toit, “God Before
Mammon? William Robertson, Episcopacy and the Church of England”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History,
54 (2003), 671-690; Colin Kidd, “Subscription, the Scottish Enlightenment and the Moderate
Interpretation of History”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 55 (2004), 502-519.
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faction that marred Scotland in the 1740s, not to speak of the civil warfare of 1745,
when he joined the Edinburgh Volunteers to defend the city against Charles Stuart
and the Jacobite army.255 It  could have been no coincidence that the historical work
which first earned him fame as an author addressed a period of the Scottish past
notorious on account of its religious and civil turbulence. His second great historical
saga explored the first episode in the formation of the system of European balance of
power at a time when Britain was emerging from a protracted war, one of whose
major stakes for her was the preservation of that system after the “diplomatic
revolution” of 1756. From this perspective, the masterly sketch of the development of
social structures over a whole millennium, on a continent-wide scale in the
voluminous preface to the History of Charles V appears as an anomalous digression,
needed to explain the emergence of states with a vastly enhanced capacity to wage
war by the beginning of the modern era.  Similarly, the philosophical analysis of the
“savage character” in the celebrated Book IV of the History of America may have been
motivated less by the ambition to contribute an innovative piece of anthropology,
and more by a realization of the difficulty which civilized Scottish Lowlanders had in
accommodating their primitive compatriots of the Highlands, or the disadvantages
suffered by British troops in North America because of the superior skills displayed
by the French in negotiating with the Iroquois.256 One might add that Robertson’s
late masterpiece on the intercourse of Europeans with the Indian subcontinent over
the  whole  of  recorded  history  was  written  at  a  time  when  Britain,  having  lost  one
colonial empire, had just gained another – only to be almost immediately confronted
with the problem of colonial mismanagement, culminating in the spectacular
political  case  of  the  times,  the  parliamentary  prosecution  of  Warren  Hastings,
governor  general  of  the  British  East  India  Company.257 In this sense, it is
255 Stuart J. Brown, “William Robertson and the Scottish Enlightenment”, in idem. (ed.), William
Robertson and the expansion of empire, 9.
256 Geoff  Grundy,  “The  emulation  of  nations.  William  Robertson  and  the  international  order”,  PhD
dissertation (University of Edinburgh, 2005), 272 ff. Cf. Troy Bickham, Savages within the Empire.
Representations of American Indians in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), Ch. 5.
especially 195 ff.
257 While the Judicial Plan of 1772, which decided that India would be governed by Indian (not British)
law,  made  it  imperative  for  British  East  India  Company  officials  to  understand  Indian  law  and  the
cultural traditions behind it, and triggered a remarkable range of relevant scholarship by a group of
British “orientalists,” Hastings and his circle went too far in portraying themselves as “the inheritors
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undoubtedly tempting to conceive of Robertson’s historiography “as counsel to the
statesmen of his day.”258
And yet these perceptive qualifiers tend to confirm, rather than undermine,
the view that we have become accustomed to form about the distinctiveness of
Roberston and the historical culture his name stands for.  They do not affect but,  on
the contrary, serve to put in sharper relief his character as a “cosmopolitan” historian
whose patriotism drew inspiration not from the vainglory of the putative medieval
liberties of Scotland but from the standards which his comparative explorations
identified in Europe’s gradual progress towards cultural refinement, socio-economic
well-being, and political stability. These standards were not derived by him from the
narrative of “the character of men”, which lacked any explanatory force of its own
and was rather to be explained through generalizations about “the character of
manners”,  allowed by the  stadialist  approach.  Even in  cases  in  which the  character
and conduct of a people,  like the Mexicans or the Peruvians, seem to emerge “from
outside  the  typology of  philosophical  history”,  they are  recorded as  anomalies  that
are strange, but ultimately not as ones that challenge the pattern.259 The same was
also instrumental for Robertson’s specific profession of “impartiality”: one not
(necessarily) based on independence from party (like in the case of Hume), nor on
scepticism (like Gibbon), but on the endeavour to grasp and express the unlimited
wholeness of history, as far as this is possible at all.260 At the same time, another key
to impartiality is provided by the almost literary sensitivity towards individual
of  the Indian polity  as  refounded by Emperor Akbar” in the sixteenth century.  For  the relevance of
these developments to Robertson’s work, see Stuart J. Brown, “William Robertson, Early Orientalism
and the Historical Disquisition on India of 1791”, The Scottish Historical Review 88:2 (2009), 296. For the
background: Peter J. Marshall, The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 1-44; John L. Brockington, “Warren Hastings and Orientalism”, in
Geoffrey Carnall and Colin Nicholson (eds.), The Impeachment of Warren Hastings (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 91-108.
258 Grundy, “The emulation of nations”, 132.
259 Cf. Hargraves, “Beyond the Savage Character”.
260 Jeffrey Smitten, “Impartiality in Robertson’s History of America”, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 19
(1985), 56-77. It must be added that his own contemporaries appreciated Robertson’s impartiality in a
less sophisticated sense, one in which Hume’s version of it was conceived. “[Y]ou have shewn that
you can write on ticklish subjects with the utmost discretion, and on subjects of religious party with
temper and impartiality”, wrote Horace Walpole upon reading the History of Scotland. Quoting
Walpole, while also expressing his own admiration, Dugald Stewart somewhat toned it down with a
simple  explanation:  “at  this  distance  of  time,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  prejudice  and  passion
should enter into the discussion.” Stewart, Biographical Memoirs, 183, 195.
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character261 – of Mary Queen of the Scots,  Charles V, Maurice of Saxony, Henry the
Navigator, Christopher Columbus, Hernán Cortes, and so forth. Similarly to the
employing of stadial patterns (but also pointing beyond them), this sensitivity led
Robertson to make it an absolute priority to register the fullness of historical
phenomena, as against passing judgment over them.
In all these respects, he participated in the methodological and theoretical
explorations described earlier in this chapter, and departed from the ground
occupied  by  a  host  of  historians  with  whom  he  shared  in  the  rightly  stressed
continuities. An overview of Robertson’s making as a historian, in combination with
his public roles, will support this claim. In the late 1730s the lectures of Charles
Mackie,  the  first  professor  of  universal  history  at  the  University  of  Edinburgh,
provided  Robertson  with  a  great  deal  of  inspiration  and  a  lasting  commitment  to
philosophical history,262 a  version  of  history  whose  task  was  to  provide  a  selective
narrative of events with a view to revealing men’s moral and political character, and
to highlighting “by example” to readers or listeners the principles conducive to the
preservation  or  the  subversion  of  the  public  good.  Adopting  this  scheme  of
explanation depended on the historian’s willingness to regard past historical agents
as  his  contemporaries  whose  actions  could  be  judged  by  timeless  standards  of
morality. Even the kind of relativism introduced by Machiavelli could be
accommodated  in  this  scheme:  the  circumstances  that  warranted  conduct  of
otherwise questionable morality were themselves entirely contingent in the sense
that they might occur with equal probability in any age or society. It was in the late
1740s that Robertson, already having embarked on the research towards his first
great work, was confronted with the kind of historical approach that he would
embrace and apply consistently in his own narratives. Montesquieu’s preoccupation
with the effects of the physical environment and the historical principles which
animated the laws and customs of an age and which determined the spirit of the
people made a deep impression on him. So did Hume’s alternative to Montesquieu,
261 Noted by Stewart in ibid., 181.
262 On the relationship between Robertson and Mackie, see Phillipson, “Providence and progress”, 57-
8. On Mackie, L.W. Sharp, “Charles Mackie, the First Professor of History at Edinburgh University”,
Scottish Historical Review, 41 (1962), 23-45.
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suggesting that the moral determinants of national character had to do with political,
legal, religious and cultural institutions, rather than geography or climate. Above all,
Robertson seems to have become inspired with the system of historical jurisprudence
which the young Adam Smith outlined in a series of lectures in Edinburgh in 1748-
1750. Smith endeavoured to show that the principles of justice and politics depended
on sentiments, manners and customs which, in turn, were themselves functions of
the means of subsistence and the distribution of property; and also combined these
observations  with  a  theory  of  the  stadial  progress  of  civilisation  from  rudeness  to
refinement, or hunting-gathering through shepherding and agriculture to
commerce.263 It  is  important  to  re-emphasize  that,  while  these  were  genuinely  new
intellectual departures, they were heavily indebted to the radical conceptual
distinction between the “state of nature” and the “civil state” introduced by modern
natural law, to whose temporalization they greatly contributed by introducing ever
more historical nuance, and to whose transformation into an empirical inquiry they
provided plenty of ammunition.264
Needless to say, this approach constituted a challenge for the philosophical
historian, especially if that historian was as good a Christian as it may be expected
from a devoted and ambitious minister and moderator of the established Kirk of
Scotland.  In  terms  of  stadial  or  “conjectural”  history,  people  who  lived  in
civilisations different from one’s own were separated from one by a cultural chasm
to the extent that they not only possessed different manners and opinions, but even
263 Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws was published in 1748, while Hume’s Essays Moral and Political
from  1741,  in  several,  continually  rewrought  editions  (the  third,  “improved  and  expanded”  edition
also exactly in 1748). “Of National Characters” is one of these essays. As for Smith, he never published
a text on jurisprudence in his lifetime: his lectures held on this subject (“on the third and fourth part of
moral philosophy”, i.e. on justice and expediency) after his appointment as professor of logics and
moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1751, have been reconstructed on the basis of lecture
notes of his students by modern scholarship. See Lectures on Jurisprudence,  eds.  R.  L.  Meek,  D.  D.
Raphael and P. G. Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Previously, however, between 1748 and 1750
the young Smith also held a few public lectures in Edinburgh, allowing Robertson to borrow some of
his views – perhaps literally so: Smith is said to have accused Robertson of having plagiarised the
backbone of A View of the Progress of Society in Europe.  Ian  Simpson  Ross, The Life of Adam Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 105-6.
264 Locke’s  claim  that  “in  the  beginning  all  the  World  was  America”  is  sometimes  quoted  to
demonstrate the propensity inherent in seventeenth-century natural law to think in stadial terms, but
the most articulate early statement of the “stages” theory (and the one that is regarded to have had the
strongest impact on eighteenth-century social science) is associated with Pufendorf. John Locke, Two
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different minds and selves. Any attempt to assess their moral, political or other
virtues  by  standards  other  than  their  own  was  “wrong”,  not  only  in  the  sense  of
being unfair towards the objects of the investigation, but also methodologically
incorrect and therefore inevitably doomed to failure. Most disturbingly, then, it
became unclear what lessons the modern reader could learn by studying the past.
Especially perplexing was the question what the knowledge of the progress of
civilisation could reveal about the eternal and unchanging mind of God.
Robertson’s solution for this problem was befitting the man of synthesis he
was in his scholarship, and the man of compromise he was in his politics. As to the
latter, recent convincing demonstrations of his strong and principled commitment to
Presbyterianism as the purest form of Christian doctrine and the best form of church
government (in particular, vis-à-vis Catholicism and Anglicanism), certainly
undermine his image as a champion of universal enlightened tolerance, if our
standard of “Enlightenment” is that of an uncompromising movement towards a
fully secularized and egalitarian world.265 But they at best qualify and enrich his
image as the leader and most influential voice in a party still styled as “moderate”,
which during his tenure as moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland and beyond,266 was willing to make gestures towards Episcopalians and
Catholics, on a principle of Enlightenment which focused on the chances of human
betterment in this world while also mindful of the next (even when such gestures
were ill at ease with their theological or ecclesiological views).267 Similar is the case
with Robertson’s endeavour to understand the history of the Western world – of
Scotland  in  her  relations  with  Europe,  and  of  Europe  in  its  relations  with  the
widening overseas spaces – in terms of the ever increasing access to the full richness
of the Gospel through material and cultural progress and refinement, in lack of which
any revelation to the primitive Christians could only have been incomplete.
Treatises of Government, ed. Pater Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 301; Hont,
“The Language of Sociability and Commerce”.
265 Cf. Du Toit, “God Before Mammon?” and idem., “’A species of false religion’: William Robertson,
Catholic relief and the myth of Moderate tolerance”, The Innes Review, 52:2 (2001), 167-88.
266 Cf. Introduction, n. 5 above..
267 For  Robertson  as  the  central  figure  in  the  “Moderate  Party”  within  the Kirk and the moderates’
place in the Edinburgh Enlightenment, see Sher, Church and University. See also Ian D. L. Clark, “From
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Conversely, Robertson was also convinced, and illustrated it with many examples
throughout his oeuvre as a historian, that without the necessary foundations in
Christian revelation, the morality established upon the grounds of natural progress is
incomplete and uncertain: although self-interest is generally compatible with ethical
conduct, in some cases vice remains unpunished and virtue remains unrewarded in
this world – hence the need for belief in the next one.268 In this sense, Robertson’s was
a Christian Enlightenment, which he shared with his fellow Moderates (leaving
Hume and Smith the outstanding exceptions of the Scottish Enlightenment), and
which made a strong imprint on his outlook as a historian.
The nature and extent of the distinctiveness of this outlook is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter Four below, and is further underlined by a comparison
between his approach to history and the methodological assumptions, thematic
preoccupations and professional endeavours of eighteenth-century German
practitioners of the field, which presumably, to some extent at least, also informed
the expectations which Robertson’s German interpreters and readers harboured
towards his texts. In many ways, the historical interest of the Scottish Enlightenment
was present-oriented, and from this point of view the situation in contemporary
Germany was not substantially different.  In both cases, history was cultivated
predominantly  in  order  to  show  how  the  present  arose  from  the  past,  and,
consequently, how the nature of the present – and the future – can be better
understood through the study of the past. What was different was the present, or
rather the vision of the present, and its aspects that history was expected to highlight.
One way of assessing the differences between the historical culture that bred
Robertson and the one in which the German transmitters of his texts were raised, is
to locate them on the contemporary maps of learned inquiry. The “neighbour
disciplines” to which Robertson’s historiography was chiefly indebted, were clearly
the ones which constituted the Edinburgh-style “science of man”: historical and
Protest  to  Reaction.  The  Moderate  Regime  in  the  Church  of  Scotland,  1752-1805”,  in  Mitchison  and
Phillipson (eds.), Scotland in the Age of Improvement, 200-224.
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natural jurisprudence, combined with political economy and moral philosophy
which, with an interest in the social dynamics arising from different “modes of
subsistence” as well as the psychological and physiological aspects of the human
condition, came close to the commitment of modern anthropology to the study of
“culture” as a complex system. A comparable Wissenschaft vom Menschen was indeed
arising in contemporary Germany as well, in particular at and around the University
of Göttingen269 – with which, as we shall see in the ensuing chapters, not a few of the
individuals involved in the reception of Robertson’s works were connected.
However, even at Göttingen, the consolidation of the psychological and ethnological
components of the “anthropological turn” seem to have much preceded the
transformation of cameralist science into Nationalökonomie, a process which, together
with the questioning of academic statistics, also led to a shift within the state sciences
(Staatswissenschaften) from concern with the state itself to “civil society”. The former
process,  with the appearance of philosophical anthropology (after the earlier rise of
physical anthropology and ethnography) was in full gear by the 1760s, but the latter
one did not seriously commence until the 1790s, coinciding with and inspired greatly
by the “second reception” of Smith’s Wealth of Nations.270 In other words, there was a
phase displacement, which was of some consequence for the chances and the ways in
which history might constitute itself as one of the “sciences of man”, and concerned
exactly the period when Robertson’s four major histories were published in Britain as
well  as  in  Germany.  Anthropology was  acknowledged to  have arisen out  of  moral
philosophy and theology in regard of its “philosophical”, and out of anatomy and
zoology in regard of its “physical” aspects; while ethnology as a comprehensive
Völkerkunde was a par excellence historical discipline, heavily indebted to geography
268 Cf. Thomas Ahnert, “Fortschrittsgeschichte und religiöse Aufklärung. William Robertson und die
Deutung außereuropäischer Kulturen”, in Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), Die Aufklärung und ihre
Weltwirkung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 101-122.
269 Hans  Erich  Bödeker,  Philippe  Büttgen,  Michel  Espagne  (eds.), Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in
Göttingen um 1800 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008). For another comprehensive treatment
of the subject within the extensive literature, see also Marino, Praeceptores Germaniae.
270 Han F. Vermeulen, “Göttingen und die Völkerkunde. Ethnologie und Ethnographie in der
deutschen Aufklärung, 1710-1815” and Guillaume Garner, “Politische Ökonomie und Statistik an der
Universität Göttingen (1760-1820)”, in Bödeker, Büttgen, Espagne (eds.), Die Wissenschaft vom
Menschen, 199-230, 371-392. On the latter subject, cf. also Keith Tribe, Governing Economy. The
Transformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
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and linguistics. The strong historicity of the Smithian (and Humean) economic
analysis of commercial modernity was also recognized by German commentators.
Characteristically, however, the authoritative German reviewer of both the original
and the first translation of the Wealth of Nations, the Göttingen philosopher Johann
Georg Heinrich Feder, failed to point out the continuities between it and the Theory of
Moral Sentiments271 –  an  early  manifestation  of  what  later  came  to  be  known  as das
Adam Smith Problem. This lopsidedness in Feder’s assessment of Smith resembles the
perspective of the reviewers of Scottish historical texts in the Göttingische Anzeigen
von gelehrten Sachen. They were almost invariably enthusiastic about the
abandonment by Hume, Robertson, Millar and others of wars, kings and dynasties as
their principal focus, which was later on described by August Ludwig Schlözer as
suited to the tastes of the “Anno Domini men of the Middle Ages.”272 However, they
took very little notice of the Scottish Enlightenment idea of “progress” as dependent
on the succession of systems of production and distribution or “modes of
subsistence”.273 Geschichten der Menschheit – the very name of the genre signalling an
endeavour  to  locate  history  among  the  “sciences  of  man”  –  flourished  to  an
astonishing extent in Germany in the 1760s to the 1780s, and while the authors of
works whose titles included this compound tended to hold chairs in philosophy
rather than history, the foremost professional historians also employed the
perspective offered by the concept. But the kind of history of cultural forms towards
which it points is little concerned with the ways in which these forms are related to
needs and the provision for them.274
271 GAgS , 30 (10 March 1777), 234-240, Zugabe, 213-220, 240.
272 August Ludwig Schlözer, Stats-Gelartheit. Zweiter Theil: Theorie der Statistik nebst Ideen über das
Studium der Politik überhaupt (Göttingen:Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1804), 92.
273 Norbert Waszek, “Die Schottische Aufklärung in der Göttinger Wissenschaft vom Menschen”, in
Bödeker, Büttgen, Espagne (eds.), Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen, 141. For a highly sophisticated study
of the Scottish “natural history of mankind” and the German Menschheitsgeschichte within the context
of the science of man and the Wissenschaft vom Menschen – and therefore, emphatically, not as a part of
the history of historiography in the narrower sense but as a critical phases in the reconstruction of the
entire contemporary landscape of knowledge – see Annette Meyer, Von der Wahrheit zur
Wahrscheinlichkeit. Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in der schottischen und deutschen Aufklärung
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2008).
274 Jörn Garber, “Von der Menschengeschichte zur Kulturgeschichte. Zum geschichtstheoretischen
Kulturbegriff der deutschen Spätaufklärung”, in idem., Spätabsolutismus und bürgerliche Gesellschaft.
Studien zur deutschen Staats- und Gesellschaftstheorie im Übergang zur Moderne (Frankfurt: Keip Verlag,
1992), 409-433; Gérard Laudin, “Histoire de la civilization et histoire anthropologique. Adelung et la
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As regards the further traditions of historical inquiry per se relevant in the
German recipient environment of Robertson’s works, they were numerous and
diverse. Some of them directly answered the need for history to talk to the present in
ways that arose from Germany’s recent and current political predicament, and
reflected the fact that in this sense 1648, the Osnabrück-Münster Peace Settlement
represented for her what 1707 and the Union of Parliaments was for Great Britain,
and the Utrecht peace treaty system of 1713 for Europe and its colonial dependencies.
The federative character and the religious and institutional pluralism of the Holy
Roman Empire, which the Westphalian system preserved in defiance of Habsburg
efforts at imperialism, inspired a great deal of Reichshistorie or “imperial history”,
with a focus on the legal and constitutional distinctiveness of the Empire.275 The
same  outcome  of  the  Thirty  Years  War,  however,  can  also  be  detected  in  the
background of Landesgeschichte, the histories of the particular territorial states whose
specific internal arrangements constituted the immediate reality in which the
Aufklärer lived and worked.276 These genres were instrumental in the expression and
formation of identities on local, regional and national scales.277 At the same time, it is
important to note that while narratio and exemplum, the long-established means of
pursuing such ends through historical representation, continued to characterize
especially Landesgeschichte into the 1760s, from then on the horizons of both types of
inquiry increasingly came to embrace the entirety of the Verfassung or constitution of
their respective domains, in the comprehensive sense of the interactions between the
Culturgeschichte”, Le Texte et l’Idée, 17 (2002), 59-78; idem., “Gatterer und Schlözer: Geschichte als
‘Wissenschaft vom Menschen’?”, in Bödeker, Büttgen, Espagne (eds.), Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen,
393-418. See also Johan van der Zande, “Popular Philosophy and the History of Mankind in
Eighteenth-Century Germany”, Storia della Storiografia 22 (1992), 37-56. Geschichte der Menschheit is also
a central theme in Carhart, The Science of Culture; most recently, see André de Melo Araújo,
Weltgeschichte in Göttingen. Eine Studie über das spätaufklärerische universalhistorische Denken, 1756-1815
(Bielefeld: Tracscript Verlag, 2012), 9-14, 97-138. For further discussion, see ch. 6 below.
275 Notker Hammerstein, Ius und Historie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historischen Denkens an deutschen
Universitäten im späten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973); idem.,
“Reichshistorie”, in Hans Erich Bödeker, Georg G. Iggers, Jonathan B. Knudsen (eds.), Aufklärung und
Geschichte. Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1986), 82-104.
276 Hans Erich Bödeker, “Landesgeschichtliche Erkenntnisinteressen der nordwestdeutschen
Aufklärungshistorie”, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte 69 (1997), 247-279.
277 See Leonard Krieger, “Germany”, in Orest Ranum (ed.), National Consciousness, History, and Political
Culture in Early-Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 67-97.
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prevailing governmental-administrative, socio-cultural and geographic-economic
systems.
This move, however, together with the emergence of a more genetic and
analytical  thrust  in  imperial  and  regional  history,  owed  a  great  deal  to  the  rise  of
Universalgeschichte as another relatively recent development in German historical
scholarship. Universal history was understood as a systematic but not speculative
rendering of the flux of history, weaving together the important threads of national
histories in a single narrative after carefully weighing the significance of data and
paying due attention to cause and effect. One of its early promoters, the first of the great
history professors at Göttingen, Johann Christoph Gatterer278 campaigned to supplant it
for Völkergeschichte, a genre of respectable pedigree, which he considered a mechanical
registration of successive events and a mere succession of national histories. Gatterer
thought that “the well-known work of the English approaches in some particulars the
outlines of such a general history of the world”279 – but he also added that a history like
this was yet to be written. The German edition of the encyclopedic English Universal
History was at that time already under heavy attack by his younger colleague
Schlözer.280 It might be added that Gatterer’s own specific recommendations on how to
approach the task of writing universal history and his practice as an author of historical
texts hardly reflected these principles. While he spoke of the necessary
“preoccupations” (Beschäftigungen) of the historian, implying that the field was still
understood by him mainly as a subject of research, Schlözer conceived of it in terms of
methods specific to it.281 In Schlözer’s rendering, the “mighty glimpse” of universal
278 The  latest  –  magesterial  –  treatment  of  Gatterer  as  an  embodiment  of  the  endeavour  of  mid-
eighteenth century historical science to establish itself as a worthy counterpart of the natural sciences
by  accommodating  the  standards  of  precision,  system,  method  and  a  holistic  aura,  is  Martin  Gierl,
Geschichte als präzisierte Wissenschaft. Johann Christoph Gatterer und die Historiographie des 18. Jahrhunderts
im ganzen Umfang (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann.Holzboog, 2012).
279 “…  das  bekante  Werk  der  Engländer  dem  Umfange  einer  solchen  allgemeinen  Welthistorie  in
manchen einzelnen Theilen nähert.“ J. C. Gatterer vom historischen Plan, und der darauf sich
gründenden Zusammenfügung der Erzählungen”, in Allgemeine historische Bibliothek vom Mitglieder der
königlichen Instituts des historischen Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, ed. J. C. Gatterer, 1 (1767), I. 26.
280 GAgS, January 27 and April 10-12, 1766, 90-93 and 340-48. Cf. Johan van der Zande, “August
Ludwig Schlözer and the English Universal History”,  in Peter Schuman, Stefan Berger, Peter Lambert
(eds.), Historikerdialoge. Geschichte, Mythos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch
1750-2000 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 137-156.
281 Gatterer’s “preoccupations” included the “most helpful historians”, the “description of the earth”,
the “account  of  historical  events  according to synchronic  and chronological  methods”,  and “peoples
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history “moulds the aggregate into a system … and regards the nations merely in
terms of their relationship to the great changes in the world;” it “grows out from the
particular histories, but as it orders these into a lucid whole it gratefully throws light
on each of these parts”.282 In other words, universal history was conceptualized as an
epitome  of  history,  and  a  symbiotic  system  of  causal  connections  which  was  more
than an aggregate of its constituent elements.283 Thus defined, it became an
important vehicle of the overall separation of Geschichte as a “collective singular”
from Historien,  whose  pursuit  of  “the  truth”  had  been  either  in  the  line  of  mere
narratio or preoccupied with ethical and political ends, rather than epistemologically
motivated, organized by the inquiring subject himself, and endeavouring to produce
new  knowledge.  In  virtue  of  the  features  now  associated  with  universal  history,  it
came to be viewed as capable of theorization and generalization, in a word, of
operating as philosophy: of being elevated from the rank of mere fact-finding to that
of a cognitive process in pursuit of regularities or “laws” peculiar to the field.284
and states according to their constitution,” while the methods listed in Schlözer’s scheme were source
criticism, and the geographic, chronographic, ethnographic and “technographic” methods. The
transparencies  and  differences  are  discussed  in  further  detail  in  De  Melo  Araújo, Weltgeschichte in
Göttingen, 71-95.
282 [D]ieser mächtige Blick schafft das Aggregate zum System … und schätzet die Völker bloß nach
ihrem Verhältnisse  zu den grossen Revolutionen der  Welt.  … Die Weltgeschichte  erwächst  aus den
Specialgeschichten:  allein  indem  sie  diese  in  ein  lichtes  Ganzes  ordnet,  so  breitet  sie  dankbar  über
jeden diesre Teile eine neue Helle aus.” August Ludwig Schlözer, Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie
(1772/73), ed. Horst Walter Blanke (Hagen: Margit Rottmann Medienverlag, 1990), 19, 34.
283 On the relevance of  the “part  versus whole” problem to historical  thought  and universal  history,
see Peter Hanns Reill, “Das Problem des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen im geschichtlichen Denken
und in in den historiographischen Darstellungen des späten 18. Jahrhunderts”, in Karl Acham,
Winfried Schulze (eds.), Teil und Ganzes: Zum Verhältnis von Einzel- und Gesamtanalyse in Geschichts-
und Sozialwissenschaften (Munich: DTV, 1990), 141-168; Jörn Garber, “Selbstreferenz und Objektivität:
Organisationsmodelle von Mensch- und Weltgeschichte in der deutschen Spätaufklärung”, in
Bödeker, Reill and Schlumbohm (eds.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis, 137-185. On universal history,
see further Hans Erich Bödeker, “The Debates about Universal History and National History around
1800: A Problem-Oriented Historical Attempt”, in Tim Blanning, Hagen Schulze (eds.), Unity and
Diversity in European Culture c. 1800 = Proceedings of the British Academy, 134 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press / British Academy, 2006), 135-170.
284 The theoretical work of Martin Chladenius, in particular his Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft,
worinnen der Grund zu einer neuen Einsicht in allen Arten der Gelahrtheit geleget wird (Leipzig, 1752) broke
much  new  ground  for  Gatterer  and  Schlözer.  For  concise  explorations  of  the  theme,  see  Reinhart
Koselleck, “Geschichte, Historie”, section V, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (eds.),
Gescichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1975), II. 647-678; Michael Gottlob, Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Aufklärung und
Historismus. Johannes von Müller und Friedrich Christoph Schlosser (Frankfurt etc.: Peter Lang, 1989), 27-
48; Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Die Verwissenschaftlichung der Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Aufklärung
und Historismus”, in idem., Geschichtskultur und Wissenschaft (München: DTV, 1990), 58-91.
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  As another aspect of the German-style “scienticization”
(Verwissenschaftlichung) of history, as the process came to be described in retrospect,
each of the above-mentioned kinds of history were cultivated with a heightened
philological awareness, inherited from humanism.285 Thus  they were  on the  way of
being developed into the “philological-critical method”, and also a refined historical
hermeneutics. In terms of the skills required from the expert historian, in the German
context perhaps more than any other it was especially these latter two features that
were supposed to make history answer the newly conceived, eighteenth-century
criteria  of  “science”:  the  knowledge  of  causes  acquired  through  the  application  of
strict methodological principles, resulting in critically demonstrated probability,
concerning a clearly defined and delimited subject matter – in the case of history,
man and humanity.286 Under  the  impact  of  philology,  both  as  an  auxiliary  science
and  as  a  methodology,  the  very  aim  of  historical  inquiry  in  Germany  became
transformed into the reconstruction of historical “facts” through the study and
interpretation of original documents.287 The “critical” character of historical research
was  to  be  manifest  no  longer  merely  in  the  criticism  of  earlier  accounts,  but  in  the
exercise of the researcher’s philological skills to the uncovering and weighing of new
evidence as the foundation of historical representation. To be sure, this was a
philology  whose  scope  was  expanded,  first,  to  embrace  a  broad  spectrum  of
disciplines from Biblical studies and classics to jurisprudence, and, second, to replace
a purely linguistic and lexicographical analysis of texts with a hermeneutic approach
which saw the source as the manifestation of a culture.288 This was the sense in which
the practitioners of the field endeavoured to establish the “immanence” of history.
Against such a background it is no wonder that Robertson’s sometimes cavalier
treatment of the sources, while in his own understanding supportive of the cause of
“impartiality”, met incomprehension or criticism among his German reviewers and
285 For humanism and Enlightenment as both belonging to the “prehistory of historicism”, see Ulrich
Muhlack, Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte des Historismus
(München: C. H. Beck, 1991).
286 Horst Dreitzel, “Die Entwicklung der Historie zur Wissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Historische
Forschung 8:3 (1981), 257-284.
287 Ulrich  Muhlack,  “Historie  und  Philologie”,  in  Bödeker,  Iggers,  Knudsen  (eds.), Aufklärung und
Geschichte, 49-81.
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editors. In respect of historical taste, synthesis, interpretation and presentation
Robertson – as well as other Scottish (and in general British, and French)
Enlightenment historians – were readily acknowledged to represent models for
German historical writing. However, they were not found “critical enough” when
measured against the standards of the new philological-hermeneutical approach
developed and employed by scholars like the Göttingen classical scholar and par
excellence philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne, or historians of the make of Schlözer
and his colleague Ludwig Timotheus Spittler.289
But this was neither all that different from the kind of commentary Robertson
quite often received from Scottish colleagues – a paramount, and well researched
example being Gilbert Stuart290 –, nor was it the main feature of, and the main reason
for,  the  anomalies  in  the  reception.   It  has  been  suggested  that  despite  the  interest
which Germans took in contemporary British historical works, the actual “influence”
of the latter was limited by a number of factors including the differences in the level
of professionalization and the nature of the public. For the Britons, history was a
literary genre whose need for greater scholarly accuracy was keenly recognized, yet
it was aimed at an expanding educated public. In Germany, by contrast, the lack, or
weakness, of such a public throughout most of the eighteenth century went together
with the concentration of history as a discipline in the universities and its consequent
emergence as a highly specialized branch of knowledge cultivated by and for a
narrowly defined community of scholars. In this interpretation these features of the
German scene are  linked to  the  weakness  of  “civil  society”  and the  pettiness  of  the
estates-dominated German Kleinstaaterei, i.e., system of small states.291
While this explanation bears the stamp of the Sonderweg theory and therefore
deserves  to  be  treated  with  caution,  it  does  not  appear  inaccurate.  In  spite  of  the
288 Michael Ermarth, “Hermeneutics and History: The Fork in Hermes’ Path through the 18th Century”,
in Bödeker, Iggers, Knudsen (eds.), Aufklärung und Geschichte, 193-221.
289 In  general  terms,  see  Georg  G.  Iggers,  “The  European  Context  of  Eighteenth-Century  German
Historiography”,  in  Bödeker,  Iggers,  Knudsen  (eds.), Aufklärung und Geschichte, 237; for details of
similar assessments of e.g. Gibbon, see Wilfried Nippel, “Gibbon and German Historiography”, in
Benedikt Stuchtey, Peter Wende (eds.), British and German Historiography 1750-1950. Traditions,
Perceptions, and Transfers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 67-81.
290 On Stuart as an opponent of Robertson in regard of his historical approach and performance as well
as his politics, see Zachs, Without Regard to Good Manners.
291 Iggers, “The European Context of Eighteenth-Century German Historiography”, 232-237.
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demonstrated expansion of the German literary public during the 1760s to the 1780s,
it is reasonable to assume that the lack of a “German Robertson” (or Gibbon, or
Hume) can be explained in terms of a lack of demand for historical works which
combined large scale structural analysis with literary merit. While Schlözer, in
particular, succeeded in amalgamating the philological and critical tradition with a
broadly comparative approach and a heightened attention to the ethnographic and
material bases of history, the narrative quality of his texts is patently inferior. Spittler
did aspire  to  transform history  into  a  more  readable  genre,  but  it  was  not  until  the
late 1780s that, with Johannes von Müller’s Geschichten schweizerischer
Eidgenossenschaften (1786) and Friedrich Schiller’s two works, the Abfall der vereinigten
Niederlande von der Spanischen Regierung (1788) and the Geschichte des Dreyßigjärigen
Krieges (1792) that a “primarily literary form of historical writing” established itself in
Germany.292 Even then, Schiller’s call to “ennoble science into work of art” seems to
have remained a minority endeavour or a largely unsuccessful one, if we are to
believe August Wilhelm Schlegel’s complaint on behalf of the refined German
readers about the lack of a “grander style” and comprehensive meaning in the works
published  by  contemporary  historians  –  perhaps  a  pointer  to  an  emerging
discrepancy  between  the  concerns  of  professionals  and  the  interests  of  the  broader
public.293 In other words, a “phase displacement” similar to the one mentioned
earlier in regard of the rise of the Göttingen Wissenschaft vom Menschen,  can also be
detected in the development of the relationship between a purportedly scientific
history and its appropriate narrative form.
Whatever these circumstances may have to do with Kleinstaaterei, I would
rather draw attention to some of the consequences which derive from Germany’s
political fragmentation to eighteenth-century historical inquiry in a less socially
deterministic fashion, and arise more directly from the stakes and the appropriate
subject matter of such inquiry, in view of its already mentioned “presentism”. These
292 Daniel Fulda, Wissenschaft aus Kunst. Die Entstehung der modernen deutschen Geschichtsschreibung
1760-1860 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), esp. Part II.D; Thomas Prüfer, Die Bildung
der Geschichte. Friedrich Schiller und die Anfänge der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft (Köln-Weimar-Wien:
Böhlau, 2002)
293 Rudolf Vierhaus, “Historisches Interesse im 18. Jahrhundert”, in Bödeker, Iggers, Knudsen (eds.),
Aufklärung und Geschichte, 264-265.
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stakes were enlightened in the same sense as in Robertson’s Enlightenment histories,
concerned  as  they  were  with  the  growth  and  the  chances  of  political  stability,
denominational peace, legal security and material improvement. For many
eighteenth-century Germans, such chances seemed to be predicated to a considerable
extent on the specific structure of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as
it became consolidated, even almost literally enshrined, after the traumas of the
Thirty  Years’  War  in  the  peace  settlement  of  Münster  and Osnabrück in  1648.  As  a
counterpart of Robertson’s modern Europe on a broader scale, the Westphalian
system was conceived as one of the equilibrium of larger and smaller states within
Germany, characterized by the plurality of political and religious establishments.
Germany’s fragmentation became consecrated and institutionalized as an internal
“balance of powers,” whose maintenance was seen as indispensable for its continent-
wide equivalent, too.  The immobility secured by the intricate system of checks and
balances, already existing before 1648 but further refined then and afterwards,
seemed  a  promoter  of  stability  to  be  celebrated,  at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  more
powerful imperial estates of the “Third Germany”, which harboured increasing
concerns in regard of the rise of Brandenburg and the ensuing Austro-Prussian
dualism. A respectable range of external observers, from Montesquieu through –
oddly – Rousseau to Burke also commended German “federalism” as an ideal type
that could be invoked to oppose political centralization in general.294  On a European
scale, one might argue that the existence of this “dead mass”, lacking a unitary
political will and situated in the heart of the continent, separating the hostile great
powers  from  one  another  and  possessing  enough  strength  to  protect  its  own
independence but not to constitute a threat to them, was a key to the balance.
Internally, there also seemed to be advantages that compensated for the political
paralysis arising from the territorial fragmentation of the Empire: a “diversity in the
forms and policies of governments, in social structures and attitudes, in cultural and
294 Maiken Umbach, Federalism and Enlightenment in Germany, 1740-1806 (London: Hambledon Press,
2000), 130-1.
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educational milieus, in religions, in economic activities and levels of well-being” –
providing “Germans with choices which citizens of other countries did not have.”295
For this state of affairs the existence of an “imperial constitution” that
eschewed universal monarchy and vested the composite parts of the assemblage
with considerable powers to provide for the civil, spiritual and material well-being of
their subjects was deemed essential. As an early dissenting voice, in 1667 Pufendorf
notoriously described the “state of the German Empire” as monstro simile: neither a
monarchy, an aristocracy or a democracy, nor a federation, it looked to him an
irregular conjunction of its constituent parts, some of them commanded as quasi-
sovereign regions by powerful states external to it.296 Nevertheless, the Reich and its
constitution, from Pufendorf’s senior contemporary Hermann Conring to Johann
Stephan Pütter a century later, was a political self-evidence throughout the later
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries for scholars interested in the exploration of
German ius publicum as a system of civil liberty and security, a pursuit inconceivable
without the reconstruction of the history of its emergence, implying attention to
factors such as customs and climate besides laws and institutions.  The gradual
development of the existing structures passed for a strong argument in their favour
as  the  key  to  their  “appropriateness”:  the  proposition  that  as  the  imperial
constitution had organically evolved over many centuries, it had come to incorporate
the character of the nation, thus there had emerged a correspondence between its
political order and its political culture.297
Hence, the preoccupation also with Teutsche Staats-Historie, German political
history among scholars of diverse disciplines who were both imperial and local
patriots, was widespread. The paramount example of this brand of scholar was
Johann Jakob Moser (1701-85), the first to have produced a comprehensive empirical
account  of  German  public  law  in  compendia  that  ran  into  several  dozens  of
295 For an evaluation of the Westphalian settlement and its long term consequences in this sense, see
John Gagliardo, Germany under the Old Regime 1600-1790 (London and New York: Longman, 1991),
chs. 7-8 and 22, here 363.
296 Severinus de Monzambano [Samuel von Pufendorf], De statu imperii Germanici (The Hague, 1667),
VI. 1 and 9. Modern German edition: Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches, ed. Horst Denzer (Stuttgart:
Reclam, 1976).
297 Umbach, Federalism and Enlightenment, 133-4.
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volumes.298 Moser  claimed to  have written more  history  than almost  anybody else,
even though his avowed aim was to emancipate public law from history. In the given
context,  however, this meant that the emancipation was to be mutual.  Moser called
history  to  the  aid  of  law  not  as  a  source  of  any  validating  power,  but  as  a  tool
promoting  its  better  understanding:  as  a  means  (a  better  one  than  logic)  for
uncovering the meaning of law through showing the context of documentary
materials and traditions, the interests and prejudices that framed it, and for sifting
these from valid law. As such, history checked, rather than established or enhanced
the power of the past over the present. It was invested by Moser with a public-
political significance, but exactly as a safeguard against false analogy and
anachronism.299
The role of historical analysis as an indispensable auxiliary science, or indeed
an almost independent dimension of any discipline within the university canon that
concerned the operation of the state, was far from being confined to the case of law.
Besides providing for good government by making and administering law, the state
came to be increasingly recognized as committed to performing the same task by the
proper management of the resources in the territory where she was sovereign, for the
sake of improving the condition of the subjects, itself conceived as the ultimate
ground for legitimacy. At its root, this recognition was indebted both to the
traditions of urban government, initially aimed to ensure the good morals and the
maintenance of order by Polizey-Ordnungen, and to the understanding of the political
community in the natural jurisprudence of Althusius and Pufendorf. It received
further impetus from the cameralist tradition initiated in the seventeenth century by
Joachim Becher, Wilhelm von Schröder and Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk. By the
eighteenth century, these tendencies coalesced into a cluster of university based
scientific disciplines: Kameralwissenschaft (focusing  on  the  economic  theory  of  the
state), Polizeywissenschaft (concerned with organizational-institutional aspects) and
298 Teutsches Staatsrecht (1739-47), 53 vols; Neues Teutsches Staatsrecht (1766-82), 24 vols. Moser’s entire
oeuvre amounts to over 500 published volumes.
299 On  Moser’s  historical  contribution,  see  Mack  Walker,  “Johann  Jakob  Moser”,  in  Bödeker,  Iggers,
Knudsen (eds.), Aufklärung und Geschichte, 105-118; more generally, idem., Johann Jakob Moser and the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1981), esp. Chs.
13-15, 29-31..
               dc_444_12
134
Staatistik (the statistical rendering of knowledge about the state in facts and figures).
Together, they constituted the science of the pragmatic, target-oriented fathoming,
registering and allocating of resources with a view to their best utilization.300
Exercising command over such resources, protected under the imperial “ancient
constitution”, the Kleinstaat, however “narrow” or “petty”, was confidently believed
to be capable of providing for the enlightened goals sought in different contexts
across  Europe,  including  Robertson’s  Edinburgh  as  well  as  so  many  centres  of
learning in the German Enlightenment. As was the case with jurisprudence, the new
state science also developed its historical counterpart: historische Staatslehre, a kind of
natural history of the state which had the potential of practical application as “the
past of the present”. It was in the comprehensive sense of the state sciences outlined
above that Schlözer conceived of history as the history of the state; and claimed that
“according to the novel taste, the history of the state is a continuous state science, just
as the latter is history of the state standing still”.301
It  is  no  wonder  that,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  chapters  that  follow,  several
protagonists in the German reception history of Robertson’s works – scholars active
300 The standard treatment of Polizey in the German context is Hans Maier, Die ältere deutsche Staats- und
Verwaltungslehre (Polizeiwissenschaft). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Wissenschaft in Deutschland
(Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1966). A  research  project  at  the  Max-Planck-Institut  für  Europäische
Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt has yielded many local and regional studies as well as a few more
comprehensive volumes, including Michael Stolleis, with Karl Härter and Lothar Schilling (eds.),
Policey im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996); Karl Härter  (ed.), Policey
und Frühneuzeitlicher Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000); Thomas Simon, ‘Gute
Policey’. Ordnungsnilder und Zielvorstellungen politischen Handelns in der Frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt:
Vittorio Klostermann, 2004). For wider implications of “police” and the problem of governmentality in
the early-modern period, see Michel Foucault, “Governmentality”, in idem., Power,  ed.  James  D.
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2000), 201-222; Gerhard Oestreich, “’Police’ and Prudentia civilis
in the seventeenth century”, in idem., Neostoicism and the early modern state (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 155-186. On the same issue and the relevance of natural jurisprudence, Robert
von  Friedeburg  and  Michael  Seidler,  “The  Holy  Roman  Empire  of  the  German  Nation”,  in  Howell
Lloyd, Glenn Burgess and Simon Hodson (eds.), European Political Thought 1450-1700. Religion, Law and
Philosophy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 120-126, 133-141, 167-172. On
eighteenth-century state sciences, Keith Tribe, Strategies of economic order. German economic discourse,
1750-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8-31; idem., “Cameralism and the sciences
of  the  state”,  in  Mark  Goldie  and  Robert  Wokler  (eds.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 525-546.
301  Gabriella Valera, “Statistik, Staatengeschichte, Geschichte im 18. Jahrhundert”, in Bödeker, Iggers,
Knudsen (eds.), Aufklärung und Geschichte, 119-143; Pasquale Pasquino, “Politisches und historisches
Interesse. Statistik und historische Staatslehre bei Gottfried Achenwall (1719-1772)”, in ibid., 144-168;
Hans Erich Bödeker, “… wer ächte freie Politik hören will, muss nach Göttingen gehen”, in  Bödeker,
Büttgen, Espagne (eds.), Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen, 325-369, esp. 343, 354; Johan van der Zande,
“Statistik and History in the German Enlightenment”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 71:3 (2010), 411-32.
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in  the  translation and the  reviewing of  these  works,  but  also  ones  whose  academic
contributions were quoted as a frame of reference for approaching Robertson – were
recruited from the fields of inquiry just listed. One may conclude this birds-eye
overview of Scottish and German historical discourses which seem relevant to the
reception of Robertson with the proposition that, as in many other cases in the
Europe of the Enlightenment, similar questions were not only answered in different
ways, but the answers were gleaned from different intellectual and academic
pursuits. At least this is what we learn from a survey of the public-political context of
the reception of Robertson’s histories in Germany. At the same time, as a final
remark it must be added that, in both the Scottish and the German context, the status
of  history  as  a  scholarly  field  was  enhanced  by  the  important  recognition  that  all
scientific “truth” is based on the description and understanding of real phenomena
that have occurred and the relations that exist between them, i.e., that scientific
explanation per se is essentially historical – which, however, means the apprehension
of causal connection, rapport and “milieu”, instead of mere succession. This
conviction, ultimately derived from Buffon’s critique of the mathematical method
and his general assault on mechanical philosophy, led to a historicization of nature
and the naturalization of history.302 While this development was rather conspicuous
among the literati  in Robertson’s environment, most of the scholars involved in the
immediate German response to Robertson were little affected by it. But here comes
an ultimate qualifier. The accomplishment of Georg Forster – anglophile,
circumnavigator,  naturalist,  and revolutionary –,  who played a  complex  part  in  the
German reception of Robertson’s work on America and India, is an ideal subject for
studying the infiltration of the historical into the modern scientific imagination. As
such, it also serves as a reminder that it is of little value to conceive the Scottish and
the German Enlightenment in terms of simple dichotomies.
302  Paul  Wood,  “The  Natural  History  of  Man  in  the  Scottish  Enlightenment”, History of Science 28
(1990), 89-123; Peter Hanns Reill, “Science and the Science of History in the Spätaufklärung”, in
Bödeker, Iggers, Knudsen (eds.), Aufklärung und Geschichte, 430-450; idem., “Das Problem des
Allgemeinen und des Besonderen”, esp. 146-157; see also idem., “Anthropology, Nature and History
in the Late Enlightenment”, in Otto Dann, Norbert Oellers, Ernst Osterkamp (eds.), Schiller als
Historiker (Stuttgart and Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 1995), 243-265.
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Chapter Three
Time and progress, time as progress:
history by way of enlightened preaching
On 6 January 1755, thirty-three year old Robertson preached the annual sermon of
the Scottish Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge upon the invitation
of its governors. The Society had been established shortly after the Union of
Parliaments, in 1709, with the goal of inculcating religion and virtue in the Scottish
Highlands and other “uncivilized” (including colonial) areas, in part to counter
Roman Catholic missionary activity.303 The pernicious potential which “popery” held
to  the  1707  settlement  became manifest  through the  active  support  of  Catholics  for
the Young Pretender in 1745, when Robertson strongly committed himself in favour
of  the  status  quo.  During  the  ensuing  decade  Robertson  emerged  as  a  recognized
member of the Edinburgh social, ecclesiastical and intellectual scene, and a leading
figure in the “Moderate Party” of the Scottish Presbyterian church. The Moderates,
while  –  as  a  means  to  secure  social  order  –  endeavouring  to  alleviate  doctrinally
based zealotry among the popular wing of the clergy, and as a means to achieving
this,  to  maintain  the  control  of  parish  appointments  by  powerful  lay  patrons,
nevertheless continued to ward off Catholicism, too.304 From this perspective, the
invitation to Robertson by the governors of the Society was a political act, and the
sermon itself a political text: in its concluding remarks, Robertson reminded that
“[i]n this neglected field [the Highlands], the enemies of our religion and liberty have
sown the seeds of the worst superstition, and the most pernicious principles of
303 See Margaret Cornell Szasz, Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans: Indigenous Education in the
Eighteenth Century Atlantic World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).
304 For the circumstances and the grounds of Robertson’s rise to recognition and a concise account of
the  rise  of  “moderatism”,  see  Brown,  “Robertson  and  the  Scottish  Enlightenment”,  in  idem.  (ed.),
Robertson and the Expansion of Empire, 10-5. The standard, full account of the Moderates is Sher, Church
and University.
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government.”305 At the same time, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s
Appearance – his first published text and his only published sermon – is also a concise
but sophisticated piece of theoretical reflection on issues central to historical
interpretation. It is helpful to introduce the discussion of these aspects of the sermon
by recalling the argument of Reinhart Koselleck in the opening essays of his seminal
Futures Past, where he offers an engaging and succinct illustration of the course of
what he calls the “temporalization of history” in European thought during the early-
modern period.
Koselleck  conceives  this  process  in  terms of  the  changes  in  the  perception of
the “compression” (or “acceleration”) of time that, supposedly, precedes the onset of
the future in the thought of these past generations. “For Luther,  the compression of
time is a visible sign that, according to God’s will, the Final Judgment is imminent,
that the world is about to end. For Robespierre,  the acceleration of time is a task of
men leading to an epoch of happiness, the golden future.”306 In the intervening
period, experience showed that religious and civil wars did not herald the Final
Judgment, at least not in the direct manner previously envisaged; the absolutist state
suppressed prophecy, while humanists and sceptics revealed its psychology,
undermining oracles and associated superstitions; as a “counter-concept” of
prophecy, rational prognosis marked out new horizons for the future by both
remaining within the dimensions of the (political) situation and attempting to change
it or “relat[ing] to events whose novelty it releases”; finally, in the eighteenth century
the appearance of the philosophy of the historical process, exploiting the notion of
progress in order to combine rational prediction with salvational expectation,
“inaugurated our modernity with a new future”. “Acceleration, intially perceived in
terms of an apocalyptic expectation of temporal abbreviation heralding the Last
Judgment, transformed itself – also from the mid-eighteenth century – into a concept
of historical hope.”307
305 William Robertson, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, and its Connection with
the Success of His Religion, in The Works of William Robertson (London:  Routledge / Thoemmes Press,
1996), XI. 54.
306 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, Mass., London:
MIT Press, 1985), 7.
307 Ibid., 14, 16, 36.
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Robertson’s  sermon  is  an  excellent  medium  to  approach  what  might  be
described in Koselleck’s terms as the very moment of this transformation. However,
it also allows us to point to certain limitations in this transformation, ones which
existed within the discourse of the Enlightenment; it prompts us to express some
reservation, and to offer correctives, to the approach that associates the
Enlightenment with “secularization” and “critical spirit.” Despite the profoundly
nuanced character of Koselleck’s presentation, this image is a Leitmotif in his work;308
despite its sophistication, the Koselleckian typology of conceptualizations of time is
still teleological in the sense that according to its premises any approach which
marries Christian stories – endeavours and expectations – of salvation with those of
the  improvement  of  the  temporal  condition  of  man,  is  likely  to  be  divested  of  its
intellectual distinctiveness and to be discussed as a transitional position, at some
distance both from pre-modern “origins” and modern “culminations”.  For the
purposes  of  this  chapter,  Robertson must  be  regarded as  a  Christian historian who
was at the same time one of the outstanding masters of enriching the “enlightened
narrative” with the perspective of “stadial history”, most commonly associated with
Adam Smith and the French physiocrats.309 He understood the history of the western
world as the unfolding of the great plan of Providence, a gradually increasing
accessibility of the divine revelation, a process which in his view crucially depended
on, but also furthered, the improvement of the means of subsistence, and the
consequent refinement of manners and enlightenment of the human mind.  There is
reason to believe that Robertson’s hardly paralleled contemporary popularity as an
author  of  historical  works  was  to  a  considerable  extent  due  to  his  power  in
representing this synthesis – for which, however, taking account of the problematic
relationship between Christian and secular understandings of time, was an
important theoretical condition. This, I want to suggest, is one of the tasks performed
308 See also his Critique and Crisis.
309 Smith  and  Turgot  have  also  received  special  emphasis  in  the  literature  devoted  to  the  idea  of
progress, and by implication to the concepts of time and history. See, for instance, J. B. Bury, The Idea of
Progress. An Inquiry into Its Growth and Origin (New York: Dover, 1955); Leslie Sklair, The Sociology of
Progress (London: Routledge, 1998), ch. I; Robert Nisbet, The History of the Idea of Progress (New York:
Basic Books, 1980), ch. 4; David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990).
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in Robertson’s early sermon, published at a time when he was also busy working on
the historical narrative which first established his literary fame.
Before turning to the sermon, it will be useful to address two questions.  The
first concerns the nature of the challenges and dilemmas that the adoption of a
stadialist-relativist position implied for a scholar desirous of retaining a Christian
framework of interpretation. The second, not unrelated with this issue, is Robertson’s
theology – or rather the little that can be known about the theology of an influential
minister whose public statements about the church concerned its social role rather
than its doctrine, who left no autobiography, whose commonplace-books
disappeared, and whose surviving correspondence is predominantly businesslike
and silent on matters of personal sentiments, convictions and faith.
As  far  as  the  first  if  these  questions  is  concerned,  it  was  argued  above  in
Chapter 2 that Robertson made strenuous efforts to reconcile the stadialist with the
Christian  perspective,  and  it  must  be  added  that,  perhaps,  the  difficulty  is  not  so
great as it  might at first seem. After all,  even Augustine stressed the significance of
context:  he displayed an acute awareness that man could only act in his own age,
that humans before and after Christ could not be expected to be the same, and that
good  and  evil  ought  to  be  judged  in  terms  of  the  conditions  necessary  to  the
individual at the particular time and place.310 The point, however, is that this is still
possible  to  explain  in  terms  of  a  conscience  that  places  the  highest  priority  on
personal spiritual progress occurring within a narrative of creation, fall, incarnation
and redemption. While these truly cataclysmic events may certainly be identified
with points in time, the succession of particular events between them is not rendered
intelligible, nor is any special importance ascribed to time itself as the dimension of
that succession. The time-bound experience of individuals is contrasted to a timeless
and eternal God, occupying a nunc-stans,  a standpoint from which he can see every
moment in time as simultaneously present. To man, whose intelligence is imprisoned
in  one  moment,  the  knowledge  of  another  is  neither  quite  possible,  nor  quite
relevant. Insofar as it is still both possible and relevant, it has to do with Providence.
310 Cf. Robert F. Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1965), 85 ff. For Augustine on the paradoxes of time, see Confessions, trans. R.
S. Pine-Coffin (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990), Book XI especially sections 10-27. 116 ff.
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It is our awareness of divine foreknowledge that persuades us about the meaning of
each apparently insignificant episode in the flow of history from one cataclysm to the
other.311
Centrally  important  for  the  topic  of  this  chapter,  Robertson’s  own  views  of
Providence were heavily influenced by his early acquaintance, through his father’s
library, with the work of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Arminian
authors such as the Huguenot refugee Jean Le Clerc, John Locke’s Dutch friend
Philippe van Limborch, or the Swiss Samuel Werenfels.312 Theologically,
Arminianism was defined by its opposition to the absolute predestination that Calvin
had argued, and by a greater emphasis on man’s free will. Philosophically, it was
based on a constructive and mitigated skepticism that established a permanent
suspension of judgement (rather than doubt) as a means of arriving at truth. For
Robertson the minister and church politician, the import of Arminianism was its
being instrumental in combating the Calvinist orthodoxy prevailing in the
Presbyterian Kirk, and to reshape it as a moderate and tolerant establishment. For
Robertson the historian, Arminianism was a way to accommodate human agency
with God’s sovereignty, the central tenet of Calvinist theology. Even for Limborch, it
had been possible to acknowledge God’s power in ordering the universe, while
finding in that ordered universe a scope for independent human action: actions by
human individuals making free choices, but ones which invariably contribute to the
plan of God.313 God does not coerce or decree absolutely, but orders the interaction of
311 Cf. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment,  ch.  1.  –  It  must  be added that,  from patristic  times on,  the
idea of progress asserted itself in various ways in the Christian apocalyptic-cataclysmic conception of
history, the more so as both of these approaches also regard time as not merely an exact chronological
standard, but the framework of change, which becomes intelligible through understanding the
relationship  between  separate  events.  A  more  thorough  invesigation  of  this  problem  is  beyond  the
confines of this study, but for the intersections of apocalyptic and progress-based approaches to time
see the pioneering and still relevant work of Ernest Lee Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the
Background of the Idea of Progress (New  York:  Harper  &  Row,  1946).  See  also  Chester  G.  Starr,
“Historical and Philosophical Time”, History and Theory 6, Beiheft 6 (1966), 24-35; Elizabeth Eisentstein,
“Clio and Chronos. An Essay on the Making and Breaking of History-Book Time”, History and Theory
6, Beiheft 6 (1966), 36-64.
312 Jeffrey Smitten, “The Shaping of Moderatism: William Robertson and Arminianism”, in Patricia
Craddock, Carla H. Hay (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, vol. 22 (1992), 281-300.
313 Philippe  van  Limborch, A Compleat System or Body of Divinity (1713),  quoted  in  Smitten,  “The
Shaping of Moderatism”, 287.
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the parts of the universe in accordance with his grand yet varied design, which
admits some flexibility regarding how his ends will be accomplished.
From this it is possible to develop a synergetic view of historical agency,
according to which human actions may be seen as expressions of divine providence,
while at the same time God’s providence may be conceived as offering so many
opportunities for the exercise of human will. This is what Robertson was doing in the
sermon. In fact,  it  was dramatically differing views that he sought to accommodate
within a larger whole, in order to give an account of the sequentiality of events and
of the rhythm of historical changes that precede and prepare the cataclysmic events
of Christian history and fill the time gaps between them. Just to make the whole
scheme even more paradoxical, he also relied on the incipient, essentially materialist,
interpretations referred to above, which portray human beings essentially as
creatures of need. Hume and Smith argued that our needs and our understanding of
needs are historically determined and that our minds will only develop insofar as we
need them to develop in order to go about the business of seeking the satisfaction of
our needs. Robertson’s move that aimed to marry these views with his
providentialism was to shift the argument from the mind itself to the circumstances
in which the mindful human being finds him or herself. On this argument, our
understanding will only develop in proportion to the development of the faculties
we possess to improve the world in which we find ourselves. With improvement
comes an increased understanding of the material and the spiritual world, and only
then can God be expected to display more of His being and nature to us. To orthodox
Presbyterians,  with  whom  Robertson  was  trying  to  build  bridges,  the  theological
consistency and rigour of this position may have looked shaky.  But this was not to
upset Robertson who, in fact, took pains to evade the immensely difficult
metaphysical and theological issues at stake, and strove, instead, to provide a
pragmatic scheme in which the emphasis was on social progress and on the intended
impact of civic harmony – objectives in whose attainment he did not fare too badly.
From  the  very  beginning  of  the  sermon,  Robertson  leaves  no  doubt  that  his
preoccupation is with the problem of design in human history, and shortly thereafter
it is also made clear that he intends to confront the problem in terms of “before” and
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“after” – i.e., before and after one of the epoch-making events of sacred history, the
advent of Christ and the preaching of the Gospel.
“There is no employment more delightful to a devout mind than the
contemplation of the divine wisdom in the government of the world. The civil
history  of  mankind  opens  a  wide  field  for  this  pious  exercise.  Careful
observers may often, by the light of reason, form probable conjectures with
regard  to  the  plan  of  God’s  providence,  and  can  discover  a  skilful  hand
directing the  revolutions  of  human affairs,  and compassing the  best  ends  by
the most effectual and surprising means: But sacred history, by drawing aside
that veil  which covers the counsels of the Almighty, lays open his designs to
the view of his creatures; and we can there trace the steps which he taketh
towards accomplishing them with more certainty, and greater pleasure. ... The
publication and establishment of Christianity in the world is a remarkable
event of this kind.”314
What Robertson sets out to address is the objection by “[Christ’s] adversaries ... and
modern infidels” that if the Gospel is indeed the truth, why was it “so long concealed
from the world”?315 Robertson’s problem, then, becomes a problem of time: Why so
late – and not earlier? He seeks to answer the question by reference to the “divine
oeconomy” and the “particular juncture to render the discovery of the Christian
religion more necessary, or the propagation of it  more successful”.  He is concerned
with the urgency of the revelation in a specific historical moment. His particular
explanations befit a conjectural historian who was at the same time a Presbyterian
minister with a strong Arminian inspiration.
To begin with, Robertson lays down two general principles.  First,  it  is one of
the general laws whereby “the Supreme Being  conducts all his operations” that “no
perfection of any kind can be attained of a sudden. The motion by which his works
advance towards their final and complete state is gradual and progressive.” He also
314 Robertson, Situation, 6-7.
315 Ibid., 8-9.
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expresses the same principle in the metaphor of time: “The obscurity of dawn went
before  the  brightness  of  noon-day.”  As  a  consequence,  it  was  “in  proportion as  the
situation of the world made it necessary, [that] the Almighty was pleased farther to
open and unfold his scheme.”316 Second, Robertson stresses that although there is a
strong and manifest design in human history, direct interventions by God are
infrequent, and even then they are organically embedded in a context of processes
predominantly triggered by merely human agency. “The Almighty seldom effects, by
supernatural means, any thing which could have been accomplished by such as are
natural.”
The advent of Christ is of course one of these rare supernatural interventions,
but the thrust of Robertson’s analysis is to demonstrate how it was catalysed by the
confluence of a colourful variety of natural causes that, as it were, increased the
density of history or accelerated the flow of time, after a long period of stagnation.
Providence and human agency are thus assigned a mutually supplementary role in
bringing about the design in human history, the latter, while “ordained in reality by
the wisdom of God,” still possessing a sufficient degree of independence to create
conditions propitious for the working of the former, should that prove “necessary”.
In the particular case discussed in the sermon, the advent of Christ is at once a
supernatural event and an event in the secular world (domains between which
Robertson is moving constantly), an event that has been thoroughly prepared for by
previous history.
Time,  then,  itself  becomes a  dimension not  only  defined by the  rythm of  the
“cataclysms” but one also marked by a periodicity emerging from the contemplation
of human activity exerted in the intervals between those cataclysms and taking
momentum in the period preceding them – and as a result, contributing to the crucial
definitions of “before” and “after”. It would be tempting to explore the extent, if any,
to which Robertson may have relied on relatively recent philosophical approaches to
time,  each  of  which  could  be  easily  demonstrated  to  have  been  relevant  for  these
perceptions. These include, first, Newton’s ideas of “absolute” and “relative” time,
the one being an equable flow, in irreversible succession, of a mathematical straight
316 Ibid., 9-10.
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line, independent of matter and motion, while the other the relation betwen time and
sensible objects, depending very much on motion whose rate varies;317 second,
Locke’s attempt to provide this with an empiricist epistemological grounding by
explaining time in terms of duration as traced to its source in sensation and
reflection;318 or, third, Leinbiz’s retort to Newton that, were time merely absolute,
there would be no reason for things (including the Creation!) to exist at one time
rather than at another (and, therefore, all time can only be “relational”).319 However,
while these sources were easily available for Robertson, there is no evidence that he
did avail himself to them.  What he did employ, with a great deal of ingenuity, was
the organizing principle of stadial history: the idea that, because of a number of
natural propensities of the human animal, societies have undergone certain stages of
progress that can be defined in terms of the dominant mode of subsistence, and the
degree of refinement expressed in their standards of conduct, as well as their ability
to comprehend sophisticated and abstract notions of morality, religion, etc.,
depended on the stage reached in that process.
To be sure, the argument that the Word had not, and could not have, been
revealed  to  the  world  until  it  was  ready  to  receive  it,  is  also  at  least  as  old  as
Augustine.320 However,  the  dynamics  that  Robertson  added  to  this  view  was  of  a
peculiarly eighteenth-century character in its suggesting that even the world of
primitive Christianity had been unrefined and pre-commercial, inhabited by peoples
who therefore could  not  have  possibly  understood  the  laws  whereby  God  exercised
his governance of the natural and moral worlds; and, consequently, that God could
317 Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Chicago:  University of  Chicago Press,
1952), 8.
318 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H,. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975),  Book II, Chapter 14, “Of Duration, and its simple Modes”, 181-196. Cf. W. Von Leyden,
“History and the Concept of Relative Time”, History and Theory, 2 (1963), 263-85.
319 The increasingly bitter  dispute that  started between Newton and Leibniz over  the “copyright” of
differential calculus later also concerned other scientific as well as philosophical and theological
questions, and involved Newton’s disciples, above all Samuel Clarke, the translator of the Optics. The
problem of time and space is abundantly discussed in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, published
in  1717.  On  the  idea  mentioned  above,  see The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H.G. Alexander
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), 27-8. For a comparison of the relevant views of
Newton,  Locke  and  Leibniz,  see  Philip  Turetzky,  Time  (London:  Routledge,  1998),  71-83;  and  J.  T.
Fraser, Of Time, Passion, and Knowledge. Reflections on the Strategy of Existence (Priceton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), 33-4.
320 Nisbet, Social Change and History, 85-91.
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have  only  revealed  as  much  of  his  Word  as  the  primitive  Christians  were  able  to
understand. It was also necessary to assume that the rest would be revealed
gradually  as  progress  made  it  appropriate.  It  must  be  added,  and  it  does  not
contradict the argument presented here, that the interdependence of revelation and
progress is fully reciprocal for Robertson: he indeed also believed “revelation to be
critical for the true refinement of manners and for moral improvement, and that
without revelation, human intellectual and cultural development will be limited and
inevitably lead to error, delusion, and moral corruption.”321
Robertson’s conjectural history of the propagation of the Gospel starts with the
observation that “[t]he world, in the most early ages, was divided into small
independent states... Commerce had not hitherto united mankind, and opened the
communication of one nation with another. The world may now be considered one
vast society... But, in those more simple ages, the intercourse between nations was
extremely inconsiderable.”322 Naturally enough, such conditions, in which mankind
had languished too long, had by themselves constituted an insurmountable obstacle
before the propagation of the Gospel across the whole of the western hemisphere.
The catalytic role of removing this obstacle was played by “Roman ambition and
bravery” that “paved the way, and prepared the world for the reception of the
Christian doctrine”: union and tranquility, as well as civilization, all corollaries of
conquest  and  enslavement  by  the  Romans,  brought  about  with  them  as  an
unintended consequence in the best Smithian fashion, the moment auspicious for the
spread of Christianity.323
Besides the civilizing effects of Roman expansion, there were moral causes too,
related to the former in a rather paradoxical way.  The Roman empire imposed itself
on the small independent states of earlier times in which public liberty rested on the
321 On this  basis,  it  is  further  argued by Thomas Ahnert  that  “Moderatism was not  characterized by
‘reasonable religion’, but by a (theologically inspired) epistemological scepticism, which emphasizes
the  limitations  of  human,  natural  reason  in  theological  questions”  –  a  case  for  a  “pious
Enlightenment”, not characterized by religious indifference, but integrating the cultivation of “polite”
manners with emphasis on religious reform. “Religion and the Moderates’ Enlightenment: the
Historiography of William Robertson”, manuscript (paper read at the conference “Empire, Philosophy
and Religion: Scotland and Central/Eastern Europe in the Eighteenth Century”, Central European
University, Budapest, 23-26 June 2005), also idem., “Fortschrittsgeschichte und religiöse Aufklärung”.
322 Robertson, Situation, 14-5.
323 Ibid., 15-9.
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foundation of the private virtues – in regard of which, however, “the conduct of
every citizen was subjected to the eye of the magistrate”. The Romans themselves
were no exception from this rule; “[but], by subduing the world, [they] lost their own
liberty ... The alliance between morals and government was now broken ... Together
with despotic power, entered all those odious vices, which are usually found in its
train.” The corruption characteristic of empires that succeeds upon the republican
purity  of  manners,  however,  supplied  the  occasion  for  God  to  “manifest  the
Christian revelation to  the  world,  not  to  re-establish  virtue  upon the  same insecure
foundation of civil government [mere human agency], but to erect it upon the eternal
and immoveable basis of religion.” In Robertson’s account Christianity appeared in
order to mitigate the pernicious effects of “despotic and unlimited empire” – as well
as luxury which inevitably proceeds from safe commerce over a vast territory – and
to perpetuate virtue among men by divine causes at a time when human causes were
no longer sufficient to effect this.324
Robertson then considers the state of the world with respect to religion,
domestic affairs and what might be  called social justice and finds that in these terms,
too, it was sufficiently critical – “crisis” in this case denoting a sort of pregnancy with
changes – to invite a thorough-going “reformation”. Religion languished between
extreme forms of corruption as represented by the superstition and hypocrisy of the
Pharisees and the libertinism of the Sadducees. The theme is developed by Robertson
in terms vaguely resembling the version of the Enlightenment discourse on religion
as presented in one of the most famous essays of Hume, first published in 1741.325
This was a discourse which employed the dichotomy of superstition and enthusiasm,
as the two archetypical forms of false religion, to account for the social and political
turmoil of the preceding two centuries all over Europe, and offered itself as an
antidote.  For some, like Hume, this could be scepticism, but for many others it  was
“moderation”, or the virtuous middle: a sober and reasoned commitment to religious
truth without subscribing to either the fanatic conceitedness of those sectarians who
claimed immediate divine inspiration, or an uncritical submission to authority.
324 Ibid., 20-4.
325 David Hume, “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm”, in Essays Moral, Political and Literary,  ed. Eugene
F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985), 74-79..
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Robertson also conceived of two extreme attitudes, between which the force of true
religion evaporated. To him as well, the one was superstition; the other, for the time
being, he styled as “scandalous libertinism.”
It was only shortly thereafter, that he, as an ecclesiastical leader, recognized a
militant interpretation of Calvinism, as professed by a considerable party within the
Kirk, to be an even more dangerous disposition.326 A mere year after the sermon was
preached, the famous Edinburgh Review, which boasted Robertson among its
founders, came under attack by Calvinist enthusiasts who protested against
criticisms of their theological works in it; approximately at the same time Robertson
and his moderate associates in the church had great difficulty in averting the threat
of excommunication from Hume and his cousin Lord Kames as pernicious sceptics.
Such struggles occupied Robertson throughout his career as a church politician, until
his retirement in 1780, shortly after the lifting of some of the centuries-old sanctions
against Catholics, implemented in England in 1778 and initiated in Scotland too,
evoked riots that even presented a threat to his personal safety (and caused the
Scottish Relief Bill to be shelved). Shocked, in one of his last speeches Robertson said:
“I  love  to  see  my  countrymen  discover  that  jealous  concern  for  the  preservation  of
their  rights  which  characterises  the  spirit  of  liberty:  but  I  am  sorry  to  behold  them
wasting their zeal without a cause.” He called the church to denounce “the principle
for conscience sake, as repugnant to the spirit of the gospel, and contrary to the
genius of the Protestant faith.”327
As regards the “regular system of superstition” introduced among the ancient
Jews by the Pharisees, this type of “false religion” already stands in full armour
before the reader of the sermon: the proliferation of traditions, ceremonial
prescriptions and rites caused the decline of principles. “Superstition never prevailed
among any people, but at the expence of morals. The heathen superstition, far from
giving any aid to virtue, seems not to have had the least connection with it.” As
326 See Sher, Church and University, 67-70, 277-97; Brown, “Robertson and the Scottish Enlightenment”.
327 [John Erskine] (ed.), A Narrative of the Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, May 25,
1779 (Edinburgh,  1780),  49,  61.  It  has,  however,  also  been  argued  that  Robertson’s  approach  to  the
issue of relief was at best “lukewarm”, his part in the crisis was ambivalent, and there was a
contradiction between his “own views and his public support for relief.” Du Toit, “’A species of false
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elsewhere, political degradation is also consequent upon the spread of supersition
and  the  moral  decay  it  occasions:  “Tyranny  and  superstition,  like  those  other
destroyers of mankid, famine and pestilence, are nearly allied. Supersition breaks the
spirit, and prepares it for servitude. Tyranny, for this reason, encourages
superstition, and employs it as a useful auxiliary to illegal power.”328
Further on, Robertson also presents the domestic scene during the times
immediately preceding the appearance of Christ, in dark tones, as having been
marked by polygamy in the East and by the practice of divorce carried to extremes
among both the  Jews and the  heathens  of  the  West,  the  one conducive  to  domestic
slavery, and the other bringing the idea of the natural bond between man and
woman into disrepute. Finally,  as in view of “the wants of human society ... far the
greater part of mankind is condemned to constant toil and labour, in order to supply
them”, and the primitive  means of subsistence in ancient times, the majority of
people were reduced to slavery – a state that became really intolerable under the
despotic government of the Roman empire.  In other words, the religious attitudes of
virtually all, and “the lives of those who are at the head of domestic society, needed
reformation”, while “the sufferings of those who were subject to them merited
relief.”329
Time  in  secular  terms  was  then  on  all  fronts  –  social  and  domestic,  political
and  moral  –  ripe  in  a  peculiar  sense  for  the  most  important  event  of  sacred  time
between the Creation and Redemption to happen. And indeed, in the time “after”
(i.e., after the incarnation) the benevolent potential inherent in Christianity on all of
these fronts asserted its corrective effect on the very phenomena in the secular
domain whose “unintended consequence” its appearance was. Particularly
noteworthy is Robertson’s unhesitating ascripton of the abolition of slavery to the
mild and liberal spirit of Christianity: indeed the Book of Isaiah is cited by him in
order to draw a parallel between the spiritual salvation prophesied there and the
religion’”. But Robertson’s obvious antipathy towards Popery is one thing; his decision to put on it the
rein of civil discipline is quite another.
328 Robertson, Situation, 25-31.
329 Ibid., 39.
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temporal deliverance from personal servitude.330 The mildness and humanity of
mondern manners is summarily represented as having been inspired, what is more,
awakened, by the Christian religion.331
Here, however, there seems to be some confusion about cause and effect, at
least if the whole of Robertson’s historical thought is taken into consideration. Of the
entire “great generation” of the Scottish Enlightenment, he was perhaps the most
straightforward “progress-and-refinement” thinker. He came closest to believing that
progress was irreversible, that the values and virtues of modernity were ultimately
superior, and that man’s capacity to absorb and comprehend sophisticated truths
and to develop refined perceptions of his moral and physical environment depended
on the advance of civilization in more broadly conceived terms. And all of his
thinking revolved around the recognition that commerce had a transformative effect
on civilization. Market relations and commercial exchange on the one hand
functioned  as  a  generic  metaphor  to  describe  so  many  other  forms  of  human
intercourse, while on the other hand it was also a very direct communication
situation, which, by virtue of its peculiar rules, was especially well suited for
grasping the  needs  and interests  of  the  one party  in  terms of  and as  depending on
those  of  the  other.  To  the  extent  that  commerce  comes  to  prevail  in  supplying  for
men’s needs, enhanced opportunities of intercourse lead to the growth of sympathy,
politeness and sociability, as well as affluence and knowledge, even among
otherwise self-regarding individuals. Emulation, inspired by self-regard, which had
once been violent, assumes milder forms,332 until even laws, issued by the civil
magistrate  to  tame  such  passions  and  suppress  eruptions  of  violence,  cease  to  be
regarded as cumbersome limitations of liberty, but rather come to be valued by
polished citizen-subjects as the instruments of the rule of law.
This conspicuously materialist logic could be abundantly documented from
the  works  of  Robertson.  The  following  passage,  which  concerns  the  awakening  of
330 Ibid., 44. The obvious objection that slavery did not prove to be incompatible with Christianity in
his own times is dismissed by Robertson by claiming that “[t]he genius and tendency of any religion
are known by the operation of its vigorous, not of its declining age.”
331 Ibid., 47.
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medieval urban communities from their long slumbering, is taken from the classic
blend between narrative and stadial history:
“The spirit of industry revived: commerce became an object of attention and
began to flourish: the population increased: independence was established:
and  wealth  flowed  into  cities  which  had  long  been  the  seat  of  poverty  and
oppression. Wealth was accompanied by its usual attendants, ostentation and
luxury; and though the former was formal and cumbersome, and the latter
inelegant, they led gradually to greater refinement in manners and in the
habits of life. Together with this improvement in manners, a more regular
species  of  government  and police  was  introduced.  As  cities  grew to  be  more
populous, and the occasions for intecourse among men increased, statutes and
regulations multiplied of course, and all became sensible that their common
safety depended on observing them with exactness, and on punishing such as
violated them with promptitude and rigour. Laws and subordination, as well
as  polished  manners,  taking  their  rise  in  the  cities,  diffused  themselves
insensibly through the rest of the society.”333
From Robertson’s views on the formative effect of material progress on manners and
the mind it  would not  necessarily  follow that  the  truth  of  the  gospel  could at  once
triumph among the prevailing conditions of civilization, represented by him as
rather primitive. And indeed, while on the one hand he thought that cultural
progress itself was of doubtful value, with even dangerous consequences, in the
absence  of  revelation,  on  the  other  hand  he  also  believed  that  it  was  in  his  own
century that religion, which at the time of the Reformation and the Counter-
Reformation was still rooted in a necessarily imperfect understanding of the Word of
God, and permeated by superstition and enthusiasm, could at last be understood as
332 The Mandevillean formula of  “private  vices  –  private  benefits”  and his  extreme statement of  the
paradigm of unsocial sociability might have been universally rejected as a “system” by eighteenth-
century theorists, but its implications were hard to escape.
333 William Robertson, A View of the Progress of Society in Europe from the Subversion of the Roman Empire
to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century, in The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (London:
Routledge / Thoemmes Press, 1996), I. 42-3..
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it was intended by the Almighty and his messenger. Developments in secular human
history, then, have again prepared the world, if not for a further revelation, but at
least to a fuller and more self-conscious grasp of the one already available.
To underpin this, Robertson’s conclusion to the sermon opens with reflections
upon  Europe’s  special  place  in  the  history  of  Christianity.  It  cannot  be  by  way  of
sheer  coincidence  that  Europe,  where  Christianity  first  spread,  surpasses  other
regions of the earth in science and improvements. “Of this superiority the Europeans
have  availed  themselves  to  the  utmost,  in  every  project  for  extending  their  empire
and commerce ... Now, the same attainments in science or policy, might be employed
to good purpose, on the side of religion.”334 Europe, or at least a part of it, has been
privileged by its running the full cycle of stadial progress at a quicker pace, and
reaching the pinnacles of the commercial and civilised stage earlier than the more
and less remote corners of the globe that were opening themselves to the gaze of
Europeans in Robertson’s lifetime. In his experience and interpretation, the progress
of commerce also coincided with the growth of politeness and knowledge, and thus
advanced the cause of a more moderate and tolerant version of Christianity than the
one which had held souls in subjection throughout the Middle Ages, and
subsequently inspired the ravages of a whole continent in the age of religious wars.
At last, while fulfilling their civilising mission in bringing commerce and refinement
to the barbarous nations of distant regions, in other words, accelerating secular time
for them, Europeans should also pay more attention to rendering their souls the
service of propagating the Gospel in a more systematic manner, thereby also
accelerating sacred time – the progress towards their receiving of the revelation, and
ultimately for all concerned, of redemption.
Perhaps  I  might  conclude here  by recapitulating that  Robertson employs  the
paradigm of Enlightenment stadial history to present a highly dynamic picture of the
intersections of secular and sacred time, and of the mutually supplementary roles of
human and divine agency in this dynamics. But there is yet another, also very
characteristically eighteenth-century dimension to his variations on the theme of time
and progress. Underlying the sermon, as indeed virtually all of his works, is the idea
334 Robertson, Situation, 51.
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that  travel  in  space  might  easily  assume  the  character  of  travel  in  time.   In  the
wilderness  of  North  America  one  can  obtain  a  fair  idea  of  the  life  of  Tacitus’
barbarians, while the Pacific islands are home to various modifications of Adamite
man.
“[T]he characters of nations depend on the sate of society in which they live,
and on the political institutions established among them; and ... the human
mind,  whenever  it  is  placed  in  the  same  situation,  will,  in  ages  the  most
distant, and in countries the most remote, assume the same form, and be
distinguished by the same manners. ... Many of the German tribes were more
civilized than the Americans.  ... The resemblance, however, between their
conditions, is greater, perhaps, than any that history affords an opportunity of
observing between any two races of uncivilized people, and this has produced
a surprising similarity of manners.”335
Or, in even more simple terms, on account of the theory of the population of America
from the old continent: “The character and occupations of the hunter in America
must be little different from those of an Asiatic, who depends for subsistence on the
chase. A tribe of savages on the banks of the Danube must nearly resemble one upon
the plains washed by the Mississippi.”336
The observation of “primitive” peoples in remote continents and the vast
work of collecting data about them contributed immensely to the development of
early ethnology,337 while in the eyes of contemporaries fulfilling the mission as
referred to above in relation to such peoples also passed for a heroic feat indeed. But
does  one  truly  need  to  cross  the  oceans  in  order  to  collect  the  same  kind  of
anthropological knowledge, and perform the same kind of civilizing service? Far
from it, according to the approach adopted in Robertson’s texts, but also represented
335 Robertson, View of the Progress, 62.
336 William Robertson, The History of America (London: Routledge / Thoemmes Press, 1996), II. 30.
337 See Hans Erich Bödeker, “Aufklärerische ethnologische Praxis: Johann Reinhold Forster und Georg
Forster”, in Hans-Erich Bödeker, Peter Hanns Reill, Jürgen Schlumbohm (eds.), Wissenschaft als
kulturelle Praxis, 1750-1900 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck ? Ruprecht, 1999), and the literature quoted
there.
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by many others in the eighteenth century.  Distance in space and distance in time can
be  brought  to  a  common  denominator,  but  occasionally  the  relationship  is  inverse:
crossing just a few hills would sometimes suffice for traversing many centuries.
Indeed, Robertson concludes the sermon suggesting that
“the  conversion  of  distant  nations  is  not  the  chief  care  of  the  Society  for  the
propagating Christian knowledge: An object nearer at hand demands its more
immediate attention. The Highlands and Islands of Scotland present to us a
scene, which we would little expect in a nation where true religion and
polished manners  have long flourished.  There  society  still  appears  in  a  rude
and  imperfect  form:  Strangers  to  industry,  averse  from  labour,  inured  to
rapine; the fierce inhabitants scorned all the arts of peace, and stood ready for
every bold and desperate action.”338
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Robertson blamed it on this primitive
state of society that “superstition” and the “pernicious principles of government”
associated with it fell on a fertile soil among the Highlanders and led them to
support the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. Human agency is then again enlisted for the
advancement of divine purposes: Robertson urges the legislature to enhance its
already  existing  policy  of  enacting  laws  “with  the  most  humane  spirit,  in  order  to
retrieve that part of the kingdom from ignorance and barbarism” – a course of action
from which “the members of the Society expect great assistance in the prosecution of
their design.”339
I view of the textual environment, this is fairly revealing. World and time are
both  “given”  for  Robertson,  in  the  strictest  Christian  sense  of  the  word.  There  is
design and ordination in the arrangement of both, but in such a way that motion in
the one has inevitable consequences for motion in the other; and the character of that
motion, Robertson seems to remind us, depends, as much as on what is “given”, on
the  disposition  of  the  receiving  agent  who  uses  the  world  once  given,  in  the  time
338 Robertson, Situation, 53.
339 Ibid., 54-5.
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given, turning the one to the well-being of his body and finding in the other the
salvation  of  his  soul.   Accordingly,  Robertson’s  ideas  on  time  and  the  event,
especially events of particularly great importance from the point of view of the
divine plan, represent a very interesting shade within the thought of the
Enlightenment about these questions. As a parallel case, we might invoke that of the
transformation of the meaning of “revolution”, simultaneously with his own career.
At  the  time  when  Robertson  was  born, revolutio was  still,  as  Copernicus  had
described it in the case of the movement of celestial objects, regarded as a circular
movement concluding in re-occupying an initial position (such as, in the political
world, the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688); or, the sudden and shocking
interference of an unpredictable force, beyond man’s control, in human affairs
(usually in affairs of government). Around the time when Robertson’s sermon was
published, a version of the same perspective started to take shape, in whose terms
such calamities may provide an enlightened people with an opportunity to take their
own fates into their own hands – without implying that the cataclysmic event is
prepared  by  the  people  itself,  but  that  using  the  event  as  a  springboard,  thereafter
they might become sovereign agents.340 Robertson’s logic, in a certain sense, is the
very reverse: men engaged in commerce, refining their manners and discovering the
natural, social and moral world around them, further the course of Christian history
by these very activities, because doing so they facilitate and abbreviate their own
path to the clear understanding of the Gospel, while they do not have any influence
on the ultimate outcome of that history.
Both approaches are capable of an interpretation on whose basis the modern
terminology and conceptualization of historical change and of the role of human
agency in that change emerged. However, it is equally useful and intellectually
perhaps more rewarding to regard these conceptual cousins ,  including Robertson’s
position, not like as yet “imperfect” anticipations of a later, more “developed” idea,
but as mature  theoretical experiments representing specific shades of opinion within
340 Cf. Keith Michael Baker, “Inventing the French Revolution”, in idem., Inventing the French
Revolution, 203-223. See also Neithard Bulst, Jörg Fisch, Reinhart Koselleck, “Revolution”, in Otto
Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1984), Bd. 5, esp. 714-24.
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the Enlightenment, claiming our attention in their own right. Paraphrasing Koselleck,
one might suggest that Robertson’s early sermon catches for us the very moment in
which the notion of the acceleration of history was not yet quite divorced from the
apocalyptic  hope  attached  to  the  ever  shortening  periods  preceding  the  Last
Judgement, but was already being transformed into a notion of historical hope. But a
formulation that would drop the words “yet” and “already”, and replace “moment”
with “perspective”, might in fact far more accurately describe the situation.
*   *   *   *   *
In his account of Robertson’s life and writings, Dugald Stewart reports that the
sermon “hath long been ranked, in both parts of the island, among the best models of
pulpit eloquence in our language”, illustrating this by pointing to five editions which
it underwent, and also adding that it “is well known in some parts of the Continent,
in the German translation of Mr. Ebeling.”341 Precisely how “well known” it was, is
actually difficult to establish. Apart from the availability of the translation mentioned
by Stewart in a few German libraries, the only information about it that I have been
able  to  locate  is  contained in  a  letter  to  Robertson by the  translator  himself.  Johann
Philipp Ebeling (1753-1795) took a medical degree at Glasgow in 1779 with a
dissertation on the quassia tree (a plant indigenous in the West Indies whose medical
uses included the treatment of stomach upset and loss of appetite as well  as fevers)
and  the  Iceland  moss  (lichen islandicus – also effective against lack of appetite and
coughs).342  Ebeling wrote the letter, on 17 November 1779, to express his gratitude to
Robertson for the warm reception by the historian in Edinburgh on his way back to
Lüneburg, and for supplying him with a copy of the sermon – which he found, to his
surprise, never to have been translated into German. He proudly reported having
341 Stewart, Biographical Memoirs, 160.
342 Dissertatio medica iauguralis de Quassia et lichene islandico … pro gradu doctoratus … in comitiis
Universitati Glasquensis. Eruditorum examini subjicit Joh. Theod. Phil. Christ. Ebeling, Luneburgensis.  …
Glasquae, 1779.
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accomplished this task343 (adding that  in  the  meantime a  very  incompetent  rival  in
Frankfurt did the same – an enterprise whose fruits seem to have been lost). The rest
of the letter reads like a series of replies to queries that may have been posed to
Ebeling during his visit in Edinburgh by Robertson about the current conditions of
Germany:
“The emperor is publicly known to meditate upon a fifth monarchy, but
probably his schemes will prove as abortive as those of Louis of France. At any
rate we want a war very much; all our regiments are overflocked with
volunteers waiting for commissions. Commerce affords with us, some few
towns excepted, no prospects of young men of family, and all their views are
therefore confined to civil offices and military places, of which however there
is  not  near  a  sufficient  number  to  provide  for  all  the  children  of  a  peace  of
eighteen years.”344
These remarks coagulate around issues that are known to have been of central
interest to Robertson. While it needs some stretch of one’s imagination to style Joseph
II’s military emulation with Frederick II (in particular its latest and remarkably
eventless episode, the War of Bavarian succession or “potato war” of 1778-1779) as
an endeavour to build universal monarchy, the topic itself was a lasting concern for
the Scottish historian, similarly to the issue of the social dynamic generated by
commerce  (or  the  lack  of  it).  If  it  is  added  that  Ebeling’s  letter  also  contained
comments and information relevant to Robertson’s History of America (which will be
discussed in Chapter 6 below), the young German physician emerges as a quite
intimate Kenner of the pursuits of the venerable Scottish historian, and the
343 William Robertson, Der Zustand der Welt bey der Erscheinung Christi und sein Einfluß auf den Fortgang
der Religion, trans. Johann Philipp Ebeling (Hamburg: Herold, 1779).
344 Robertson-MacDonald papers, National Library of Scotland, MS. 3943. ff. 106-7. Ebeling then
complained that the shrinking job market affected him as well, and requested Robertson to mobilize
his aristocratic contacts to find a position as a travelling tutor. Ebeling ended up pursuing a career as a
physician in Germany,  but  he remained devoted to Scotland and its  culture,  and also translated the
account of Thomas Pennant on his travels across that country. See further below, Chapter Six, 315.
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conversation which they had seems to have been as serious in breadth and depth as
it was probably rather brief.
As Robertson’s rise to international recognition was triggered by the
publication of the History of Scotland in 1759, it should not be surprising that the
Situation of the World went unnoticed in Germany until the contingent factor of the
personal  meeting  with  Ebeling,  and  the  role  of  a  copy  of  the  sermon  as  a  gift  to
commemorate the meeting, motivated the latter to translate it – at a time when, as we
shall  see,  three  major  works  of  Robertson  had  already  been  widely  commented  on
and were also available in German translations. However important the sermon is as
a testimony to the early development of theoretical convictions that were to exert an
impact on each of Robertson’s mature historical works, in view of this chronology it
is also little wonder that its appearance on the German book market apparently
evoked  no  critical  response  at  all.  Unlike  most  fellow  translators  of  Robertson,
Ebeling himself also refrained from adding a preface or notes of his own to the text.
Nevertheless, there are two issues raised by Ebeling’s performance that are worth
exploring in the rest of this chapter. One of them, the character and the quality of the
translation itself, with an emphasis on the terminological choices of the translator,
will be a recurrent theme throughout the pages that follow. Second, Robertson’s
combination of providence and progress as a framework of historical interpretation,
and more broadly his discussion of a Christian theme as a piece of secular narrative,
calls for an assessment of compatible perspectives in contemporary German religious
thought.
Apart from relatively insignificant instances of imprecision, Ebeling proved
himself as a competent and confident translator: the text runs smoothly, and in the
liberties he occasionally took he departed from Robertson’s original only to the
extent required to make the German idiomatic. At the same time, he was helpless in
regard of a feature of Robertson’s compositions that invariably caused problems also
to the other German translators whose contributions are discussed in this book. The
intellectual discourse of Robertson as a historian of human progress is organized
around  a  basic  vocabulary  whose  coherence  is  difficult  to  convey  by  the  means  of
German as a natural language. This must be borne in mind even though he is
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evidently much more than just a historian of human progress – a historian of human
progress as interdependent with the accessibility of the Christian revelation, as in the
Situation of the World, or a historian of human progress as contextualizing political
drama and the conflict of characters, as in the History of Scotland, and so forth. While
neither of Robertson’s works are outright stadial histories, the semantic possibilities
inherent in the stadialist vocabulary are crucial to the texture and the conceptional
unity  of  each,  the Situation of the World being no exception. Here too, “commerce”
and “intercourse” are used to denote the exchange of goods with the potential of
generating sociability (an inference prompted by the fact that in English these words
are also capable of denoting the exchange of much more than just goods). The
refinement or civilization of “manners”, the ethical, aesthetic and custom-based
standards of human conduct characteristic of a society is understood as dependent
on the proliferation of the opportunities of each type of such exchanges.  Further, the
“political state”, or simply the “policy” or “police” of a community assumes more
regular forms in proportion of the advance of its “manners” towards more
“polished” or “polite” stages. Etymological confluences, whether real or assumed (as
in the case of “polished / polite / police), played a major role in cementing this
vocabulary as a tool of sociological and historical interpretation.345
The success of Ebeling in rendering such consistencies was as meagre as it was
in  the  case  of  any of  his  colleagues. Handlung (for  commerce)  is  trade in  goods but
hardly anything else, though by extending to mean “action” it at least preserves the
notion of agency; Gemeinschaft (for intercourse – as well as communication) is
“community”, thus an accomplished fact, rather than active engagement.346 Finding
an equivalent for “manners” in German was apparently an easy job: Sitten was used
in  this  role  frequently  by  Ebeling  as  well  as  others.  However,  as  I  shall  argue  in
greater detail in Chapter Four below, this routine was not unproblematic, because in
Sitten the  ethical  overtone  seems  to  suppress  the  others  which  are  present  in
“manners” – a point which is also illustrated by Ebeling’s indiscriminate use of it for
345 This theme is developed in greater detail in Chapter Four, where one of Robertson’s most
consistently “stadialist” texts and its German reception is discussed. See below, 212 ff; cf. Chapter
Five, 240 ff . and Chapter Six, 299 ff.
346 Robertson, Zustand der Welt, 10, 42.
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“morals” as well as “manners.”347 This  imbalance  is  somewhat  redressed  by
rendering “civilised” with gesittet348 – which, however, does not evoke the connection
of the process of refinement with progress towards and within the “civil”, i.e.,
political  state.  To  further  undermine  the  status  of  stadialist  terminology  as  a
vocabulary, Ebeling translated “policy” as Staatsklugheit,349 a term used extensively in
German reason of state literature to denote the prudence necessary for effective
statesmanship, but rather inadequate as a tool to point to the progress – “polishing,”
i.e., refinement – of civil (political) society.
Such difficulties, even blunders in coping with Scottish stadialist vocabulary,
were not untypical in the history of the reception of Robertson’s texts in German.  As,
for the possible reasons mentioned above, direct German responses to the argument
presented in the sermon are lacking, it remains to be seen in the rest of this chapter
what  parallels  for  Robertson’s  reliance  on  secular  causation,  applied  to  themes  in
sacred history, may have existed in the German “religious Enlightenment.” That
several strains of thought deserving of such an appellation operated in eighteenth-
century Germany, is now widely accepted. That these displayed a broad family
resemblance with the interpretation of the meaning of the New Testament offered in
the Situation of the World, is a less obvious fact, but one which dovetails well with
both the generally amenable atmosphere in which his other works received a great
deal of attention, and the incomprehension which surrounded some of their aspects.
One possible German counterpart of Robertson’s attempt to present the
biblical story as one in which human agency and intentions are as manifest as the
divine  contents  of  the  books,  was  the  historical  exegesis  encapsulated  in  the
“theological Wolffianism”350 of the Halle professor Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten
(1706-1757) and his disciple Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791). The University of
Halle was founded in 1694 by Frederick III of Brandenburg-Prussia as a bulwark
347 E.g., ibid., 16. To confuse matters even more, at one instance Sitten is  also  employed  to  render
“custom.” Ibid., 45.
348 Ibid., 11, 39.
349 Ibid., 11, 43.
350 On this concept see Horst Stephan, Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, XXI, ed.
Albert Hauck (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908), 452–464; cf. David Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology for the
Enlightenment: The Case of Siegnmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-1757)”, Central European History 36:4
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against the Lutheran Orthodoxy prevailing at the nearby universities of Wittenberg
and Leipzig in Saxony. Initially, the means to rejuvenate Lutheran belief was Pietism,
which countered the strongly speculative-scholastic dogmatizing and intolerance of
Orthodoxy by a stress on edificatory preaching, devotional experience through Bible-
reading and individual access to God, and freedom of conscience.351 At the same
time, Pietism remained just as untouched as Orthodoxy by the most important
intellectual developments of the age, and there soon arose a generation of scholars at
Halle and more broadly in German Pietism which acutely felt the need for thorough
empirical research, methodological rigour and a general open-mindedness towards
the new scientific-mathematical thinking, if theology were to retain its position on
the  map  of  learning.  While  the  Pietists  of  Halle  at  first  secured  the  suppression  of
both of the early representatives of the German “rival Enlightenments”, Christian
Thomasius and Christian Wolff (constraining the former to the teaching of law in
1696, and expelling the latter from the university in 1723), Wolff’s re-inviting in 1733
signaled the changing of the tides. Baumgarten’s theology took shape in the context
of these contests, and was an attempt to reconcile reason and revelation by resorting
not only to the Wolffian standards of achieving quasi-mathematical certainty, but
also to historical analysis as a field capable both of accommodating such standards
and of consolidating faith by mediating between human experience and the divine
truth.
 The endeavour of Baumgarten, and in his wake Semler, to supersede Pietism
by  resorting  to  Wolff’s  philosophy  thus  arose  out  of  local  debates,  but  had  a  great
deal in common with other forceful statements of a moderate and religious
Enlightenment elsewhere in Europe. Affinities between the thought of Baumgarten
and figures like William Warburton, Jacob Vernet or Moses Mendelssohn have been
pointed out convincingly.352 For  the  present  study,  the  centrality  of  history  as  a
(2003), 505. It must be added, however, that Wolffianism was found increasingly unsatisfactory by the
Halle professors exactly because of its hostility to history. See below.
351 The standard monograph is Klaus Deppermann, Der hallesche Pietismus und der preußische Staat unter
Friedrich III./I. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961). See further Carl Hinrichs, Preußentum und
Pietismus. Der Pietismus in Brandenburg-Preußen als religiössoziale Reformbewegung (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1971); Richard L. Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth Century
Prussia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
352 Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment.
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discipline to Baumgarten’s intellectual strategy, and the importance of his
contributions to eighteenth-century German historical scholarship must be stressed.
His theological oeuvre was thoroughly imbued with a historical approach, but he
also published an influential work on ecclesiastical history in 1743 and, between 1744
and 1758, edited seventeen volumes of the German translation of the highly popular
and influential English Universal History – with commentaries that were later
translated into English and published as a supplement to the original.353  Thus,
Baumgarten  also  needs  to  be  reckoned  with  in  tracing  the  local  conditions  for  the
reception of Robertson – another “moderate” as well as a highly successful
professional historian – in Germany.
If Robertson’s sermon was a formidable effort at developing a historically
contextualized understanding of the full import of the account of Christ’s suffering
as related in the testimonies of the Gospel, the same was true for a considerable
portion of Baumgarten’s oeuvre. He was fully convinced of the significance of history
for theology:354 extracting truth from Scripture for him depended on the application
of a philological and historical method, which consisted of the excavation of the
meaning of words among the exact historical conditions in which they had been once
used.355 On the same grounds Baumgarten stressed that “before we form a Judgment
of ancient and foreign Historians, we ought to consider the Opinion and Customs of
the Times and Places in which they were written,” adding that competence in the
source languages was an indispensable qualification of the historian in developing
such a contextual understanding.356 Further,  he  not  only  suggested  that  his
353 Cf.  below,  notes  52  ff.  For  modern  commentary,  see  Martin  Schloemann, Siegmund Jacob
Baumgarten. System und Geschichte in der Theologie des Überganges zum Neuprotestantismus (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974) Ch. III; Lutz Danneberg, “Siegmund Jakob Baumgartens biblische
Hermeneutik”, in Axel Bühler (ed.), Unzeitgemä?e Hermeneutik. Verstehen und Interpretation im Denken
der Aufklärung (Frankfurt am Main:  Klostermann, 1994), 88-157.
354 This conviction became especially strong from the late 1730s. It has been emphasized that
Baumgarten saw the task of the confrontation with and the refutation of “freethinking” increasingly as
a historical one. See Schloemann, Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, 109 ff and 170.
355 Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, Auszug der Kirchengeschichte, von der Geburt Jesu an (Halle: J. A. Bauer,
1743), Vorrede;  8. Cf. Idem., Unterricht von Auslegung der heiligen Schrift (Halle: J. A. Bauer, 1759), cited
by Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology”, 511.
356 Idem., A  Supplement to the English Universal History, Lately published in London (London: Dilly, 1760),
vii, xiv; translation of the Übersetzung der Allgemeinen Welthistorie die in England durch eine Gesellschaft
der Gelehrten ausgefertiget worden … Genau durchgesehen und mit häufigen Anmerkungen vermeret von
Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (Halle: Gebauer, 1744), Vorrede, 7, 13.
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“grammatical and dogmatic” method of exegesis was capable of extracting from
Scripture the “vital knowledge” needed for Christian “union,357 but  also,  as  a
corollary, that history pursued with this method rendered a service to belief because,
whether sacred or secular, it was unitary. The Bible certainly incorporated aspects
that were strictly temporal, and thus subject to error,358 as well as truths central to
salvation and therefore incontrovertible. All the same, Baumgarten held these two
apparently opposed characters of the holy books to be subject to the same methods,
applicable to the sacred as well  as the secular,  pointing to the soundness of the one
and the uncertainty of the other.
He  was  able  to  do  so  on  the  grounds  of  his  importation  of  the  premises  of
Wolff into the study of history (and theology). Wolff despised history as a field of
inquiry concerned only with particulars (but not, as a proper science ought to, with
generalia), and where no certainty is feasible.359 Baumgarten insisted that the widely
accepted charge concerning the lack of certainty in historical scholarship is
unfounded, and that instead a “demonstrable certainty” existed in history, based on
the same notions of credibility and coherence – non-contradiction of facts and events
to  themselves,  the  laws  of  nature,  or  divine  attributes  –  as  in  any  other  branch  of
knowledge.  True, Baumgarten’s historical credibility was one which was peculiar to
the field. It differed from mathematical certainty and the “demonstrability” of
general truths: a “credible” historian may not be “infallible,” yet “a Fact is
considerably more demonstrable if supported by the Credibility of the Historian”
(though it is added that “the bare mention of an Event by a credible Historian, doth
not constitute the whole proof of its Certainty”).360 This sounds like a circular
argument, but Baumgarten merely points to the fact that it  belongs to the nature of
certainty and probability in history that “the Demonstrability of Events has different
Degrees and Limits” – but it is philosophically wrong just for this reason to deny
357 Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology”,  512.
358 This was because God’s universal benevolence led him to “accommodate” to contexts and
contingencies when dealing with mankind and its frailties. For “accommodation” in providential
histories throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, see Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific
Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), Ch. 4., esp. 243-70.
359 For  Baumgarten’s  departure  from  Wolff,  especially  in  regard  of  the  appreciation  of  history,  see
Schloemann, Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, 129-56.
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history  the  character  of  a  certainty-based  science.361 On the contrary, Baumgarten
confidently asserted that it is
“no difficult nor tedious matter to refute the trifling Arguments made us of to
depreciate  the  Study of  History.  … Every Inquiry  into  the  real  Grounds and
different Degrees of Probability and Certainty of historical Events and Facts, a
Discovery of the Connection of different Events, and their mutual Influence
over each other, and a right Judgment and Application of the same, require as
much Reflection and Exercise, and sharpen the reflecting Powers as much, as
any other Science.”362
However, Baumgarten championed history not only on account of its
possessing a legitimate claim to the status of a science, but also because of its distinct
socio-cultural uses. He argued that a “thorough insight” in sacred history – which, as
pointed out above, had in his view a symbiotic relationship with secular history –
was the best “weapon” in defense of the Christian religion against its detractors,
thanks to its capacity to promote a middle course between “all the cruelty, deception,
sinfulness and dominant passions occasioned by superstition and ignorance under
the pretext of worshipping God” and “fanatical enthusiasm.”363 Baumgarten’s
agenda was chiefly to reclaim history from deists and freethinkers, in whose hands it
had become an instrument of undermining the credibility of revelation. But his
conviction that this arose precisely from the defectiveness of historical knowledge as
cultivated by these rivals, and that its correction would help suppress all the error
they  stood  for,  was  typical  of  moderate  enlightened  Christians  across  Europe  who
aimed at keeping an equal distance from all varieties of enthusiasm and superstition
360 Baumgarten, Supplement, xxv-xxvi. Cf. Übersetzung, 19-20.
361 It  has  been  suggested  that  with  these  insights  Baumgarten  “anticipated  the  efforts  of  such  later
eighteenth-century historians as Johann Martin Chladenius, Johann Christoph Gatterer and Jacob
Wegelin.” Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology”, 515 (.n. 58). Cf. Petr Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment
and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley:  University of  California Press,  1975),  Ch.  5;  and above,  Chapter
Two, 126 ff .
362 Baumgarten, Supplement, li. Cf. Übersetzung, 36.
363 “alle[n]  aus  Aberglauben  und  Unwissenheit  unter  dem  Vorwand  des  Gottesdienstes  verübten
Grausamkeit, Betriegerey, Laster und herrschender Leidenschaften”; “fanatischen Schwermereien.”
Baumgarten, Auszug der Kirchengeschichte, 10-1.
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through the application of scientific reason. For them, the knowledge of history
seemed crucial in order to overcome the erroneous notions that had thrown several
generations of Europeans into a terrible cycle of religious and civil warfare.
As a further Enlightenment trade mark, Baumgarten moved on in his
Supplement to the English Universal History to extol the “usefulness” of history –
notably, associated with the “agreeableness, pleasure and entertainment” found in it.
Thanks  to  such  associations,  it  is  already  easy  to  comprehend  that  the  study  of
history fulfils a social mission, in the eighteenth-century sense, because “it will fill up
the longest Life of the idlest  Man, the pleasures of it will engage him to relish it; it
will insensibly correct his Manners and improve his Understanding; and it may
excite  him to  other  useful  Employments  …” The purpose  of  the  study of  history  is
eminently sociable for Baumgarten, and thus congenial to the constitution of
humanity in the highest order:
“History is the means of our acquaintance with a much greater and more
remote part of the human Race than would be possible without it. … Man is of
a sociable nature, formed for a social Life, and obliged to it. Now Societies
cannot subsist, much less can all the ends of their Institution be answered,
without a retrospect to past Events … no one can either be a useful Member of
human Society, or even enjoy all its Advantages, who is indifferent to the
public Good, and therefore careless of the Concerns, the Prosperity, or
Distresses  of  his  Fellow-members.  …  The  more  we  consider  the  close
Connection between all human Societies, which all together make up but one
general Society, the more interesting the Events and Actions of our Fellow-
members will appears to us, even those that happen in the remotest part of the
Universe.  And  as  this  connection  not  only  unites  all  Contemporaries,  but
likewise extends to different Periods, whence general obligations to our
Ancestors  and Posterity  arise;  it  follows,  that  the  Attention must  likewise  be
extended to Events of former times, if we chuse to be the better of our
Predecessors, to discharge our Duty to them, and to render their Actions, and
the  effects  they have produced,  more  useful  to  Posterity.  For  it  would be  an
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unaccountable Conduct to live in the World as if  the human Race had begun
and was to perish with us.”364
Hume’s metaphor about silkworms versus humans, the one marked by a
discontinuity between generations and the other by the indissoluble ties that bind
them together, or Burke’s notion of society as a contract among the living, the dead,
and  those  who  are  not  yet  born,  are  widely  known  formulations  of  the  same
sentiments.  But more important than the apparently conservative overtones of
Baumgarten’s statement are its implications for the gift of sensitivity and empathy
towards  different  human  situations  as  they  arise  across  time  and  space,  and  the
consequences for the anthropology of the Enlightenment. Man cannot subsist outside
society; society is by definition a product of history, and man’s sociable disposition is
nurtured by the knowledge of history, which is,  therefore,  one of the most effective
means of securing the perpetuation of the social bond.
In the 1740s and 1750s, Baumgarten thus invested history with an
authoritative voice in the matters both of religion and sociability. Both this
combination, and the agenda that it was intended to promote, was strikingly similar
to the one which marked Robertson’s 1755 sermon, even though the topics which
Baumgarten addressed in his own historical texts (confined as these were to the
history of the church) and the principles of causality applied in them (devoid of the
materialistic aspects of stadial history) obviously separate him from the Scottish
historian.  Baumgarten’s  initiatives  in  Halle  were  taken  up  with  a  great  deal  of
commitment and competence by his student Johann Salomo Semler, who not only
continued his master’s work in editing the German translation of the English
Universal History (volumes 18 to 31, between 1758 and 1766), but also further refined
and broadened the establishment of theological theorizing on the foundations of
historical epistemology.
Semler’s  seminal  contributions  to  the  development  of  academic  source
criticism, and the particular value of a handbook he published in 1761 on the use of
364 Baumgarten, Supplement, xxxii-xxxiv. Cf. Übersetzung, 24-5.
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sources for medieval political and ecclesiastical history,365 were already recognized
by contemporaries, including Gatterer, who simply called Semler “a classic.”366 There
is neither scope nor need to reproduce here the comprehensive and in-depth analysis
of Semler’s contribution to the rise of “scientific history” that is now available in the
literature. 367 As regards the possible parallels with the position which Robertson
took in the Situation of the World, the most noteworthy feature of Semler’s thought is
his  conviction  that,  thanks  to  Providence,  he  lived  and  worked  in  an  age  that  was
“better” than all the preceding ones, and that if there ever was an age that enjoyed
the advantage of being able to put together a “fruitful history of moral notions and
maxims [eine … fruchtbare Geschichte moralischer Begriffe und Lehrsätze”],” it was
exactly his.368 This claim has several important implications. First, Semler thought
that all ages had – because they both needed and deserved – their own, new
histories, which were peculiar to them. This was because all forms of consciousness
existed in mutual conformity with the surrounding, changing socio-cultural
environment: it was not the sources that constituted history, but the engagement
with them and the process of interpretation and reconstruction, inevitably taking
place according to principles of selectivity peculiar to the time and place in which the
historian is active. Take, for instance, the stories of the life of Jesus and the religion of
the  early  Christians  as  related  in  the  Gospel:  they  are  not  “history  proper”,  which
arises out of the judgements [Urtheile]  we form about them – “[n]ow, readers make
365 Johann Salomo Semler, Versuch den Gebrauch der Quellen in den Staats- und Kirchengeschichte der
mittleren Zeiten zu erleichtern (Halle, 1761), ed. Dirk Fleischer (Waltrop: Hartmut Spenner, 1996).
366 Johann Christoph Gatterer, “Nähere Nachricht voin der neuen Ausgabe der gleichzeitigen
Schriftsteller über die teutsche Geschichte”, AhB 8 (1768), 17.
367 Semler’s  importance  in  the  development  of  eighteenth-century  German  historical  thought  has
received a more extensive echo in modern scholarship than that of Baumgarten. Unlike the latter,
Semler is discussed at some length in Reill, The German Enlightenment, 166 ff. Substantial monographic
studies and articles also address his contributions. See Gottfried Hornig, Die Anfänge der historisch-
kritischen Theologie. Johann Salomo Semlers Schriftverständnis und seine Stellung zu Luther  (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961); Eric Wilhelm Carlsson, “Johann Salomo Semler, the German
Enlightenment, and Protestant Theology’s Historical Turn”, PhD. Diss., University of Wisconsin,
Madison (2006); Dirk Fleischer, Zwischen Tradition und Fortschritt: Der Strukturwandel der
protestantischen Kinchengeschichtsschreibung im deutschsprachigen Diskurs der Aufklärung (Waltrop:
Hartmut Spenner, 2006), 517-768; idem., “Geschichte und Sinn. Johann Salomo Semler als
Geschichtstheoretiker”, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 56:5 (2008), 397-417; Marianne Schröter,
Aufklärung durch Historisierung: Johann Salomo Semlers Hermeneutik des Christentums (Berlin: De Gruyter,
2012)
368 Johann Salomo Semler, “Vorrede”, in Johann Moritz Schwager, Beytrag zur Geschichte der Intoleranz
(Leipzig, 1780), xiv, cited in Fleischer, “Geschichte und Sinn”, 399.
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judgements about [such histories] according to their present way of thinking; thus
their own history is what they think about that history, according to a mixture of a
Christian kind.”369 It  is  this  “mixture”  of  past  events  and  experiences  with  present
judgements, their evaluation in light of current standards and values that results in a
“relation, representation, collection of cases which its author regards as interesting,
as useful, and as far as he himself is concerned, truthful.”370
Thus, according to Semler, different histories of the same object, including the
Scripture, were possible, even desirable. In a slightly different perspective, he
thought that just as history itself was plural and context-dependent, so were all other
forms of consciousness, religion not excepted.  “[A] theologian … does not do justice
to his calling, if he is foreign to history,” he summed up his relevant convictions early
in his career, in a preface to the translation of a popular history of Spain.371 The idea
of religion as a closed, immutable, “perfect” system was no more realistic to him than
that of an impeccable social order: on the contrary, religion was a universal force in a
constant  flux,  growing  together  with  the  human  mind,  and  obliged,  as  it  were,  to
answer the distinct spiritual needs of all times. As a result, the same hermeneutical
principles and patterns of interpretation were applicable to sacred as to profane
history.372 In Semler’s view, this approach was indispensable for eighteenth-century
men  and  women  to  realize  that  while  they  could  understand  the  past,  it  was
impossible for them to become first-century Christians – a recognition that seemed to
him all-important for the present understanding of the Gospel.
Christianity for Semler, following Baumgarten, had a crucial temporal
dimension, which made it inseparable from developments in the secular
environment. He clearly conceived of such developments as “progress,” as a result of
369 “Nun urtheilen Leser darüber, in ihrer jezigen Denkugsart; das ist nun ihre eigene Geschichte, was sie
über jene Geschichte denken, in der Mischung eines christlichen Charakters.” Johann Salomo Semler,
“Vorrede”, in Hugh Farmer’s Briefe an D. Worthington über die Dämonischen in den Evangelien (Halle,
1783), cited in Fleischer, “Geschichte und Sinn”, 403.
370 “[Alle Historie ist eine] Erzählung, Darstellung, Sammlung solchen Begebenheiten, welche ihr
Urheber  für  merkwürdig,  für  nützlich,  auch  wohl  selbst,  was  ihn  betrifft,  für  wahr  halt.”  Johann
Samolo Semler, Neue Versuche die Kirchenhistorie der ersten Jahrhunderte mehr aufzuklären (Leipzig:
Weygand, 1788), 3-4.
371 Idem., “Vorrede”, in Johann von Ferreras, Algemeine Historie von Spanien mit den Zusätzen der
französischen Uebersetzung nebst Fortsetzung bis auf gegenwärtige Zeit, vol. 8 (Halle: Gebauer, 1757), 5.
372 Reill, The German Enlightenment, 166-7.
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which his age was better equipped than its predecessor to access the past, including
the Christian past. Further enhancing this access was emphatically proposed by him
as an instrument of Enlightenment: “As history in general diffuses the most powerful
light, and most certainly suppresses ignorance; so do I also hope to achieve through
many such historical proofs among all  thinking contemporaries that they no longer
remain the slaves of human opinions and prejudices.”373 While Semler was
apparently rather uninterested in the forces and the working of historical causality,
his forceful effort at inscribing historical relativism into the learned account of the
Christian religion while still asserting the divine character of Christ, puts him into
company with his master Baumgarten in creating an intellectual atmosphere in
which Robertson’s pertinent views were not alien.
“Neology”, as the theological stance represented by Baumgarten and Semler
came  to  be  referred  to,  took  issue  with  both  the  Orthodox  and  Pietist  currents  of
contemporary German Protestantism, while resorting to methods of historical
criticism keenly employed already for a century by the Deists, whose idea and
agenda of natural religion constituted a fundamental challenge for them all.374
During the 1770s, yet another new voice appeared on the already complex stage of
enlightened debate on religion in Germany. That voice belonged to Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), one of the most famous German philosophes of the time,
whose earlier views on the matter, to the extent he was concerned with it,375 could be
373 “Wie überhaupt die Historie das mächtigste Licht ausbreitet und die Unwissenheit am gewissesten
besieget; so hoffe ich auch durch solche historische viele Beweise, bey allen denkenden Zeitgenossen,
es dahin zu bringen, daß sie nicht mehr Knechte menschlicher Meinungen und Vorurtheile bleiben.”
Johann Salomo Semler, “Vorrede” in Sammlungen von Briefen und Aufsätzen über die Gaßnerischen und
Schröpferischen Geisterbeschwörungen (Halle: Gebauer, 1776), cited in Fleischer, “Geschichte und Sinn”,
416.
374 For  the Deists  as  a  much neglected radical  undercurrent  in the early German Enlightenment,  see
Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Ch. 29, esp. 552-8; Ch. 34. Also, Winfried Schröder, “Natürliche Religion
und  Religionskritik  in  der  deutschen  Frühaufklärung”,  in  Hans  Erich  Bödeker  (ed.), Strukturen der
deutschen Frühaufklärung 1680-1720 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 146-64.
375 Lessing refused being considered a theologian but acknowledged being “a lover of theology”
(Liebhaber der Theologie). Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Axiomata, in Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden, ed.
Wilfried Barner et al., IX: Werke 1778-1780, ed. Klaus Bohnen and Arno Schilson (Frankfurt am Main:
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993), 57. He did not publish anything specifically addressing theology
before  the  1770s,  but  there  is  evidence  for  his  engagement  with  it  throughout  his  career.  See  Arno
Schilson, Geschichte im Horizont der Vorsehung. G. E. Lessings Beitrag zu einer Theologie der Geschichte
(Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1974), Ch. 1; Toshimasa Yasumata, Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion
and the German Enlightenment. Lessing on Christianity and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), Ch. 1.
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most closely associated with Deism. After about 1773, however, his approach
changed. Lessing, since May 1770 librarian of the splendid collections of Duke
Ferdinand of Brunswick at Wolfenbüttel, published a sequence of writings
displaying a genuine interest in giving a rational account of the Christian revelation
while making gestures to revealed religion. The change did not go unnoticed: as his
friend, the Berlin writer and publisher Friedrich Nicolai wrote to Lessing on 24 April
1777, “the theologians think that you are a freethinker, and freethinkers, that you
have become a theologian.”376
The first set of publications which triggered this shift in Lessing’s reputation
was seven fragments from four-thousand pages of manuscripts by the Hamburg
gymnasium professor of Oriental languages, Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768).
The manuscripts seem to have been entrusted to Lessing by Reimarus’ children,
whom he had befriended during his stay in Hamburg as literary advisor of the newly
founded German National Theatre there prior to his engagement in Wolfenbüttel.
They were collectively entitled Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer
Gottes (Apology or Vindication for the Rational Worshippers of God), and contained
a radical statement of the deist position. As Lessing promised to Reimarus’ heirs
never to reveal the identity of the author, and the immunity from censorship he
received from his employer was conditional on his refraining from any attack on
Christianity, he chose a dual strategy in making the manuscripts public. First,
pretending to have found them among the holdings of the library, he published them
in the series Zur Geschichte und Literatur: Aus den Schätzen der Herzoglichen Bibliothek
zu Wolfenbüttel Contributions to Literature and History from the Treasures of the
Ducal Library at Wolfenbüttel), which he had just initiated, under the title Fragmente
eines Ungenannten (Fragments by an Unnamed Author, 1774-1778). Second, he
equipped the texts with critical commentary (Gegensätze – “counter-arguments”).
Neither of these strategies was fully successful. As Lessing’s correspondence
demonstrates, in spite of his precautions Reimarus was widely suspected behind the
376 “Die Theologen glauben, da? Sie ein Freigeist sind, und die Freigeister, da? Sie  ein  Theolog
geworden  sind.”  Nicolai  to  Lessing,  24  April  1777.  In Werke und Briefe XII: Briefe von und an Lessing
1776-1781, ed. Helmuth Kiesel et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1994), 69. In his
reply, Lessing rejected being either a theologian or a freethinker. Ibid., 78.
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texts. More importantly, the Fragments evoked a torrent of angry refutations. Initially,
the main target of these responses was the anonymous author and his highly erudite
assaults on the historical roots and historical legitimacy of Christianity – among other
things, denying the possibility of universal revelation, undermining the credibility of
crucial accounts of the holy books, such as the passage of the Israelites across the Red
Sea or the resurrection of Christ, and imputing disingenuous intentions to Apostles.
While Lessing’s own objections to Reimarus, advanced in the Gegensätze and aimed
to  use  the  opportunity  of  the  debate  with  the  heterodox  author  to  establish
Christianity on a firmer footing, were primarily based on methodological grounds,
the respondents simply re-claimed the historical truthfulness of the Bible.377
However, with the involvement of Johann Melchior Goeze (1717-1786), Hauptpastor
of the Hamburg pastors, the editor and his counter-positions came to be repudiated
as even more dangerous than the fragments themselves. Eventually, in 1779, Semler
also entered the debate with a wholesale and point-by-point response especially to
the supposedly most provocative of the fragments,  concerning the purpose of Jesus
and his disciples.378 But even before then, the intervention of civil authority
effectively closed the “fragment controversy” (Fragmententstreit):  from  July  1778
onwards, all of Lessing’s publications in the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel were
to be censored. Yet he continued addressing the status of revealed religion and the
topic of reason and revelation by “finding out whether I  am still  allowed to preach
undisturbed at least from my old pulpit, the theatre”379 –  whose  result  was  the
famous drama Nathan the Wise –,  and by completing in  1780  a  brief  piece  begun in
377 For  an  excellent  concise  account  of  the  contents  of  the Fragments, together with the thrust of
Lessing’s criticism and the responses, see Arno Schilson, “Lessing and Theology”, in Barbara Fischer
and Thomas C. Fox (eds.), A Companion to the Works of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (Woodbridge: Camden
House, 2005), 163-70.
378 Johann Salomo Semler, Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenanten insbesondere vom Zweck Jesu und
seiner Jünger (Halle, 1779), ed. Dirk Fleischer (Waltrop: Hartmut Spenner, 2003). Semler’s lengthy
contribution focused overwhelmingly on Reimarus, and Lessing was chiefly criticized because of the
foolish decision to publish the Fragments. It is interesting that just a decade earlier, Semler and Goeze
(both of them former students of Baumgarten) were engaged in a fierce debate on the source value of
an early sixteenth century Spanish edition of the New Testament, with implications for textual
criticism  as  well  as  dogmatics.  See  Gottfried  Hornig.  “Orthodoxie  und  Textkritik.  Die  Kontroverse
Zwischen  Johann  Melchior  Goeze  und  Johann  Salomo  Semler”,  in  Heimo  Reinitzer,  Walter  Sparn
(eds.), Verspätete Orthodoxie. Über D. Johann Melchior Goeze (1717-1786) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,
1989), 159-77.
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1777, entitled Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (The Education of the Human
Race).
In  the  eleven essays  that  comprise  his Anti-Goeze, Lessing vindicated himself
against Orthodoxy by stressing that “the ultimate purpose of Christianity is not our
salvation, wherever it comes from, but our salvation by means of our enlightenment,”380
and that the publication of texts by someone who appears to be a genuine adversary
of religion served the attainment of this end by facilitating an open discussion of “the
question of truth” (Wahrheitsfrage).  In  the  pursuit  of  truth  –  “salvation by means  of
enlightenment” –, Lessing advanced intellectual and methodological positions which
were in the first place directed against Goeze and his Orthodox supporters, but were
also firm vis-à-vis his other rivals, Deists and Neologists. In apparently fundamental
contradiction to the resort to historical criticism in the interpretation of Christianity
urged by them, he proposed that “contingent truths of history can never become the
proof for indispensable truths of reason,”381 and, famously, employed the metaphor
of the “hideous broad ditch” (der garstige breite Graben) separating the two from one
another. In Lessing’s view, there was a problem with the character of historical
knowledge – in the given case, the knowledge of miracles and the fulfillment of
prophecies – because of the difference between the immediate experience and the
indirect mediation and reporting of these past phenomena. Certainty may arise from
the former, but never from the latter, which supplies only probable and relatively
credible knowledge, and is therefore an insufficient ground for true faith. The
379 “Ich  mu? versuchen, ob man mich auf meinen alten Kanzel, auf dem Theater wenigstens, noch
ungestört will predigen lassen.” Lessing to Elise Reimarus, 6 September 1778. Briefe 1776-1781, 193.
380 Nun ist … die letzte Absicht des Christentums nicht unsere Seligkeit, sie mag herkommen woher
sie will: sondern unsre Seligkeit, vermittelst unsrer Erleuchtung …” 4. Anti-Goeze, in Werke 1778-1780,
196.
381 “[Z]ufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können den Beweis von nothwendigen Vernunfstwahrheiten nie
werden.” Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, in Werke und Briefe, VIII:
Werke 1774-1778, ed. Arno Schilson (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), 441.
Lessing wrote this short polemical essay in response to Johann Daniel Schumann, Über die Evidenz der
Beweise für die Wahrheit der christilchen Religion (On  the  Evidence  of  the  Proofs  for  the  Truth  of  the
Christian  Religion,  1777).  In  fact,  in  regard  of  the  imperfect  demonstrability  of  historical  truths  the
opinion  of  the  two  authors  was  quite  similar.  On  the  differences  of  Lessing  and  Goeze  about  the
relevance of history to Christian faith, see Arno Schilson, “Offenbarung und Geschichte bei J.M. Goeze
und G. E. Lessing. Hinweise zu einer offenbarungstheologischen Neuorientierung”, in Reinitzer and
Sparn (eds.), Verspätete Orthodoxie, 87-120.
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capacity inherent to truths of “other classes” but, according to Lessing, lacking in
historical truth, is demonstrability – perhaps an implicit retort to Baumgarten.382
Instead  of  a  detailed  exploration  of  the  notion  of  the  “inner  truth”  (innere
Wahrheit)  of  religion  introduced  by  Lessing  as  the  true  ground  for  Christian  faith,
what is pertinent here is a further discussion of the arguments for eschewing “the
historical” in this quest. Somewhat ironically, these arguments are advanced on a
basis that might be described as historicist: a sensitivity towards cultural-contextual
specificity and difference. What Lessing denies is not “that in Christ prophecies were
fulfilled” or
“that Christ performed miracles. But since the truth of these miracles has
completely ceased to be demonstrated by miracles still occurring in the
present, since they are no more than reports of miracles (may these report be
as undisputed and as incontrovertible as possible), I deny that they can and
should bind me in the least to faith in the other teachings of Christ.
What does then bind me? Nothing but these teachings themselves.
Eighteen hundred years ago they were so new, so foreign to the whole mass of
truths recognized in that age, that nothing less than miracles and fulfilled
prophecies were required if the multitude were to take heed of them at all.”383
As  Lessing  wrote  these  lines,  he  was  already  also  working  on  the  100-
paragraph essay on “The Education of the Human Race”, to which they read like an
introduction. They challenge the assumption which Orthodox and Deists shared
382 For a detailed discussion of these views and their genealogy from Leibniz and Spinoza, see
Yasukata, Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion, Ch. 4; Martin Bollacher, Lessing: Vernunft und Geschichte.
Untersuchungen zum Problem religiöser Aufklärung in der Spätschriften (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1978), 109-
29.
383 “Ich leugne also gar nicht, da? in Christo Weissagungen erfüllet worden; ich leugne gar nicht, da?
Christus  Wunder  getan:  somdern  ich  leugne,  da? diese Wunder,  seitdem ihre Wahrheit völlig
aufgehöret  hat,  durch noich gegenwärtig gangbare Wunder erwiesen zu warden;  seitdem sie  nichts
als Nachrichten von Wundern sind, (mögen diese Nachrichten so unwidersprochen, so
unwidersprechlich  sein,  als  sie  immer  wollen:)  mich  zu  den  geringsten  Glauben  an  Christi
anderweitige Lehren verbinden können und dürfen.
Was verbindet mich denn dazu? – Nichts, als diese Lehren selbst, die vor 18 hundert Jahren
allerdings so neu, dem ganzen Umfange damals erkannter Wahrheiten so fremd, so uneinverleiblich
               dc_444_12
173
about  the  basic  character  of  any  religion  with  a  claim  to  the  status  of  being
“revealed:”  namely,  that  it  must  from the  very outset  contain  the  rational  truths  of
the unity of God and the immortality of the soul.  To highlight the weakness of this
assumption, Lessing employs the metaphor of the elementary schoolbook or primer
in explaining the role of the books of the Bible in the education of mankind. Just as a
good pedagogue considers the abilities of the student in constructing a curriculum,
God resorted to a method for the moral education of the Israelites – chosen precisely
because they were “the least polished and the most ferocious, so that he could start
with them from the very beginning”384 –  that  was  suited  to  their  condition  of
“childhood”: direct and immediate rewards and punishments. “Thus, the books of
the  Old  Testament,  this  primer  of  the  rude  and  in  the  matters  of  the  mind
inexperienced people of Israel, may have lacked the doctrine of the immortality of
the soul: but at least it ought not to have contained anything which could have
arrested  the  advance  of  the  people  for  whom  it  was  written  on  the  path  towards
these great truths.”385 Human  beings  do  possess  the  capacity  to  discover  truths  on
their own, and the role of education is merely accelerating and facilitating the
process. Similarly, revelation does not provide anything for them which they are
incapable of arriving at by themselves; “it only supplies them with the most
important of these things sooner.”386
The analogy between revelation and education had been as old as Augustine’s
De Civitate Dei,  and  its  pedigree  included  statements  by  further  eminent  church
fathers, Luther and other leading German Protestants like Iohannes Cocceji, the
founder of “federal theology”, and, more recently, some Pietists. It was also an idea
which, for obvious reasons, was congenial to the adherents of a religious
waren, da? nichts geringeres als Wunder und erfüllte Weissagungen erfordert wurden, um erst die
Menge aufmerksam darauf zu machen.” Lessing, Über den Beweis, 444.
384 “…eben das ungeschliffenste, das verwilderste, um mit ihm ganz von vorne anfangen zu können
…” Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, §8, in Werke und Briefe, X: Werke
1778-1781, eds. Arno Schilson, Axel Schmitt (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2001) 76.
385 “Also  auch  konnten  in  den  Schriften  des  Alten  Testaments,  in  diesen  Elementarbüchern  für  das
rohe und im Denken ungeübte Israelitische Volk, die Lehre von der unsterblichkeit der Seele und
künftigen  Vergeltung  gar  wohl  mangeln:  aber  enthalten  durften  sie  schlechterdings  nichts,  was  das
Volk, für das sie geschrieben waren, auf dem Wege zu dieser gro?en Wahrheiten auch nur verspätet
hätte.” Ibid., § 27. 82.
386 “…sondern sie gab und giebt ihm die wichtigsten dieser Dinge nur früher.” Ibid., § 4. 75.
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Enlightenment. Lessing’s contribution was its combination with the idea of the
historical development of human reason, and the proposition of a dynamics in which
revelation and reason both received stimuli from one another. This is possible
because reason also possesses the power of revelation (offenbarungsmächtig).387 In
view of the “reciprocal service” (wechselseitige Dienst) and “mutual influence”
(eingegenseitiger Einflu?)388 taking place between revelation and reason, Lessing
opposes any rigid demarcation between revealed and rational principles and the
tracing of them back to separate sources: as he had already set down in his counter-
arguments to Reimarus, “revealed religion does not in the least have rational religion
as its prerequisite, but encapsulates it.”389 At all times, the stage of development
attained in this process of evolution is decisive for the nature of the truths that can
usefully serve the purposes of God and man. The “second, better primer” (zweite
be?re Elementarbuch) could only be issued to a part of humanity which “was already
bound together through language, conduct, government, and other natural and
political relations – was ripe for the second great step of education.”390 Thanks to the
Greeks and Romans, this part of mankind was already familiar with the “shadows”
(Schatten) of the necessary principles and “was so advanced in the exercise of its
reason that it needed, and could make use of, nobler and worthier motives for its
moral actions than the secular rewards and punishments which had guided it so
far.”391 And yet, even in this second, better primer, the doctrine of the immortality of
the soul was “preached as revelation, not taught as a result of human keys.”392 In other
words, the truths of revelation were not truths of reason at the time when they were
revealed;  but  Lessing  harbours  no  doubt  that  they  have  the  capacity  of  becoming
387 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Axiomata, in Werke 1778-1780, 82.
388 Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, §§ 36, 37. 84.
389 „Die geoffenbarte Religion setzt im geringsten nicht eine vernünftige Religion voraus: sondern
schlie?t sie in sich.” Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Gegensätze des Herausgebers, I. Werke und Briefe, VIII:
Werke 1774-1778, ed. Arno Schilson (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989), 319.
390 “… der durch Sprache, durch Handlung, durch Regierung, durch andere natürliche und politische
Verhältnisse in sich bereits verbunden war – war zu dem zweiten gro?en Schritte der Erziehung reif.”
Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, § 54. 89.
391 “[D]ieser Teil des Menschengeschlechts war in der Ausübung seiner Vernunft so weit gekommen,
da? er zu seinen moiralischen Handlungen edlere, würdigere Bewegungsgründe bedurfte und
brauchen konnte, als zeitliche Belohnung und Strafen waren, die ihn bisher geleitet hatten.” Ibid., § 55.
90.
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ones, and even that they were revealed with the purpose of becoming ones.
Revelation is not something that occurred at a distinct moment in time (“at once” –
auf einmal), but progressive (fortschreitende Offenbarung): God decided to guide
human reason to higher truths “gradually” (allmählig), providing “directing
impulses” (Richtungssto?)  with  the  Old  and  then  the  New  Testament,  so  that
humanity may pass through the stages of childhood and youth to full maturity – in
which “truths of immediate revelation” (unmittelbare geoffenbarte Wahrheiten) are to be
transformed into “bare truths of reason” (blo?e Vernunftswahrheiten).393 Lessing saw
this process as yet unfinished in his own time, but towards the end of the Erziehung
he gave voice to the conviction that the “highest grade of the enlightenment and
purity  [of  heart]”  (höchste Stufe der Aufklärung und Reinigkeit [des Herzens])  of  the
human race, will be attained; the “time of perfection” will come, when “man, the
more his understanding feels convinced about an ever better future, will nevertheless
no longer need to obtain motives for his actions from this future; for he will act right
because it is right, and not because there are arbitrary rewards fixed to it.”394
To the extent that Lessing asserts the fundamental historicity of all truths,395 it
is worth noting that in a sense his approach is not all  that distant from a Neologist
such  as  Semler,  whose  critique  of  “the  Unnamed”  was  based  on  the  latter’s
insufficient awareness of the historical relativity of the biblical accounts. Semler
spoke of a “dual mode of teaching” (doppelte Lehrart)  in  the  Gospels,  “of  which the
one, sensual and imagery, constitutes the true character of that time and place … rich
in images and modes of speech from the circle of the Jews, in order to facilitate the
beginning of new notions of their current (greater) significance. … However, the
other mode of teaching already contains the pure spiritual doctrine of Jesus, and can
fully dispense with such images, as the listeners or readers are no longer such
392 “….  wird  in  dem  zweiten  bessrn  Elementarbuche  als  Offenbarung geprediget, nicht als Resultat
menschlicher Schlüssel gelehret.” Ibid., § 71. 92.
393 Ibid., §§ 13, 63, 70-72. 77, 90, 92.
394 Nein;  sie  wird  kommen,  sie  wird  gewi? kommen,  die  Zeit  der  Vollendung,  da  der  Mensch,  je
überzeugter sein Verstand  einer immer bessern Zukunft sich fühlet, von dieser Zukunft gleichwohl
Bewegungsgründe  zu  seinen  Handlungen  zu  erborgen,  nicht  nötig  haben  wird;  da  er  das  Gute  tun
wird, weil es das Gute ist, nicht weil willkürliche Belohnungen darauf gesetzt sind …” Ibid., § 85. 96.
395 For an in-depth exploration, see Wilm Peters, Lessings Standort: Sinndeutung der Geschichte als Kern
seines Denkens (Heidelberg: Stiehm, 1972).
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sensual and inexperienced Jews.”396 Long  before  the  fragment  controversy,  Semler
had established that  “the  so-called historical  circumstances  of  any text  … belong to
the grounds of the satisfactory interpretation of the same,” including the
“circumstances” of the author as well as the readers; the scholar must therefore also
investigate whether a (biblical) text had been developed or revised, and if so, arrange
textual versions in a temporal order on the basis of specific groups of addressees.397
These were to be central points of contention in the polemic against the Unnamed,398
who in Semler’s view neglected to consider such distinctions, and thus lagged
behind in recognizing the relevance of a new, dynamic concept of history to biblical
exegesis.
And yet, Lessing was separated from Neology not only by his low judgement
on its intellectual quality and the consequent hazards it constituted to proper
enlightenment in religious matters.399 With all their emphasis on historicity, the
Neologues’ perspective was focused on the Bible (thus sharing the Schriftprinzip of
Orthodoxy, which retained the Bible as the only legitimate source of faith). “Our
doctrine is not established upon auctoritatem patrum or upon particularia; but on the
contents of the Holy Scriptures and their correct interpretation; what concilia and
396 “… davon die eine, sinliche, bildliche, den wahren Charakter jener Zeit und Orte ausmacht; und
damalen nur für solche Leser aus den Juden bestimt worden ist; reich an Bildern und Redensarten aus
der jüdischen Sphäre, um den Anfang eigener neuen Vorstellungen über ihre nunmehrige (grössere)
Bedeutung zu erleichtern. … Die andre Lehrart aber hat schon den reinen Inhalt der geistlichen Lehren
Jesu,  und  kan  jene  Bilder  wirklich  ganz  entberen,  wenn  die  Zuhörer  oder  Leser  nicht  mehr  solche
sinliche und ungeübte Juden sind. “ Semler, Beantwortung, Vorrede, b1.
397 “Die so genanten historischen Umstände einer jeden Schrift, gehören … zu dem eigentlichen
völligen Grunde der richtigen Auslegung derselben.” Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, Untersuchung
Theologischer Streitigkeiten. Mit einigen Anmerkungen, Vorrede und fortgesetzten Geschichte der christlichen
Glaubenslehre, ed. Johann Salomo Semler (Halle: Gebauer, 1762-1764) I. 16, II. 7 (Semler’s prefaces to
both volumes).
398 Semler, Beantwortung, 23.
399 He despised the “new-fangled” theology even more than Orthodoxy: its representatives seemed to
him “far too weightless as theologians, and not nearly weighty enough as philosophers,” who may
become more tyrannical than the Orthodox had ever been. (Was gehen mich die Orthodoxen an? Ich
verachte sie eben so selbst als Du; nur verachte ich unsere neumodischen Geistlichen noch mehr, die
Theologen zu wenig,  und Philosophen lange nocht  genug sind.  Ich bin von solchen schalen Köpfen
auch  sehr  überzeugt,  da?,  wenn  man  sie  aufkommen  lä?t, sie mit der Zeit mehr tyrannisieren
warden, als es die Orthodoxen jemals getan haben.) Letter to Karl Lessing, 8 April 1773. Werke und
Briefe XI/2: Briefe von und an Lessing 1770-1776,  ed.  Helmuth  Kiesel  et  al.  (Frankfurt  am  Main:
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1988), 540.
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patres correctly  hold  thereof,  we  also  hold,  but not  because  they  hold  it,”400 Semler
wrote in the preface to a work on theological debates in early Christianity by
Baumgarten, which he edited after the death of his master.  The last clause seems to
be echoed in Lessing’s statement in the Gegensätze to the effect that “[r]eligion is not
true because the Evangelists and the Apostles propagated it: rather, they propagated
it because it is true. The written traditions must be explained from its inner truth, and
no  written  tradition  is  capable  of  investing  it  with  inner  truth  if  it  has  none.”
Lessing’s Christian truth, however, is not fully encapsulated in the Bible, nor even in
its interpretation, and the reasons have to do exactly with its historicity.  First, even
the  New Testament  itself  was  the  outcome of  a  historical  process.  “There  had been
religion before there was a Bible. There had been Christianity before the Evangelists
and the Apostles wrote. Some time passed before the first of them wrote; and a
considerable amount of time passed until the whole of the canon arose. Thus
however  much  depends  on  these  scriptures,  the  full  truth  of  religion  can  still  not
possibly rest on them.”401  Furthermore, there was the process of “progressive
revelation,” in which reason was assisted by providence. For, on the final analysis,
the progress of human reason is not understood by Lessing as a fully autonomous
evolution: the final dénouement of the “third age” and the coming of a “new, eternal
Gospel” (ein neues ewiges Evangelium)  is expected by him to be wrought by “eternal
Providence.”402
Given the combination of historicity and providentialism, and the
amalgamation of motives, themes and telos from sacred and profane history in
Lessing’s grappling with the difficulties of championing a Christianity that answers
the requirements of modern times, it is tempting to speculate about the affinities
between his stance and that of Robertson advanced in the Sermon. The publication
date  and  place  of  Ebeling’s  German  translation  –  Hamburg,  1779  –  also  points  to
interesting possibilities: the translation could have been intended as a (belated and
indirect)  contribution  to  the  fragment  controversy,  and  could  have  served  as  a
400 “Unsere Lehre ist nicht gebauet auf auctoritatem patrum oder particularia; sondern auf den Inhalt der
h. Schrift, und ihre richtige Auslegung; was davon concilia und patres richtig haben, das behalten wir
also auch, aber nicht darum, weil sie es haben.” Baumgarten, Untersuchung, III. 13 (Semler’s preface).
401 Werke 1774-1784, 312-3.
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potential buttress for the position being developed by Lessing in the Erziehung. There
is,  however,  no  evidence  to  corroborate  such  speculations.  Lessing  had  some
correspondence with Ebeling’s brother Christoph Daniel (who will be also discussed
at some length in Chapter Six below), but not with Johann Philipp. He was certainly
aware  of  the  work  of  English  theologians  applying  a  historical  approach.  He
favourably reviewed a German translation of William Warburton’s Divine Legation of
Moses (1737-1741),403 and he obtained a copy of William Whiston’s heterodox
Primitive Christianity Revived (1711-1712) from his fellow librarian, Christian Gottlob
Heyne of Göttingen;404 he was apparently also enthusiastic about the thought of
Adam Ferguson.405 There is, however, no trace of any concern with anything
Robertson ever wrote in the whole of Lessing’s mighty oeuvre.  How he would have
reacted to the materialist aspects of stadial history that lurk even in the background
of the account of the Gospel Robertson advanced in the Sermon, remains a tantalizing
question.  For  those  aspects  certainly  created  a  gulf  that  separated  the  two  minds,
however closely they met on the general ground of historicity as married with
providentialism.
Having probed into different estimates of the relevance of historical
understanding to religious faith in the milieux of Halle and Wolfenbüttel, a brief
glance at how this relationship was dealt with at Göttingen will  be interesting. The
reason is not only geographic proximity and the level of interaction among these
seats  of  learning,  nor  the  general  significance  of  the  Georgia  Augusta,  suggested in
the Introduction above, for a comparative treatment of the Scottish and German
Enlightenments. Recent studies of the transformation of Christianity during the
eighteenth century identify a fundamental shift in assigning legitimate grounds to
402 Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, §§ 86-91. 97-8.
403 The translation, by Johann Christian Schmidt, was published in Frankfurt in 1751, and Lessing’s
review  appeared  in  the  same  year  in  the Berlinische Privilegierte Zeitung. Werke und Briefe, II: Werke
1751-1753, ed. Jürgen Stenzel (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1998), 263-3. There are
further references to Warburton in the fourth fragment of Reimarus (see Werke 1774-1778, 247 f.) and
in the Erziehung, § 24 (see Werke 1778-1781, 81.)
404 Lessing to Heyne, 23 October 1778. Briefe 1776-1780, 203.
405 The possibility of Lessing’s reliance on Ferguson for the “historical and evolutionary dimension” of
his thought is discussed at length in Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment,  Ch.  7,   concluding
that the German scholar “neither accepted nor attacked Ferguson’s model of civilization” and that the
“absence of a political dimension” distances the Erziehung from Ferguson’s Essay.
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the authority of the Bible.406 With the Reformation, it is argued, the Bible became a
contested legacy: competing and incompatible claims, increasingly referring to extra-
scriptural concepts, were raised as to its “meaning,” so that it ceased to function as
Scripture – the self-authorizing, unifying document of European culture. Two
centuries of  philologically and historically based biblical criticism further
undermined the prestige of the “scriptural Bible,” until biblical scholarship, arising
as an academic discipline in the eighteenth century, aimed and finally managed to
disengage the study and interpretation of the Bible from confessional paradigms, and
to reassert its status not on strictly theological but rather philological, philosophical,
literary and historical grounds, as a common stock of cultural inheritance. To a
considerable extent, the advent of the “cultural Bible” was the achievement of
university men who understood “the scriptural Bible embedded as it was in
confessional particularities, was inimical to the socio-political project from which
Enlightenment universities drew their purpose and support,” and that if the
theological faculty was to retain an honourable position, new functions were to be
invented for it, which were conducive to the creation of  “an irenic social order based
on reason, morality and the growing power of the state.”407 The revivification of the
Bible as a cornerstone of European culture was thus principally a university project,
and the product an “academic” as well as a “cultural Bible.”
Baumgarten, Semler and a host of other figures from the eighteenth-century
German university scene receive attention in these studies, but no-one so extensively
as the Göttingen orientalist and theologian Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791).
Michaelis, who studied with Baumgarten in Halle, arrived in Göttingen at the
invitation of Münchhausen as Privatdozent in 1745, to love and work there (from 1750
as ordinary professor at the philosophical faculty) for almost half a century. His
strategy to assert the value of the Bible for contemporary life (in a way, to restore its
“catholicity,” its universal meaning) was facilitated by the atmosphere of academic
freedom at the university, which he and his theologian colleagues at Göttingen used
to investigate the historical dimensions of the Christian tradition without correlating
406 Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible;  Michael  C.  Legaspi, The Death of  Scripture  and the  Rise  of  Biblical
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
407 Legaspi, The Death of Scripture, viii, x.
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the results to specific theological positions (while remaining true to a dogma of
minimal Protestantism intended less to distinguish among denominations than to
separate what was respectably Christian from what was not).408 What  came  to  be
emphasized in the volumes of scholarship that these investigations yielded
(including a monumental translation of the Old Testament) was the essential, striking
strangeness of the Bible:409 no longer studied as text but as document, as the archive
of a splendid but alien civilization, what the Old Testament conveyed was not
theological dogma or religious truth, but the heritage of an ancient Israelite society
whose relevance to modern Europe paralleled that of Hellas or Rome. Michaelis thus
chose to decompose the Bible through philological-historical research in order to
recover it as a literary remainder capable of fertilizing modern European culture.
It has been argued that, for all the historical character of his method, it is
unhelpful to regard Michaelis as a middling figure between orthodoxy and
historicism, for he was chiefly interested in the philosophical, literary indeed poetic –
“cultural,” in the modern sense which we owe to the Enlightenment – treasures
unearthed with that method, and the possible uses to which they could be turned in
the present.410 Thus, Michaelis, along with several fellow Göttingen philologists and
philosophers who have been recently collectively styled as “the Göttingen School,” is
perhaps better understood as neo-humanists interested in reshaping antiquity in the
light of contemporary realities, or as “scientists of culture.” The latter term refers to
university academics engaged in a non-ideological mode of inquiry oriented towards
“collectivist particularism:” they rejected universal principles in favour of
particularism in the study of “real,” historical and unique nations with an empirical
disposition. Whether examining the origin of language, legal collections, societies in
newly  discovered  lands,  they  were  sensitive  to  the  peculiar  genius  of  such  groups
and aimed to understand data within their own conditions. The critical analysis to
which they subjected received tradition – their own or that of others – was motivated
by an interest in what make societies distinct and resilient, and did not lead them to
408 Ibid., 48 f.
409 Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible, 185 f.
410 Legaspi, The Death of Scripture, 50.
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embrace radical or revolutionary principles: if anything, their political sympathies
were gradualist, favouring conservative reform.411
Michaelis and the other members of this group, then, seem to stand for
another moderate, conservative version of Enlightenment, whose interest in history
had little  to  do with  the  idea  of  the  discipline  of  history  as  temporal  progress,  and
whose concern with religion (and the relevance of history to religion) had little to do
with  the  aim  of  justifying  faith  in  the  Christian  revelation.  In  this  sense,  there  was
also little to connect them with the agenda pursued by Robertson in the Sermon, and
more generally in his career as a historian-cleric (though perhaps more to share with
him as an entrepreneur in academic and ecclesiastical politics). But as all
generalizations, this one is in need of qualifications, and indeed in the literature
summarized  in  the  last  few  pages  it  is  repeatedly  emphasized  that  the  non-
theological and non-confessional outlook of these scholars went together with a deep
commitment to Christian religious forms, and the eclecticism they applied to the
refurbishment of Christianity was compatible for them with engaging in apologetics
against atheism and skepticism. Michaelis himself is an interesting case. Most of his
formidable oeuvre was devoted to the excavation of ancient Israel as a classical
civilization from the Old Testament, as a means of providing a cultural key to social
order under the post-confessional state. However, still at the beginning of his career
at Göttingen, he also wrote a lengthy introduction to “the divine writings of the New
Testament”, which was successful enough to merit several revised editions,412 and in
1783 also served as the basis for his own belated contribution to the Fragmentenstreit.
These are, to all intents and purposes, apologetic writing, one of their recurrent
themes being the “authenticity” of the gospels and the letters of the apostles, besides
the question whether they are of immediate divine inspiration. Michaelis’ position is
411 Michael Carhart, The Science of Culture in Enlightenment Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2007), passim. Carhart’s “Göttingen School” includes many greater and lesser figures,
not all of them necessarily associated with the Georgia Augusta: principally, besides Michaelis, his
disciple Johann Gottfried Eichhorn; the legal scholar Johann Jakob Moser; another philologist,
Christian Gottlob Heyne; and the eccentric polymath Christoph Meiners. Some of them will re-appear
in the pages below.
412 Johann David Michaelis, Einleitung in the göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Testaments, 2 vols (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck, 1750). By 1788, the fouth edition came out; the book was also popular in Britain as An
Introduction to the New Testament, by John David Michaelis, late Professor in the University of Göttingen.
Translated from the fourth edition of the German, by Herbert Marsh, D.D. 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1793-1802).
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remarkable on both issues. As to the second one, he simply dismisses it as a question
of decisive importance:
“The question whether the books of the New Testament are ispired by God, is
not at all as important for the Christian religion as the previous one, whether
they are  authentic?  … Suppose  that  God did not  inspire  any of  the  books  of
the  New Testament,  and that  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  John and Paul  were  left
completely to their own resources to write as well they could, yet if the
writings were merely old, authentic and credible, the Christian religion would
still remain the true one. The miracles which lend support to it would just as
well prove its truthfulness if their witnesses were not inspired but merely
human witnesses, because in the investigation of these miracles we are
anyway not postulating the divine authority of these writers, but regard them
as merely human witnesses … Thus it would be fully well possible for
someone to doubt, or even deny, the divine inspiration of the complete books
of the N. T., and yet wholeheartedly believe in the Christian religion …413
The  question  of  inspiration  is  thus  beside  the  point:  there  is  nothing  to  lose  from
acknowledging that “in merely historical matters” (blos historische Dinge) the
evangelist were not inspired.
413 “Die  Frage,  ob  die  Bücher  des  Neuen  Testament  von  Gott  eingegeben  sind,  ist  der  christlichen
Religion  nicht  völlig  so  wichtig,  als  die  vorige,  ob  sie  ächt  sind?  …  Gesetzt,  Gott  hätte  keins  des
Bücher des Neuen Testaments inspirirt, sondern Matthäum, Marcum, Lucam, Johannem, Paulum,
blo? sich selbsten überlassen, zu schreiben was sie wu?ten,  die  Schriften  wären  aber  nur  alt,  ächt,
und  glaubwürdig,  so  würde  die  christliche  Religion  die  wahre  bleiben.  Die  Wunder,  durch  die  sie
bestätiget  ist,  würden  ihre  Wahrheit  eben  so  gut  beweisen,  wenn  auch  die  Zeugen  derselben  nicht
inspirirte, sondern blos menschliche Zeugen wären, denn ohnehin setzen wir bey Untersuchung der
Wahrheit dieser Wunder gar nicht das göttliche Ansehen der Schriftsteller zum voraus, sondern
betrachten wir sie blos als menschliche Zeugen. … Es ware also ganz wol möglich, da? jemand an der
göttlichen Eingebung der sämmtlichen Schriften des N. T. einen Zweifel hätte, oder sie sogar leugnete,
und  doch  die  christliche  Religion  von  Herzen  glaubte  …”  Johann  David  Michaelis, Einleitung in die
göttliche Schriften des Neuen Bundes. Dritte und vermehrte Ausgabe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck , 1777), I. 73.
A part of this passage is copied, and the argument reproduced in order to support Michaelis’
argument against Reimarus in Johann David Michaelis, Erklärung der Begräbnis und
Auferstehungssgeschichte Christi nach der vier Evangelisten. Mit Rücksicht auf die in den Fragmenten
gemachten Einwürfe und deren Beantwortung (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1783), xxxx.
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As for the other, to his mind really decisive issue, Michaelis proposes the
standard methodological apparatus and procedure of historical philology as the
ground for  evaluating the  genuineness  of  the  books  of  the  New Testament.  First  of
all, he insists that the same criteria should be accepted in establishing the authenticity
of these documents as are usually deemed satisfactory vis-à-vis the works of
“profane authors:” there is no reason why “more explicit witnesses” (ausdrücklichere
Zeugnisse) should be required and produced to prove the authenticity of the writings
of the evangelists of Paul than is the case with Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius or
any other ancient writer. This basic principle, Michaelis suggests, is often neglected.
It  follows  for  him  that  the  “contradictions”  within  and  among  the  accounts  of  the
four evangelists, which have been instrumentalized in challenging the credibility of
the gospels by adversaries of the Christian revelation from ancient Manicheans to
modern Deists, ought to be assessed by the standards applied to apparently
contradictory testimonies about the same set of events by different reporters in
secular history. To highlight the point, Michaelis brings examples from ancient and
modern history. The accounts of two Prussian officers,  related from memory, of the
great war of 1756-1763, may differ and contradict one another in many more or less
important details; but does this call into question the veracity and “reality” of the
basic facts and the story as a whole? Almost naturally, there are contradictions
among the sources used to construct a scientifically credible history, but it is still
possible to establish upon them a coherent and consistent narrative, from which
contradictions are eliminated. Michaelis uses the example of his colleague Johann
Stephan Pütter’s widely acclaimed “Reichsgeschichte” (probably the Vollständiges
Handbuch der deutschen Reichshistorie, 1762) to illustrate this argument.414
Next, Michaelis points out that the suspicion of forgery depends on the
assumption of a forger possessing “a superior genius and superhuman
circumspection, a near-omniscience in history” (recht superieuren Genie, und
übermenschlichen Vorsichtigkeit, beynahe eine historische Allwissenheit), for the accounts
advanced in this most often inspected text of all, is “in a miraculous way consonant
with the history, manners and opinions of the first century” (auf eine wunderswürdige
414 Michaelis, Erklärung, xvii-xxi.
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Weise mit der Geschichte, Sitten, Meinungen des ersten Jahrhunderts übereinstimmt),
especially when it comes to minute details.415 Implicit here is an acute awareness of
the paramount importance of contextual understanding for historical interpretation
and thus – consistently with the arguments advanced about the identical status of
testimonies relevant to sacred and secular history – for biblical exegesis, which in the
case of Michaelis’ Einleitung and Erklärung is specifically concerned with buttressing
faith in the Gospel. To refute objections levelled against the authenticity of the
gospels, he repeatedly refers to the consonance of the manners, customs and
practices as described in them with other testimonies from the same period, but as a
philologist, of all usages he is most concerned with linguistic ones. Whether Greek, in
which the  gospels  were  passed down to  posterity,  was  the  language in  which they
were originally written, was another question often discussed by doubters of their
authenticity, and they were confirmed in their doubts by the alleged “impurity” – the
swarming of “Hebraisms” and other “isms” – in the texts. Michaelis emphatically
disagrees  with  those  who  regard  such  objections  as  mere  blasphemy:  this  is  mere
“pedantry”, which “much too overrates the purity and gracefulness of language” (die
Reinigkeit und Zierlichkeit der Sprache zu hoch schätzt).  Zealous goodwill  for the cause
of the Christian religion have blinded theologians and philologists to this fact and led
them to assert, wrongly, the “cleanness” of the Greek language gospels.  Historically,
it could not have been anything but “impure.” Once again, Michaelis illustrates his
point  by  recent  developments  in  the  history  of  the  German  language.  In  the  early
eighteenth century, German was a “hideous mixture” of native and foreign words,
and as one of the reasons was a “stupid affectation” in aping the French, “the
blending of the rich mother tongue with a poor foreign language presented itself  in
its worst aspect” (hier zeigte sich die Mischung der reichen Muttersprache mit einer armen
ausländischen gerade auf der schlimmsten Seite). Then came the movement for the
reforming  of  the  German  language,  associated  with  the  name  of  Gottsched,  whose
services are warmly commended by Michaelis.  But before then, anyone who
undertook to write a book or a letter, “wrote in a German as mixed as it was usual at
that  time:  this  may  have  been  disliked  by  posterity  in  the  short  run,  between  1735
415Idem., Einleitung., I. 24-5, 48-9.
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and 1755, but in fact he wrote for his own time, sought and feared its opinions, and
did not know what the future would bring: so he judged himself according to the
habits  of  his  own  time.”416 By  the  same  token,  it  would  have  been  ridiculous
affectation for the evangelists and the apostles to address their highly mixed
audience in a Greek as pure as if they had been in Athens or before a Roman court.
“One cannot generally regard the purity of language a duty and its opposite a fault,
but  consider here time, place, purpose, and material. One must write differently
when one acts as an author who endeavours at stylistic beauty, and differently in
letters, where the intimacy of tone and the language of the addressee takes
precedence to bookish language. If in a certain discipline or subject a certain style,
however mixed, is already habitual, it would be striking to change it all of a
sudden.”417 By no means was it, therefore, a fault in the authors of the Gospel to have
interspersed their Greek discourse, addressed to a multitude of Jews and heathens
including many women, with phrases from a wide array of the languages of the
region and even “Idiotisms” – words from the spoken language of the common folk
as distinguished from the literary standard.
If the bulk of Michaelis’ investigations of the Old Testament were geared
toward one aspect of the programme of enlightened university theology –
modernizing Christianity by recovering and reappropriating the materials of
traditional culture in a new irenic, pragmatic and academic mode418 –,  his
engagement with the New Testament demonstrates that he was no less competent in
applying his  scholarship to  the  other,  apologetic  goals  of  that  programme.  In  these
writings he evidently aimed at shoring up faith in Christianity as a revealed religion
by resort to advanced methods of historical and philological criticism, including a
416 “…das Deutsche so gemischt schrieb, als es damahls gewöhnlich war: es mag seyn, da? er der
kurzdauernden Nachwelt von 1735 bis 1755 darüber misfällt, aber er schrieb eigentlich für seine Zeit,
suchte und furchte deren Urtheile, und wu?te  nicht  was  künftig  seyn  würde;  also  nach  der  Mode
seiner Zeit richtete er sich.” Ibid., 115.
417 “Also man kann doch nicht ganz allgemein die Reinigkeit der Sprache zur Pflicht, und das
Gegentheil zum Fehler machen, sondern es kommt hier auf Zeit, Ort, Absicht und Materie an. Anders
mu? man schreiben, wenn man als Author auftrit, und Anspruch an Schönheit der Schreibart
machern will, anders in Briefe, wo der vertrauliche Ton, und die Sprache dessen an den man schreibt,
vor  der  Büchersprache  den  Vorzug  hat.  Ist  in  einer  gewissen  Disciplin  oder  Materie  einmahl  eine
gewisse noch so gemischte Schreibart gewöhnlich, so würde es auffallend seyn, sie plötzlich zu
ändern.” Ibid., 117.
418 Cf. Legaspi, The Death of Scripture, 50, 55.
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strong awareness of the relevance of historically specific human contexts to biblical
exegesis. It is remarkable that he did so by radically denying the legitimacy of any
distinction between the standards of interpretation applied in sacred and secular
history. This is certainly not the same as Robertson’s assimilation or reciprocal
insertion of sacred and secular themes in his narrative account of the gradually
unfolding meaning of the Gospel, and The Robertsonian-Lessingian idea of
“progressive revelation” is also missing from Michaelis’ theoretical apparatus.
Nevertheless, the family resemblances among all the authors discussed in this
chapter are strong enough to construe them as representatives of several varieties of
a moderate,  conservative, religious Enlightenment, for whom the vindication of the
Christian revelation and of its continuing relevance to their contemporary
circumstances was indissolubly wedded to the recognition of the historicity of
religion, and strongly depended on the application of methods deriving from the
ever more professional and “scientific” historical discipline.
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Chapter Four
A different View of the Progress of Society in Europe
As it  was  recalled in  Chapter  2,  a  great  deal  of  nuance  has  been introduced into  our
understanding of the overall character of Robertson’s achievement by a respectable
bulk of recent scholarship, re-contextualizing it within the mainstream of eighteenth-
century historical studies, inspired by narrative as well as political, religious,
educational and other agendas. These valuable correctives to the received image of
Robertson as an avant-garde structuralist historian do not seriously affect the status of
his admittedly most experimental text, on which (together with Book Four and other
portions of the History of America and passages from his other works) this image has
been  largely  based.  The View of the Progress of Society was written by Robertson as a
volume-length introduction to the History of Charles V, in an attempt to explore the
forces of causality underlying long-term historical processes which led, by the
beginning of the sixteenth century, to the rise of states capable of sustaining large scale
and long standing military efforts. It has been suggested that in his writings Robertson
moves rather flexibly between the patterns of “Enlightenment” history – where
progress takes place (or at least may take place) as a result of conscious choice, even
intervention – and “stadial” or conjectural history, which is dominated by a theory of
spontaneous order emerging from a natural succession of various stages in people’s
mode of subsistence.419 This is an important distinction in accounting for the variability
of perspective within the oeuvre as a whole, but less helpful in approaching the specific
case of A View of the Progress of Society. In this composition Robertson’s smooth
combination of descriptive and narrative history420 is distinguished by an exceptionally
419 Karen O’Brien, “Between Enlightenment and stadial history: William Robertson on the History of
Europe", British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 16:1 (1993), 53-64.
420 “Descriptive history is the detail of coexistent circumstances and qualities. Narrative history is the
detail of successive events.” Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell,
1769), 61. Cf. O’Brien, “Between Enlightenment and stadial history”, 54.
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rigorous application of a set of standards derived from the sciences of man to reveal the
logic of the unfolding of European history and to identify the place of each distinct
period  in  this  process.  This  was  necessary,  in  his  own  words,  “in  order  to  mark  the
great steps by which [the northern nations] advanced from barbarism to refinement,
and to point out those general principles and events which, by their uniform as well as
extensive operation, conducted all of them to that degree of improvement in policy and
in manners which they had attained at the period when Charles V. began his reign.”421
This is also important to stress because it was exactly this logic and these
standards that were, for linguistic, cultural and other reasons, obliterated in the
complicated history of the work’s German reception, which was already hinted at the
beginning of the Introduction. In this chapter I shall explore the nature and the causes
of these transformations, contextualizing them especially in regard of the ways in
which they bear the imprint of the environment, the personality as well as the
limitations of the stature of the translator-editor as “new author”. A brief reassessment
of  Robertson’s  own  argument  in A View of the Progress of Society will be followed by
portraits of the German interlocutors. Then I shall proceed to considering the fortunes
of Robertson’s “meaning 3” (in Skinner’s terms: his “intended meaning”)422 in the
translating process, through an exploration of the relevant terminology and textual
strategies deployed to produce “meaning 2” (the meaning pursued by the recipients).
Robertson’s presentation is organized around the concept of manners, the
unwritten ethical and aesthetic rules of human intercourse, essential for the eighteenth-
century Scottish thinkers as a category of social science inquiry as well as a set of norms
to live by.423 In A View of the Progress of Society, manners function like a seismograph: in
their transformation the minor and major tremors in the mode of subsistence and
material well-being of society on the one hand, and in its legal and political framework
on the other, are faithfully registered. Already in the very first sentence of the text, the
key word “manners” occupies a central place. “Two great revolutions have happened
421 Robertson, History of Charles V,  I. 13-14.
422 Cf. above, Chapter Two, 78 ff.
423 For a particularly perceptive analysis of how politeness, progress and patriotism were part and parcel
of one and the same programme in Robertson's immediate environment, that of the “moderate literati” in
Edinburgh, see Sher, Church and University.
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in the political state and in the manners of the European nations. The first was
occasioned by the progress of the Roman Empire, the second by the subversion of it.”
The latter was especially destructive of earlier structures: “Very faint vestiges of the
Roman policy,  jurisprudence,  arts,  or  literature  remained.  New forms of  government,
new laws, new manners, new dresses, new languages, and new names of men and
countries, were every where introduced.”424
But this represented the last case of dramatic discontinuity in Europe’s civilizing
process, the proper subject of the voluminous introduction to The History of Charles V.
From this several centuries’ chasm onwards, Robertson’s account is that of unbroken –
gradual, if uneven – development from rudeness to refinement, resulting from shifts in
the mode of subsistence, and giving rise to innovations in the public institutions of
Europeans. While paying tribute to some of the virtues of the conquering barbarians,
Robertson uses dark colours to depict the medieval stagnation of the human mind, and
invokes  for  the  first  time  in  the  book  one  of  the  characteristic  ideas  of  the  Scottish
Enlightenment. The cultivation and flourishing of the arts and sciences play a decisive
role in the ennoblement – and their neglect, in the degradation – of the forms of human
intercourse, with far-reaching consequences to the public sphere as a whole. Also, these
factors mutually reinforce each other’s effects.
“If men do not enjoy the protection of regular government, together with the
expectation of personal security, which naturally flows from it, they never
attempt to make progress in science, nor aim at attaining refinement in taste or
manners.  ...  Force  of  mind,  a  sense  of  personal  dignity,  gallantry  in  enterprise,
invincible perseverance in execution, contempt of danger and of death, are the
characteristic virtues of uncivilized nations. But these are the offspring of
equality and independence, both which the feudal institutions had destroyed. ...
Human society is in its most corrupted state, at that period when men have lost
their original independence and simplicity of manners, but have not attained
424 Robertson, History of Charles V, I. 1, 12.
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that degree of refinement which introduces a sense of decorum and of propriety
in conduct, as a restraint on those passions which lead to heinous crimes.”425
Watching for the key word has led us to the central organizing principle of A View of the
Progress of Society: the idea of stadial or conjectural history that manners – as we shall
see in more detail, in close interplay with the division of labour, mode of subsistence
and institutions – characteristic of European society had undergone several stages of
refinement, until, by the advent of the modern period, they came to serve as the
foundation of a sophisticated and highly developed civilization. This civilization was
not considered flawless, but certainly unparalleled, representing a different quality, and
a higher order than either its predecessors or its contemporary counterparts outside
Europe. The low level of material culture and intellectual accomplishment (the “mode
of subsistence” and primitive stage of “refinement”) among the barbarian peoples are
linked by Robertson to their warlike virtues, which, however, are in turn made to
account for their ethos of personal liberty. Reflecting on the false assumption of
historians about their great numbers, he claims
“that some of the most considerable of the barbarous nations subsisted entirely
by hunting or pasturage, in both which states of society large tracts of land are
required for maintaining a few inhabitants; and ... all of them were strangers to
the arts and industry without which population cannot increase to any great
degree... But the same circumstances that prevented the barbarous nations from
becoming populous, contributed to inspire or to strengthen the martial spirit by
which they were distinguished.”
Later, this is supplemented by the following remark:
“Not only the different nations that issued from the north of Europe, which has
always been considered as the seat of liberty, but the Huns and Alans, who
425 Ibid., 21, 23, 24.
               dc_444_12
191
inhabited part of those countries which have been marked out as the peculiar
region of servitude, enjoyed freedom and independence in such a high degree as
seems to be scarcely compatible with a state of social union, or with the
subordination necessary to maintain it.”426
In a note placed in the section ‘Proofs and Illustrations’ – which he contrived in order to
avoid the traditional digressions within the text that tended to break the flux of the
narrative –, Robertson supplies an example of and methodological advice on the
application of a device peculiar to conjectural history. Comparing the “political state”
and material circumstances of the ancient Germans and the North-American Indians,
he claims that observations on the latter could throw light on the “character and
manners” of the former almost as usefully as the works of Caesar or Tacitus. The reason
for this was that “the characters of nations depend on the state of society in which they
live, and on the political institutions established among them.” Robertson called
attention to the limits of the applicability of such material of anthropological nature in
comparative history: “I do not pretend that the state of society in the two countries was
perfectly similar in every respect.” But he still asserted that “[t]he resemblance,
however, between their condition, is greater, perhaps, than any that history affords an
opportunity  of  observing  between  any  two  races  of  uncivilized  people,  and  this  has
produced a surprising similarity of manners.”427
Soon  enough,  in  what  are  perhaps  the  most  striking  passages  of A  View  of  the
Progress of Society, Robertson sets out “to point out those general principles and events”
which led the European nations from this barbarous state “to that degree of
improvement in policy and in manners which they had attained at the period when
Charles V. began his reign”. The crucial events were the Crusades, in whose wake
Europe gradually emerged from the feudal system, described by Robertson in
disparaging terms. Having reduced many from freemen to serfs, it also failed to
provide a satisfactory degree of security. In the feudal kingdom – “a military
426 Ibid., 5, 14.
427 Ibid., 253.
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establishment rather than a civil institution” – “[t]he bond of political union was
extremely feeble, the sources of anarchy were innumerable. The monarchical and
aristocratical parts of the constitution having no intermediate power to balance them,
were perpetually at variance, and justling with each other.”428 The Crusades put an end
to these miserable conditions not merely by exporting Europe’s surplus of violence.
First, they acquainted Europeans with long forgotten attainments and standards of
civilization:
“Although the attention of the historians of the Crusades was fixed on other
objects than the state of society and manners among the nations which they
invaded,  ...  [i]t  was  not  possible  for  the  crusaders  to  travel  so  many countries,
and to behold their various customs and institutions, without acquiring
information and improvement. Their views enlarged; their prejudices wore off;
new ideas crowded into their minds; and they must have been sensible, on many
occasions, of the rusticity of their own manners, when compared with those of a
more polished people. ... [T]o these wild expeditions, the effect of superstition or
folly, we owe the first gleams of light which tended to dispel barbarism and
ignorance.”429
Especially in the light of this last remark, the passage sounds very much like an
ingenious application of the Smithian rule of unintended consequences, and somewhat
later Robertson indeed takes up a thread which appears in Book III of The  Wealth  of
Nations as an exemplary case of the operation of that rule.430 For,  according  to
Robertson, a further result of the Crusades was that through the stimulus they gave to
428 Ibid., 17.
429 Ibid., 31.
430 In Smith's account, the magnetism of luxury articles offered at the market by greedy merchants tames
the lust for domination of noblemen into mere vanity and drains their wealth; and thus, as a result of two
selfish social actors who in fact neglect the public good, urban liberties, the core privileges of later safety
under the law, arise in the high Middle Ages. Smith, Wealth of Nations,  ,  I.  422;  cf.  idem., Lectures on
Jurisprudence, , 420. Cf. also n. 34 in Ch. 2 for charges on Robertson’s unacknowledged reliance on Smith in
the View of the Progress of Society.
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commerce they unwittingly contributed to the strengthening of those “intermediate
powers” whose rudimentary state under feudalism he had earlier lamented. Among
such circumstances the civilizing potential inherent in exchange relationships could
also grow to full blossom:
“Wealth [generated by commerce] was accompanied by its usual attendants,
ostentation and luxury; and though the former was formal and cumbersome,
and the latter inelegant, they led gradually to greater refinement in manners and
in the habits of life. ... As cities grew to be more populous, and the occasions of
intercourse between people increased, statutes and regulations multiplied of
course, and all became sensible that their common safety depended on
observing them with exactness, and on punishing such as violated them with
promptitude and rigour. Laws and subordination, as well as polished manners,
taking their rise in the cities, diffused themselves insensibly through the rest of
society.”431
These blessings appeared hand in hand with other progressive developments, such as
the loosening of the dependence of serfs here and there, the strengthening of royal
authority and the success in restraining baronial feuds, the greater stability of
jurisdiction through the revival of Roman law, the renaissance of the arts and sciences,
or the softening of martial virtues into chivalric manners.432 And before, and even after
Robertson proceeds to the history of the military organization of the main European
states, to be followed by their constitutional arrangements at the beginning of the
sixteenth century – both topics being obviously essential in the introduction to a history
of the reign of Charles V –, he inserts several eulogies on commerce and its role in
refining the political, moral and intellectual condition of European society.433
431 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 42-43.
432 Ibid., 46-51.
433 See for instance ibid., 91-98, 162, 399-408.
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What emerges quite clearly from this summary of Robertson’s main argument is
that  he  follows the  logic  of  cause  and effect  very  rigorously,  to  which in  one case  he
explicitly draws attention. He stresses that “[i]n pointing out and explaining these
causes and events [of the improvement of government and manners after the eleventh
century], it is not necessary to observe the order of time with a chronological accuracy;
it is of more importance to keep in view their mutual connexion and dependence, and
to show how the operation of one event or one cause prepared the way for another, and
augmented its influence.”434 The reader is constantly reminded how the developments
highlighted by the author are organically embedded into one and the same process;
how the ever-increasing specialization of functions, and with it the differentiation and
mutually counterpoising role of orders, constitute a common background of all of them;
and  how  all  of  this  is  attended  by  the  growth  of  a  set  of  standards  in  human
intercourse, which is already familiar to the citizen of the modern eighteenth-century
world. Crusades, commerce, refinement, polite manners, rule of law – in this order:  a
succession of events whose motive forces are traditional and “superstitious” gives rise
to unexpected consequences, which are at first felt on the level of the prevailing “mode
of subsistence”, next, in the norms that regulate interpersonal relationships, and finally
in the sphere of the institutions through which civil society is governed. This is not to
deny that Robertson, strongly attached to the Scottish civic moralist tradition, struggles
to save intentionality, and thus the possibility of moral example, in history, and to
avoid the deterministic implications of stadial history:435 the  above  is  an  admittedly
simplified epitome of an argument that is admirably multifaceted in all of its
conciseness. But what matters for the purposes of this chapter is that, if the “meaning”
of the progress of society in Europe according to Robertson is the rise of the rule of law
under  stable  monarchy,  this  is  shown by him to  have taken place  in  close  interaction
with the growth of commerce and manners, the other two distinctive features of
434 Ibid., 25. See the contrast drawn by D. J. Womersley between The History of Charles V and Robertson’s
other historical works on account of his strict adherence to the principle of causality in it, “The Historical
Writings of William Robertson”, esp. 503 f.
435 O’Brien, “Between Enlightenment and stadial history”,  57 f.
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modern society; and according to the thrust of Robertson’s argument, their succession
in the logical-causal sequence should be understood as irreversible.
*   *   *   *   *   *
Before turning to the versions of the View of the Progress of Society which appeared in the
standard German editions of the History of Charles V, the independent rendering of the
text by Ludwig Heinrich von Nicolay, mentioned in the Introduction, deserves some
attention. Nicolay (1737-1820) was born as the son of the local archivist in Strasbourg,
where he studied philosophy and law. Already as a student he started publishing his
poetry, and after his graduation in 1760 he moved to Paris and soon made the
acquaintance of some of the leading lights, including Voltaire, Diderot, D’Alembert and
Melchior Grimm (with whom Nicolay maintained a long lasting correspondence).
These contacts earned him entry in the world of the salons, which was decisive for his
future career: one of the habitués of the salons, the Russian Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich
Golitsin was so impressed with Nicolay’s manners and talents that he hired him as a
personal  secretary,  and also  took him to  Vienna when he  became appointed there  as
Russian ambassador in 1761. After a subsequent brief spell at the university of his home
town as Privatdozent, Nicolay became the tutor of another Russian aristocrat, the young
Count Aleksei Rasumovsky (son of the president of the Saint Petersburg Academy of
Sciences and a former student of his at Strasbourg). Nicolay accompanied Rasumovsky
Junior and Senior on a European Grand Tour, including Italy, Switzerland, South
Germany, France and England. While still in England, in 1769 he received and accepted
an invitation from Count Nikita Panin, who supervised the education of Grand Duke
Paul, to serve as one of the tutors of the son and heir of Empress Catherine the Great.
While he continued to publish his literary works in Germany, his rise at the Russian
court  was  steady.  He escorted his  former  student  after  the  death of  the  grand duke’s
first wife in 1776 to arrange a new marriage Berlin (where he made important new
acquaintances, including the publisher and Aufklärer Friedrich Nicolai), and in 1781-82
to a European tour highlighting Vienna and Versailles (where he could be an expert
guide of the traveling Russian “small court”, and earned the esteem of Joseph II, as well
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as a patent of imperial nobility). He also filled secretarial positions to both Paul’s first
and second wife. This went together with the acquisition of estates – including
Monrepos, a real gem outside the city of Vyborg, the seat of his remarkable collection of
books and art objects –, emoluments and titles. The zenith of Nicolay’s career was his
appointment, after the succession of Paul as Tsar in 1796, as a member of the imperial
cabinet council and, in 1798, as president of the Academy of Sciences. After the murder
of  his  patron  in  1801  he  was  discharged  from  his  positions  and  lived  a  quiet  life  of
writing and managing his estate at Monrepos.436
In the preface to the History of Charles V, Robertson wrote: “History claims it as
her prerogative to offer instruction to Kings, as well as to their people.” Nicolay took
this claim in the narrowest literal sense. Whether prompted by the Empress437 (who
was keen on adding erudition in literary and philosophical matters to the curriculum
prescribed by Panin, focusing on military administration and statecraft), or on his own
initiative (based on his possible familiarity with the work and status of Robertson from
his stay to Britain), Nicolay identified in the View of the Progress of Society an excellent
tool for the education of a future ruler. He must have recognized an object lesson in the
“barbarity, disorder and infertility” [Barbarei, Verwirrung und Unfruchtbarkeit] of the
Middle Ages, which for a long time discouraged even the best experts [die geschickteste
Männer] from dealing with them. Montesquieu is praised as the first to have “brought
the torch of genius into this obscure cave, [and] showed us among its debris the sources
of our present laws. Robertson penetrated with the same deliberation into the still dark
pit, identified the elements of scattered rubble, arranged them in order, and
demonstrated to us on them the history of human understanding.”438 There was one
436 On Nicolay’s life, career and European contacts, see Edmund Heier, L. H. Nicolay (1737-1820) and his
contemporaries (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
437 Relations between the imperial mother and son tended to be loveless and tense, even hostile, but
the early 1770s were a period of temporary reconciliation.
438 “Montesquieu, welcher zuerst die Fackel des Genies in diese finstere Höhle brachte, wies uns
zwischen dem Schutte derselben die Quellen unserer hutigen Gesetze. Robertson drang mit gleichem
Muthe  in  die  noch  dunkle  Grube,  erkannte  die  hingestreuten  Ruinen,  stellte  sie  in  Ordnung,  und
zeigte uns an denselben die Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes.” Entwurf des politischen
Zustandes in Europa, vom Verfall der römischen Macht an bis auf das sechzehnte Jahrhundert. Aus Robertsons
Einleitung in die Geschichte Karls des Fünften gezogen, in Vermischte Gedichte und prosaische Schriften von
Herrn Ludwig Heinrich von Nicolay (Berlin und Stettin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1793), III. 98. Nicolay’s
rendering of the View of the Progress of Society, was first published in his Verse und Prose (Basel:
Schweighäuser, 1773), II. 5-155.
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problem, though, with Robertson’s masterpiece: its length, sophistication and scholarly
apparatus, which Nicolay deemed forbidding for his seventeen-year old pupil. He
therefore decided for a free adaptation: “In order to lay such an important canvas
before the eyes of a young prince, I have attempted to render the work of the famous
Briton in a language and in a style that is familiar to him, and corresponds to his age,
which abhors its length, and to his discernment, for which it is much too detailed.”439
Accordingly, Nicolay dropped in their entirety Robertson’s substantial “Proofs
and Illustrations” from the end of the volume, and condensed them into rudimentary
explanatory footnotes. The size of the book became reduced by about one half, and the
internal proportions were also subverted: Section I, which occupies less than one half of
the original, takes nearly two-thirds of Nicolay’s rendering, in which Sections II and III
are little more than précis of the English version. The relentless exercise in abbreviation
performed  by  Nicolay  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  reviewers.  “The  style  is  too
affectedly concise,” the reviewer of the first edition complained, “not merely compact,
but fragmented;” and he thought that it was “modelled after Tacitus” (whose
biography of Agricola was also translated for Paul by Nicolay, and included in the
same edition of his poetical and prose works as the Entwurf).440 True, the reviewer of
the 1793 edition found merit in Nicolay’s translation as one which is “free, but executed
with gusto, and it reads like an original.”441 His objections against the style
notwithstanding, the first reviewer thought that “as R. is not in every hand, this short
excerpt of such an excellent book must be in any case welcome.”442 What the 1793
reviewer found odd was the context in which Nicolay’s rendering was published, and
agreed with the decision to omit it from the previous, second edition, “and it would not
439 “Einem jungen Prinzen ein so wichtiges Gemählde vor die Augen zu legen, habe ich das Werk des
berühmten  Britten  in  eine  ihm  bekannte  Sprache  und  in  eine  Schreibart  überzutragen  gesucht,  die
sowohl seinem Alter, welches die Länge scheuet, als auch seiner Einsicht, für die sie überflüssig ist,
angemessen sei.” Entwurf, 98.
440 “Der  Styl  list  zu  affektirt  kurz,  und  recht,  wie  man  sieht,  nach  dem  Tacitus  gebildet;  nicht  bloß
gedrängt, sondern oft zerstückelt.” Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, 24:1 (1775), 108.
441 “Die Uebersetzung ist frey, aber mit Geist gemacht, und ließt sich wie ein Original.” Neue allgemeine
deutsche Bibliothek, 7:1 (1793), 293.
442 “Da R. nicht in aller Händen ist, so muß diese kleine Auszug eines so vortreflichen Buches allerdings
willkommen seyn.”
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have been missed here, either, for hitherto people, not at all unjustly, wanted to see only
poetical translations included in the work of a writer.”443
A  few  interesting  points  emerge  from  these  elements  of  a  mosaic  which  are
worth registering. That Nicolay’s work consisted not merely of a condensation of
Robertson’s text but its concentration as well, is revealed by the first glance at the title:
the  Scottish  historian’s  “view  of  the  progress  of  society”  becomes  an  “outline  of  the
political condition” of Europe [Entwurf des politischen Zustandes in Europa] in the
rendering of the German writer, a lapse which may be fortuitous, but at least in part
reflects the real character of the changes of the text itself. While the strongly analytical
thrust of Robertson’s account is more or less still retained in the first section of
Nicolay’s rendering, in the radically shortened second and third sections the socio-
cultural contextualization of political developments and institutions is entirely weeded
out, and it is a narrative of events that remains. It is perhaps little wonder that this
transformation went unnoticed by the literary critics, who were more interested in
matters of style and presentation. More surprisingly, they also failed to comment on the
fact that by the time Nicolay took to translating the View of the Progress of Society, there
was  already  a  full  German  edition  of  the History of Charles V available on the book
market; it is a genuine puzzle that the silence about this alternative edition continued at
the time of the re-edition of the Entwurf in  Nicolay’s  works  in  1793,  the  year  when
Remer’s thoroughly re-worked Abriß des Wachstums und Fortgangs des gesellschaftlichen
Lebens in Europa, published in 1792, was already reviewed in the Göttingische Anzeigen
von gelehrten Sachen. Still further to complicate the matter, one might ask whether in
1772 Nicolay, a man of broad erudition and intellectual horizon as well as good
connections in the world of letters, could have been genuinely unaware of the existence
of what was to be the standard German edition of the text he was about to translate for
his pupil; or whether Remer’s similar neglect to mention Nicolay’s rival attempt in
either the 1778-79 or the 1792-95 editions prepared by him arose out of ignorance,
contempt or jealousy. In the lack of documentary evidence, these questions remain
unanswered.
443 “… und würde auch hier nicht vermißt worden seyn, da man bis jetzt, und wohl nicht mit Unrecht, in
die Werke eines Schriftstellers nur poetische Uebersetzungen hat aufgenommen sehen wollen.”
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It is now time to move on to the remarkable history of the versions of the View of
the Progress of Society published in the full German editions of the History of Charles V, by
introducing first the figures of the interpreters. Unlike Robertson, and perhaps even
Nicolay, they are relatively obscure figures.444 Theodor Christoph Mittelstedt (1712-
1777), church councilor, and court pastor of the Dukes of Braunschweig, was a
successful translator of contemporary English and French works. His first noteworthy
translation was Deism Revealed, Henry Skelton’s compilation of texts by Herbert of
Cherbury, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Toland, Tindal, Collins, Mandeville and others in 1756.
His later translations include Gilbert Burnet’s History of the Reformation (1765-1769) and
A Sentimental Journey by Laurence Sterne (1769, 2nd ed. 1774). When Mittelstedt
undertook to render The History of Charles V into German in 1769, he had already
become familiar with Robertson as a writer through his translation of the latter’s History
of Scotland (1762).445 Shortly before his death, he translated Richard Price’s Observations
on the Nature of Civil Liberty and Edmund Burke’s Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies,
published in the first volume of Amerikanisches Archiv (1777),  edited by Julius August
Remer.
Though also not a particularly shining light of the German Aufklärung, Remer
(1738-1803) had a more interesting as well as more scholarly career than Mittelstedt.
Son of a protestant pastor in Braunschweig, he studied first at Helmstedt, whose once
famous university was on the decline at that time, and later at the vigorously
developing new University of Göttingen.446 At both universities he enrolled in the
theological faculty, nevertheless, his main interest was already history. We can only
guess who his mentors may have been. In view of Remer’s later intellectual
development, it is safe to assume that Gatterer, who joined the Göttingen faculty in the
444 The following biographical sketches of Mittelstedt and Remer are mainly based on Johann Georg
Meusel, Lexikon der vom Jahr 1750 bis 1800 verstorbenen teutschen Schriftsteller (Leipzig, 1802-1816, repr.
Hildesheim: Olms,, 1967), IX. 190-92; Georg Christoph Hamberger and Johann Georg Meusel, Das gelehrte
Teutschland oder Lexikon der jetzt lebenden teutschen Schriftsteller (Lemgo, 1796-1834, repr. Hildesheim, 1965:
Olms),  VI. 305-8; Allgemeine deutsche Biographie (Leipzig, 1889), XXVIII.  198-200.
445 To be considered below, Chapter Five.
446 See the 3 October 1757 entry in Herbert Mundhenke (ed.), Die Matrikel der Universität Helmstedt 1685-
1810 (Hildesheim: Lax, 1979), 187; and the 17 October 1759 entry in Götz von Selle (ed.), Die Matrikel der
Georg-August Universität zu Göttingen (Hildesheim: Lax, 1937), I. 132.
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same year as Remer began his studies, made an impact on the latter’s scholarly
attitudes. Though his great dream of a historical society and a journal only came true
several years later, Gatterer’s commitment to a fresh brand of universal history,
described in Chapter Three, was well known from the outset. Another Göttingen
professor who might have influenced Remer was Pütter, also mentioned above, whose
fame  as  an  expert  on Reichsgeschichte and German Staatsrecht and popularity as a
lecturer rose sharply during Remer’s student years.447 In view of Pütter’s possible
impact on the later editor of Robertson’s History of Charles V, it is noteworthy that the
English translator of his Historische Entwickelung der heutigen Staatsverfassung des
Teutschen Reichs (1786-1788) seems to have thought, whether rightly or wrongly, this
work to be a German counterpart of Scottish “philosophical history”.448
Having graduated from Göttingen, in 1763 Remer became a tutor, in 1770 a
lecturer, and in 1774 professor of Universal- und Staatengeschichte at the Collegium
Carolinum in Braunschweig, while also editing various local journals. In 1787, he
returned to Helmstedt, now as ordinary professor of history and statistics (Staatistik, i.e.,
state sciences). Having held an office in the ducal intelligence and press service since
1774, in 1796 Remer rose to the rank of court councillor.
Remer seems to have lived the life of the industrious provincial scholar within
rather narrow confines, never leaving his native land apart from a short trip to
Schleswig. He was a prolific if unoriginal author of compendium-like textbooks of
history and state sciences, which went through several editions.449 While not later than
in 1771 he revealed familiarity, through quotations (without references), with
447 On  Pütter  in  general,  see  Wilhelm  Ebel, Der göttinger Professor Johann Stephan Pütter aus Iserlohn
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975); Christoph Link, “Johann Stephan Pütter (1725-1807).
Staatsrecht am Ende des alten Reiches”, in Fritz Loos (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in Göttingen. Göttinger
Juristen aus 250 Jahren (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 75-99.
448 See the “Preface” by Josiah Dornford (a British disciple of Pütter’s) in An Historical Development of the
Present Political Constitution of the Germanic Empire (London: Payne and Son, 1790),  I. For more details, see
below, Chapter Five, 259.
449 Handbuch der Geschichte neurerer Zeiten, von der grossen Völkerwanderung bis zum Hubertusburgischen
Frieden (1771); Ausführliches Handbuch der ältern allgemeinen Geschichte; nebst einer Vorstellung der politischen,
geistlichen, gelehrten und bürgerlichen Verfassung der Nationen in jedem Zeitpunkte (1775); Handbuch der
allgemeinen Geschichte I-III (1783-1784); Lehrbuch der Staatskunde der vornehmsten europäischen Staaten (1785);
Tabellarische Uebersicht der wichtigsten statistischen Veränderungen in der vornehmsten Europäischen Staaten
(1786-1794).
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Robertson’s History of Charles V, his acknowledged mentor was Gatterer, and he did his
best to prevent, as the Göttingen professor warned, the “degeneration” of his history
into mere state or imperial history – “which general [in effect, universal] history should
never be”.450 His most important work, besides his revision of Robertson’s History of
Charles V was Versuch einer Geschichte der französischen Constitutionen (1795), an account
of the transformation of the French state from the Middle Ages to 1789, also containing
thoughtful analyses of the causes of the Revolution. Remer also earned a reputation as
one of the main German authorities on America, especially on the thirteen colonies’
relations with England and the circumstances of the War of Independence.451 Besides
the documents in the three volumes of Amerikanisches Archiv (1777-78) mentioned
above, he published a carefully annotated German translation of Charles Stedman’s
History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War.452
Within Remer’s own relatively confined circle of operation, these achievements
earned him not  only  titles  and honours,  but  also  a  considerable  amount  of  respect,  a
circumstance about which even Robertson was informed. Writing from Braunschweig
in November 1780 and recalling his acquaintance with Robertson in their youth, a
certain  J.  Westphalen (about  whom I  have not  been able  to  find out  any more  detail)
reported to Robertson not only about the “universal Applause” which his works
evoked in Germany, but specifically about the revised edition of the History of Charles V,
“which was undertook & now finished by a Man of great Abilities professor Römer at
the Colledge Carolin at Brunswic well known in the literary world for some able
performances.” Westphalen added that Remer was even “honoured with the particular
esteem of her Royal Highness the Duchess of Brunswic, with whom he reads History
twice a Week” (and assured Robertson that at these sessions his works are “not
forgot”).453 Though Remer could never have equaled the financial status Robertson
450 Julius August Remer, Handbuch der Geschichte neurerer Zeiten, Preface. Shortly later in the text, on page
5, one finds the first of several word-by-word quotes from Robertson, referring to the rise of “new forms
of government, new laws, new manners, new dresses, new languages,” etc., cited above (n. 8).
451 See Horst Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution 1770-1800 (Chapel  Hill:  University  of  North
Carolina Press, 1977), 57 f.
452 Geschichte des Ursprungs, des Fortgangs und der Beendigung des Amerikanischen Krieges, I-II (1774-1796).
453 J. Westphalen to Robertson, November 12, 1780. National Library of Scotland, Robertson-
MacDonald papers, MS. 3943. ff. 128-9. Remer’s local reputation is also clear from a published
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attained with his intellectual accomplishments, these labours rewarded the former with
comfortable, if not luxurious circumstances. According to his last will, in 1800 his
fortune exceeded 1,000 thalers in cash and in debts owed to him (though he also
incurred a debt of 450); he had a house worth 2,500 thalers.454 His chief treasure,
however, was his library, whose size was estimated in the will at 6,000 volumes and its
value  at  1,500  thalers;  but  when  his  son  –  a  doctor  who  later  became  a  professor  of
medicine – put the books up for auction, the catalogue revealed that Remer’s zeal as a
collector was even greater than he thought, the list containing over 7,400 titles and 43
manuscripts.455
All of these circumstances taken together, Remer’s figure seems to be ideally
suited  for  a  study  of  the  significance  of  the  interpreter  of  foreign  intellectual  and
cultural attainments in the eighteenth century, a role which he undertook
enthusiastically. First, while his library in particular testifies to the remarkable breadth
of his intellectual horizon and his erudition, as an author Remer was more
representative of the accomplished artisan than the artist of genius. He possessed a fine
sense of relevance, and a fair ability to summarize and synthesize, but little sensitivity
for nuances of meaning, and still less elegance of style. This, however, also meant
accessibility: it was precisely on account of his average character or typicality that
Remer and his likes could play an immense role in shaping the dominant modes of
thinking in the confined universe of the German small town or province. At the same
time,  in  the  succession  of  prefaces  and  remarks  placed  in  the  notes  with  which  he
equipped Robertson’s text, one may recognize a voice of growing self-confidence,
obituary,  J.  P.  Bruns,   “Etwas  von  dem  Leben  und  den  Verdiensten  des  de  26sten  August  1803  zu
Helmstedt verstorbenen Professors und Hofraths Julius August Remer”, Braunschweigisches Magazin,
37 (10 September 1803)
454 Niedersachsisches Staatsarchiv in Wolfenbüttel, 37 Alt 3643. The will is dated 6 August 1800, and was
opened on 27 August 1803.
455 Julius August Remers Herzogl. Braunschw. Hofraths und Professors zu Helmstedt hinterlassene
Büchersammlung ... (Braunschweig, 1804). The titles in the catalogue are arranged into eighteen classes
according to subject matter. As it might be expected, nearly half of the books in the collection (cca. 3,500
titles) were about the various branches of history, politics and related subjects, with most of the important
eighteenth-century German, British and French authors being represented. Literature and literary history,
travelogues, theology, geography, philosophy, jurisprudence, art and art history followed (roughly in this
order), while the few books on the natural sciences which Remer possessed are found dispersed in several
of these subdivisions.
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supported by climbing into ever more respectable academic and administrative
positions. This was a characteristic combination on the contemporary public scene in
Hannover and elsewhere in Germany, where university professors became almost
automatically appointed Hofrat. By virtue of his own record of scholarly contributions
as  well  as  his  visible  social  advance,  Remer  could  well  have  felt  entitled  to  assert  an
independence from his source, besides (or, in many cases, precisely because of) the
meticulous care he in general devoted to its proper rendering. Performing this exercise
on one of the international historical bestsellers of the time was also quite beyond doubt
a strategy calculated to further consolidate his own status and credentials in the
academic community and his wider social world.
In addition, it must be re-emphasized that his critical remarks on Robertson –
which are sporadic and relegated to the notes of the 1778-1779 edition, while sweeping
and essential in the 1792-1795 revision of The History of Charles V – are in full
compliance with the established practices of translating foreign texts in eighteenth-
century Germany. True, Gatterer himself warned that a translation “may contain
neither more nor less than the original. That is, the translator may neither expand nor
shorten the original”, and this must be applied to content and style as well.456 But such
rigour and self-discipline was by no means a rule among contemporary German
translators.457 As explored more broadly in Chapter Two, the boundaries between
faithful translation and adaptation were dim; dropping chapters and inserting prefaces,
notes or appendices in order to explain or challenge the author’s meaning was not only
common, but even required as a means to make the foreign text more accessible to the
German reader. Besides the obviously felt needs of a different cultural environment and
the dubious status of translation between piracy and independent achievement, this
was due to the fact that publishing a text was considered to enhance the reputation of
the publisher in proportion with the element of originality contained in it. Remer, when
456 “Joh. Christoph Gatterer von der Kunst zu übersetzen, besonders in Absicht auf historische Schriften",
in AhB 1767, II. 11-2.
457 See Bernhard Fabian, “English Books and their Eighteenth Century German Readers”, in Paul Korshin
(ed.), The Widening Circle. Essays on the Circulation of Literature in Eighteenth Century Europe (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), 117-96; and especially Kenneth E. Carpenter, Dialogue in Political
Economy. Translations from and into German in the Eighteenth Century (Boston: Kress Library Publications,
1977), ch I.
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he expressed his pretensions to surpass his model Robertson – politely and awkwardly
in  the  1778  Preface  to  the Geschichte Kaiser Carls des Fünften,  and  boldly  and
uncompromisingly in 1792458 - could therefore only expect to meet the approval of the
audience he addressed.
As a matter of fact, one has to distinguish between intended changes and
unintended distortions of the original meaning of a text through translation into a
foreign language. Some of the pitfalls of translation set by the insurmountable linguistic
and cultural barriers between eighteenth-century Scottish and German thought have
been perceptively analyzed in the cases, e.g., of David Hume and Adam Ferguson: we
know how, and with what consequences Humean “belief” became Glaube, or the terms
of Fergusonian civic activism were translated into a language of spiritual
perfectibilism.459 I shall argue that in the case of Robertson, too, unwittingly committed
errors supplemented intentional textual revision in transforming a natural into an
idealist history of the rise of modern European society. Due to the combination of
deliberate changes, arising from the translator’s interpretative strategy, and shifts of
meaning occasioned by the manner of translating the pivotal elements of Robertson’s
vocabulary mentioned above, the logic they established became gradually
overwhelmed in the course of the German publishing history of A View of the Progress of
Society. It is chiefly not mistranslations, but the rendering of those key English words of
classical derivation, whose breadth of meaning is difficult to convey by using even their
closest German counterparts, that obscure some crucial associations, described above in
458 “I hope the readers will not consider it as a mark of arrogance or cavil that in the attached notes I have
endeavoured to improve the accuracy of this excellent book.” [Ich hoffe nicht, daß es die Leser für Stolz
oder Tadelsucht halten werden, daß ich den Versuch gewagt habe, in den hinzugefügten Noten einigen
Stellen diesen vortrefflichen Buchs eine größre Richtigkeit zu geben.] Robertson, Geschichte Carls des
Fünften (1778-1779), I. Vorrede. “In certain subjects Robertson follows completely false principles, others
he touches very superficially, and fully neglects many highly important ones, although they significantly
contributed to the shaping of the character and mentality of the Middle Ages.” [Robertson in einigen
Materien ganz irrigen Grundsätzen folgt, andere nur außerst oberflächlich behandelt, und viele sehr
wichtige  gar  nicht  berührt,  ungeachtet  sie  wesentlich  dazu  beygetragen  haben,  den  Charakter  und  die
Denkart der mittleren Zeiten zu bilden.] Therefore the only remedy is a full revision of the text.
Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), I. v.
459 Isaiah Berlin, “Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism”, in idem., Against the Current:
Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford, 1981), 162-87; Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment, ch. 6.
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my summary of Robertson’s argument, in the main text of the 1778 version. Let us first
look at some examples of this.
“Arts and industry” (“without which population cannot increase to any great
degree” among the barbarous peoples) is translated as “erfinderischer Fleiß”.460 In the
case of both of the central terms in this phrase, one of their several connotations is thus
selected in the translation – “inventiveness” or “resourcefulness” for art, and
“diligence” for industry. As a result the additional sense of the concrete productive
activities that stem from these human qualities, and even the fruits of such activities,
which is all undoubtedly implied in the original and essential from the point of view of
the  meaning  of  the  book,  is  sifted  out  of  the  German  text.  Further  on,  in  a  sentence
where Robertson writes that “the arts of elegance, which minister to luxury, and are
supported by it ... were neglected or lost”, Mittelstedt chooses to translate “luxury” as
“Ueppigkeit”, a solution Remer approves of.461 Luxury  is,  of  course,  one  of  the  grand
topics of moral and political discourse in eighteenth-century Britain and elsewhere in
Europe, a phenomenon applauded as often as denounced.462 But when, as in the given
context, it appears unqualified, it is used as a neutral term to describe splendour, or a
higher degree of affluence than that ensured by the merely “useful arts, without which
life can scarcely be considered as comfortable”. Ueppigkeit, on the other hand, more than
simply meaning opulence, carries the notion of lusciousness, i.e., an exorbitant
enjoyment of superfluity, and thus some moral disapproval even when it is in no way
qualified.
460 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 5; Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778), I. 7. Cf. History of Charles V, I. 42
and Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778),  53,  where  the  “spirit  of  industry”  is  rendered  as  “Geist der
Emsigkeit” (a close synonym of Fleiß, also lacking the comprehensiveness implied by “industry”.
461 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 21; Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778), I. 30. See also 42 of the former
and 53 of the latter.
462 See, e.g., M. M. Goldsmith, “Liberty, Luxury and the Pursuit of Happiness”, in Anthony Pagden (ed.),
The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
225-251; Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, esp. ch. 2.; Istvan Hont, “The early Enlightenment debate on
commerce  and  luxury”,  in  Mark  Goldie  and  Robert  Wokler  (eds.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 379-418.
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The case of “commerce”, when it is translated as “Handel”463, is analogous to that
of “arts and industry”. Whereas the English term automatically anticipates the strong
linkage  Robertson  is  about  to  suggest  between  the  exchange  of  goods  and  the
refinement of manners by denoting any kind of communication or free intercourse in
the affairs of life, the latter is clearly outside the semantic content of Handel. The
problem of sociability as a function of commercial society, which is central for the
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, is thus rendered somewhat difficult to grasp in
the German translation.464
Finally, one needs to confront the intricate cluster of ideas connected with the
terms “police”, “polite”, “polished”, whose etymology is divergent, but whose near-
homophonous character could prove quite deceiving. Thus, Ferguson – having, of
course, the classical polis as a civic ideal in mind – thought that
“[t]he term polished,  if  we may judge from its etymology, originally referred to
the  state  of  nations  in  respect  to  their  laws  and  government.  In  its  later
applications, it refers no less to their proficiency in the liberal and mechanical
arts, in literature, and in commerce.”465
Even though throughout his oeuvre, and especially in the View of the Progress,
Robertson showed himself to be more of a full blown progress-and-refinement theorist
than Ferguson ever was, there is reason to believe that he thought in a like manner
when he wrote in conjunction about “the forming of cities into communities,
corporations, or bodies politic” and the introduction of “regular government, police
and arts”; or when he claimed that “[l]aws and subordination, as well as polished
manners, taking their rise in the cities, diffused themselves insensibly through the rest
463 Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778), I. 53 ff.
464 A similar point is made about the German translation of the same term in the case of Ferguson by Oz-
Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment, 151.
465 Adam  Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 195.
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of society”.466 Indeed, if one considers that the meaning of “police” could be expanded
to include not only public policy, organized government or civil administration but
even civilized relationships in general, there was a way to associate it with “polished”,
i.e., elegant, cultured, refined.
Such associations, however, were rendered extremely difficult to coin by the
expressions used in Mittelstedt’s translation. Neither Polizei (Polizey, Policey) nor Politik
carried the general civilizational connotations of “police”. The former term referred to
the maintenance of internal public order, safety, moral as well as physical well-being in
the commonwealth through laws, administration and disciplinary action, in municipal
government and, increasingly, on the level of the territorial state as well; by the
eighteenth century, Polizei in this sense became the subject matter of a university
discipline.467 In the seventeenth century, Politik in the tradition of the politica of Justus
Lipsius, but also Johannes Althusius, was understood as the science of men’s common
life in the state, including the issues of virtue and utility as the motive of association, of
power  and  command,  judgement  (prudentia), obedience and order, and many others.
The “political Aristotelianism” built on such foundations was also a university based
field of study, before it gave way to both Polizeiwissenschaft and a general state science
drawing on jurisprudence, politics, economics and the historical and statistical
disciplines.468 Thus,  on  the  one  hand  both Polizei and Politik are hardly adequate to
recall the qualities of “polite” or “polished”. On the other hand, while the latter words
are (correctly) rendered into German by Mittelstedt as verfeinert or geschliffen, no reader
could have supposed them to be etymologically linked with Polizey and Politik.469
466 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 36, 42-3.
467 From the extensive literature on the early moden German theory and concept of Polizey, I have used
Maier, Die ältere deutsche Staats- und Verwaltungslehre, pt. 3; Jutta Brückner, Staatswissenschaften,
Kameralismus und Naturrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Wissenschaft im Deutschland des späten
17. und frühen 18. Jahrhunderts (München: C. H. Beck, 1976);  Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, “Polizei”, in
Brunner, Conze and Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, IV (1978), 875-898;  Michael Stolleis,
Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. Erster Band: Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft 1600-
1800 (München: C. H. Beck, 1988), ch. 8.
468 Volker Sellin, “Politik”, in Brunner, Conze and Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, IV (1978),
esp. 814-830;  Friedeburg and Seidler, “The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation”, 134-166.
469 Cf. the passages quoted above from Robertson, History of Charles V, I.,  36-43 with Geschichte Carkls des
Fünften (1778),  I. 45-54.
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Apparently, then, even in the main text of Mittelstedt’s translation, Robertson’s
grand design suffers  as  a  result  of  the  choice  of  certain  terms.  Besides  weakening the
coherence of Robertson’s train of thought, these terms seem to reflect a mentality and a
milieu that is somewhat different from the one which bred the viewpoints of the
“moderate literati”. They belong to a morally austere bürgerlich world, where
respectable middle class activities, such as trade (Handel) are pursued with diligence
(Fleiß), under the paternal solicitude of gute Policey. How all these naturally reinforce
each other to constitute a complex web of social relationships governed by good
manners and justice can by no means emerge as spontaneously from the German as it
does from the English text.
Turning to the notes with which Remer supplemented the translation, they can
be classified, first, as methodological objections against Robertson’s quasi-
anthropological approach and the generalizations he made on its basis, and, second, as
comments on his terminology and a number of statements, mainly in regard of the
institutions of feudalism and the German and other constitutions, which Remer found
insufficient or inaccurate. The first kind of criticism occasionally results in some
inconsistencies. In agreement with Robertson, Remer complements his account of the
causes of the barbaric invasions of the Roman Empire by stressing the peculiarities of
the mode of subsistence they all shared (“they all subsisted from pasturage, hunting
and the booty of war”); at other places, however, he emphasizes that their remarkable
similarity is mainly due to their ethnic identity, that is, not their similar
circumstances).470
It is also in this spirit that Remer criticizes Robertson for drawing the above-
mentioned parallel between the Germanic peoples and the native Americans, a device
peculiar to conjectural history. He thought that this comparison, which is “neither
particularly necessary, nor particularly well-founded”, was only made because “the
history of the Americans is one of Mr Robertson’s favourite themes”. “The Americans”,
Remer goes on, “resemble the Germans no more closely than any people does another
one in the state of nature. It might be far more apposite to draw a parallel between the
470  Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778), I. 9, 23.
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ancient Germans and the Tartars of Asia. For these ultimately belong to the same
original tribe [Stammvolk].”471 Remer introduces here a quite different principle of socio-
historical explanation from the one Robertson uses: that of race and ethnicity. Since
Robertson himself, while stressing the value of anthropological material for comparison
and generalization, also admits its limits – I do not pretend that the state of society in
the two countries was perfectly similar” –, Remer’s captious remark even seems
somewhat unfair. It should probably be conceived as one of the tokens of his attempt at
independence and originality, dictated by the contemporary conventions of judging the
standard of a translation.
By contrast, the notes with factual criticism usually contain useful additions to
and corrections of the text, and complement Robertson’s intellectual power with careful
attention to the minute details of the functioning and transformations of the feudal
order, mainly its legal and jurisdictional framework. Such notes concerned, for instance,
the rise of urban liberties, some aspects of the administering of laws among the
Germanic peoples, or the restoration of royal supremacy as a result of the suppression
of baronial jurisdiction. Commenting on Robertson’s treatment of certain subjects of
German history, Remer could not conceal a sense of patriotic resentment: “Throughout
this entire book, Mr Robertson failed to make a proper use of German writers, which
gives rise to a false,  confusing and incomplete presentation of subjects concerning the
internal condition of Germany.” 472 Remer, on the contrary, as it is explained in the
“Preface”, relied in his notes on the advice of “a learned friend” whose contributions he
marked with the letter “P.”. The characteristic topics of such notes are, first, certain
concepts pertaining to feudal tenure; and, second, the constitution of the Holy Roman
Empire and the role of its peculiar institutions, such as the Reichstag, the imperial cities,
the Reichshofrat and the Kammergericht.473 As these are all themes which figured very
prominently in the oeuvre of Pütter, it is tempting to guess that the great Göttingen jurist
471 “Die Amerikaner sind den Teutschen nicht ähnlicher, als jedes Volk einander im Stande der Natur ist.
Weit treffender würde vielleicht eine Parallel gerathen, die zwischen den alten Teutschen, und den
Asiatischen Tartren gezogen würde. Denn diese sind ursprünglich ein Stammvolk.” Ibid., 290.
472 Ibid., 56-7, 84, 90, 243.
473 Ibid., 243, 247, 297, 483; 247, 354, 417.
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might have assisted Remer in compiling his critical apparatus to Robertson, though in
the lack of direct evidence this must be treated with caution.
As long as such modifications were limited to the footnotes and were not
included in the main text, they served to adjust the book to the expectations of the
learned German reader, rather than adding to the confusion of the original argument
caused by the unavoidably unfortunate choice of some key terms and the pretentious
methodological objections. Remer, however, did not remain content with such
alterations. He must have wished to benefit from Robertson’s fame while taking pride
in an “original” achievement that could be considered his own. Were it not for this
ambition, it would be quite puzzling that in his revision of the book no reference at all
is made to the already eventful history of the book in German – a history in which he
played an important role himself. In the 1792 “Preface” to the entirely rewritten
Geschichte Kaiser Carls des Fünften published from 1792 to 1795, Remer explicitly claimed
that a mere annotation of the text would not suffice, as if this were not the course he
had chosen to follow fourteen years earlier. He promised to retain everything that was
“true and correct” in the original, but he thought that the confusion stemming from the
structure of the book could only be remedied by a full revision – otherwise the reader,
instead of  obtaining a  true  picture,  would have merely  learned where  Robertson had
erred. Similarly to Adam Smith, who also preferred the traditional, digressive style,474
Remer found it a mark of incoherence to include the dominant tendencies in a fairly
concise  narrative  and refer  the  reader  for  nearly  everything else  (sources,  authorities,
explanations, doubts, contrary opinions) to the section “Proofs and Illustrations” at the
end of the main text, as Robertson did. “According to Robertson’s plan, the text should
have contained only the great outlines, the more detailed exposition taking place in the
notes.” But so difficult are the “great outlines” (große Umrisse) objectively to determine,
that this is in fact impossible.475
However much he may have admired, as he claimed, Robertson’s “philosophical
overview” of the Middle Ages, such remarks show that Remer had some doubts
474 Stewart, Biographical Memoirs,  173.
475 Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), I. vii.
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concerning the very possibility of what others considered the former’s main
achievement, i.e., historical generalization. Indeed, the text resulting from a revision
undertaken in this spirit, if not precisely a step back towards Völkergeschichte, which
Gatterer had in vain wished to supersede, fell short of the criteria established for a true
Universalhistorie. In the Abriß of 1792, twice as long as Robertson’s A View of the Progress
of Society, Remer rearranged and renamed the chapters of the original, and
amalgamated the notes, both those of Robertson and his own from the 1778 edition,
into the main text. He also supplemented it with a detailed account of the history of the
Germanic peoples until the reign of Charlemagne, a more profound analysis of
medieval constitutions, and “nearly all particulars” on the origin of towns, the history
of  the  papacy  and  the  monastic  orders,  commerce  and  warfare.  True,  the  work  was
enriched in data by such additions, but it became rather difficult to discover the
argument they serve. As a result of the revisions, Robertson’s tightly knit logic was
thrown into disarray, making it virtually impossible to follow the natural succession of
developments that emerged so clearly from the original.
Such changes in the coherence of the work are, in fact, reflected in its
contemporary German reviews. The reviewer of the original English edition – the
renowned polymath Albrecht von Haller, who continued to send reviews to the
Göttingische Anzeigen long  after  his  departure  from  the  Georgia  Augusta  –  found  no
difficulty in presenting a fairly correct assessment of the main themes and messages of
the text: an account of the transformation of primitive Germanic liberties into
representative institutions, in conjunction with the growth of commerce and cities in
the aftermath of the Crusades; the contribution of cultural attainments, such as the
printing press, to these processes; and the simultaneous decline of feudal dominion and
the rise of national monarchies.476 By contrast, in the review of Remer’s revision of the
View of the Progress of Society,  while  acknowledging that  the  book had gained a  lot  in
factual accuracy, Spittler complained not only that the additions “should have followed
476 Albrecht von Haller, “Review of Robertson, History of Charles V”, GAgS, 23 (1770), I. 571.
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Robertson’s style more closely”, but also that the text “in more than one passage ... lacks
the true clarity of expression.”477
So far, I have not dwelt on how the term I identified as a cornerstone of A View of
the Progress of Society,  that is,  “manners”, fared in the various German versions of the
work.  In  the  1778  edition,  it  was  more  or  less  consistently  rendered  as Sitten,
conventionally and quite sensibly used to translate mores, moeurs and manners into
German. In the 1792 revision, however, it became the object of the first conspicuous
alterations. “View of the Progress of Society in Europe, with respect to interior
Government,  Laws  and  Manners”  is  the  title  of  Section  One  (out  of  three)  in
Robertson’s work. Remer’s first chapter (out of eight) is entitled “The general
revolution of state [allgemeine Staatsveränderung] in Europe through the overthrow of
the Western Empire”; and where in the first sentence, quoted above, Robertson
mentions the revolution in “manners”, the German text has “internal constitution”
[innere Verfassung]. Whereas in Robertson’s original the standards of human intercourse
which arise organically as  a  result  of  spontaneous  communication  itself  and/or  are
dictated by the individual moral sense, occupy an emphatic position, Remer simply
uses instead a near-synonym of the other adverbial phrase in the sentence (i.e., “in the
political state” / “in dem politischen System”). A term denoting governance, “the political
state” cannot be directly related to the theme of natural sociability. Obviously, recalling
the humanist categories of Bruni mentioned in Chapter Three above, it was far from
being intended by Remer as a translatio of the word “manners”; quite on the contrary, it
was deliberately chosen by him, through an exercise of his vis traducatur,  as  a
replacement for it, implying an appropriate transformatio of meaning.478 In the opening
passages of the text, which carry an especially heavy weight, the sphere in which events
and changes or “revolutions” of historical significance may take place seems to be
reduced to those where human activity, particularly in the contemporary German
environment, was usually conceived of as organized, which is by no means implied by
Robertson’s original.
477 Ludwig Timotheus Spittler, “Review of Remer, Abri? des gesellschaftlichen Lebens in Europa … Nach dem
ertsen Theile von Robertsons Leben Carl V. bearbeitet”, GAgS, 46 (1793), II. 787, 788.
478 Cf. above, Chapter One, 57.
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It is also in vain to look for Sitten in the revision at the place where “manners”
next appear in Robertson’s original. Referring to the times when the Roman Empire
was at the height of its power, it is claimed there that “[a]s a consolation for the loss of
liberty, [the Romans] communicated their arts, sciences, language and manners to their
new subjects.” This sentence was faithfully reproduced in the 1778, and also retained in
the 1792 version of the Abriß, with the difference that “language and manners”,
translated in the former as “Sprache und Sitten”, was replaced by Bildung in the latter.479
Learning or erudition, and the process of its acquisition through education, or
alternatively mental frame and cultural accomplishments in general, the common sense
meaning of Bildung embraces that of the terms which preceded it (“arts and
sciences”/”Künste und Wissenschaften”). In a near-contemporary discussion of this
concept Moses Mendelssohn spoke of it as the perfection of material and spiritual
culture which is possessed by a nation in proportion with the harmony (attained
through art and industry) between its social condition and the calling of man.480 In
Herder’s influential texts, from the letters on recent German literature (1767-1768),
through the Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774) to the
Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784), the field covered by Bildung is
successively expanded to embrace the entire historical process of the formation and
successive improvement of natural, mental and spiritual phenomena.481 Here we have a
term which had increasingly “public” overtones in Germany during this period;
nevertheless, Robertson’s argument is diluted because “manners” loses its distinct and
emphatic status, this time through being subsumed in a more comprehensive concept.
In a passage referred to above in connection with “luxury”, Remer’s solution is
analogous to the problem of police/polished/polite. “In less than a century after the
barbarous nations settled in their new conquests,” Robertson wrote, “almost all the
479 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 2; Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778), I. 4; ibid., (1792/1819), 3, 4.
480 “Je  mehr  der  gesellige  Zustand  eines  Volks  durch  Kunst  und  Fleiß  mit  der  Bestimmung  des
Menschen in Harmonie gebracht worden, desto mehr Bildung hat dieses Volk. Bildung Zerfällt in
Kultur und Aufklärung. Jene scheint mehr auf das Praktische zu gehen … Aufklärung hingegen scheinet
sich  mehr  auf  das Theoretische  zu beziehen. Moses Mendelsshon, “Über die Frage: was heißt
aufklären?” [Berlinische Monatsschrift, 1784], in Was ist Aufklärung? Thesen und Definitionen, ed. Ehrhard
Bahr (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), 4.
481 Rudolf Vierhaus, “Bildung”, in Brunner, Conze, Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, I. 508-
551, for Herder specifically 515-7.
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effects of the knowledge and civility which the Romans had spread through Europe
disappeared.” The topic of manners, this time not as an analytical category, but as a
term implying positive value judgement, is lost in the German rendering of a sentence:
where Robertson spoke of “civility” –  i.e., good or polite manners as well as liberal
education and orderly political state –, Remer has feine[r] Geschmack (refined taste).
Although “taste” was used in this period in Britain, too, to describe manners or social
attitudes, it lacks the etymological association with the public sphere which was so
essential for the purposes of Robertson.482
Sitten later appears483 quite frequently in the text. But in certain key passages it is
juxtaposed with other words or phrases which make it doubtful whether it means the
same, both semantically and methodologically, for Remer as “manners” does for
Robertson. In reference to the remarkable similarity of the barbarous tribes –  explained
by Robertson in sociological and by Remer, here again, in ethnic terms –, the 1792 Abriß
mentions their Sitten und Gewohnheiten (manners and customs). The fifth  chapter, on
“The first steps towards amending the faults of the Middle Ages,” is introduced by a
reflection on the changes in the Sitten und Denkart (manners and mentality/way of
thinking) of the period. Both passages have their approximate counterparts in the
original, which only refers to manners.484 Even a paragraph which is retained almost
word by word (although heaped together from separate passages of the original) may
leave the reader perplexed.  Robertson uses dark colours to depict the medieval
stagnation of the human mind:
If men do not enjoy the protection of regular government, together with the
expectation of personal security, which naturally flows from it, they never
482 Robertson, History  of  Charles  V,  I., 21; Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), I. 288. The German
sentence reads in full: “In weniger als hundert Jahren nach der Eroberung ihrer neuen Wohnsitze
verschwunden fast alle Denkmahle und Wirkungen der Wissenschaften und des feinen Geschmacks, den
die Römer einem beträchtlichen Theile von Europa mitgetheilt hatten.”
483 First, in the passage about the introduction of `new forms of government, new laws, new manners' etc.
as a result of the Germanic invasions throughout Europe. Cf. History of Charles V, I., 12 and Geschichte Carls
des Fünften (1792/1819), I. 27-8.
484 Cf. Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), I. 64 and II. 4 with History of Charles V, I., 17, 24.
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attempt to make any progress in science, not aim at attaining to refinement in
taste or manners…. Human society is in its most corrupted state at that period
when men have lost their original independence and simplicity of manners, but
have not attained to that degree of refinement which introduces a sense of
decorum and of propriety in conduct, as a restraint on those passions which lead
to heinous crimes.”485
For him this serves to invoke for the first time in the book one of the characteristic ideas
of the Scottish Enlightenment. The cultivation and flourishing of the arts and sciences
play a decisive role in the ennoblement – and their neglect results in the degradation –
of the forms of human intercourse, with far-reaching consequences to the good of the
public as a whole.  Moreover,  these factors mutually reinforce one another’s effects.  In
Remer’s revision the passage bears the heading “Wildheit der Sitten” (the savageness of
manners). The word Sitten, however, is not used in the passage itself, which is,
significantly, introduced with the following sentence: “The constitution of the state and
religion are the two great progenitors of the moral character of a nation.”486
To sum up, it seems that the word Sitten is felt by Remer in the first two cases to
be in need of supplement in order to convey the full meaning of “manners”, an
impression confirmed by the third case, where it is not supplemented and is apparently
subsumed under morality. These examples suggest that for Remer, if he was aware of
the crucial role of the term at all, the purely ethical component in the meaning of Sitten
was predominant. This impression is confirmed in a passage where he censures the
warlike Sitten of the noblemen of the Dark Ages, and then observes that
“[o]ne could expect even less morality [Sittlichkeit] from the common man,
whose moral improvement [moralische Bildung] is neglected in such a period and
among such a nation, which in these unhappy times consisted of a crowd of
miserable creatures, deprived of all human rights, even a claim to such rights ...
485 Ibid. 21, 24.
486 Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), I. 316. “Staatsverfassung und Religion [sind] die beyden
großen Schöpferinnen des moralischen Charakters einer Nation.”
               dc_444_12
216
The students of the moral condition [sittlichen Zustand] of nations have observed
that  in  all  peoples  it  is  amongst  the  well-to-do  middle  class  that  the  greatest
amount of morality [Sittlichkeit] is to be found ...”487
But this class disappeared along with the towns which the barbarous invasions had
destroyed. Almost imperceptibly, what initially looks like a discussion of the totality of
the standards of human intercourse – a category in which grace, elegance and
politeness  as  well  as  virtue,  justice  and chastity  are  involved –,  is  reduced to  include
only the second group of these qualities.
Let us now turn to Remer’s treatment of Robertson’s account of how European
society started to emerge from the miserable state of feudal barbarism. On comparing
the two texts, the reader’s main impression is the further disruption of Robertsonian
causality. The most striking passages of A View of the Progress of Society, eloquent in all
their conciseness, are frequently rephrased in a way that only dimly resembles the
original; what is more, their order of succession is often changed, and they are
interspersed with long digressions, explanations and qualifications that verge on
pedantry. Conspicuous examples of this is Remer’s exhaustive treatment of the customs
relating to private war and jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, and his long lamentation on
the fact that the first revival of learning failed to go beyond speculative
Aristotelianism.488
The impact of the Crusades on commerce, and through it on the growth of
towns and on the rise of the rule of law, is a topic crucial for the message of Robertson,
and here Remer’s narrative unfolds in a rather peculiar way. He also observes that
these undertakings, whose chief motivation was superstition, resulted in an unexpected
transformation  of,  e.g.,  property  relations.  Besides  the  ever  growing  riches  of  the
Church and monarchs,  the  rise  of  the  middle  classes  (Mittelstand) is duly mentioned.
487 “Noch weniger Sittlichkeit konnte man von dem gemeinen Mann erwarten, dessen moralische Bildung
in einer jeden Periode und unter einer jeden Nation verabsäumt ist, der aber in diesen unglücklichen
Zeiten aus einem Haufen armseliger, aller Menschenrechte, selbst aller Forderungen dieselben beraubter
Geschöpfe bestand ... Die Beobachter der sittlichen Zustandes der Nationen haben die Bemerkung
gemacht, daß die größte Sittlichkeit bey allen Völkerschaften unter den wohlhabenden Mittelstande zu
finden sey ...” Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), II.  318.
488 Ibid., II. 75-119, 170-8.
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However, the meticulous description of some particulars of this process in Italy,
Germany, France and England is followed not by the vivid Robertsonian summary of
the consequences but rather by dozens of pages on the minutiae of the changing status
of serfs, of medieval jurisdiction, of the restoration of Roman law, and of the revival of
learning.489 Only then is the reader's attention animated by the following:
“Above, we have already described those salutary effects which the liberation of
the townsman and the peasant had on the activities of both. [In fact, this
description was far from being as impressive as in Robertson”s original.] There
was a general fermentation of humours. New crafts arose; the ones already
cultivated were improved; sundry kinds of labourers were united in factories
and workshops; neighbouring peoples were emulating each other; each product
became more refined; the peasant found a market for the produce of his land in
the populous cities, and paid the money earned on them back to the townsman
in exchange for the articles purchased from him. Commerce became more
extensive, enriched a considerable part of the nation, forged links between
distant peoples, taught men a thousand new ways to please their senses, made
them familiar with forms of comfort and diversion they had never known, and
while it thus created new demands, it also satisfied them. Thus, it became one of
the most important and most efficient means through which the manners and
mentality [die Sitten und die Denkart] of Europe took on an entirely different
shape.”490
489 Ibid., II. 21-178.
490 “Wir haben oben die seligen Wirkungen beschrieben, welche die Befreyung des Städters und des
Landmanns auf ihre Thätigkeit hervorbrachte.Die Gährung der Gemüther war allgemein. Neue
Handwerke entstanden; die schon getriebenen wurden verbessert; man vereinigte vielerley Arbeiter zu
Fabriken und Manufacturen; ein benachbartes Volk lernte von dem anderen; jedes Product wurde
veredelt; der Landmann fand in den volkreichen Städten Abnehmer der Früchte seines Ackers, und gab
sein dafür erworbenes Geld dem Städter wieder für erkaufte Waaren zurück. Die Handlung verbreitete
sich, bereicherte eine beträchtliche Theil der Nation,verband entfernten Völkerschaften mit einander,
lehrte die Menschen tausend neue Vergnügungen ihrer Sinne zu kennen, machte sie aufmerksam auf
Bequemlichkeiten und Ergößlichkeiten, von denen sie vorher keinen Begriff hatten, und schuf zwar auf
diese Art neue Bedürfnisse, befriedigte sie aber auch. So wurde sie eines der vornehmsten und
wirksamsten Hülfmitteln, durch welcher die Sitten und die Denkart Europens eine völlig veränderte
Gestalt gewanne.” Ibid, II. 179.
               dc_444_12
218
This passage, with the emphasis it puts on the mechanism of exchange, in fact even
surpasses Robertson’s text as regards its clarity in representing the intercourse between
the various partners in the division of labour. However, its value is seriously reduced
by its disjunction from the earlier reflections on the same range of problems, and, more
importantly, by the fact that in it the Robertsonian logic is turned upside down. In A
View of the Progress of Society the institutionalization of freedom under the law is
consequent upon the refinement of manners through the accelerated pace of social
intercourse, itself stemming from a more vigorous commerce. In the 1792 Abriß, the
freedom of townsmen (and of peasants) is itself the cause which produces “salutary
effects”; their liberation comes deus ex machina, fertilizing, first, economic relationships,
and through them attitudes and norms of behaviour.491
It is true that in the next chapter Remer undertakes once more to strike the
balance of “the good and evil effects of the first enlightenment” [erste Aufklärung] and
begins by establishing that no improvement could take place in the lifestyle and
manners of any people
“until they enter into communication with a more refined people. Among the
European nations, such a faster improvement was brought about by the
Crusades,  by  the  familiarity  with  the  Orient  which  they  caused,  by  the  more
extensive trade and the increasing welfare it gave rise to. Among the nobleman,
the first step of the improvement of manners [Sittenverbesserung] was the spirit of
chivalry; among the middle classes, gradually a degree of refinement, pliancy
and affability arose, which are facilitated by a more frequent intercourse with
various  sorts  of  people  and  by  the  prospect  of  gain  or  the  achievement  of
goals.”492
491 Cf.  ibid., II. 253, where “welfare and freedom” are mentioned as parallel causes whose effect is the
improvement of manners.
492 “...  bis  es  mit  einem  anderen  mehr  verfeinerten  Volke  in  Verbindung  kommt.  Diese  schnellere
Verbesserung  brachten  bey  den  europäischen  Nationen  die  Kreuzzüge,  die  dadurch  mit  dem  Orient
entstandene  Bekanntschaft,  die  Erweiterung  der  Handlung  und  der  durch  sie  vermehrte  Wohlstand
hervor.  Bey  den  Edlen  war  der  Geist  der  Ritterschaft  die  erste  Stuffe  der  Sittenverbesserung;  bey  dem
Mittelstande entstand allmählich diese Abschleifung, Geschmeidigkeit und Gefälligkeit , welche häufiger
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The last remarks hold out the promise of the restoration of Robertson's logic. However,
on the subsequent pages it is not the assessment of the impact of commerce on the
growth of politeness that occupies the central place. They are dominated by the theme
of chivalry, a subject on which Remer follows Robertson’s phrases with unusual
accuracy – with the significant difference that according to him the germs of chivalric
virtues were already inherent in the ancient Germans.
Reading the Abriß, one is left with the impression that it was mainly this
“mixture of valour, gallantry and religious sentiment,” which “contributed
extraordinarily to the improvement of the manners of the great,” that account for any
“good effects of the first enlightenment.”493 Although Robertson, too, attributes
importance to chivalry in his history of manners, he regards its role as rather
complementary. He closes his first section by emphasizing that “[i]n proportion as
commerce made its way into the different countries of Europe, they successively turned
their attention to those objects and adopted those manners which occupy and
distinguish polished nations.”494 In Remer’s account the acknowledgement of the
civilizing role of commerce and townsmen seems rather half-hearted when compared
to the emphasis he puts on the spirit of chivalry and the virtuous knight.495 While
geared to flatter Bürger morality, then, Remer’s overturning of Robertson’s logic also
results in another sort of “Germanization” as it harks back fondly to “Gothic” ethos.
If Remer represented chivalry as having been more influential in shaping the
rudiments of modern polite manners than other factors, it is tempting to draw a parallel
between his twist of Robertson’s argument and the polemic of Edmund Burke with the
“oeconomical politicians” in the Reflections on the Revolution in France.496 There, too, in a
Umgang mit mehreren Arten von Menschen, und das Verlangen, zu gewinnen oder seine Absichten zu
erreichen, hervorzubringen pflegt.” Ibid., II. 246.
493 Ibid.,  247-51. Cf. Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 329.
494 Ibid.,  333.
495 See, e.g., Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1792/1819), II. 251 ff,  337.
496 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol.
VIII: The French Revolution 1790-1794, ed. Leslie Mitchell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 130.
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discussion that paraphrases much of the thought of the historians of the Scottish school,
the driving force of the growth of civilization is the refinement of the spirit and not that
of matter.497 Remer was an admirer of Burke – an “English Demosthenes” whose
insight in politics, knowledge of commerce and national characters and, above all, love
of freedom is unmatched498 -, at least until he thought, probably under the impact of
Burke’s later revolutionary writings, that old age had “weakened his
understanding.”499 But Remer was not in the habit of citing contemporary authorities;
and, according to the catalogue of his books, he only possessed the Reflections not in the
original edition but in Friedrich Gentz’ translation, published a year after the Abriß.
On the other hand, Remer possessed a considerable number of books by authors
with whose thinking his own in fact showed a greater affinity than with his model
Robertson. One such author was Göttingen’s prolific historian Christoph Meiners, who
himself relied extensively on Robertson’s account of, e.g., the Crusades and the rise of
urban communities, but in a framework where the structural peculiarities of West
European societies sprang from the ethnic identity of the Germanic peoples (and their
superiority to others).500 Like Remer, Meiners argued that chivalry was in the nature of
the “Celts” well before they started to play a prominent role in shaping the history of
497 See  J.  G.  A.  Pocock,  “The  Political  Economy  of  Burke's  Analysis  of  the  French  Revolution”, The
Historical Journal, 25 (1982), 331-349, repr. in idem., Virtue, Commerce, and History. Essays on Political Thought
and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 198-9.
498 Remer (ed.), Amerikanisches Archiv, I. 6-7.
499 Remer’s note in Charles Stedman, Geschichte des Ursprungs, des Fortgangs und der Beendigung des
Amerikanischen Krieges,  trans.  by  Julius  August  Remer  (Berlin:  Vo?, 1795), I. 117. Robertson actually
thought in a similar fashion upon the publication of the Reflections,  referring  to  Burke’s  “ravings”  (to
change his mind about the French Revolution soon afterwards). See Richard B. Sher, “1688 and 1788:
William Robertson on Revolution in Britain and France”, in Paul Dukes and John Dunkley, (eds.), Culture
and Revolution (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 103. As for Remer’s own views on the
French Revolution, the only source to assess them is a series of tantalizingly incomplete remarks in his
Geschichte der französischen Constitutionen (in which the revolutionary constitutions are not discussed).
These  show  him  to  have  been  by  and  large  in  agreement  with  Burke’s  Hanoverian  followers,  Ernst
Brandes and August Wilhelm Rehberg, without referring to either of them.
500 See Christoph Meiners, Geschichte der Ungleichheit der Stände unter den vornehmsten Europäischen Staaten
(Hannover: Helwing, 1792), II. ch. 5 and 7. Meiners’ preoccupation with race as a decisive factor in history
had been well known since the publication of his Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit (Lemgo: Meyer,
1785).  On  Meiners,  see  Friedrich  Lotter,  “Christoph  Meiners  und  die  Lehre  von  der  unterschiedlichen
Wertigkeit der Menschenrassen”, in Hartmut Boockmann, Hermann Wellenreuther (ed.),
Geschichtswissenschaft in Göttingen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 30-75.
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Europe.501 In both respects, Meiners had a Scottish predecessor: Gilbert Stuart, already
mentioned in Chapter Three as a rival and a critic of Robertson. In addition to making
similar points about the transhistorical significance of ethnicity, Stuart also claimed in
an obvious jest on Robertson that, contrary to what “some writers who have no tincture
of philosophy” have written, chivalry and the holy wars were not the cause, but the
effect of refinement.502
The fact that Remer possessed these books, of course, supplies no evidence of his
actual reliance on their authors.503 Nevertheless, textual and structural similarities put
him, interestingly enough, in company with writers whose methodological and
theoretical approach to history contradicted that of Robertson (in the case of Stuart,
directly and explicitly by a self-proclaimed rival), and whose works he must have
known quite well. The following conclusion, then, seems reasonable to draw. The
expressions used to translate terms whose proper understanding is the clue to
Robertson’s logic already tend to weaken the strong socio-economic links he assumed
between the various spheres of human existence and progress taking place in them. In
addition, as Remer’s narrative in the 1792 Abriß unfolds,  a  quite  different  system  of
causality gradually emerges. From the outset, historical change seems to occur in and
through organized activities and to be motivated by moral-spiritual enlightenment.
Both as the medium and as the cause of such transformations, spontaneous intercourse
in the socio-economic realm takes second place. Whatever the motivation and the
influences under which Remer thought it appropriate to wrap up a critical
reassessment of Robertson in an adaptation of one of the latter’s chief works, the
German publishing history of A View of the Progress of Society represents a parallel to the
above-mentioned cases of David Hume’s skepticism and Adam Ferguson’s civic
activism.
501 Christoph Meiners, Geschichte des weiblichen Geschlechts, vol. I (Hannover: Helwing, 1788), ch. 6.
502 Gilbert Stuart, A View of Society in Europe in its Progress from Rudeness to Refinement: Or, Inquiries
Concerning the History of Law, Government, and Manners [1778] (Basel: Tourneisen, 1797), 59.
503 Remer had Christoph Friedrich Blankenburg’s 1779 German translation of the View of Society by Stuart.
For reference to this book and the ones by Meiners, see Remers hinterlassene Büchersammlung, 8, 56, 59, 93.
               dc_444_12
222
Chapter Five
 “Scottish” histories and German identities
In the previous chapter Robertson’s View of the Progress of Society in Europe received a
separate discussion on two grounds: first, its inherent character arising from the
consistent application of the stadial scheme throughout the text, and second, the
rather drastic nature of the transformations it underwent during the process of
German reception. There are similarly compelling reasons for a combined treatment
of the narrative sections of the History of Charles V and the History of Scotland in this
chapter. While the fundamental sociological assumptions concerning the incentives
and structures of material, cultural and institutional progress, together with the
relevant vocabulary, are nowhere suppressed in them, both of these works are
fundamentally political narratives of wielding and losing power, of manoeuvre and
stratagem  applied  to  the  building  or  challenging  of  states,  in  which  personal
sentiment and character receive an amount of attention commensurate with their
importance. In discussing these topics, both works inevitably address their
implications  to  the  wider  themes of  the  chances  of  civil  and religious  liberty  in  the
face of ambitious bureaucratic-military establishments (or, paradoxically, the lack of
them). In turn, the tackling of such themes generated conceptualizations of political
loyalty, commitment, community and identity. From the angle of the comparisons
and transfers that are the central concern of this book, the preoccupation of this
chapter  should be  the  uses  to  which Robertson’s  relevant  views were  put  among a
linguistic and cultural community that was different from his primary audience.
These views themselves ought to be briefly examined first.
The History of Scotland and the History of Charles V are  lithmus  tests  for
investigating the benefits and the limits of transferring approaches to national history
and judgements about it into a foreign linguistic and cultural environment. Both of
them are works of a patriotic national historian who has also been identified as one
of the quintessential eighteenth-century cosmopolitan historians. In both of them
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Robertson focuses on the sixteenth century, which he considered crucial from the
point of view of his vision of the history of the western world as the unfolding of the
great plan of Providence: a gradually increasing accessibility of the divine revelation,
made possible by the improvement of the means of subsistence, of manners, and of
the human mind.504 The period of chief interest for the Scottish historian represented
a crisis in that process (in the sense in which the term has been used in twentieth-
century literature on the early-modern period, i.e., both as a halt in progress and as
the catalyst of a future pregnant with innovation.)505 In the first work Robertson
sought to show how and why Scotland, although already making its appearance on
the  horizon  of  European  history  by  the  sixteenth  century,  did  not  share  in
developments that were taking place elsewhere, such as the curtailing of feudalism.
The country passed “through the valley of the shadow of despotism,”506 which
Scottish Whigs like Robertson – in a fashion resembling Voltaire’s thèse royale –
regarded as a precondition of attaining true civil liberty extending to the commons,
only after the Union of Crowns in 1603, and the purgatory lasted until the
revolutionary settlement of the turn of the eighteenth century completely annihilated
the power of the nobles.  In exploring Scottish history in such terms, he contributed
to the further erosion of a mode of patriotic history-writing that rested on the legend
of the ancient Scottish constitution, whose special virtues were owing to a unique
Gaelic legacy, and which was heroically preserved against tyrants within the country
and foreign invaders by a valiant, public-spirited nobility.
This interpretation of the Scottish past, most notably represented in the
humanist George Buchanan’s Rerum Scoticarum historia (1582), was already being
challenged  from  at  least  two  angles  for  over  half  a  century  by  the  time  Robertson
started his career.507 One important critic of it was the republican Andrew Fletcher of
504 Phillipson, “Providence and progress”; cf. Chapter 3 above.
505 This  use  of  “crisis”,  perhaps  introduced  by  Jakob  Burckhardt  in  Chapter  4  of  the Reflections on
History, was applied to the birth pangs giving rise to the Enlightenment in Paul Hazard, La crise de la
conscience européenne in  1935,  a  book  that  in  turn  was  to  some  extent  responsible  for  the
fashionableness of the term in the 1950s and thereafter among historians studying the “general crisis”
of the seventeenth century which marked the advent of capitalism.
506 Cf. Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s past, 182.
507 On Buchanan’s relevant views, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, “George Buchanan and the ancient Scottish
constitution”, English Historical Review,  supplement  3  (1966);  Roger  A.  Mason,  “Scotching  the  Brut:
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Saltoun, a father figure for the Scottish Enlightenment at the time of the Union
debates as well as an arch-patriot. Fletcher ridiculed the idea that the nobility had
been a disinterested guardian of Scottish liberty, although he retained the notion of
liberty as freedom to take an active part in national affairs, and the view that “no
monarchy in Europe was more limited, nor any people more jealous of liberty than
the Scots.”508 Second, there was also a trend of royalist, even Jacobite inspiration,
which suggested that as freedom was incompatible with the lawlessness that
generally prevailed in the country, “actual liberty was a stranger here ... our Scottish
heroes of old savour a little of the Poles at present: they fought for liberty and
independency, not to their country, but to the crown and the grandees.” The royalist
view also undermined the historical basis of the alleged two-thousand-year-old ius
regni.509 Such trends were all helpful in working out the historical foundations of an
anti-aristocratic and civil patriotism in an atmosphere generally critical of the
Scottish past, as encapsulated in Alexander Wedderburn’s Preface to the Edinburgh
Review of 1755-6 (an initiative whose aim was to improve Scottish letters, and in
which Robertson was also active): “The memory of our ancient state is not so much
obliterated, but that, by comparing the past with the present, we may clearly see the
superior advantages we now enjoy, and readily discern from what sources they
flow.”510 He meant, of course, the Union and its consequences.
True, Robertson did pay tribute to the robust traditions of independence and
martial  vigour  that  so  heavily  imprinted themselves  on the  history  of  Scotland.  He
was also as willing as Fletcher to explore these themes by using the classical
vocabulary of virtue, and in a “mood of carefully contained nostalgia.”511 But at the
same  time  he  had,  and  left,  no  doubt  that  these  aspects  of  the  Scottish  past  were
politics, history and national myth in sixteenth-century Britain”, in Roger A Mason (ed.), Scotland and
England 1286-1815 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987), 60-84.
508 Andrew Fletcher, “Speeches by a Member of the Parliament which Began at Edinburgh on the 6th of
May, 1703”, in Andrew Fletcher, Political Works, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 135.
509 By the Jacobite antiquary Thomas Innes. The previous quotation is from an 1735 article by the jurist
James Erskine of Grange. For both, see Colin Kidd, “The ideological significance of Robertson’s
History of Scotland”, in Brown (ed.), Robertson and the expansion of empire, 126-7.
510 Edinburgh Review (1755-6),  ii.  For  the  general  context,  see  Nicholas  Phillipson,  “Scottish  Public
Opinion  and  the  Union  in  the  Age  of  Association”,  in  Nicholas  Phillipson  and  Rosalind  Mitchison
(eds.), Scotland in the Age of Improvement (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 125-147.
511 The expression of Karen O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, 108.
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indissolubly wedded to the “aristocratical genius of the feudal government”512
which,  because  of  a  few peculiar  properties  of  the  country  and its  inhabitants,  was
only accentuated in the case of Scotland: while the lairds acknowledged no master,
foreign or domestic, nor did they recognize legal constraints, and exercised an
oppressive tyranny over their inferiors. “In rude ages, when the science of
government was extremely imperfect, among a martial people, unacquainted with
the arts of peace, strangers to the talents which make a figure in debate, and
despising them, Parliaments were not held in the same estimation as at present; nor
did haughty Barons love those courts, in which they appeared with such evident
marks of inferiority.”513 And  Scotland,  alas,  seemed  to  have  been  marked  by  the
longevity of these structures:
“The feudal aristocracy, which had been subverted in most nations of Europe
by the policy of their princes, or had been undermined by the progress of
commerce, still subsisted in full force in Scotland. Many causes had
contributed gradually to augment the power of the Scottish nobles;  and even
the  Reformation,  which,  in  every other  country  where  it  prevailed,  added to
the authority of the monarch, had increased their wealth and influence.”514
A remarkable shift in this (im)balance of power was brought about by the
accession of James VI to the throne of England and the consequent augmentation of
the resources available for the crown. This, however, temporarily created “a political
situation, of all others the most singular and the most unhappy; subjected at once to
the absolute will of a monarch, and to the oppressive jurisdiction of the aristocracy, it
suffered all  the miseries peculiar to both these forms of government. Its kings were
despotic; its nobles were slaves and tyrants; and the people groaned under the
rigorous domination of both.”515  Not least because of these considerations,
Robertson did not hesitate to hail the revolution of 1688 and the subsequent
512 William Robertson, The History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of King James VI, till
His Accession to the Crown of England, 2 vols. (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1996), I. 25.
513 Ibid., I. 82-3.
514 Ibid., II. 300.
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constitutional union of 1707, which “introduced other maxims of government in
Scotland.”  After  a  “survey  of  the  political  state  of  Scotland,  in  which  events  and
causes have been mentioned rather than developed”, he points out that the commons
became “admitted to a participation of all the privileges which the English had
purchased at the expence of so much blood.” Together with the economic benefits of
the Union and the potential for social progress and cultural refinement created by it,
in his eyes these developments compensated even for the partial loss of political
viability in the traditional sense, as embodied in the institution of an independent
Scottish parliament.
Recently, the vigour of Robertson’s Scottish patriotic commitment has been re-
emphasized, and his character as a “cosmopolitan” historian challenged. After all,
not only in the History of Scotland, but also in the History of Charles V, he consistently
raises his voice against foreign dominance and expresses his sympathy with the
defenders of local, regional and national political traditions.516 Robertson’s
“cosmopolitanism” is certainly limited if it is taken to mean a preference for
territorial homogenization and the creation of supra-national structures of authority
and governance. Accordingly, while the Union seemed to him as a “junction” by
which “Great Britain hath risen to an eminence and authority in Europe, which
England and Scotland, while separate, could never have attained,”517 he also saw the
need to stress that during the “famous controversy” that preceded the Union the
“imperial  and  independent”  character  of  both  partners  was  an  issue  of  crucial
importance. In a retrospect of five decades, however, Robertson felt that for his
contemporaries the same issue was “a matter of mere curiosity” (although precisely
because it was “momentous to our ancestors” it “cannot be altogether indifferent or
uninstructive to us” – a qualification of rather little weight).518 With the ebbing away
of the “national animosities” of an earlier age on which the debates focusing on the
desirable degree of parity between the partners fed, the very stakes of tackling the
Union  issue  were  shifted:  irrespective  of  the  extent  to  which  it  preserved  or
515 Ibid., II. 302.
516 Alex du Toit, “Cosmopolitanism, Despotism and Patriotic Resistance: William Robertson on the
Spanish Revolts against Charles V”, Bulletin of Spanish Studies, LXXXVI:1 (2009), 19-43.
517 Robertson, History of Scotland, II. 299.
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jeopardized national sovereignty, Robertson represented it as the beginning of an
authentic history of freedom in Scotland.
“As the nobles were deprived of power, the people acquired liberty. Exempted
from  the  burdens  to  which  they  were  formerly  subject,  screened  from
oppression,  to  which  they  had  been  long  exposed,  and  adopted  into  a
constitution,  whose  genius  and  laws  were  more  liberal  than  their  own,  they
have extended their commerce, refined their manners, made improvements in
the elegancies of life, and cultivated the arts and sciences.”519
By  broadening  the  horizon  of  writing  Scottish  history  to  include  the  progress  of
manners and social structures besides political events – in other words, by adopting a
comparative perspective and a “cosmopolitanism” of vision and approach, if not of
political commitment –, Robertson proposed to supersede the shallow ancient
constitutionalism (or rather “institutionalized liberty or right of resistance”)520 and
the insularity characteristic of former “patriotic” renderings of that history.
Thoroughly depending on a systematic criticism of feudalism, he offered a new,
enlightened patriotism, one that has been described as Anglo-British rather than
Scottish,  but  whose  chief  pursuit  was  the  improvement  of  the  socio-cultural
condition of Scotland, rather than vainglory and partisanship.
This interpretation of the History of Scotland rests exclusively on references to
Books I and VIII, the portions within which the narrative sections are bracketed and
in which, indeed, “events and causes have been mentioned rather than developed.”
While it has been suggested that Robertson’s first work lacks the “complicating
dimension of social theory”,521 the references above, which could be infinitely
multiplied from Books I and VIII, bear a striking similarity with the spirit and tenor,
if not the analytical tightness of the View of the Progress. The proportions are certainly
different, but the function of these sections for the argument of the History of Scotland
518 Ibid., I. 7.
519 Ibid., II. 305.
520 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, II. 263.
521 O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, 95.
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also resembles that of the View of the Progress for the History of Charles V: to provide a
structural-analytical framework for the contemplation and comprehension of the
human drama related in the narrative parts.  In the History of Scotland, this drama is
one  of  chaos  and  barbarity  almost  natural  to  a  land  whose  circumstances  do  not
favour the appearance and success of a type of political personality or “character”
motivated primarily by the dictates of interest rather than by passion.522
The  chief,  though  by  no  means  innocent  sufferer  of  the  drama  of  sixteenth-
century Scottish history was Mary Queen of the Scots, who was the subject of a
significant revival of interest during the period preceding the publication of
Robertson’s History.523 This was a thoroughly partisan interest, with adversaries
diabolizing Mary and adherents showing her to have been innocent and victimized.
Robertson chose to follow a different strategy. True to his moderate Whig convictions,
he believed that anti-Jacobitism, which he certainly embraced, was more effectively
served by marginalizing Mary as a political emblem than by railing against her.524 His
main device to divest Mary of her character as a potent symbol of an independent and
Stuart Scotland was to feminize her in ways that evoke contemporary aesthetic
discourse.  It  has  been  argued  that  Robertson  could  have  been  relying  on  the
aesthetics of the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson in intimating that Mary’s
femininity was a source of her moral weakness, simultaneously inviting empathy
from female readers and indulgent yet belittling sentiments of chivalry from men;
and that as this morally incompetent femininity demonstrates, stemming as it was
from her French and Catholic connections, Scotland’s destiny was with England and
Protestantism rather than anything represented by Mary.525 Yet Hutcheson’s directly
relevant text, the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), makes
no explicit reference to femininity. Robertson’s representation of Mary’s case as one
of  “beauty  in  distress”  –  one  in  which  the  frailties  that  lead  to  the  demise  of  the
522 Cf. Hargraves, “National history and ‘philosophical history’”, 22.
523 See O’ Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, 114 ff.
524 Dugald Stewart makes the point that such is [Robertson’s] skilful contrast of light and shade, aided
by  the  irresistible  charm  of  his  narration,  that  the  story  of  the  beautiful  and  unfortunate  Queen,  as
related  by  him,  excites  on  the  whole  a  deeper  interest  in  her  fortunes,  and  a  more  lively  sympathy
with her fate, than have been produced by all the attempts to canonize her memory, whether inspired
by the sympathetic zeal of the Romish church, or by the enthusiasm of Scottish chivalry.” Stewart,
Biographical Memoirs, 181.
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suffering person are inseparable from qualities that evoke sentiments essential for the
perpetuation of the bonds of sociability526 –  seems  to  be  more  akin  to  the  Earl  of
Shaftesbury’s virtual conflation of the moral sense and the sense of beauty, and even
more to Edmund Burke’s observations on “the origin of our ideas of the sublime and
beautiful.” These were published two years before the History of Scotland, and three
decades later provided Burke with an analytical framework to discuss the
tribulations of Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, in terms strikingly similar to those
Robertson employed in regard of Mary Queen of the Scots.527
More important than the provenance of Robertson’s treatment of the subject is
its substance. He took great pains to point out the positive effects that Mary’s
feminine character, combined with the values of refinement with which it was
associated,  wrought,  or  at  least  promised,  in  Scotland  after  she  had  returned  there
from France. “The amusements and gaiety of her court ... began to soften and polish
the rude manners of the nation. ...  The beauty and gracefulness of her person drew
universal admiration, the elegance and politeness of her manners commanded
general respect.” She displayed a “corteous affability ... without lessening the dignity
of a Prince.”528 The problem was that Scotland was not yet quite ripe for appreciating
such refinements and for being receptive to their soothing effects. “The inhabitants,
strangers to industry, averse from labour, and unacquainted with the arts of peace,
subsisted intirely by spoil and pillage”, and “the nature of the Scottish constitution,
the impotence of regal authority, the exorbitant power of the nobles, the violence of
faction, and the fierce manners of the people, rendered the execution of the laws
525 Ibid., 118-9.
526 As Robertson wrote on account of Mary’s final tribulations: “A woman, young and beautiful, and
in  distress,  is  naturally  the  object  of  compassion.  The  comparison  of  their  present  misery  with  the
former splendour, usually softens us in favour of illustrious sufferers” – irrespective of our moral or
political judgement on the sufferer’s character. “But the people”, he adds, “beheld the deplorable
situation of their sovereign with insensibility”. History of Scotland, I. 445-6. As a matter of fact, the
question  why  tragedy  pleases  was  a  hotly  debated  one  in  Edinburgh  at  the  time  of  the  writing  of
Robertson’s History of Scotland, with virtually all of the literati contributing something on it. For the
broader context see Sher, Church and University, 65-92.
527 Among many references in Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times, etc.,  ed. John M. Robertson (reprint of the 1900 edition, Thoemmes Press: Bristol, 1997), see II.
137.; Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed.
James T. Boulton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 38-65; Idem., Reflections on the Revolution in France, 127 ff. I
have discussed this in more detail in László Kontler, “Beauty or Beast or Monstrous Regiments?
Robertson and Burke on Women and the Public Scene”, Modern Intellectual History, 1, 3 (2004), 305-330.
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feeble, irregular, and partial.” Therefore, the attempts of the young queen to exercise
a moderating influence, by policy as well as example and simply by character, were
doomed to failure or could bring about but an apparent and ephemeral alleviation of
the endemic habits of licentiousness, insubordination and disdain for justice.529
Robertson’s  portrayal  of  Mary  is  not  devoid  of  the  idea  of  physical  and  moral
feebleness, capable of simultaneously evoking disesteem and empathy, by way of the
classical rhetorical device of re-description: the reliance on subtle semantic shifts
among apparently related but actually distinct terms while intimating that they are
quasi-synonymous. The very same feebleness appears at times  as fragility, and
ultimately as grace and beauty, capable of exerting a moderating effect on sentiments
and interpersonal relations. However, this potential could be realized only in a
sufficiently improved physical, moral and intellectual environment. It was no
wonder that it failed in sixteenth-century Scotland, and remained unappreciated
until the times of commerce, rule of law and Enlightenment when Robertson was
writing.
In an environment such as Scotland, insensitive towards the merits of
refinement and moderation in most walks of life, politics, a realm in which these
notions could be translated into self-control and calculation, could not have
remained an exception.  Elsewhere  in  Europe –  at  the  beginning in  Italy,  but  on her
example quickly spreading to the nations which gained first-hand experience of
Italian policy through their invasions whose ferocity astonished their victims: France,
Spain and “Germany” – “the great secret of modern politics” was discovered and
pursued. The “perpetual enmity” of Francis I and Charles V, one of the grand themes
of  Robertson’s  next  great  work,  “was  not  owing  solely  to  personal  jealousy,  or  the
caprice  of  private  passion,  but  was  founded … in  the  nature  of  true  policy,”  which
was “more an exercise of judgement, than of the passions of men.”530 Among the
circumstances that prevailed in Scotland, it was impossible for such an approach to
arise. Isolated instances of promising beginnings in prudence inevitably degenerated
into passion, as it can be shown on the examples of James V, Cardinal Beatoun, Mary
528 Robertson, History of Scotland, I. 274-5.
529 Ibid., I. 283, 292.
530 Ibid., I. 90.
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of Guise, the earl of Murray, and finally Queen Mary herself.531 The  latter  case  is
especially revealing of the forces at work: under the suffocating pressure of an
environment fundamentally different from the one in which Mary’s sensibilities had
been forged, her religious devotion developed into expressions of a bigotry
comparable to the zeal of her opponents; her affability of character into romantic
passion that undermined her judgement; and her politic control of appearances into a
spiral of transparent scheming. In striking contrast to the violent, but still measured
stage of the wider European arena – explored in Robertson’s next work –, sixteenth-
century  Scotland  was  a  scene  for  the  perpetual  struggle  of  antagonistic  passions,
resulting in a “carnival of resentment”.532
Moving on to the History of Charles V, its chief endeavour was further to refine
and arrange into a comprehensive narrative the pointers offered already in the
History of Scotland on how Europe in the same period ? before high-taxing territorial
monarchies maintaining large standing armies could have become internally
mitigated by checks and balances and externally by balance of power, and the idea of
toleration reconciled people to religious plurality ? experienced the challenges of
absolutism, universal monarchy and religious wars.533 The account of the life and the
deeds of Charles V, especially the grand conflict with Francis I, serves to illustrate the
theme of ambition, specifically aimed at creating and consolidating monolithic
territorial power in near-continental dimensions. The book also explored the failure
of this project, and explained it by the increased “vigour” of the individual states of
Europe as well as their arising awareness of their shared political identity. These
were circumstances whose combination in Robertson’s vision favoured the
development  of  a  system  of  balancing  states  rather  than  universal  monarchy.  The
stage is already set in the concluding sections of the View of the Progress.  There it  is
claimed that by the beginning of the sixteenth century several causes and events
“contributed either to improve internal order and police in [Europe’s] various states,
or to enlarge the sphere of their activity, by giving them more entire command of the
force with which foreign operations are carried on”, and although there was  “[a]
531 Cf. Hargraves, “National history and ’philosophical history’”, 25-6.
532 Cf. Hargraves, “Resentment and history”, 20.
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considerable variety in the constitution of the different nations”, the same causes and
events still “formed the people of Europe to resemble each other.”534 This thread is
then resumed in Book XII, the “general review of the whole period”: while the “near
resemblance and equality in improvement” already described earlier “prevented the
reign of Charles V. from being distinguished by such sudden and extensive
conquests as occur in some other periods of history” (and “among nations whose
progress in improvement is unequal”), under the provocation of the “perpetual
efforts to which his enterprizing ambition roused him”, the same tendencies became
further consolidated. As a result, on the one hand, “the different kingdoms of Europe
… came both to feel their own strength, and to know how to render it formidable to
others”, and on the other hand “became so thoroughly acquainted, and so intimately
connected with each other, as to form one great political system, in which each took a
station,  wherein  it  has  remained ever  since  that  time with  less  variation than could
have been expected after the events of two active centuries.”535
In a slightly different formulation found in the same section of the book,
“there  was  not  among  [the  states  of  Europe]  that  wide  diversity  of  character  and
genius which, in almost every period of history, hath exalted Europeans above the
inhabitants of other quarters of the globe.” European exceptionalism has often been
ascribed to Robertson, chiefly on account of his representation of native society in the
History of America, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Here it is expressed in
a statement embedded in a discussion of the rise of the circumstances in which the
domestication  of  armed  violence,  the  conquest  of  the  violent  passions  became
possible due to structural developments unique to European societies. Each nation
“made progress in improvement.” As we know from the View of the Progress, this was
thanks to a great extent to commerce, which by itself “tends to wear off those
prejudices which maintain distinction and animosity among nations” and “unites
[men]  by  one  of  the  strongest  of  all  ties,  the  desire  of  supplying  their  mutual
wants,”536 However, none of the nations of Europe developed “far beyond its
533 Cf. O’Brien, Narratives, 130 ff.
534 Robertson, History of Charles V, I., 146-7.
535 Ibid., IV. 302, 304-5.
536 Ibid., I.  97.
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neighbours”; and while the same improvement was instrumental in the
augmentation of their power in the very material sense of raising standing armies, it
was the capacity of military build-up for deterrence (rendering oneself
“formidable”), not destruction, that in the long run mattered. The idea that the power
to intimidate is a restraint on the violent passions and on the propensity of men to
cause wanton injury is as old as the endeavour of Grotius and Hobbes to establish a
modern system of natural law on the limited sociability they diagnosed in human
nature.537 Together with Mandeville’s observations on the manner in which
commercial societies – uniquely – enable their members to satisfy self-regarding
impulses and make them free to compete for tokens of approbation in non-violent
ways,538 this idea was crucially,  if  controversially,  important to the version of social
psychology  employed  by  the  Scottish  sciences  of  man  in  Robertson’s  immediate
environment.  In the History  of  Charles  V, Robertson relies on a pattern of analysis
which combines each of these theoretical insights in describing a set of situations
arising  among  conditions  peculiar  to  Europe  in  the  sixteenth  century.  He  offers  an
interpretation in which the events of this period were crucial to the long historical
process of the conquest of the violent passions, largely through trial and error, and
thanks to the growth of pragmatism nourished by experience.
This spacious pattern accommodated a substantial amount of variety, even
contradiction of detail in the engagement with intentions, character, actions and
consequences. Tradition, personality and other circumstances imposed limitations,
even among the favourable conditions that had arisen by the beginning of the
sixteenth century, on the capacity of ambition to become “transformed from a private
spasm of self-aggrandizement into a product of rational interest and calculating
policy.”539 Even in the case of the same individual or social group, a consistent
application of the principle of policy to the harnessing of passion occasionally proved
to be an unbeatable challenge. The conduct of the Cortes of Castile during the conflict
with Charles V is characterized by Robertson in this light. “[T]he principles of liberty
537 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, Chs. 5, 7.
538 Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable, esp. Ch. 4; idem., “Introduction”, in Mandeville, The Fable of the
Bees, esp. xx-xxxii.
539 Hargraves, “The ‘Progress of Ambition’”, 270.
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seem to have been better understood at this period, by the Castilians, than by any
other people in Europe …; they had formed more bold and generous sentiments
concerning government; and discovered an extent of political knowledge to which
the  English  themselves  did  not  attain  until  more  than  a  century  afterwards.”  And
yet, “the spirit of reformation among the Castilians, hitherto unrestrained by
authority, and emboldened by success, became too impetuous, and prompted the
Junta  to  propose  innovations  which,  by  alarming  the  other  members  of  the
constitution, proved fatal to their cause.”540 With  Henry  VIII  of  England  it  was  the
other way round:
“Though Henry, in entering into alliances with Charles or Francis, seldom
followed any regular or concerted plan or policy, but was influenced chiefly
by the caprice of temporary passions, such occurrences often happened as
recalled  his  attention  toward  that  equal  balance  of  power  which  it  was
necessary to keep between the two contending potentates, the preservation of
which he always boasted to be his peculiar office.”541
Overall, Henry and Francis I are both represented by Robertson as slightly absurd
examples of incapacity for adaptation to the new requirements of the European stage
of politics, on which Louis XI of France had been a trendsetter by establishing
maxims and introducing practices further refined and pursued with even greater
consistency by Charles  V.  In  contrast  to  the  “desultory  and irregular  sallies”  of  the
former two, pursued “without assuming any disguise,” Charles’ measures assumed
the character of a “regular system”, the results of “cool reflection … and carried on
upon a concerted plan.” They were marked by a comprehensiveness of vision and
unfailing  dedication:   “cautious  and  considerate”  in  forming  his  schemes,  “he  was
accustomed to ponder every subject that demanded his consideration, with a careful
and deliberate attention” and “bent the whole force of his mind towards it.” This
imposition of discipline over passion serves almost an excuse to the fact, amply
540 Robertson, History of Charles V, II. 220-1.
541 Ibid., 301.
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illustrated by examples in Robertson’s narrative, that “[s]uch as hold the latter
course, are apt, in forming, as well as in executing their designs, to employ such
refinements as always lead to artifice in conduct, and often degenerate into deceit.”542
Charles’ sustained adherence to the principles of self-control and calculation
appears all the more remarkable as Robertson takes several opportunities to remind
the reader of the transitional nature of the age.  For instance, Luther’s weaknesses of
character, from impetuosity and rashness through arrogance to obstinacy, “ought to
be charged in part on the manners of the age. Among a rude people,  unacquainted
with  those  maxims,  which  by  putting  continual  restraint  on  the  passions  of
individuals, have polished society, and rendered it agreeable, disputes of every kind
were managed with heat, and strong emotions were uttered in their natural language
without reserve and delicacy.”543 The ambiguity of the situation was further
enhanced by the process of the Reformation itself, which, besides “many beneficial
and salutary effects”, also had “some consequences of the opposite nature.”
Religious enthusiasm is not particularly conducive to the political disposition whose
development had been favoured by some long-term structural processes in European
history. Robertson provides a succinct account of the coalescence of psychological
factors and features of human character that led to the escalation of fanaticism in the
early Reformation.  Referring to the Anabaptists, he writes:
“When the human mind is roused by grand objects, and agitated by strong
passions, its operations acquire such force, that they are apt to become
irregular and extravagant. … The mind … disdains all restraint, and runs into
wild notions … As neither of these fanatics wanted the talents requisite in
desperate enterprises, great resolution, the appearance of sanctity, bold
pretensions to inspiration, and a confident and plausible manner of
discoursing, they soon gained many converts.”544
542 Ibid., IV. 286, 289. Cf. Hargraves, “The ‘Progress of Ambition’”, 275.
543 Robertson, History of Charles V, III. 311-2.
544 Ibid., III. 71-2, 74.
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Fortunately for the dénouement of Robertson’s narrative, Protestantism also
had at least one leader whose opposition to the “formidable progress of Imperial
power”, although “flowing from the love of liberty, or zeal for religion, was
strengthened by political and interested considerations.” Maurice of Saxony was
certainly not devoid of “passion” and “resentment,” but in his case these impulses
are described as only adding “new force to the motives of opposing the Emperor,
which sound policy suggested.” Indeed, his whole conduct, from the moment of
allying with Charles through that of betraying him to the ultimate thwarting of the
Emperor’s ambition, is presented by Robertson as a measured course of political
prudence and dissimulation, in which Maurice’s adeptness becomes ever more
refined by “his long and intimate union with the Emperor [which] had afforded him
many opportunities of observing narrowly the dangerous tendency of that
Monarch’s schemes” – and, one might add, the methods whereby these were
implemented. 545 An emulation in ambition led to an emulation in calculation
between the two princes with an inevitability that culminated in Maurice gaining the
upper hand over his role model, thereby also fashioning himself as a new role model:
that of a political leader reproducing the type established by Charles in order to resist
him. This was an achievement that, according to Robertson, earned him the pride of
place among all of his contemporaries, including Charles V himself.
“Of all the personages who have appeared in the history of this active age, …
Maurice may justly be considered as the most remarkable … At an age, when
impetuosity of spirit commonly predominates over political wisdom, when
the highest effort even of a genius of the first order is to fix on a bold scheme,
and to execute it with promptitude and courage, he formed and conducted an
intricate plan of policy, which deceived the most artful Monarch in Europe.”546
The  analysis  of  the  stadial  patterns  of  socio-cultural  and  institutional  progress  and
the narrative  of  events,  intentions  and agency are  two styles  of  historical  reflection
545 Ibid., III. 352 ff.; IV. 10-1.
546 Ibid., IV. 121.
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whose reconciliation was not always unproblematic in Robertson’s works, including
the History of Charles V. In the characterization of Maurice of Saxony they are brought
to a common ground in a mutually reinforcing fashion. According to the former, the
tendency of European history has been towards a commonwealth of modern civil
polities whose mutual relations are marked by complementarities which result in
cooperation as well as emulation and conflict. According to the latter, even among
the substantially contingent and circuitous processes of the dealings of particular
individuals in particular situations within this larger scheme of structural
movements, it has been possible for a social type to emerge that is sufficiently
equipped to cope with the complex task of making this system “running”.
At the end of this rudimentary sketch of the argument of the two works, from
the point of view of the Rezeptionsgeschichte I am interested in, their significance can
be summarized as follows. In the History of Scotland, Robertson provided a pattern to
study national history in the context of the continent-wide development of
economies, societies and polities. Placing Scottish history on the map of Europe was
to be a means of overcoming the endemic introversion and partisanship that had
characterized Scottish historiography, historical and national consciousness and
political culture. In the History of Charles V the perspective was, as it were, the reverse
of this: European history was here shown to be different from the sum total of
national histories by exploring the birth pangs of Europe as “one great political
system”. The reason why this is especially noteworthy is that looking at the sixteenth
century from this angle renders one of the central themes of national histories in that
period, the struggle for and against religious reform, a subtext547 ? needless to say,
with particularly important consequences in the case of German history. My central
question will be how far these implications of both works were appreciated in the
contemporary German reception. When considering this question it should also be
borne in mind that while Robertson was writing not long after Scotland had lost an
identity which could be readily discernible through national political institutions
(and was himself seriously at work to consolidate a new one), Germany as a unit had
547 Cf. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, II. 294.
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hardly ever possessed an identity other than that manifested in the political
institutions of the Reich.
Besides translations, editorial prefaces and notes, and reviews of both books, I
shall also pay attention to references to Robertson in contemporary German historical
literature, and items in this literature on topics similar to ones with which he too was
preoccupied.  Once  Robertson’s  fame  as  a  historian  had  been  established,  the
appearance  of  his  works  seems  to  have  been  expected  eagerly  in  Germany.  The
History of Charles V was  first  borrowed  from  the  library  of  the  University  of
Göttingen within a few weeks of its publication in London, and in six months’ time a
lengthy review also appeared in the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen.548 By
that time, late in the spring of 1770, the first German translation had also been turned
in by Mittelstedt, already familiar from Chapter 4, to a publisher in Braunschweig.
This was followed by a new edition of the same translation improved through
textual changes and notes by Remer, also discussed above (Braunschweig, 1778-
1779), which in turn was expanded with further notes and re-published by Johann
Martin von Abele at his own printing house at Kempten, in 1781-1783.549 Finally, as
we have also seen, there followed yet another attempt by Remer (Braunschweig,
1792-1796), who now completely revised and significantly expanded the first volume
and reissued the 1778-1779 texts of the second and third volumes. The publishing
history of the History of Scotland is less complicated, but no less interesting. Being the
first work of an as yet unknown author, it was not as avidly snatched as Robertson’s
later volumes, but it was also reviewed within a year of its publication, and by the
548 Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. Bibliotheksarchiv, Ausleiheregister
A,  Mich.  1769.  f.  37.  The  borrower  was,  on  14  October,  the  historian  Christoph  Gatterer.  Borrowal
registers of the library of the Georgia Augusta are extant from 1769 onwards; from that time till the
end of Robertson’s life (1793), the History of Charles V was the most frequently borrowed work of his –
with 45 records, as against the History of Scotland with 19 (which is  respectable,  in  comparison with
Hume’s History of England, scoring 15 during the same period) and the History of America with 20 and
the Historical Disquisition with  5  records.  To  be  sure,  these  latter  two  titles  had  shorter  time  to
“compete with” the History of Charles V. The review published in no. 65 of 1770 (31 May) in the GAgS,
was  written  by  the  Swiss  polymath  Albrecht  von  Haller,  who  had  also  written  the  review  on  the
History of Scotland ten years earlier (no. 107, 6 September 1760).
549 Abele  (1753-1805)  graduated  with  a  degree  in  law  from  Göttingen  in  1778.  He  soon  moved  to
Kempten as a syndic of the town, also running a journal on “recent world events, by a citizen of the
world”  (Neueste Weltbegebenheiten, von einem Weltbürger),  publishing  works  of  his  own  on  various
aspects of German public law, and contributing to an edition of Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes (1784-
1788).
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spring of 1762 Mittelstedt as well as Georg Friedrich Seiler had completed
translations of the text.
The quality of each of these translations was above the average that was
available on the contemporary German market. Although both Remer and Abele
thought  all  readers  would agree  that  Mittelstedt’s  previous  translation of Charles V
deserves criticism because of its “heavy way of expression, a certain unpleasant
stiffness, and too frequently applied punctuation”550, their own modifications of it
were not very significant. Mittelstedt’s rendering of the History of Scotland
occasionally indeed suffers from exactly such weaknesses when compared to that of
Seiler,  but  on the  whole  both of  them are  readable  enough.  It  is  important  to  point
out,  however,  that  for  each  of  the  translators,  just  as  it  has  already  been
demonstrated on the example of the View of the Progress, coping with the vocabulary
of Scottish stadial history proved to be a tall order in the History of Scotland and the
narrative  portions  of  the History of Charles V as  well.  No  doubt,  in  these  texts
“industry” (manufacturing activity as well as a diligent exertion of productive
powers necessary for such activity, both denoted by the same term), “commerce”
(the exchange of commodities thus produced as well  as the exchange of sentiments
and ideas between the humans brought together in situations of both types of
“intercourse”) appear less abundantly. A more frequently used term is “manners.”
Amidst the proliferation of opportunities to exercise one’s sociability, “manners” are
described as growing ever more “polished” or “polite”, in turn resulting in
increasingly enlightened and stable forms of “policy”. However, it is important to
remember that in Robertson’s approach the second cluster (manners-polished/polite-
policy) is intrinsically associated with the first one (industry-commerce-intercourse),
and even in the latter’s absence it is capable of evoking the entire etymological chain.
Any break or crack in this chain, likely to occur if translators are unable to find
equally tightly knit clusters that prompt similar associations, has serious
550 “Daß die übrigens schätzbare Mittelstädtsche Uebersetzung der Robertsonischen Geschichte
Kayser Karls V. wegen des harten Ausdrucks, einer gewissen unangenehmen Steifigkeit, und der gar
zu häufig angebrachten Interpunktionen gerechten Tadel verdiene, ist eine Behauptung, welcher jeder
Leser gern beyfallen wird …” See Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778-1779), II. Vorrede.; cf.
Dr. Wilhelm Robertsons, Vorstehers der Universität Edinburg, und königlichen Gro?britannischen
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consequences. First, it puts the whole stadial logic at risk, and may even result in its
complete demise. Second, it is likely to obliterate the ways (described above) in
which  this  logic  underpins  the  meaning  of  the  narrative,  and,  by  implication,
ultimately jeopardize the full import of the narrative itself.
Sampling the German translations of Robertson’s texts, again no translator
could have coped with the difficulty that Sitten (mainly because of derivates such as
Sittlichkeit,  purity  of  morals)  has  a  more  pronounced  ethical  overtone  than
“manners”, in which the element of custom and aesthetic qualities are equally
emphatic.551 This  is  shown  by  the  instability  in  the  choice  of  terms  to  render
“manners”: the translators were sometimes content with Sitten, but they often used
Sitten und Gewohnheiten or merely Gewohnheiten if  the context seemed to suggest so,
and occasionally even Manieren.552 Particularly illuminating of the confusion is a
sentence according to which Charles V established his firm grasp over the Castilians
by “assuming their manners, ... and complying with all their humours and customs”,
translated as “er ihre Manieren annahm, ... und sich alle ihre Sitten und Gewohnheiten
gefallen ließ”.553 As for “polished/polite” and “police/policy”, to the eighteenth-
century British mind, both expressions were vaguely linked to the idea of the polis
and  were  related  to  the  intercourse  of  the  citizens  in  their  private  and  public
capacities, respectively, also suggesting that a bridge existed between these two
spheres.554 To  achieve  the  same  effect,  similar  terms  of  classical  derivation  would
have been needed, but the ones existing in the contemporary German vocabulary
were not particularly helpful. “Nations, which hold the first rank in politeness” (and,
one like Robertson might add, in which police is therefore also the most sophisticated
Geschichtsschreibers, Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Carls des V, trans. Johann Martin von Abele, notes
Julius August Remer et al. (Kempten, 1781-1783), I. Vorrede.
551 Cf. above, 212 ff.
552 Each  of  the  first  three  options  appears,  for  instance,  in  the  same  passage  in  both Herrn William
Robertsons Geschichte von Schottland unter den Regierungen der Königinn Maria, und des Königes Jacobs VI.
bis auf dessen Erhebung auf den englischen Thron, trans. Theodor Christoph Mittelstedt (Braunschweig:
Meyer, Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1762), I. 135; and Wilhelm Robertsons Geschichte von Schottland unter den
Regierungen der Königinn Maria und des Königs Jacobs VI. bis auf die Zeit, da der Letztere den englischen
Thron bestieg, trans. Georg Friedrich Seiler (Ulm-Leipzig: Gaum, 1762), p. 69. Cf. Robertson, History of
Scotland, I. 134.; for manners as Manieren, see below.
553 Robertson, History of Charles V, II. 245 and Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778-1779), II. 267.
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and efficient) become wohlgesittete Nationen in Seiler’s and Nationen, die für die
artigsten gehalten werden in Mittelstedt’s translation of the History of Scotland.555
“Police”, on the other hand, was more or less consistently rendered by each
translator as Policey. This term had no supposed etymological link with the German
equivalents of “politeness”; moreover, its traditional early modern meaning was
governance  in  the  sense  of  control  exercised  by  the  magistrate  for  the  sake  of
improving morals and maintaining order among the citizens. This made it quite
impossible for the German reader to establish the spontaneous link between the
concept of refined intercourse of ordinary citizens in the private sphere and the
imposition of good manners over their own public conduct by political personages in
the form of measure, self-control and calculation.
In spite of such linguistic limitations, the quality of the translations in and by
itself was no serious obstacle for Robertson’s historical message to be conveyed to the
German audience, and the historiographical context was not unfavourable, either.
The endeavour of the Göttingen historians to introduce principles into the study of
their field which encouraged the understanding of particular processes against a
background of larger patterns of structural progress was outlined in Chapter 2. This
endeavour  must  have  been  familiar  to  graduates  of  the  Georgia  Augusta  of
Göttingen who ventured to interpret Robertson’s texts for a German audience. Yet,
the contemporary German reception of his History of Scotland and History of Charles V
illustrates  the  difficulty  for  such  principles  to  strike  roots  or  to  make  a  broader
impact. They do not seem to have been read, as they certainly could have been, as
attempts to supersede the traditional limitations of both national and universal
history (partisan spirit and parochialism on the one hand and compartmentalization
on the other) by establishing between them the kind of link urged by Gatterer,
Schlözer and their colleagues. According to the testimony of translators’ prefaces,
reviews and annotations, one of the main interest of the German readers was the way
Robertson took sides in the “grand debates” with which his topics could be
554 It is instructive to see that such associations were relevant even for figures committed to a tradition
of  active  civic  virtue,  such  as  Adam  Ferguson.  See,  for  instance,  Adam  Ferguson, An  Essay  on  the
History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge, 1995), 195. Cf. above, 206.
555 Again in the passege referred to in n. 46 above.
               dc_444_12
242
associated ? whereas, as it has been argued, his own attitude to such debates was one
of studied impartiality, sometimes even amounting to a politically selective use of
sources to suit his “moderate Whig” position.556 His  quest  for  objectivity  was  not
ignored and often explicitly praised, but his strategy to shift interest from
immediately partisan issues to the longue durée problem of emerging from feudalism
in the History of Scotland and the growth of an “European system” in Charles V was
far less appreciated, even recognized, than his pronouncements on the rivalry of
Mary  Queen  of  the  Scots  and  Queen  Elizabeth  in  the  first  and  on  the  strife  of
Protestantism and Catholicism in the second.
By all concerned, The History of Scotland was acknowledged to have “enriched
British history with a well-elaborated piece” (hat die Brittischen Geschichte mit einem
wohlausgearbeiteten Stücke bereichert), even a “masterpiece” (Meisterstück)557, and thus
it established the ground for Robertson’s renown in Germany. When Charles V was
published,  he  could  already  be  referred  to  as  the  author  of  the  “universally
applauded History of Mary Stuart” (dessen Geschichte der Maria Stuart einen
allgemeinen Beyfall gefunden hat).558 But even the reviewer almost wholly neglected
Robertson’s concise summaries of the preceding and succeeding periods, which were
essential  to  recognize  the  context  of  the  turmoil  of  the  sixteenth  century,  while  the
translators in their prefaces only made the most passing references to these sections.
Each of them were mainly interested in highlighting what they thought was the main
theme: the character, the conflict and the responsibility of the two queens ? a
preoccupation Robertson thought was an affliction of Scottish historiography from
which  it  ought  to  be  cured.  What  is  more,  both  translators  and  the  reviewer  also
decided to discuss Robertson’s representation of this theme in evaluative terms.
Mittelstedt was the most sympathetic to this representation. He also seems to have
realized or at least felt that one of Robertson’s devices to divest Mary of her character
as a political emblem was to feminise her, with the consequences explored above. In
556 For  the  idea  and  practice  of  “impartiality”  in  Robertson’s  works,  see  Smitten,  “Impartiality  in
Robertson’s History of America”; idem., “The Shaping of Moderatism: William Robertson and
Arminianism”,  in  Patricia  Craddock,  Carla  H.  Hay  (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 22
(1992), 281-300; O’Brien, Narratives, 104 ff.
557 Albrecht von Haller, Review of Robertson, History of Scotland, GAgS, September 6, 1760 (no. 107),
913; Geschichte von Schottland (Abele), Vorrede.
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Mittelstedt’s assessment, Robertson “represents her for what she was, lovable in
youth; rash and despicable in mature years; and worthy of admiration and sympathy
in her death,” 559 which was meted out to her by the rage of God for falling prey to
characteristically female frailties, including the “unbridled passions” that push a
“lively spirit” into a deep abyss (wie tief ungebändigte Leidenschaften eine lebhafte Seele
stürzen). Nor does he neglect referring to the tensions which arose from Mary’s
upbringing  in  an  environment  that  was  “the  most  polite  and  refined,  but  also  the
most sinful” in Europe (Erziehung, an einem damals der artigsten und feinsten, aber auch
lasterhaftesten Höfe von Europa), where “all French heedlessness became combined
with the refined taste of the Italians for sensual pleasure” (an welchem sich aller
französischen Leichtsinn, mit der Raffinements der Italiener zur Schärfung des Geschmacks
an sinnlichen Vergnüen verband). Mittelstedt also suggested that Robertson examined
Elizabeth in the same light. Her qualities as a great ruler are acknowledged, but “as
the upright historian must describe not only the acts but also their sources and
motives; he must distinguish between great qualities and true virtues; so truthfulness
certainly  obliged Mr Robertson to  separate  the  queen from the  woman,  and amidst
all the glitter of Elizabeth’s throne also to throw light on the dark spots”560 ? and
thus, with great moderation and only when necessary, provide evidence of her
jealousy, duplicity and schemes. Finally, it was important for Mittelstedt to point out
that  while  Elizabeth  picked  her  ministers  with  more  consideration  than  her
favourites,  her  manner  of  procedure  was  still  far  superior  to  that  of  her  successor
James I/VI, who remained a prisoner of his “passions and selfishness” (Leidenschaften
und Eigennutz). While the central Robertsonian theme of restraining or indulging
political passion is not connected to the analysis of the socio-cultural environment
which allows or curtails its operation, the centrality of this theme is quite acutely
558 Haller, “Review of History of Charles V” , 571.
559 “Er  stellet  sie  vor,  wie  sie  war,  liebenswürdig  in  ihrer  jugend;  unbesonnen  und  verächtlich  bey
reifern  Jahren;  und  der  Bewunderung  und  des  Mitleidens  werth  in  ihrem  Tode  …” Geschichte von
Schottaln (Mittelstedt), vol. I, Vorrede.
560 “Muß aber der rechtschaffene Geschichtsschreiber nicht allein Thaten beschreiben, sondern auch
die Quellen und Triebfedern derselben aufsuchen; muß er einen Unterschied zwischen großen
Eigenschaften und wahren Tugenden machen; so legte die Wahrheit dem Herrn Robertson gewiß die
Pflicht auf, die Königinn zu weilen vom Weibe zu trennen, und mitten in dem Schimmer des Thrones
die Elisabeth auch mit ihren Flecken zu zeigen …” Ibid.
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recognized by Mittelstedt, and discussed by him in terms compatible with those
developed by Robertson.561
Compared to this golden mean, Seiler and the reviewer represented two
extreme opinions. The former, while remarking that the book contains an account of
the “core” of the older as well as the most important new period of “profane” history
in Scotland, also claims that for him its most important aspect was “a confident and
reliable report on the movements of the Reformation, and the great transformations
which the Church of Scotland underwent at that time, and which at more than one
place evokes an admiration and worshipping of the wisdom, the justice, and the
mysterious governance of the Lord of the World.” 562 To Seiler’s mind, these were
features which rendered superfluous all further explication about the importance of
the undertaking by the translator. As discussed above, providentialism, in the sense
of divine foreknowledge facilitating progressively better access for mankind not only
to the Word of God but also to a more comprehensive happiness comprising material
as well as spiritual well-being, was central to Robertson’s historical thought.
However, Seiler’s approach here is more restrictive and concerns the significance of
the History of Scotland as a contribution to modern salvation history.  Strangely
enough from the angle of someone who believed that the Reformation was the
accomplishment  of  God’s  design,  he  then  goes  on  to  occupy  a  sharply  pro-Marian
stand, arguing that Robertson made a mistake in accepting the famous Casket Letters
as authentic proof of Mary’s complicity in the murder of Darnley, and finds in
general that the circumstances – her youth and “fiery” (feurig) character, the nature of
her upbringing, her inevitable dependence on advice, etc. –  supply a sufficient
excuse for all of her conduct as queen.
561 To  lend  further  support  to  his  own  “revisionist”  position,  Mittelstedt  quotes  at  length  from  the
Moral and Political Dialogues (1759) of the Anglican divine Richard Hurd (1720-1808). The future bishop
of Lichfield and Coventry, Hurd was a staunch supporter of William Warburton’s political theology of
the “alliance of Church and State,” and the editor of Warburton’s works (1772).
562 “[E]s  enthält  den  Kern  der  alten  und  der  wichtigsten  Zeitraum  der  neuern  schottischen
Profangeschichte; es giebt uns, was für mich das hauptsächlichste war, eine sichere und umständliche
Nachricht von den Bewegungen der Reformation und den großen Veränderungen, welche damals mit
der Kirche in Schottland vorgiengen, und erwckt an mehr als einem Orte zur Bewunderung und
Anbetung der Weisheit, der Gerechtigkeit und der geheimnißvollen Regierung des Herrn der Welt.”
Geschichte von Schottland (Abele), Vorrede.
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While scholarly argument as well as political polemic in the Protestant
Aufklärung often bore the imprint of anti-Catholicism and anti-clericalism, the
partisanship of Mary by Johann Friedrich Seiler (1733-1807), who later became a
quite influential representative of Lutheran practical theology, is noteworthy. Seiler
studied philosophy and theology, oriental languages, mathematics and natural
sciences at the University of Erlangen, where he returned in 1770 as a professor of
theology after a period of pastoral service in Saxony-Coburg. Even apart from his
rendering of Robertson, he earned a reputation as a reliable translator,563 while his
extensive correspondence and publications establish him within the tradition of
German popular philosophy, referring itself to Leibniz and Wolff and aiming to
develop a harmony between reason and revelation (perhaps a remote inspiration for
him to become interested in Robertson). It was, however, Kant whom Seiler regarded
as the “ultimate conversation partner” of contemporary theologians, and the
“philosophus subtilissimus.”564.He criticizes Robertson’s measured judgement of the
Earl of Murray in a frame of reference anticipating that employed in speculations of a
“Jesuit” conspiracy aimed at subverting the positions of Protestantism as well as
lawful governments in contemporary Germany. In Robertson’s presentation Murray,
bringing prudence to control passion, reconciled his devotion to the reformed church
with his dutiful service to Mary. Seiler, by contrast, suggested that “Murray’s zeal for
the church was similar to that of the Jesuits in our century; he did not allow his
fatherland  to  be  oppressed  by  France  because  he  wanted  to  rule  it  himself;  and  he
served Queen Mary in order to reign in her name over the whole kingdom”565 –  a
version of prudence pursued to Machiavellian extreme. Without resulting in physical
violence, but with an intellectual fervour as powerful as in the most intense periods
of anti-Popery in Britain, a decade and a half after these lines were written influential
563 The classical philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne praised Seiler’s translation of Demosthenes and
Lysias as a proof of his “diligence, erudition, and his study of the language and genius of his orators”
(Fleiß, Belesenheit, Studium der Sprache, des Genies seiner Redner). GAgS, 3 December 1768 (no. 145), 1209.
564 On Seiler, see Ottfried Jordahn, Georg Friedrich Seilers Beitrag zur praktischen Theologie der kirchlichen
Aufklärung (Nürnberg:  Selbstverlag des Vereins für  bayerische Kirchengeschichte,  1970).  Cf.  also the
references to “theological Wolffianism” above, Chapter Three, 159 f.
565 “Murray für die Kirche so eiferte, wie in unserm Jahhundert die Jesuiten; daß er sein Vaterland von
Frankreich nicht unterdrücken ließ, weil er selbst herrschen wollte; und daß er die Königinn Maria
diente, weil er in ihrem Namen fast das ganze Reich regieren durfte.” Geschichte von Schottland (Abele,
Vorrede.
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figures of the German intellectual scene launched a full scale campaign to avert, as
they conceived of it, a conspiratorial offensive of the Catholic Church against
Protestantism and Enlightenment, described in the same terms of diabolical
Machiavellianism.566 Such sentiments were entirely foreign to Robertson, who as an
ecclesiastical leader recognized a militant interpretation of Calvinism, as professed
by a considerable party within the Kirk, to be a dangerous disposition.567 He decided
to retire from the Assembly in 1780, shortly after the lifting of some of the centuries-
old sanctions against Catholics, implemented in England in 1778 and initiated in
Scotland too, evoked riots that even presented a threat to his personal safety.
Shocked, in one of his last speeches Robertson said: “I love to see my countrymen
discover that jealous concern for the preservation of their rights which characterises
the spirit of liberty: but I am sorry to behold them wasting their zeal without a
cause.” He called the church to denounce “the principle for conscience sake, as
repugnant to the spirit of the gospel, and contrary to the genius of the Protestant
faith.”568
Given Seiler’s denominational loyalties, made explicit at several places, his
exculpation of Mary Stuart remains an enigma. In any case, the reviewer’s opinion is
in  stark  contrast  to  his  evaluation.  According  to  Haller,  Robertson  was  unfair  in
imputing infidelity and severity to Elizabeth: Mary’s reluctance to abandon her claim
to the English throne, as well as her awareness of and possible complicity in the
conspiracies of Jesuits, the Roman church and virtually all the Catholic princes of
Europe against Elizabeth made the prosecution of Mary the only means to preserve
the security of the English throne, and England itself. In the same vein, Robertson is
criticized for treating too mildly the impunity of turbulent Catholic lords under
566 The  causes  of  the  initiative,  and  especially  of  its  bitterness,  have  not  been  sufficiently  explored.
General explanations as the crisis of Protestant rationalism, or the relatively weak self-confidence of
the Aufklärung , are hardly satisfactory. For an overview, see Johannes Rogalla von Bieberstein, Die
These von der Verschwörung 1776--1945  (Frankfurt:  Peter  Lang,  1976),  ch.  1.  Aspects  of  this  episode
relevant to the present subject are summarized in Wolfgang Schieder, Christof Dipper, “Propaganda”,
in Brunner, Conze, Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,  V.  71-6.  See  also  László  Kontler,
“Superstitition, enthusiasm and propagandism: Burke and Gentz on the French Revolution”, in Bertrand
Taithe, Tim Thornton (eds.): Propaganda. Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300?2000 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton
Publishing, 1999), 97-114.
567 See Sher, Church and University, 67-70, 277-97; Brown, “Robertson and the Scottish Enlightenment”.
568 [Erskine] (ed.), A Narrative of the Debate, 49, 61.
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James  VI,  especially  in  view  of  the  harsh,  even  despotic  measures  against  his  own
capital.569 If Seiler’s position is somewhat contradictory, the reviewer unambiguously
aligns himself with the cause of the “improved religion” (verbesserte Religion), as he
refers to it. But whatever the precise motives of either of these commentators were,
from the point of view of the present discussion the central issue is that it  is on the
partisan aspect of the topic that they felt most inclined and inspired to contribute,
and not on the theoretically innovative aspects of Robertson’s work.
By and large, similar was the case with the History of Charles V, with the
difference that, since many technical as well as sensitive points of German history
were tackled in it, the reaction was more variegated and occasionally also more
animated. To begin again with the review in the Göttingische Anzeigen, it is a fairly
detailed descriptive summary of the contents. The main recurrent theme in the more
reflective pieces of assessment is Robertson’s failure to take a more partisan stand in
favour of Protestantism. To be sure, Robertson was far from displaying Catholic
sympathies, but true to the spirit of Edinburgh moderatism, he also refrained from
representing Protestantism in heroic terms and explained the Reformation largely as
an event in secular history. But this was precisely what Haller missed. Whereas
Robertson “acknowledges  all  the  human springs  that  promoted this  great  event,  in
our opinion he did not sufficiently emphasize the strength of conviction which arose
from the  comparison of  revealed truth and the  Roman beliefs,  and which uniquely
gave  so  many  thousands  the  courage  to  testify  for  the  truth  in  their  deaths.”570 He
also  took issue  with  Robertson who,  reflecting on the  history  of  toleration,  claimed
that in the sixteenth century
“?r?ight  to  extirpate  error  by  force,  was  universally  acknowledged  the
prerogative  of  such  as  possessed  the  knowledge  of  truth  ...  Luther,  Calvin,
Cranmer, Knox, the founders of the reformed church in their respective
569 Haller, Review of History of Scotland, 914, 917.
570 “Hr. R. zwar alle die menschlichen Ursachen erkennt, die dieses große Werk befördert haben, doch,
nach unserm Sinne, nicht genug auf die Ueberzeugung dringt, die die Vergleichung der geoffenbarten
Wahrheit  mit  dem  Römischen  Glauben  bewürkt  hat,  und  die  einzig  so  viele  Tausenden  den  Muht
eingeben konte, mit ihrem Tode für die Wahrheit zu zeugen.”Haller, Review of History of Charles V,
932.
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countries, as far as they had power and opportunity, inflicted the same
punishments upon such as called in question any article in their creeds, which
were denounced against their own disciples by the church of Rome.”571
Especially in regard of Luther, the reviewer found this evaluation grossly unfair,
claiming that among the great reformers mentioned “no case [of persecution] by
Luther is known”, and the only example of it by Calvin afflicted the “blasphemous”
(Gotteslästerer) Servet, but no atrocity against Roman Catholics at all. (Cranmer and
Knox are conveniently forgotten.)572 Technically he may have been closer to the truth,
whereas in broader historical terms it  was obviously Robertson who had a stronger
case.  However,  the  point  is  again  not  so  much  whether  the  one  or  the  other  was
“correct”,  but  that  both of  these  criticisms show the  reviewer  to  have mistaken the
very character of Robertsonian “impartiality” (which he otherwise quite frequently
praised). Several notes that Remer added in the 1778-1779 edition also fall into this
category. At one point, for instance, he expresses his dissatisfaction with Robertson’s
belittling of the difficulties of the process of Reformation (thus, by implication the
heroism of the Reformers) and the severity of certain measures taken against them by
imperial diets. Elsewhere he sternly reminds that a letter apparently showing an
iconic Protestant leader like the Landgrave of Hesse to give in to the Emperor’s
demands may well have been a forgery.573
Some of these specific faults, and many others which the German readers
found in Robertson’s text were attributed by them to his unfamiliarity with the
German language and the sources of German history. In reporting to Robertson on
Remer’s completion of his annotated edition, Westphalen574 mentioned that the latter
would have been pleased if Robertson had wanted to see it before it was published.
But in the same breath he dismissed the value of this, recalling that Robertson did
not read German (which was perhaps the reason why the letter was dated long after
571 Robertson, History of Charles V , IV. 185-6.
572Haller, Review of Robertson, History of Charles V, 998.
573 Robertson, Geschichte Carl des Fünften (1778-1789),  I. 302, 402,  III, 234.
574 Cf. above, 201.
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Remer’s edition had emerged from the press).575 While admitting that the book was
“altogether pieced together from good sources,” the Haller in his review of the
History of Charles V called attention to this gap in Robertson’s erudition, too.576
Commenting on Robertson’s treatment of certain subjects of German history, Remer
also could not conceal a sense of patriotic resentment: “Throughout this entire book,
Mr.  Robertson  failed  to  make  a  proper  use  of  German  writers,  which  gives  rise  to  a
false, confusing and incomplete presentation of subjects concerning the internal
condition of Germany.”577
To redress such shortcomings, Remer, as it were, reveled in mobilizing not only
his own erudition, but also relied on the advice of “a learned friend”, who wanted to
preserve his anonymity, and whose contributions he therefore marked with the letter
“P”. Apart from the ones already referred to, the characteristic topics of the notes with
which Remer and “P” equipped Robertson’s text are the system (in this period rather
the remnants) of vassalage; the dues and services of the peasantry; and the constitution
of  the  Holy  Roman Empire.  Their  overall  tendency is  a  vindication of  what  has  been
called the “German idea of liberty.” According to views widely held among German
“imperial patriots” in the eighteenth century, the authority of territorial princes as it
became stabilized after the age of religious wars, was not only reconcilable with
freedom, but as it checked the power of the emperor it was in a sense the very
guarantee of it. 578 Freedom in this sense was even identified as the German “national
spirit” by Friedrich Carl von Moser a few years before the German translations of the
History of Charles V were published. Moser (1723-1798), the eldest son of the
575 J. Westphalen to Robertson, November 12, 1780. National Library of Scotland, Robertson-
MacDonald  papers,  MS.  3943.  ff.  128-9.  I  have  not  found  evidence  that  Robertson  ever  cared  to
respond.
576 Haller, Review of Robertson, History of Charles V, 931, 996.
577 “Herr  Robertson  hat  durch  dieses  ganze  Buch  die  teutschen  Schriftsteller  nicht  gehörig  genutyt,
daher  entsteht  manche  falsche,  verwirrte  und  unvolkomne  Vorstellung  der  Sachen,  die  zur  innern
Beschaffenheit Teutschlands gehören.” Gescgichte Carls des Fünften (1778-1789), I. 243.
578 See Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom. History of a Political Idea (Chicago: The University
of Chicage Press, 1957). But cf. also the view that apparently “absolute” monarchies were in fact
moderate, with a generally constructive relationship between crown and estates, and the system of
Landstände and imperial Kreistage perceived by several Germans as representative bodies
comparable  to  the  British  parliament.  Rudolf  Vierhaus,  “Politisches  Bewußtsein  in  Deutschland  vor
1789”, in idem., Deutscland im 18. Jahrhundert: Politische Verfassung, soziales Gefüge, geistige Bewegungen
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 195.; Charles Ingrao, “Introduction: A Pre-Revolutionary
Sonderweg”, German History 20:3 (2002), 282.
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outstanding jurist and Reichspublizist Johann Jakob Moser, served in administrative,
advisory and ministerial functions at several German princely courts, including the
imperial court in Vienna as Reichshofrat in the late 1760s, and was also a widely
published author on political subjects. He has even been described as “the political
classic of the German Aufklärung.”579 “Patriotism” was central to the argument of his
works. In an early treatise of his – an eighteenth-century engagement with the “mirror
for magistrates” genre, intended not for professionals but for the educated public – the
co-operative relationship of “the lord and the servant” (in fact, the sovereign and his
minister) was “depicted with patriotic freedom.” In the 1780s, he went on to publish, in
twelve  volumes,  a  “patriotic  archive  for  Germany”:  a  collection  of  sources,
correspondence and biographies of German princes and ministers, which can be
regarded as a historical retrospective counterpart of Schlözer’s present-oriented
Briefwechsel meist historischen und politischen Inhalts from a slightly earlier period.580
Moser’s main and most consistent contribution on the subject of German
Nationalgeist, besides a pamphlet bearing this title, was a collection of “patriotic letters”
published in 1765. He thought that freedom was the watchword and the Leitmotif of the
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire throughout its history, preserved as a
fundamental “truth” amidst a succession of “revolutions” and dramatic changes. There
was an equilibrium between the princes and the estates, and the excellence on the
constitution could have been only surpassed by that of England.
“Territorial prerogative [Landes-Hoheit]581 is a precious and invaluable ornament
of the German imperial estates, and to call it into doubt would be tantamount to
a violation of the laws themselves. But it is no sovereign power … The German
579 G.P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (London and New York: Longman, 1920), 22. f.
580 Friedrich Carl von Moser, Der Herr und der Diener, geschildert mit patriotischer Freyheit (Frankfurt:
Raspe, 1759); idem. (ed.), Patriotisches Archiv für Deutschland (1784-1790), 12 vols. On Moser, see
Notker Hammerstein, “Das politische Denken Friedrich Carl von  Mosers”, Historische Zeitschrift 212
(1971), 316-338; John Gagliardo, Reich und Nation. The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980), Ch. 4; Angela Stirken, Der Herr und der
Diener. Friedrich Carl von Moser und das Beamtenwesen seiner Zeit (Berlin: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1984);
Wolfgang Martens, Der patriotische Minister. Fürstendiener in der Literatur der Aufklärungszeit (Weimar-
Köln-Wien: Böhlau, 1996), III.1.
581 Landeshoheit is commonly translated into English as “territorial sovereignty”. However, Moser
rejects the sovereign quality of the authority in question.
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nobleman, burgher and peasant is a direct subject to his territorial lord, but
according to the same laws which invest his electors,  princes,  counts and lords
with the most extensive prerogatives over him, he is also the indirect subject and
loyal adherent of the Emperor and the Empire. The German common man, who
extorted with his blood and wounds the rights of territorial prerogative for his
lord  in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  was  at  the  same  time  defending  his  own,  his
children’s, his grandchildren’s, and posterity’s freedom.  The election contract
[Wahl-Capitulation]  itself  refers  to  all  of  the  previous,  and  especially  those
imperial statutes, which mete out, in fair measure, the rights of each; and
hopefully these laws will be retained at least during the present century, even
though legions of un-knowing chatterers should rise, who claim with the
impertinence so commonly shared by the ignorant: La liberté germanique est une
liberté chimerique.”582
It has been argued that the periodic resurgence of Reichspatriotismus in early
modern Germany took place at times of crisis, such as the decades of the post-1517
schism, the final phases of the Thirty Years War following the Peace Treaty of Prague in
1636, the wars of Louis XIV at the end of the seventeenth century, and, finally, the late
eighteenth century, before the collapse of the Empire.583 This latter crisis had been
introduced by the mid-century wars, the War of Austrian Succession and especially the
582 “Die Landes-Hoheit ist ein theures und unschätzbares Kleinod der Deutschen Reichs-Stände,
solche zu bezweifeln, würde eine Beleidigung der Gesetze selbsten seyn. Sie ist aber keine
Souverainität … Der Deutsche Edelmann, Landsatz, Landstand, Bürger und Bauer ist seines
Landesherrn unmittelbarer Unterthan, nach eben denen Gesetzen aber, welche seinem Churfürsten,
Fürsten, Grafen und Herrn die Hoheit über ihn, in dem weit möglichsten Umfang zusprechen, ist er
auch  des  Kaysers  und  Reichs  mittelbarer  Unterthan,  des  Kaysers  und  Reichs  lieber  Getreuer.  Der
gemeine Deutsche Mann, der mit seinem Blut und Wunden die Hoheits-Rechte seines Landesherrn in
dem Westphälischen Frieden erstritten, hat zugkeich seine, seiner Kinder, Enkel und Nachkommen
Freyheit mit verfochten. Die Wahl-Capitulation selbst beruft sich noch auf alle vorige und eben
dieselbe Reichs-Gesetze, welche mit gerechter Wage die Rechte eines jeden zuwiegen; und bey dieser
Gesetzen wird es hoffentlich wenigstens noch diß Jahrhundertsein Verbleibens haben, wann auch
noch Legionen unwisnder Schwätzer  aufstünden,  welche mit  der  dreistigkeit,  so Ignoranten allemal
am ersten eigen ist, in die Welt hineinschreiben: La liberté germanique est une liberté chimerique. Friedrich
Carl von Moser, Patriotische Briefe (N.d., 1767 [1765]), Zweyter Brief, 32?40. 232-3.
583 Michael Stolleis, “Reichspublizistik und Reichspatriotismus vom 16. zum 18. Jahrhundert”,
Aufklärung 4/2 (1989), 7-23; Karl Othmar Freiherr von Aretin, “Reichspatriotismus”, ibid., 25-36. The
standard treatment of the history of the waning Holy Roman Empire is still Karl Otmar Freiherr von
Aretin, Heiliges Römisches Reich1776-1806: Reichsverfassung und Staatssouveränität, 2 vols (Wiesbaden:
Steiner, 1967).
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Seven Years War, which immediately preceded Moser’s “patriotic” effusions. These
wars demonstrated the precariousness (and perhaps chimerical character) of the
imperial cooperation in the anti-Ludovican wars and the arising ideal of imperial unity
between “head and members” as well as among the members themselves. Much
dismay was caused among imperial patriots, on the one hand, by Austria’s volte face in
its international relations – the alliance with Russia and especially France, which re-
alarmed old suspicions about Habsburg designs on Germany –, and on the other hand
by the emergence of a German state, Prussia, which had the resources to organize anti-
Habsburg opposition on the strength of its own military might, and to frame the
strategies of this opposition according to its own political interests, rather than those
encapsulated in the idea of “German liberty.” The perplexity which this combination of
developments  caused  is  amply  illustrated  by  the  trajectory  of  Moser’s  personal
allegiances. While in Der Herr und der Diener (1759) he had been favourably inclined to
Frederick II as a Protestant counterweight to Austria, the pamphlet of 1765 already
marked his conversion to the cause of Joseph II (to a very great extent under the impact
of personal experience with the new Roman king and several of his officials during the
election and coronation ceremonies of 1764 in Frankfurt). Moser’s views on the German
national spirit evoked a wide echo, including critical voices. The latter, including the
famous Osnabrück official and publicist Justus Möser, were dissatisfied with Moser’s
preoccupation with the level of courtly politics, his purported equation of the German
nation with the Empire, and the implication that the “national spirit” was the spirit of
the imperial constitution; in other words, with the fact that in spite of his appreciation
for the positive effects of the territorial fragmentation of Germany, the overarching
national spirit which was to provide a moral cement to the nation was to his mind “the
Duty of Submissiveness of the German Imperial Estates to Their Emperor.”584
While this perspective ignores the gestures made by Moser towards the integrity
of the imperial estates, it lays a stronger emphasis on the merits of Germany’s division
as a guarantee against the haunting image of monolithic despotism by an imperial
oligarchy led by the Emperor himself and issuing uniform laws with reference to the
584 Johann Jakob Bülau, Noch etwas zum deutschen Nationalgeist (1766), cited in Gagliardo, Reich and
Nation, 58.
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supposedly unitary “national spirit”. The elder Moser, instigated by his realization that
since the 1740s a “different empire” had arisen, also revisited his earlier work on
German imperial law, and published between 1766 and 1782 twenty-four volumes of
Neues Teutsches Staatsrecht, with the purpose “to offer observations on how the German
Empire so far as possible may sustain its present constitution, and show here and there
how correctable defects may be overcome.”585 One of the noteworthy aspects of this
revision was the clarification that Landeshoheit had “two faces”, the one outward and
the other inward: a capacity of territorial rulers to act independently and even in
defiance of imperial authority, and a direct jurisdiction which they possessed over their
subjects and estates. Whichever of these two “faces” obtained preponderance, such a
development constituted a hazard to the rights of subjects, which was another topic
that received extended treatment in Moser’s late synthesis.
The revival of imperial patriotism in the aftermath of the Seven Years War,
illustrated here with a mere handful of prominent examples, indicates a broader
intellectual ferment which had political, juridical as well as historical dimensions. At
this point, it is interesting to recall the proposition that Robertson’s decision in 1760 to
prefer the topic of the reign of Charles V to several alternatives (of his own design, or
prompted by others) for his next historical work was elicited by its perceived relevance
to the contemporary upheaval of the international system of balance of power.
Although a “translatio tyrannae” had taken place in the intervening centuries, the
character of imperial and Spanish military and religious expansionism in the sixteenth
century prefigured the same pursued by France with ever greater vigour since the
seventeenth. In Whig orthodoxy, the idea of Britain’s “providential custodianship of the
scales  of  balance  in  Europe  against  the  threat  of  Popish  universal  monarchy”  was  as
strongly entrenched as the contrast between her matchless domestic constitution and
French despotism. 586 Such broader connexions were looming especially large when,
with the renversement des alliances and the outbreak of the continental war, existing Tory
misgivings about the commitment of the House of Hanover to British interests received
585 Johann Jakob Moser, Lebensgeschichte … von ihm selbst geschrieben (1777-83), cited in Walker, Johann
Jakob Moser, 292.
586 Grundy, “The emulation of nations”, 140 ff.
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reinforcement from Britain’s being drawn into an apparently local German conflict.587
In Germany itself, too, the Seven Years War was perceived as marking a major
realignment, but indeed one taking place predominantly on the domestic scene: its
central feature was Austro-Prussian antagonism and the corresponding lining up of
most of the larger and many of the lesser states. Subsequently, similar alarm was
caused in the “Third Germany” by the temporary rapprochement between the two
rivals, resulting among other things in the first partition of Poland in 1772 – a lot which,
many feared, might befall some of the lesser German states too. In this perspective the
Seven Years War and its consequences was understood as an imperial affair, with
internal rather than any other stakes, none of these seeming more important than the
preservation of the tradition of German liberty and its precarious foundations in the
historically evolved equilibrium of forces.
Argument from history was central to the debate about the Empire and its
peculiar system of “checks and balances” throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and perhaps never more so than in the last decades of the Reich.  Some, like
Justus Möser, located the origins of this system in the medieval autonomy of the
separate estates and the right of a German to obey “only that court which he himself
helped tom constitute, that judge whom he had elected, and that contract to which he
had agreed to.” Others – one might contend, in a more enlightened fashion – attributed
it  to  the  legal  institutions  arising from the  end of  the  fifteenth century,  especially  the
Reichskammergericht, to which all citizens could appeal irrespective of their estate. 588
The latter camp included, among many others, Freidrich Carl von Moser as well as the
famous Göttingen professor Johann Stephan Pütter (1725-1807). At this point it is
appropriate to resume the history of the translations of Robertson’s History of Charles V,
for it is tempting to believe that the learned “P” was no other than Pütter, whose
possible influence on Remer I have already mentioned. Neither the subject matter of the
notes, nor the ideas just described were alien to him. Although his compendia on public
law and imperial history are regarded as “prototypical products of an apolitical
587 Richard Pares, “American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-1763,” English Historical Review 51
(1936), 436.
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specialist scholarship,”589 his devotion to the existing institutions and arrangements of
the Reich shines through even the detached tenor of his texts.
Pütter’s work has been recognized as “the culmination of German imperial
public law,” which in his approach meant the study of the state as a legal order to be
comprehended in its historical development: an order not “established” by abstract
principle but “unfolding” in time with the development of society, and therefore to be
interpreted in close relation to its own past. The tradition of Reichsgeschichte he
cultivated took to history as source material capable of shedding light on the currently
valid system of law, and his historical works aimed to promote a better understanding
of the existing constitution and its fundamental laws. He was a firm believer in the
excellence of this system, and while he recognized that it  was in a permanent state of
development, its complete dissolution was unthinkable for him.590 One of the keys to
this  excellence  lay  in  the  composite  character  of  the Reich: rejecting the notion of the
translatio imperii, Pütter appreciated the empire as “a state composed of several states,”
and explained even the surviving effectiveness of Roman law in terms of its becoming
indigenous custom. “Among all the states of Europe the German Empire is the only one
in  which  each  of  the  imperial  estates  constitute  a  fully  separate  state,  so  that  each  of
them have their own particular history, and yet the general imperial history comprises
all of these states as participants of an empire.” This state of affairs was consolidated
especially as in the high Middle Ages both the secular and the ecclesiastical estates
became proper territorial lords of their provinces, thus “Germany gradually acquired
the constitution that ultimately became peculiar to it.”591 This feature of German history
588 Jonathan Knudsen, Justus Möser and the German Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 99-109; Umbach, Federal Enlightenment, 134 ff; Volker Press, Das Reichskammergericht in der
deutschen Geschichte (Wetzlar: Gesellschaft der Reichskammergerichtsforschung, 1987).
589 Manfred Friedrich, Geschichte der deutschen Staatsrechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997),
131.
590 On the character of Pütter’s legal scholarship, see Ulrich Schlie, Johann Stephan Pütters Rechtbegriff
(Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwarz, 1961); for a broader contextualization, see Friedrich, Geschichte der
deutschen Staatsrechtswissenschaft, Ch. 9.
591 “Es ist aber vollends das Teutsche Reich unter allen Europäischen Reichen das einzige in seiner Art,
de jeder Reichsstand einen völlig eignen Staat ausmacht, und also auch seine eigne Specialgeschichte
hat, und doch die allgemeine Reichsgeschichte wiederum alle jene Staaten als Mitglieder eines Reichs
zusammen in sich fasset.” “…Teutschland nach und nach dadurch in die demselben zuletzt
eihgenthümlich gebliebene Verfassung kömmt.” Johann Stephan Pütter, Teutsche Reichsgeschichte in
ihrem Hauptfaden entwickelt (Göttingen:  Ruprecht,  1778),  5,  278.  In discussing the age of  Charles  V in
this work, Pütter’s notes show a quite thorough familiarity with Robertson.
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was also kept by Pütter as a red thread in his arguably greatest literary achievement,
the Historische Entwicklung des heutigen Staatsverfassung des Teutschen Reichs (1786-1787),
in which he claimed that  “Germany had been for several centuries in such a situation,
that  it  might  easily  be  foreseen,  that  it  would  not,  like  France  and  other  European
nations, continue an undivided Empire, which could not upon the whole be
considered in any other light than as a single state.”592 The Westphalian settlement,
in which this tendency culminated and became consecrated, thwarted not only
imperial despotism, but also prevented the abuse of territorial “prerogative” by the
estates – a carefully balanced set of arrangements resembling the mixed constitutions
of the United Provinces, or the new United States.593
Returning to the question of the notes in the German edition, as a matter of
fact, some of them are merely pedantic. It is also interesting to see how Robertson’s
text occasioned debates between the individuals who participated in conveying them
to the German public. Abele (who wrote his dissertation at Göttingen in 1778 on the
German imperial nobility ? again, quite possibly under the guidance of Pütter) on
several occasions commented on and corrected not Robertson, but his German
predecessors.594 Many of the notes usefully correct Robertson’s errors, lapses or
inadequate terminology as regards German history, but just as the review in the
Göttingische Anzeigen,  they  are  not  concerned  with  Robertson’s  main  theme  as
enunciated in the first half of this chapter: the ambivalent processes of the formation
of the modern European states system and the very character of modern politics. In
an age of interpretative editorial prefaces, this theme was also ignored in the ones
which our translators provided.
This did not mean, however, that Robertson’s character as a historian was
unrecognized by them, quite on the contrary. To be sure, there were sceptics as well
as pedantic critics of Robertson’s approach. These included Franz Dominic Häberlin
(1720-1787), a very early graduate of the University of Göttingen, who also started a
teaching career at his alma mater, before taking up in 1746 a professorial position at
592 Pütter, An Historical Development, II. 165. Cf. Pütter’s original, Historische Entwicklung des heutigen
Staatsverfassung des Teutschen Reichs (Göttingen: Ruprecht, 1786-1787), II. 156.
593 Ibid., II. 168.
594 Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1781-1783), I. 316, 369; II. 361.
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Helmstedt, at first in history and then in public law (thus, he was a senior colleague
of Remer’s).595 Already in the preface to his “new imperial history”, Häberlin
couched quite sarcastic judgements in his apparent appreciation for Robertson.
“But  without  taking  away  in  the  least  from  the  value  of  Robertson’s  very
precious and worth while history, or underrating it with my reproaches, yet
anyone more closely familiar with the authentic sources of our fatherland’s
history  must  admit,  that  some  things  have  been  advanced  not  in  the  most
accurate faithfulness to the available sources, the public documents and
contemporary authors, and sometimes, in order to give the narrative a more
refined turn or a greater momentum, his own ideas were mixed in it.  Not to
mention that in tackling the German affairs this famous writer pays attention
more to the general than the particular, which, however, may be excused by
the plan he designed; therefore as regards these particular internal affairs of
the German Empire, the task of a generous gleaning has been bequeathed to
me.”596
Further on in the book, all politeness is abandoned by Häberlin, who makes the flat
claim  that  Robertson  “wrote  something  between  a  true  history  and  a  novel”  (ein
Mittelding einer wahren Geschichte und einem Roman geschrieben).597 We have seen that
Remer, too, occasionally expressed his unhappiness with the lacunae in Robertson’s
familiarity with the sources of German history. Yet he thought that the “minor
595 Franz Xaver von Wegele, “Häberlin, Franz Dominicus”, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 10.
(Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1879), 274 f.
596 “Allein ohne dem Wehrte dieser gewiß sehr schätzbaren und höchstlesenswürdigen
Robertsonischen Geschichte was zu benehmen, oder selbiger durch meinen Tadel herunter zu setzen,
wird doch ein jeder, der mit der ächten Quellen unserer vaterländischen Geschichte genauer bekannt
ist, einräumen müssen, daß manches nicht nach der genauesten Richtigkeit der vorhandenen
Urkunden, öffentlichen Acten und gleichzeitigen Schriftsteller sey vorgetragen, sondern bisweilen der
Erzählung, um ihr eine artigere Wendung oder grösser Schwung zu geben, von eigenen Gedanken
was beygemischt worden. Nicht zu gedenken, daß dieser berühmte Schriftsteller bey Berührung der
Teutschen Angelegenheiten mehr auf das allgemeine, als auf das besondere, sein Augenmerk
genommen hat,  welches sich aber  nach seinem entworfenem Plane entschuldigen läßt;  daher mir  in
Ansehung dieser besondern und innern Angelegenheiten des Teutschen Reichs noch eine reiche
Nachlese übrig geblieben ist.”.Franz Dominic Häberlin,  Neue Teutsche Reichs-Geschichte, Vom Anfänge
des Schmalkaldischen Krieges bis auf unsere Zeiten (Halle: Gebauer, 1774-1790), I. iv-v.
597  Ibid., II. 430.
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inaccuracies” of which Robertson was blameable did not justify the heavy charges
levelled against him by Häberlin, and as an overall retort to the latter, exclaimed: “If
only God willed that half of Robertson’s philosophical discerning spirit imbued our
students of the history of Germany!”598
There were in fact a few candidates for the role of a “German Robertson”, one
of them promptly suggested by Abele in a note to Remer’s note just mentioned:
“Schmidt is completely imbued with this discerning spirit, and his patriotic history is
already meeting the applause of the public.”599 Michael Ignaz Schmidt (1735-1794)
served at the court of the Catholic prince-bishop of Würzburg as university librarian
and, from 1773, professor of history until 1780, when he moved to Vienna as director
of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. He started to publish his Geschichte der Deutschen
in Ulm in 1778, the same year as the first volume of Remer’s annotated edition
appeared, and reached, with the fifth volume, the age of Charles V in 1783,
simultaneously  with  the  publication  of  the  last  volume  of  Abele’s  edition  of
Robertson. A new edition in eight volumes in Vienna followed in 1787, while
Schmidt was also busy bringing the story to 1657 in a now six-volume Neuere
Geschichte der Deutschen. The publishing history is evidence for the “applause”
mentioned by Abele. Pütter, who also thought highly of Schmidt’s work600 ? a very
generous opinion on the former’s part,  as we shall  see ?, had an indirect candidacy
for  the  role  of  a  “German  Robertson”,  too.  In  1790,  Pütter’s Historische Entwicklung
appeared in the English translation of Josiah Dornford (1764-1797), almost naturally
another recent Göttingen graduate. With a bachelor’s degree from Oxford, Dornford
arrived to study law at the Georgia Augusta in late 1786, and was examined, with
Pütter  on the  committee,  for  his  doctorate  in  January 1789.601 He later remembered
598 “Wollte Gott, Robertsons philosophischer Bemerkungsgeist ruhete nur halb auf unsre bisheriger
Bearbeiter der Geschichte Teutschlands!” Robertson, Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778-1789),  II. 466.
599 “Auf Schmidt  ruht  dieser  Bemerkungsgeist  ganz,  und schon findet  die  vaterlandische Geschichte
beym Publikum mehr Beyfall.” Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1781-1783), II. 468.
600 Pütter, Teutsche Reichsgeschichte,  vii.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  praise  of  Pütter,  as  well  as  of
Gatterer, for Schmidt was explicitly expressed in favourably comparing him to Robertson, for which I
have found no evidence. Peter Baumgart, “Michael Ignaz Schmidt (1736-1794). Leben und Werk”, in
idem. (ed.), Michael Ignaz Schmidt (1736-1794) in seiner Zeit. Der aufgeklärte Theologe, Bildungsreformer
und “Historiker der Deutschen” aus Franken in neuer Sicht (Neustadt and der Aisch: Verlag Degener &
Co. 1996), 121.
601 Universitätsarchiv Göttingen, J57; Promotionsalbum der Juristischen Fakultät 1789.
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fondly the “many instances of disinterested friendship I experienced in Göttingen
[which] have attached me so much to that University, that I feel myself happy in the
smallest opportunity of contributing to its welfare.”602 Translating his master’s book
was no doubt understood by him as such an opportunity. In his preface to Pütter’s
work Dornford claimed that in order to acquire the relevant English terminology he
studied a number of British texts, including Robertson’s History of Charles V (besides
John Millar’s A Historical View of the English Government, and Gilbert Stuart’s A View
of Society in Europe in its Progress from Rudeness to Refinement), the implication being
that it could be considered as a German counterpart of the combination of stadial and
narrative history.603
The piquancy of both Pütter and Schmidt being put forward in this context
arises from the fact that hardly could two figures have been more at variance on
issues they both considered to be crucial for the period of German history on which
Robertson focused. Furthermore, whatever their “philosophical discerning spirit,”
both of them produced highly partisan readings of German history as a whole and
particularly the sixteenth century. Let me conclude this chapter by a comparison of
Robertson in the original and the putative “German Robertsons” from this point of
view.
In Robertson’s own approach, true to his “moderatist” principles, a
conjectural-stadialist framework and a European perspective on national histories, as
well as a studied endeavour to assert impartiality, were employed in order to
transcend the traditional limitations of historical understanding. To some extent
Pütter  and,  more  arguably,  Schmidt  were  a  match  to  Robertson  in  the  first  two
respects. Pütter frequently reminded that the histories of the individual German
states can only be fruitfully studied by concentrating on those circumstances that are
closely related to the whole of Germany604 (a counterpart of Robertson’s vision of the
histories of European states as pars pro toto). His concerns were mainly with laws and
602 Josiah Dornford to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, 22 August 1791. Niedersächsisches Staats- und
Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, Cod. Ms. Lichtenberg III, 51. – It is noteworthy that before his
premature  death,  Dornford  also  contributed  in  a  thoroughly  Burkean  spirit  to  the  debate  on  the
French revolutionary wars. Josiah Dornford, The Motives and Consequences of the Present War Impartially
Considered (London: Pridden, 1793).
603 Pütter, An Historical Development, I. xiv.
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institutions, and thus his aims were not narrative, so he was quite indifferent to some
of Robertson’s preoccupations, such as the nature of modern politics and its relation
with the problem of character. At the same time, he frequently resorted to stadial
patterns of history in order to contextualize the development of the German
constitution. 605  Schmidt did so quite systematically. The preface to his first volume
was a concise engagement with the manners of the ancient Germans in Robertson’s
style (including some polemic with the Scottish historian),606 and sections on “the
manners, character and constitution” (Sitten, Charakter, Verfassung) of the Germans,
examining these issues in mutual reference to one another, regularly appeared in the
subsequent  parts  of  the  book.   In  addition,  overviews  of  the  European  status  quo
introduced every chapter in order to establish a context for the ensuing discussion of
German developments. The most successful one among these overviews was the
tableau of European affairs on the eve of the Reformation, in which Schmidt
presented a picture closely resembling that depicted by Robertson on the period of
Charles V’s accession.607 At this point, it is worth mentioning Schmidt’s avowed
endeavour “to show how Germany has acquired its present manners, enlightenment,
laws, arts and sciences, and above all its excellent political and ecclesiastical
constitution;  shortly,  how  it  has  become  what  it  is.”608 He thus shared Pütter’s
attempt to sketch a “historical development” of the “present” constitution, and thus
the overall ambition of Aufklärungshistorie to grasp history as a comprehensive set of
causal relationships between the past and the present. But he also stressed that “the
conflict of the power of the rulers and the estates” (der Zusammenstoß der kaiserlichen
und Ständischen Macht),  which most  historians  are  content  to  discuss,  can hardly  be
“the ultimate goal of history” (der letzte Zweck der Geschichte).  The  true  subject  of
history for him was the progress of “national happiness” (Nationalglückseligkeit), and
604 For instance, idem., Teutsche Reichsgeschichte,  iii-iv.
605 E.g. Pütter, An Historical Development,  I.  3  (on  ancient  Germanic  manners),  13  (on  mode  of
subsistence and the Salic laws), 117-8 (on medieval urban communities), 169 (on the consequences of
the Crusades), 380-1 (on the consequences of the discovery of America).
606 Michael Ignaz Schmidt, Geschichte der Deutschen (Ulm: Stettin, 1778-1783), I. Vorrede; 11-16.
607 Ibid., V., 1-6.
608 “Meine Absicht bey diesem werke ist, zu zeigen, wie Deutschland seine dermaligen Sitten,
Aufklärung, Gesetze, Künste und Wissenschaften, hauptsächlich aber seine so sehr ausgezeichnete
Staats- und Kirchenverfassung bekommen habe; kurz, wie es das worden, was es wirklich ist..” Ibid.,
I. 3.
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it  was for this reason that the more spacious horizon described above was adopted
by him.609 Besides the development of German manners and the moral and religious
history of the people, this also implied an interest in the rise of territorial states
capable of asserting their authority not only in the secular domain but also in
religious affairs: as a prominent representative of the German Catholic
Enlightenment and its “Gallican longings”, Schmidt looked to these secular
establishments as potential aids in promoting an enlightened version of Catholicism
against the Roman hierarchy and the popular religious practices supported by it. 610
It  has  been  stressed  that  Montesquieu  and  Voltaire  were  important  influences  on
Schmidt in developing his historical approach, but his generous (sometimes
polemical) references to Robertson are also important to note.
Where the German historians parted company with their Scottish colleague
was the latter’s peculiar brand of impartiality. It has been pointed out that Robertson,
in order to comply with his own moderatist standards, had recourse to a politic
(rather than scholarly) selection of facts in his assessment of Queen Mary’s status in
Scottish history as a gesture to demonstrate the possibility “to incorporate Jacobitism
… within a Whig and cosmopolitan sense of progress.”611 If no deliberate selection of
facts was involved in his evaluation of Francis I and Charles V, he did take
considerable pains to show even-handedness, and his judgement of his two
protagonists was not based on their attitude to the Catholic-Protestant strife, but on
their performance as statesmen amidst the challenges of a new status quo in state
and  church  as  well  as  the  international  system  as  a  whole.  Even  so,  while  he  held
Charles’ superiority in matters of statesmanship beyond doubt, he sought to explain
609 Ibid., I. 12-3, 22.
610 Recently, Schmidt has been explicitly put forward as a counterpart of Robertson in such terms: he
too is portrayed as a religious and ecclesiastical “moderate” who belonged to the broader family of
enlightened narrative history, and sought to place the history of the clergy “within the history of civil
society  and  manners”  -   a  reference  to  Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, II. 282 in Michael Printy,
Enlightenment and the Creation of German Catholicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
198 and the whole of Ch. 9. See also Michael Printy, “From Barbarism to Religion: Church History and
the Enlightened Narrative in Germany”, German History 23 (2005), 172-201. On Schmidt as a historian,
see further Arnold Berney, “Michael Ignatz Schmidt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Historiographie
in der deutschen Aufklärung”, Historisches Jahrbuch, 44 (1924), 211-239; Hans-Wolfgang Bergerhausen,
“Michael  Ignaz  Schmidt  in  der  historiographischen  Tradition  der  Aufklärung”,  in  Baumgart  (ed.),
Michael Ignaz Schmidt, 63- 79.
611 O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, 121.
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the contradiction that “Francis is one of the Monarchs who occupies a higher rank in
the temple of Fame, than either his talents or performances entitle him to hold.” He
found a complex answer. First, he “was viewed by most of the other powers not only
with the partiality which naturally arises for those who gallantly maintain an
unequal contest, but with the favour due to one who was resisting a common
enemy.” In addition, “[c]aptivated with his personal qualities, his subjects forgot his
defects as a Monarch, and admiring him as the most accomplished and amiable
gentleman in his dominions, they hardly murmured at acts of maladministration.”
Finally,  his patronage for the arts and sciences preserved his reputation beyond his
own  times,  so  that  not  even  posterity  “judged  of  his  public  conduct  with  its  usual
impartiality.”612 Among Robertson’s German interlocutors, Remer in fact denied
Francis  a  triumph over  Charles  even in  terms of  gallantry,  in  a  sense  overthrowing
the  carefully  poised  balance.  In  early  1528,  at  a  highly  critical  juncture  in  the  great
conflict, Francis challenged Charles to settle their differences by a duel – in
Robertson’s rendering “an absurd custom,” “more becoming the heroes of romance
than the  two great  monarchs  of  the  age,”  and although at  first  Charles  accepted it,
finally the idea was laid aside. In a note Remer criticizes Robertson not only for
dwelling too shortly on this “extraordinary duel”, but also makes a point out of
proving that the challenger was actually Charles, and the fight was cancelled, “if not
because of Francis himself, then because of the French.”613
On a more general level, whereas Robertson obviously wrote “Protestant
history”, as we have seen above he took care to point out excesses of “fanaticism” on
the Protestant as well as the Catholic side, and religion, however important and
omnipresent, remained an undercurrent in his narrative. By contrast, Pütter’s
sections on the sixteenth century present a thoroughly partisan reading of the history
of the Reformation (even earlier, the anti-papalist tenor is quite conspicuous). As
612 Robertson, History of Charles V, esp. III. 393 ff..
613 Ibid., III. 14-5; Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778-1789), II. 417. Later on the balance is somewhat
redressed.  In  Robertson’s  account,  it  was  “the  greatest  dishonour”  on  Charles’  reputation  to  have
refused the fulfilment  of  the promises  he had made in return for  free march across  French territory
against  the  Low  Countries  in  early  1540,  while  he  also  dismissed  the  “credulous  simplicity”  which
Francis  displayed  in  this  matter.  Agreeing  with  Robertson’s  judgement  on  the  Emperor,  Remer
stresses the “noble” conduct of the French king. Robertson, History of Charles V, III. 187-8; Geschichte
Carls des Fünften (1778-1789), II. 604.
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soon as, in Book V, he proceeds to the theme of religious reform, he does not omit to
claim that “[e]very one who was in the least enlightened, and indulged a freedom of
thinking, allowed that Luther and those who were united in his common cause, with
respect  to  the  doctrines  he  had  hitherto  advanced,  were  right”614 ? an
uncompromising value judgement which dominated every aspect of Pütter’s
treatment of German constitutional development in the age of confessional strife and
religious wars. He in fact insists that the religious and political settlements of 1555
and 1648 were the logical consequences, as well as the confirmation, of German
“liberty” as defined in terms of the imperial constitution. Viewed from this angle,
that is, with the partisan Protestant principles consistently in the background, the
attempts  of  Charles  V  and  Ferdinand  III  “to  reduce  Germany,  like  France,  to  the
dominion of a single sovereign”615 appear as almost exclusively the affairs of the
Reich. The situation is the very reverse of Robertson’s History of Charles V, where the
European perspective and the attempt to transcend the limitations of partisan
historiography mutually reinforce each other.
If impartiality is one of the standards whereby to measure the historian’s
achievement, Schmidt’s introductory remarks to his fifth volume, focusing on the
reign of Charles V, are quite promising. The reader is reminded that this period is
particularly susceptible to partisan treatment, and that in regard of it even the
learned Häberlin had lost his temper, suggesting that the Reformation was a work of
God’s omnipotence, and Luther the instrument of eternity. Schmidt himself claims to
aim at impartiality, but doubts that his analysis will satisfy all readers. Indeed, even
his fairly unbiased account of Luther’s appearance and the circumstances in which
the Reformation began, caused consternation among a number of otherwise
sympathetic Protestant readers.616 By the time the reader advances to the translation
of the Bible, Schmidt’s allegiances start to reveal themselves. It was a major error, he
claims, to entrust the common man with the interpretation and discussion of matters
vital for salvation: however much Luther repudiated the fanatical enthusiasm of the
614 Pütter, An Historical Development, II. 402. Cf. idem., Historische Entwickelung, II. 355.
615 Ibid.,  III. 167 in the English and 158 in the German text.
616 Printy, “From Barbarism to Religion”, 174-5.
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Anabaptists, their excesses can be traced back ultimately to his own programme.617
Nor is it legitimate to claim, Schmidt suggests, that theoretical and practical religion,
enlightenment, toleration or the cause of liberty gained with the Reformation, which
in fact halted Germany’s progress towards emerging as a cultured nation, not in the
least by pushing Catholics towards adopting extreme positions.618 Predictably, then,
Charles V, who in the eyes of Pütter pursued universal monarchy and according to
the author of the notes by “P” (who may have been Pütter) was an inconsistent and
mediocre politician,619 and according to Robertson also pursued something like
universal monarchy620 but  was  a  refined  practitioner  of  reason  of  state,  seemed  to
Schmidt not only a particularly able ruler but even one who saved the imperial
constitution from ruin. The Emperor’s “limitless ambition and conquering spirit” is
not denied by Schmidt, but in his view
“so little did Charles reduce Germany to slavery, that he is rather the sustainer
and to a certain extent the creator of the present system of the empire. Without
the breaking of the all too powerful Schmalkaldic League, either the
dissolution of the whole, or at least the annihilation of the Catholic parts,
especially  the  bishoprics,  was  bound to  occur.  … It  is  also  certain  that  if  the
leaguers had gained the upper hand, they would have dealt with the Catholics
in a very different manner from the way Charles dealt with them.”621
617 Schmidt, Geschichte, V. 138-40, 179-85.
618 Ibid., Ch. 23, 24; VI. 305 ff.
619 Even  Robertson’s  central  claim  on  Charles’  measures  being  the  result  of  “cool  reflection”  and
“disposed into a regular system” (mentioned above) were called into question by “P”, who suggested
that Robertson himself shows Charles often following his passion. Geschichte Carls des Fünften (1778-
1789), III. 546-9.
620 In the History of Scotland, I. 91, Robertson flatly claimed that Charles “openly aspired to universal
monarchy.” In the History of Charles V,  IV.  288,  the Emperor’s  undoubtedly “insatiable” ambition is
described  in  more  nuanced  terms,  and  while  he  is  shown  to  have  harboured  “a  desire  of  being
distinguished as  a  conqueror,”  in Robertson’s  revised view “there seems to be no foundation for  an
opinion prevalent in his own age, that he had formed the chimerical project of establishing a universal
monarchy in Europe.”
621 “Karl [hat] so wenig [Deutschland] in die Dienstbarkeit gebracht, daß er viel mehr der erhalter und
einiger Maaßen der Schöpfer des jetzigen Reichs-Systems ist. Ohne die Trennung des übermächtigen
Schmalkaldischen  Bundes  hätte  entweder  die  Auflösung  desselben,  oder  doch  die  Aufreibung  des
katholischen Reichstheils besonders der Bisthümer erfolgen müssen. … So viel ist auch sicher, daß,
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In other words, the casting became the very reverse of what Robertson, with the
balance of power in Europe and not merely the Empire in mind, presented.
As in so many other instances of explicit or implicit communication within the
enlightened republic of letters, the questions here were, to a great extent, similar,
whereas the stakes and the answers were fundamentally different. Robertson and
most of those involved in the process of the German reception of his historical works
asked what  made modern liberty,  the  rule  of  law under  stable  monarchy,  possible.
For the Scottish historian the answer lay in the elimination of feudalism by powerful
monarchs and their own subsequent inability to wield the plenitude of power for
themselves. From the point of view of national historical self-reflection the
understanding of the reasons for this development to him took precedence over
partisan arguments that could be drawn from history, and therefore, in an effort to
arrive at an impartial interpretation of controversial themes in national histories, he
appealed to their continent-wide horizon. By contrast, although European history is
not at all absent from the accounts of Robertson’s German interlocutors, the point is
that their German histories are completely intelligible by themselves. The reason for
this was that balance of power and social change (however frequently mentioned)
seemed irrelevant to the framework that had defined the chances of Freyheit since
time immemorial: the constitution of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation”. In addition, the character of the latest settlement of that constitution, the
Peace of Westphalia, rendered it extremely difficult to tackle the issue in any but
partisan terms. Therefore, in spite of the demand for true universal history in
contemporary German high academia, and the recognition of the merits of
impartiality, the problems which from Robertson’s Scottish perspective called for a
cosmopolitan and non-partisan treatment, continued to be discussed in precisely the
opposite terms in the German reception of his writings relevant to national history.
wenn die bundesverwandten die Oberhand behalten hätten, sie mit den Katholischen auf eine ganz
andere Art würden verfahren seyn, als Karl mit ihnen.” Schmidt, Geschichte, VI. 282.
               dc_444_12
266
Chapter Six
Maps of mankind: the savage and the civilised
In a now famous letter of compliment to Robertson upon the publication of his
History of America in  1777,  Edmund Burke referred to  “the  Great  Map of  Mankind”
that is “unrolld” for the gaze of contemporaries, not in the least thanks to Robertson’s
employment of “Philosophy to judge on Manners.”622 While Burke combined this
remark with the observation that “[w]e no longer need to go to History to trace
[human nature] in all its stages and periods” (perhaps found not so congenial by the
addressee of his praises), it illustrates well the contemporary understanding of the
distinctiveness of Robertson’s combination of historical narrative with theoretical
reflection. In recent literature, Burke’s eulogy of Robertson has been cited at a
frequency that highlighting it here may risk both being impolite and eliciting
boredom. There are still several reasons why it is not fully awkward to start this
chapter by referring to it.
First, Burke’s remark assumes that the comparative study of European contact
with other human groups, and the attempt to make sense for Europeans both of such
groups and the influence of the intercourse with them on their own societies, is a
study of  “mankind,”  of  humanity.  This  was  a  concept  still  tenuous at  the  time,  but
one which we certainly owe to the Enlightenment, and one to which Robertson’s late
masterpieces on America and India both contributed significantly. Second, it also
assumes that such study is best carried out with a “philosophical” approach to
“manners” – an approach that has been identified as a Scottish Enlightenment trade
mark associated with the science of man. Having first turned from national to
European themes, from Scotland to Charles V, by an ease secured by the persistent
application of this frame of interpretation, Robertson moved on equally smoothly to
what today would be styled as global history: the exploration of the encounter and
622 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. Thomas W. Copeland (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1958-1971), III. 350-1.
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transactions of Europeans with other civilizations in reciprocal though asymmetric
relationships, an indispensable tool for assessing the nature and extent of such
asymmetries being once again exactly the systematic use of the stadial scheme. Both
in the case of the History of America and the Historical Disquisition, the most striking
features – ones which also had highly important moral and political implications –
were “stadialist” pieces of analysis: of the progress of European navigation and
commercial expansion (Book I, History of America, and much of  Sections  I-III  in  the
Historical Disquisition); of “savage” society (Book IV, History of America); of the more
sophisticated Inca and Aztec cultures (Book VII, History of America); of the “political
economy” of the Spanish colonial empire (Book VIII, History of America);  and of the
advanced manners and institutions of India (Appendix, Historical Disquisition).623 As I
shall show, however, standards of causal explanation and patterns of interpretation
dictated by the stadialist logic also permeate the narrative portions of both works,
where they are the principal tool for Robertson to give an account of the conduct and
manners of individual protagonists and collective personae.
Similarly  to  the  cases  of  the History of Scotland and the History of Charles V,
such avant-garde credentials of Robertson’s,  with reference to at least the History of
America,  have been put  in  a  more  relativistic  light  in  recent  literature.  For  instance,
the  very  incentives  for  him  in  making  this  move  towards  the  topic  of  Europe’s
colonial dependencies after an inquiry into the birth pangs of the European state
system were not strictly scientific-professional, and certainly included ones arising
from his own status within the British political establishment, to whose then-current
concerns the retention of a recently preserved empire in North America and the
proper control of another one emerging in India, were integral.624 These are highly
important findings from the point of view of Robertson’s plausible motivations,
which, however, together with the British policy considerations with which they
were associated, mattered less for the German interpreters and interpretations of
Robertson,  the  chief  concern  of  this  book.  Of  more  significance  is  the  overall
atmosphere of the late 1760s and 1770s, when the recently concluded conflict of
623 For  an  assessment  of  the  significance  of  the  two  books  in  this  sense,  see  O’Brien, Narratives of
Enlightenment, 156-65.
624 Cf. Ch. 3, n. 27.
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colonial powers threw into prominence the conditions of Europe’s unfolding global
ascendancy. This was an atmosphere in which the stringent criticism of the practices
applied in the conquest of overseas territories and the subjugation of native
populations by the Abbé Raynal and his team of authors – in particular, Denis
Diderot – in the Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des
Européens dans les des deux Indes attracted vast audiences across Europe,625 and in
which treatments of the same themes by other authors such as Robertson, could also
count on avid interest.
In  each  of  the  sections  of  the  two  works  which  I  highlighted  above,
Robertson’s discussion is informed by the premise, made explicit by him with a
striking regularity in diverse but unambiguous formulations, that human
communities normally advance through broadly similar stages of development,
defined in terms of the dominant “mode of subsistence” (hunting and gathering;
pasturing; agriculture; and commerce).626 There  is  also  a  rough  correspondence
between the complexity of procuring subsistence, the refinement of manners, and the
sophistication of institutions, concepts and beliefs. The accounts of the history of
navigation among the leading maritime nations of Europe offered in both the History
of America and the Historical Disquisition (the latter frequently just referring to the
former, or adopting passages from it verbatim) are possible to read as extensions of
the main overall thrust of the View of the Progress into  a  particular  thematic  field.
625 The  name  of  the  Jesuit  Raynal  provided  a  cover  for  this  undertaking  of  a  host  of  iconoclastic
authors in order to protect them from harassment by the authorities. Diderot’s contributions are
estimated at c. 700 pages in the ten-volume 1780 edition. First published in 1772 (with an imprint of
1770), one of the most popular “forbidden bestsellers” of the eighteenth century went through more
than thirty editions by 1787. Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (New
York:  Norton,  1996),  22  f.  The  literature  on  the  Histoire  des  deux  Indes  is  immense.  See  Gabriel
Esquer, L'Anticolonialisme au XVIIIe siècle : Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du
commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1951) ; Michèle
Duchet, Diderot et l'Histoire des deux Indes : ou, L'écriture fragmentaire (Paris : A.-G. Nizet, 1978) ; Hans-
Jürgen Lüsebrink, Anthony Strugnell, L'Histoire des deux Indes : réécriture et polygraphie (Oxford :
Voltaire Foundation, 1995 ); Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire, Ch. 3 ; Pocock, Barbarism and
Religion, IV. Ch. 4.
626 The “four stages,” while present in eighteenth-century language, are better understood as a loose
heuristic scheme – not necessarily rigidly applied, and always presenting challenges of interpretation
for those who attempted to apply it (including Robertson) – than the “system” which Ronald Meek’s
pathbreaking Social Science and the Ignoble Savage proposed it to be. For a recent, detailed treatment of
the subject,  including a  critique of  Meek,  see Thomas Nutz, »Varietäten des Menschengeschlechts«. Die
Wissenschaften vom menschen in der Zeit der Aufklärung (Köln-Weimar-Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), Ch. 3.
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Navigation and ship-building are described by Robertson as “nice and complicated”
arts,  so  that  “[f]rom the  raft  or  canoe,  which first  served to  carry  a  savage over  the
river that obstructed him in the chace, to the construction of a vessel capable of
conveying  a  numerous  crew  with  safety  to  a  distant  coast,  the  progress  in
improvement is immense.” In demonstrating this, philosophical conjecture can be
resorted to as a helpful tool: “The rude and imperfect state in which navigation is still
found among all nations which are not considerably civilized, corresponds with this
account of its progress, and demonstrates, that in early times, the art was not so far
improved as to enable men to undertake distant voyages, or to attempt remote
discoveries.”627 The existence of “mutual interest and mutual wants” among humans
who inhabit different regions with differing resources is an important trigger of the
said “progress in improvement:”
“It  is  to  navigation  that  men  are  indebted  for  the  power  of  transporting  the
superfluous stock of one part of the earth, to supply the wants of another. The
luxuries and blessings of a particular climate are no longer confined to itself
alone …” Besides and above conquest and settlement, “[t]he desire of gain
became a  new incentive  to  activity,  roused adventurers,  and sent  them forth
upon long voyages, in search of countries, whose products or wants might
increase that circulation, which nourishes and gives vigour to commerce.
Trade proved a great source of discovery, it opened unknown seas, it
penetrated into new regions, and contributed more than any other cause. To
bring men acquainted with the situation, the nature, and commodities of the
different parts of the globe.”628
Commerce (interest) and curiosity, enterprise and adventure walk hand in
hand. Their incremental growth is slow and cumbersome, guided by trial and error,
and ridden with setbacks.  But whenever in history the “spirit of commerce” arose –
whether  from  the  absence  of  the  natural  fertility  of  the  soil,  as  in  the  case  of  the
627 William Robertson, The History of America (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1996), I. 2-3.
628 Ibid., I. 4-5.
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ancient Phoenicians, from the policy of empire building, as in the case of Alexander
the Great, or from the multiplication of needs, as among Western Europeans from the
thirteenth century on –, it was followed by its “usual effects”: it “awakened curiosity,
enlarged the ideas and desires of men, and incited them to bold enterprises.”629 This
was a spirit which might assume an “adventurous” character, in which it resembled
–  and  received  reinforcement  from  –  that  of  pirates  and  warriors.  This  theme  is
developed by Robertson with reference to the grant of the Canaries by Henry III  of
Castile to the Norman baron John de Bethencourt (who possessed the “valour and
good fortune which distinguished the adventurers of his country”), and to the
heightening of a “martial and adventurous spirit” among the Iberian nations during
the reconquista, which “called forth men of such active and daring genius, as are fit
for bold undertakings.” For them the sea presented a “field of enterprise in which
they could distinguish themselves.”630
However, it is worth remembering that in early-modern English usage,
“adventure” did not necessarily only refer to a rash, extravagant, chivalrous quest of
danger and valiant defiance of fortune. The Company of the Merchant Adventurers
of London, chartered in 1407 to export wool to the continent and developing its
privileges  into  a  monopoly  of  the  cloth  trade  during  most  of  the  sixteenth  and
seventeenth centuries, was a thoroughly regulated company of capitalist
entrepreneurs, under a governor and several deputies, who all sought decent profit
through safe investment and reasonable risk-taking. The word also appeared in the
name of companies specifically created in the atmosphere of the lure of geographic
exploration,  such  as  “The  Mystery,  Company,  and  Fellowship  of  Merchant
Adventurers for the Discovery of Regions, Dominions, Islands, and Places
Unknown,” founded in 1551 by Sebastian Cabot (as governor), Richard Chancellor,
Hugh Willoughby and some 240 associates, and renamed in 1555 as the Muscovy
Company. “Adventurer” continued to simply denote a business investor who
“ventures” capital well into the seventeenth century, when the 1642 Adventurers’
629 Ibid.,  I.  8,  12-3.  Cf.  20  ff,  40  ff.;  and  William  Robertson, An Historical Disquisition concerning the
Knowledge which the Ancients had of India; and the Progress of Trade with that Country prior to the Discovery
of the Passage to it by the Cape of Good Hope (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1996), 6, 30 ff, 152 ff.
630 Robertson, History of America, I. 54-8.
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Act invited the public to invest in the suppression of the Irish rebellion in return for
the  promise  of  lands  to  be  confiscated  from  the  rebels.631 In the History of America,
Robertson’s purpose is eminently served by the ambiguity of language, which allows
for a permeability of the boundary between the moral psychology of two social types
that  were  to  play  a  paramount  role  in  Europe’s  global  expansion,  showing  the
merchant  and  the  conquistador  to  be  distant  relatives.  In  the  history  of  Spanish
America the disposition of the latter would be irresistible. At the auspicious
beginning of the process, the most towering figures among “enterprising” men, like
Prince  Henry  the  Navigator,  also  “added  all  the  accomplishments  of  a  more
enlightened and polished age” to the martial spirit, as a result of which the first
“regular  plan  of  discovery”  was  conceived  in  Portugal.  In  the  classic  style  of  the
Edinburgh sciences on man, stadial-conjectural pieces of social analysis lead to (and
establish the ground for) a discussion of the moral psychology of discovery and the
character  of  the  discoverer.  According  to  Robertson’s  plastic  representation,  a
curiosity feeding on the prospect of material gain and thus becoming second nature
thanks  to  the  swelling  spirit  of  commerce,  was  capable  of  accommodating  the
attitudes of a warrior elite whose ethos rested on personal valour and glory, and also
of resorting to the advances of “enlightenment” – science and technology as well as a
culture of self-control and considered calculation – for the sake of giving direction to
both sets of dispositions. The equilibrium in this character was a tenuous one, and, as
Robertson’s characterizations of the conquistadors would show, could be
overwhelmed or degenerated under the unusual exigencies of the process of
discovery itself. But Christopher Columbus still represented the ideal type: in him,
“the modesty and diffidence of true genius was united with the ardent enthusiasm of
a projector;” his “active mind” was applied to the sciences that gave a new and
thorough underpinning to navigation; with a “sanguine and enterprising temper”, he
turned his speculative knowledge directly to action; in addition, “[h]e possessed a
thorough knowledge of mankind, an insinuating address, a patient perseverance in
executing any plan, the perfect government of his own passions, and the talent of
631 On the sixteenth-century history of the company, see Douglas R. Bisson, The Merchant Adventurers
of England: The Company and the Crown, 1474-1564 (University of Delaware Press, 1993)
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acquiring an ascendant over those of other men.”632 Ambition geared to
purposefulness by conscious deliberation and composure: the figure of the
accomplished discoverer is a companion of the resourceful statesman, familiar from
portraits drawn by Robertson in the History of Charles V,  in  his  picture  gallery  of
modernity.
As a matter of fact,  the application of the language of stadial history and the
related categories of moral psychology to the New World, and for different reasons
to India, too, is paradoxical:633 strictly speaking, it could be difficult to discern the
sequence of stages anywhere in America, while one of the remarkable features of
Indian society seemed to be precisely the permanence and immutability of manners
and institutions. In most of the territories of the former, what remained of the stadial
scheme was the “savage” stage of hunters, gatherers and primitive planters who did
not attain to pasturing, and whatever agriculture they developed was insufficient to
generate commerce and the accompanying system of legal codes and political
institutions. The fact – or assumption, which creole historians would ardently
debate634 – that even the most sophisticated of American societies failed to reach the
stage where the writing of history as an account of civil  society could be a relevant
pursuit,  was  also  a  chief  reason  why  Robertson  abandoned  his  original  plan  of
inserting the discovery and conquest of America into his history of the reign of
Charles  V.  To  all  intents  and  purposes,  civil  history  was  “brought”  to  America  by
Europeans;  it  was  their  history  in  America  (as  in  the  case  of  Columbus,  Las  Casas,
Cortes  and Pizarro),  and that  of  America  in  Europe (as  in  the  case  of  the  successes
and failures in governing the colonial economy by Spain). As for the history of the
Americans and of their encounter with the conquerors, it was incapable of rendering
by way of a civil narrative because the unequal relations of power between the two
sides deprived it from any dramatic suspense, essential for this type of history.
Robertson suggested that civil history as an account of the emulation of human
talents and endeavours is close to its “noblest” when representing “men at a juncture
632 Robertson, History of America, I. 86, 95, 120.
633 See Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, IV. Ch. 9.
634 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies and
Identities in the Eighteenth-Centry Atlantic World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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when their minds are most violently agitated, and all their powers and passions are
called forth” – that is,  in war. “But in a contest between naked savages, and one of
the most warlike of European nations, where science, courage, and discipline on one
side, were opposed by ignorance, timidity, and disorder on the other, a particular
detail of events would be as unpleasant as uninstructive.”635 Such  encounters,  and
the part played by the indigenous in them – the very history of the latter – was to be
intelligible only if rendered in terms that were quasi-ethnographical, philosophical
and conjectural,  to which the vocabulary and underlying principles,  if  not the strict
sequence, of stages was still indispensable. India was an altogether different case:
manufactures were brought to perfection, social differentiation occurred, legal codes
and institutions of police emerged, and a literate culture with written philosophies
and histories was established there in the remote past. Yet, although the subcontinent
proved resistant to change for many centuries and thus any evidence for “progress”
was difficult to invoke, the comparative potential of the stadialist vocabulary made it
an  attractive  tool  for  Robertson,  and  one  widely  resorted  to  by  him,  to  frame  his
analysis of situations that were essentially static in this case, too.
It is somewhat remarkable that for Robertson the absence of stages still invited
a plethora of formulations employing the analytical standards and terminological
arsenal of stadial history to make sense of non-European societies.  In fact,  probably
his most uncompromising commitment to the methodological tenets of stadial
history  is  contained in  Book IV of  the History of America:  “In  order  to  complete  the
history  of  the  human mind,  and attain  to  a  perfect  knowledge of  its  nature  and its
operations, we must contemplate man in all those various situations wherein he has
been  placed.  We  must  follow  him  in  his  progress  through  the  different  stages  of
society, as he advances from the infant state of civil life towards its maturity and
decline.”  In the same section of the work, substantial space is devoted by him to the
discussion of theories about the settlement of the American continent, only to
conclude that “[t]he condition and character of the American nations, at the time
when they became known to the Europeans, deserve more attentive consideration,
than the  inquiry  concerning their  origin.  The latter  is  merely  an object  of  curiosity,
635 Robertson, History of America, I. 253-4.
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the former is one of the most important as well  as instructive researches which can
occupy the historian.”636 Further  on  in  the  text  Robertson  also  gives  the  reason  for
this view: nearly two centuries after the discovery of America, philosophers started
to appreciate the fact that a better knowledge of “the Americans in their original state
…  might  enable  us  to  fill  up  a  considerable  chasm  in  [the  human  species’]
progress.”637 He  then  goes  on  to  provide  a  concise  summary  of  the  dominant  tone
and tenor of the whole of Book IV:
“In  America,  man  appears  under  the  rudest  form  in  which  we  can  conceive
him to subsist. We behold communities just beginning to unite, and may
examine the sentiments and actions of human beings in the infancy of social
life, while they feel but imperfectly the force of its ties, and have scarcely
relinquished their native liberty. The state of primaeval simplicity, which was
known in our continent only by the fanciful description of poets, really existed
in the other. The greater part of its inhabitants were strangers to industry and
labour, ignorant of arts, imperfectly acquainted with the nature of property,
and enjoying almost without restriction or controul the blessings which
flowed spontaneously from the bounty of nature.”638
 The assumption that similar conditions of socio-cultural existence nurture a
similarity  of  lifestyles  is  a  recurrent  feature  of  the  text.  “A  tribe  of  savages  on  the
banks of the Danube must very nearly resemble one upon the plains washed by the
Mississippi. Instead then of presuming from this similarity, that there is an affinity
between  them,  we  should  only  conclude,  that  the  disposition  and  manners  of  men
are formed by their situation, and arise from the state of society in which they
636 Ibid., II. 49-50. While devoted to the study of Robertson’s Spanish sources, Lenman, “’From savage
to  Scot’  via  the  French  and  the  Spaniards”  emphasizes  the  centrality  of  the  stadial  scheme  to  the
History of America. See also E. Adamson Hoebel, “William Robertson: an 18th century anthropological
historian”, American Anthropologist 62 (1960), 648-55; Stuart J. Brown, “An eighteenth-century historian
on the Amerindians: Culture, Colonialism and Christianity in William Robertson’s History of
America”, Studies in World Christianity 2 (1996), 204-22.
637 Robertson, History of America, II. 56.
638 Ibid., II. 51.
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live.”639 The affinity mentioned extends, beyond habits of conduct in peace and war
(especially the latter being a pet topic with many authors of scientific travelogues and
philosophical histories640),  to  moral  and religious  beliefs  as  well.  “Were  we to  trace
back the ideas of other nations to that rude state in which history first presents them
to our view, we should discover a surprising resemblance in their tenets and
practices; and should be convinced that, in similar circumstances, the faculties of the
human mind hold nearly the same course in their progress, and arrive at almost the
same conclusion.”641 It  is  striking  –  and  confirming  the  ubiquitous  character  of  the
pattern – to find a counterpart of this proposition, now applied to the opposite end of
the  developmental  scale,  in  the  important  Appendix  on  the  “genius,  manners  and
institutions of India” in the Historical Disquisition: “we find that as soon as men arrive
at that stage in social life, when they can turn their attention to speculative inquiries,
the human mind will,  in every region of the earth, display nearly the same powers,
and proceed in its investigations and discoveries by nearly the same steps.”642
In  order  to  account  for  the  apparent  inability  of  most  native  American
societies to progress beyond the hunting-gathering stage, Robertson also resorted to
further devices. One of them was another widely available discourse about primitive
man: the so-called immaturity or degeneracy thesis, whose supporters – Buffon in its
milder statement and De Pauw in its less elegant form – held that in the New World,
either because it was too young or too ancient, all forms of life were necessarily tiny
and feeble.643 Robertson duly signals the relevance of these theories, as well as of the
639 Ibid., II. 30.
640 Cf. below, 332 f.
641 Ibid., II. 188.
642 Robertson, Historical Disquisition, 283.
643 In  his Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (1749-88, in 36 volumes), Georges-Louis Leclerc,
Comte de Buffon placed man in the centre of his zoological investigations, radically historicizing the
notion of race by attributing all diversity within the unitary human species to the variability of
climatic and geographical circumstances (adversely affecting the development of animate organisms
in the Americas). In the Dutch philosopher Cornelius de Pauw’s Recherches philosophiques sur les
Américains (1771) this perspective was flatly converted into an argument about the inferiority of native
Americans.  The  topic  is  discussed  extensively  in  Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World; Wheeler, The
Complexion of Race.  For echoes in the Scottish Enlightenment, see Robert Wokler, “Apes and Races in
the  Scottish  Enlightenment:  Monboddo  and  Kames  on  the  Nature  of  Man”,  in  Peter  Jones  (ed.),
Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988), 145-
68;  Silvia Sebastiani, “Race and national character in eighteenth-century Scotland: then polygenetic
discourses of Kames and Pinkerton”, Studi settecenteschi 21 (2001), 265-81; idem., I limiti del progresso.
For Robertson’s reliance on Buffon, see Robertson, History of America, II. 19 ff.
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adulation of “the rude simplicity of savage life” by Rousseau, to the theme of Book
IV, while warning against uncritically giving credit to the “superficial remarks of
vulgar travellers, of sailors, traders, buccaneers, and missionaries” (upon which,
presumably, he deemed each of these types of analysis to be established). “Without
indulging conjecture, or betraying a propensity to either system, we must study with
equal care to avoid the extremes of extravagant admiration, or of supercilious
contempt for those manners which we describe,”644 he admonished – only to align
himself basically with Buffon and De Pauw in his ensuing account of the pervasive
bodily and mental “feebleness” of the Americans.  While their overall appearance is
pleasant, the indigenous people of the New World are “more remarkable for agility
than strength” and “not only averse to toil but incapable of it;” their “native
indolence” is logically accompanied by “the smallness of their appetite for food,”
while their “beardless countenance and smooth skin … seems to indicate a defect of
vigour” – altogether, leading the philosophical historian “to suspect that there is
some natural debility in their frame.”645 It seemed only logical that among such
creatures, not only the progress of arts, but also population growth was arrested. Not
surprisingly, their mental faculties are described in matching terms: in this state, the
intellectual powers of the human mind are “extremely limited”, and “its emotions
and efforts are few and languid.” Following one of his most cherished sources,
Herrera, Robertson’s overall judgement is formulated in vivid terms: “Their vacant
countenance, their staring unexpressive eye, their listless inattention, and total
ignorance of subjects, which seem to be the first which should occupy the thoughts of
rational beings, made such impression upon the Spaniards, when they first beheld
those rude people, that they considered them as animals of an inferior order, and
could not believe that they belonged to the human species.”646 Even the virtues
which Americans may boast, such as their independence of spirit, fortitude in the
face of indigence, danger or torture, or satisfaction with their condition, are shown to
644 Ibid., II. 58-9.
645 Ibid., II, 62-3.
646 Ibid., II. 94-5. It must be added that earlier in the text Robertson also described the conquerors as
inadequately prepared for the experience of encounter with indigenous populations: they were
“mostly illiterate adventurers, destitute of all ideas which should have directed them in contemplating
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arise to a very considerable extent from the primitiveness of their social ties, from
their insensitivity, and overall lack of motivation.
Averse to labour and indifferent to both “the hope of future good” and “the
apprehension of future evil” that might alleviate this aversion, American have little
prospect of emerging from the savage state out of their own effort. In taking stock of
their  social  conditions,  the  natural  history  of  the  sort  cultivated  by  Buffon  and  De
Pauw still informs Robertson’s anthropology, but he predominantly reverts to the
analytical  frame  offered  by  stadial  history.  It  is  “mode  of  subsistence”  that
determines relations in the family including the important theme of the status of
women, as well as military and civil “establishments,” and laws and customs in
general.  Robertson’s  indebtedness  to  the  stadial  scheme  is  also  the  key  to  his
preference for Buffon’s view about the New World as being “of a recent original …
[whose] inhabitants … still at the beginning of their career, were unworthy to be
compared to a people of a more ancient and improved continent” over De Pauw’s
thesis that because of climatic and other factors “man never attained in America the
perfection that belongs to his nature, but remained an animal of an inferior order.”647
Both Buffon’s and Robertson’s frameworks of explanation allowed for a great deal of
diversity within humanity, while unequivocally considering it to be unitary as a
species: the former on the ground that the offspring of any male and female
specimen was capable of further procreation, and the latter on the ground that
mankind everywhere possessed the same “capacity for improvement.” No wonder
that both of them were committed adherents of the monogenetic account of the
Creation, which was being called into question in their time – among others, by
Robertson’s fellow Edinburgh philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames.648 “We know,
with  infallible  certainty,  that  all  the  human  race  spring  from  the  same  source,  and
that the descendants of one man, under the protection, as well as in obedience to the
command of Heaven, multiplied and replenished the earth,”649 Robertson wrote, and
while the “infallible source” for a leading ecclesiastic like him was undoubtedly the
objects,  so  extremely  different  from  those  with  which  they  had  been  acquainted.”  What  is  more,  a
disparaging estimate of native populations also eminently served their interest. Ibid., II. 54-5.
647 These are Robertson’s own representations of the two theories. Ibid., II. 57.
648 Cf. below, 341.
               dc_444_12
278
Bible, he also sought further underpinnings for his conviction, available from the
theory of stages. “The disposition and manners of men are formed by their situation,
and arise from the state of society in which they live. … In every part of the earth the
progress of man hath been nearly the same, and we can trace him in his career from
the rude simplicity of savage life, until he attains the industry, the arts, and the
elegance of polished society”650 – a potential realized to differing degrees and at
different  paces  because  of  contingent  factors.  This  was  the  sole  reason  why
Europeans had become “exalted ... above the inhabitants of the other quarters of the
globe,”651 and whatever entitlement to domination over these “quarters” they had,
was inseparable from their calling to help trigger a development among them which
would yield similar achievements – even though certain stages in it might prove
painful, and an improper understanding of the requirements of socio-economic
progress,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spanish  colonists,  could  be  disadvantageous  both  to
the conquerors and the conquered.
In any case, Europeans became masters in America not only over the “savage
nations,” but also over those which “may be considered polished states” when
compared to the former, though they “can hardly be considered as having advanced
beyond the infancy of civil life.”652 From this cautious formulation it might appear
that the Mexican and the Peruvian “empires” were recognized by Robertson to have
a place in the civilizational scale of the Edinburgh science of man. There
“we find countries of great extent subjected to the dominion of one sovereign,
the inhabitants collected together in cities, the wisdom and foresight of rulers
employed in providing for the maintenance and security of the people, the
empire of laws in some measure established, the authority of religion
recognized,  many  of  the  arts  essential  to  life  brought  to  some  degree  of
maturity, and the dawn of such as are ornamental beginning to appear.”653
649 Robertson, History of America, II. 26.
650 Ibid., II. 30-1.
651 Robertson, History of Charles V, IV. 304.
652 Robertson, History of  America, III. 151, 154.
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The  reason  why  the  claim  of  these  societies  to  civilization  was  at  best  imperfect  is
that they lacked several essential triggers of large scale stadial progress, including
the smelting and forging of “useful metals” and an extensive “dominion over animal
creation.” “In our continent, long after men had attained both, society continued in
that state which is denominated barbarous. Even with all that command over nature
which these confer, many ages elapse, before industry becomes so regular as to
render subsistence secure, before the arts which supply the wants and furnish the
accommodations of life are brought to any considerable degree of perfection, and
before any idea is conceived of various institutions requisite in a well-ordered
society.” 654 To these one may add the failure even of the Mexicans and the Peruvians
to develop alphabetic writing (an indispensable tool of expressing abstract ideas, as
against devices such as the quipu and other types of pictograms and ideograms,
described as  mere  mnemonic  techniques),  money (together  with  letters,  a  means  of
communicating wants to a distance) and wheeled traffic (together with money, a
means of multiplying and satisfying such wants). Among such circumstances the
excellent system of roads in the Inca empire is the symbolic expression of a paradox:
rather than prosperous merchants, they are trodden by athlete-messengers needed to
make up for the lack of written script. 655
It has been suggested that these explanations for the imperfections of the state
of civilization even among the most advanced American societies lie outside the
succession of stages, and are necessary for Robertson because of the general difficulty
of  the  theorists  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  in  accounting for  the  move from one
stage to the next.656 This observation is helpful if it is taken to refer to the fact that the
argument from technology (just as we have seen in the case of the argument from
natural history) was complementary, not contradictory to the argument from stages
in Robertson’s system of causality employed to illustrate and explain the ultimate
653 Ibid., III. 152.
654 Ibid., III. 153.
655 Ibid., III. 178 ff. and 200 f. (on writing); 189 f. (on money); 217 ff. (on roads and traffic).
656 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, IV. 202. Cf. Christopher J. Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 96. Similarly, narrative altogether has
been claimed to “serve to confuse, correct or overturn the supposed verities, or perhaps simplicities, of
the stadial exposition.” Hargraves, “Enterprise, adventure and industry”, 36-7;  idem., “Beyond the
Savage Character”, 114.
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universality of the savage character in America – despite the “nice discrimination of
those  shades  that  mingle  so  perceptibly  in  so  many  different  gradations  of  savage
life.”657 Whatever refinements Mexico and Peru may boast – in the building of their
cities, in the splendour of their monarchs, in the improved state of their police, in the
delicate workmanship of their artistic products in the case of the former; to which the
gentle spirit of their religion, mitigating the excesses of despotism, may be added in
the latter – are described as those of men “just emerging from barbarity”, occurring
in spite of a primitive mode of subsistence, lack of technological improvement,
unfortunate geophysical conditions and their physiological consequences.  The
gradations “from infancy to adolescence” (but not to “the rest” of the process of
growth towards maturity, supplied by “our continent”) mentioned by Burke can still
be comfortably accommodated within the “savage” state. Whether descending to
war  with  a  ferocity  animated  by  the  spirit  of  vengeance,  like  the  Tlascalans  or  the
Mexicans, or marked by an unwarlike feebleness, like the Caribs and the Peruvians,
they are a poor match in the encounter with the calculating determination,
technological ascendancy, and physical and psychological stamina of the conquerors.
Historians have pointed to the discrepancies between the philosophical and
the narrative parts of the History of America and suggested that the latter were
designed by Robertson as an antidote to the perceived limitations of stadial theory as
a self-contained pattern of analysis, and to create room for the “unique” and
“particular” as against the ‘typical”.658 It has even been claimed that the
philosophical sections are to be understood mainly as a polite gesture to the fashion
of  the  time,  and  that  the  stadial  discourse  which  is  prominent  in  them  has  a
negligible function in the rest of the work, in which it is not a theoretical stage of
savagery but “real” Indians that are presented, and in which “barbarism” is not a
stadial division but a moral condition – of Spaniards, rather than Americans.659 This
point is valuable as a reminder that Robertson’s enthusiasm for empire-building was
not  unqualified  (as  it  would  also  be  evident  in  the Historical Disquisition), and that
657 Another  formulation  by  Burke,  in  his  review  of  the History of America in  the Annual Register 19
(1777), 215.
658 Höpfl, “From Savage to Scotsman”, esp. 23.
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especially in instances when empire was pursued through violent armed conquest by
a Catholic power that also aspired at universal monarchy in Europe, he found it  all
the more unpalatable. It also illustrates the fact that even a committed “modern” like
Robertson believed that  it  was  possible  for  Europeans  to  divest  themselves  of  their
civilized habits and fall back to practices associated with savagery and barbarism,
such as cannibalism or the violation of the rights of war.
All  of  this,  however,  does  nothing  to  prevent  Robertson  from  retaining  the
stadial vocabulary and its corollary arguments from technological development and
natural history as the chief underlying pattern of interpreting individual and
collective agency in the narrative portions of the History of America as  well,  most
characteristically stressing the anomalous character of actions, events or other
phenomena whenever they seem to contradict the logic dictated by the “typicalities”
described in the “philosophical” books. The manners of the natives whom Columbus
encountered at the site of his first discoveries in San Salvador and Hispaniola answer
to  the  model  presented in  Book IV to  an extent  that  the  relevant  passages  could be
inserted in that section of the work without disrupting its argument. In contrast to
the “enlightened and ambitious” Spaniards, they are “simple and undiscerning”,
“unacquainted with all the arts which appear most necessary in polished societies,
but … gentle, credulous and timid.”660 Above all,  they proved to  be  at  a  loss  when
they realized that the Spaniards had come
“not to visit the country, but to settle in it. Though the number of those
strangers was inconsiderable,  the state of cultivation among this rude people
was so imperfect, and in such exact proportion to their own consumption, that
it was with difficulty they could afford subsistence to their new guests. Their
own mode of life was so indolent and inactive, the warmth of the climate so
enervating,  the  constitution  of  their  bodies  naturally  so  feeble,  and  so
unaccustomed to the laborious exertions of industry, that they were satisfied
with a proportion of food amazingly small.  … Self-preservation prompted
659 Alexander du Toit, “Who Are the Barbarians? Scottish Views of Conquest and Indians, and
Robertson’s History of America”, Scottish Literary Journal 26 (1999), 34-5.
660 Robertson, History of America, I. 134, 139.
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them to wish for the departure of guests who wasted so fast their slender stock
of provisions.”
In the subsequent conflict – the first “war” between Europeans and native Americans
– a long lasting pattern was established: especially as the Spaniards were decimated
by diseases, “[t]he vast superiority of the natives in number, compensated for many
defects,” but superiority in weapons, discipline and strategy in the end almost
inevitably prevailed.661 The only “scheme” the Indians were capable of attempting
was finely in tune with their aversion of “a regular and persevering exertion of their
industry:” it was starving the oppressors, whose “voracious appetite” seemed to
make them vulnerable, by “suspend[ing] all the operations of agriculture.” This time
they were defeated by the civilizational ascendancy of the Old World, expressed in
terms of both greater economic productive capacity and the concomitant human
qualities: initiative and adaptability. “The Spaniards were reduced to extreme want;
but they received such seasonable supplies of provisions from Europe, and found so
many resources in their own ingenuity and industry, that they suffered no great loss
of men. The wretched Indians were the victims of their own ill-concerted policy.”
Famine, diseases and death ensued among them on a massive scale.662
Recognizing  the  human  cost  of  introducing  modern  discipline  among  a
population both socially backward and physically “feeble” (the Buffonian/Pauwian
term used in Book IV features regularly in Books II and III as well), there were some
on the Spanish side who, driven by a charitable disposition, proposed and
implemented a more gentle policy in the settlements. But Queen Isabella’s solicitude
“retarded … the  progress  of  improvement,”  just  as  the  later  experiment  of  Rodrigo
de Figueroa, chief judge of Hispaniola, with “the system of Las Casas” was doomed
to failure: “He collected in Hispaniola a good number of the natives, and settled
them in two villages, leaving them at perfect liberty, and with the uncontrolled
direction  of  their  own  actions.  But  that  people,  accustomed  to  a  mode  of  life
extremely different from that which takes place wherever civilization has made
661 Ibid., I. 178-83.
662 Ibid., I. 185-6.
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considerable  progress,  were  incapable  of  assuming  new  habits  at  once.”  The
miserable outcome of the experiment had the result that the Spaniards “pronounced
them incapable of being formed to live like men in social life, and considered them as
children,  who  should  be  kept  under  the  perpetual  tutelage  of  persons  superior  to
themselves in wisdom and sagacity.”663 Robertson knew all to well that arriving at
this conclusion and proclaiming it was fully in the interest of the Spanish, and did
not hesitate to label the alternative policy, fatal to the indigenous people, as
“barbarous.” At the same time, he was willing to acknowledge that it not only
succeeded in “calling forth the force of a whole nation, and exerting it in one
direction” – the working of the mines – “with amazing rapidity and success,” but
also paved the way to the establishment by Nicholas de Ovando at Hispaniola of a
government “with wisdom and justice, not inferior to the rigour with which he
treated the Indians.” Besides equal laws and their impartial execution, this also
implied the encouragement of cultivation, manufactures and commerce, to the extent
that Ovando’s “prudent endeavours” finally awakened King Ferdinand’s interest in
the discoveries hitherto neglected by him, and prompted him to introduce “many of
those regulations which gradually formed that system of profound, but jealous
policy by which [Spain] governs her dominions in the New World.”664
The actions  of  Ovando,  while  triggering some consolidation in  the  emerging
colonial establishment, already represent a deterioration from the standard of public,
ordered and systematic endeavour665 still  represented  by  Henry  the  Navigator  and
Columbus. The brand of adventurism represented especially by the latter, in whom
the “enterprising spirit” and “curiosity” awakened by the recent improvement of
navigation and commerce was visibly fuelled by personal ambition, too, received a
lamentable impetus from two forces that disfigured its originally progressive face:
“religious enthusiasm always mingled with the spirit of adventure in the New
World, and, by a combination still more strange, united with avarice.” 666  The
fanaticism of religion and the fanaticism of gold had mutually reinforcing effects and
663 Ibid., I. 251, 333-4.
664 Ibid., I. 259-61.
665 Hargraves, “Enterprise, adventure and industry”, 44.
666 Robertson, History of America, II. 242, cf. III. 5.
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even  on  Cortes,  whose  initial  characterization  by  Robertson  still  resembled  that  of
Columbus: his youthful turbulence “settled into a habit of regular indefatigable
activity”, “[t]he impetuosity of his temper …abated, by being kept under restraint,
and mellowed into a cordial soldierly frankness. These qualities were accompanied
with calm prudence in concerting his schemes, and with what is peculiar to superior
genius, the art of gaining the confidence and governing the minds of men.” By the
time, however, he established the first “form of civil government” in Mexico, “[t]he
two principles of avarice and enthusiasm, which prompted the Spaniards in all their
enterprises in the New World, seem to have concurred in suggesting the name which
Cortes bestowed on his infant settlement. He called it, The rich town of the true
Cross.”667 (Villa rica de la vera Cruz.) Though sometimes “prudence overruled his
zeal”, on other occasions “a new effusion of that intemperate religious zeal with
which Cortes was animated, no less than other adventurers of the age” put recently
forged alliances with local peoples at risk: “astonished and enraged” by the obstinacy
of the Tlascalans to embrace Christianity, he “prepared to execute by force, what he
could not accomplish by persuasion.” His “inconsiderate impetuosity” was only
checked  thanks  to  the  intervention  of  father  Olmedo  –  another  paradox  for
Robertson: “at a time when the rights of conscience were little understood in the
Christian world, and the idea of toleration unknown, one is astonished to find a
Spanish monk of the sixteenth century among the first advocates against persecution,
and in behalf of religious liberty.”668 In  most  situations,  however,  there  was  no
benign influence to restrain the despicable violence ignited by the combination of
material greed and religious zeal. Disappointed by the “smallness of the booty”
which “their rapaciousness could collect” after the fall of Mexico and believing that
the  bulk  of  the  treasure  was  hidden,  the  Spaniards  decided  to  torture  Guatimozin
(Montezuma’s nephew and son-in-law, who valiantly defended the city during the
final assault) with a “refined cruelty” – “a deed which stains the glory of all [Cortes’]
great actions.”669 The subsequent insurrections of the Mexicans were put down and
retaliated with a “shocking barbarity:” “In almost every district of the Mexican
667 Ibid., II. 235, 260-1.
668 Ibid., II. 287-8, 319.
669 Ibid., II. 388-9.
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empire, the progress of Spanish arms is marked with blood, and with deeds so
atrocious, as disgrace the enterprising valour that conducted them to success.”670 The
progress  of  Pizarro  –  also  characterized  as  a  man  of  uncommon  “patience”  and
“fortitude”, but in every other talent much inferior to Cortes – and his associates in
Peru is then related in Book VI as a succession of acts of “unrelenting barbarity”
occasioned by the “strange alliance of fanaticism with avarice.”671
Since in most instances Robertson establishes a direct causal link between
greed and zeal as the impulses that undermine the orderly and progressive character
of modern enterprise, and the violence of the conquistadors, his is a somewhat
different perspective from that of Diderot in the Histoire des deux Indes, where
European colonists, removed from the polite societies and well-regulated polities
which the historical progress of their home countries has bred, throw off the reins of
civility and debase themselves, as “domestic tigers returning to the forest,” to the
level of their new domiciles – also developing a threat to the integrity of metropolitan
civilization.672 According  to  Robertson,  they  are  not  infected  by  their  savage
environment: the fault is to be found within themselves, more precisely, in the
precariousness and vulnerability of the system of enterprise and adventure that arose
through the growth of navigation and commerce as described in Book I. In their case,
barbarism is an anomaly that contradicts the normal course of civilization: they
engage in it in spite of what they are, could or ought to be – or, have become over the
two and half centuries that separates their time from Robertson’s own, during which
Europe itself has better learnt how to preserve faith without proselytization and
persecution, and to obtain wealth without plunder. The blemishes which Robertson
deplored from the perspective of enlightened civic moralism – which he shared with
his fellow Edinburgh moderate literati – “stained the glory” and “disgraced the
enterprising valour” of the conquerors. But glory and valour they did possess, and
670 Ibid., II. 403-4.
671 Ibid., III. 37, 41.
672 Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du
commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes, 10 vols (Geneva: Jean-Leonard Pellet,
1780), IX. 1, cited in Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire, 74. For parallel arguments
in contemporary Britain, in particular by Alexander Dow and Edmund Burke, see
Abbattista, “Empire, Liberty and the Rule of Difference”.
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they were of a kind based on the values and dispositions that had been nurtured by
the  process  which  also  bred  Henry  the  Navigator  and  Columbus.  It  was  not  only
through the rare examples of “persons who retained some tincture of the Castilian
generosity”673 that  the  violence  of  the  conquest  could  be  expected  to  assume
restraints. Pizarro himself, soon after the infamous “trial” and execution of the Inca
and the indiscriminate slaughter that followed, is found to be
“apply[ing] himself with that persevering ardour, which distinguishes his
character, to introduce a form of regular government … He distributed the
country into various districts; he appointed proper magistrates to preside in
each; and established regulations concerning the administration of justice, the
collection of the royal revenue, the working of the mines, and the treatment of
the Indians, extremely simple, but well calculated to promote the public
prosperity.”
Even the villain whose trajectory illustrates the darkest aspects of the corruption of
which the “spirit of enterprise and adventure” is capable, preserves the capacity for
assiduous application for the sake of stability and well-being, part and parcel of the
frame of mind in the role model, when enjoying “an interval of tranquillity,
undisturbed by any enemy.”674
By stark contrast, at every instance when some American achievement that
appears  to  surpass  the  standard  associated  with  savagery  is  mentioned,  it  is
described by Robertson in a tone of puzzlement, as an anomaly that occurs in spite of
the “nature of things” defined by the stadial pattern. Sometimes such anomalies are
illusory, and shown to be based merely on error or delusion. Such was the case with
the “sanguine hopes” of the Spaniards about the amount of treasure – at Hispaniola,
in Mexico as well as in Peru – they could take as booty, which, however, could not be
met: given that “[t]o penetrate into the bowels of the earth, and to refine the rude ore,
673 Robertson, History of America, III. 48.
674 Ibid., III. 58.
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were operations too complicated and laborious for their talents and industry,”675 the
natives  had  amassed  gold  in  much  smaller  quantity  than  it  was  assumed.  The
paradoxical nature of the “refinement in police,  unknown, at that time, in Europe,”
illustrated by the example of conveying intelligence by means of well-trained
couriers, has already been mentioned. The Tlascalans are recognized by Robertson to
have “advanced in improvement far beyond the rude nations of America,” yet “their
degree of civilization was incomplete,” which also had as its corollary an archaic
manner of warfare, doomed to failure in the encounter with the Spaniards:  they
“were, like all unpolished nations, strangers to military order and discipline” – not to
speak of their primitive weapons and their “barbarous generosity” in sending
forewarnings and even provisions to the enemy.676 When it comes to character,
Montezuma, the only ruler except Atahualpa in the New World who may have had it
in  his  power  to  resist  the  tide,  turns  out  to  be  a  disappointingly  poor  match to  the
task: “though his talents might be suited to the transactions of a state so imperfectly
polished as the Mexican empire, and sufficient to conduct them while in their
accustomed course, they were inadequate to a conjuncture so extraordinary, and did
not qualify him either to judge with discernment, or to act with decision, requisite to
such a trying emergence.”677 The fact that he shared the universally superstitious
disposition of his people, profoundly affecting their attitude to the Spanish, only
made things worse. The city of Mexico is recognized to have been “the pride of the
New  World,  and  the  noblest  monument  of  the  industry  and  art  of  man”  –  but  the
added clause “while unacquainted with the use of iron, and destitute of aid from any
domestic animal” both enhances the sense of admiration and wonderment, and
distracts from it: it is a splendour achieved in defiance of the level attained in stadial
progress, and therefore in a realistic estimate is hardly tenable. 678
The opulence and civilization of Peru is described, if  anything, in even more
striking terms than it  is  the  case  with  Mexico.  It  was  “a  country  fully  peopled,  and
cultivated with an appearance of regular industry.” Already long before the arrival
675 Ibid., I. 172. Cf. II. 317-8.
676 Ibid., II. 279-81.
677 Ibid., II. 252.
678 Ibid., II. 300.
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of the conquistadors, the half-legendary founders Manco Capac and Mama Ocollo
had “formed that social union, which, by multiplying the desires, and uniting the
efforts of the human species, excites industry, and leads to improvement.” They
introduced “such laws and policy as might perpetuate their happiness,” and
“various relations in private life were established, and the duties resulting from them
prescribed with such propriety, as gradually formed a barbarous people to decency
of manners.” The country “soon assumed the aspect of a regular and well-governed
state.” Although in narrow precincts, the Incas “exercised absolute and uncontrolled
authority” and they endeavoured to extend their dominions not out of “the rage of
conquest” but “the desire of diffusing the blessings of civilization.”679 Robertson’s
appreciation of Peruvian civilization, expressed with a great deal of lucidity by
employing  the  established  categories  of  stadial  history,  in  the  narrative  sections  of
the History of America seems  almost  unqualified  (we  have  seen,  however,  the
qualifications advanced in the philosophical Book VII). It is only logical that
subverting  it  by  force  depended  on  the  most  extreme  violation  of  the  principles  of
civilized humanity by Pizarro and his associates.
Robertson was sometimes criticized by his contemporaries for painting an all
too homogeneous picture of the native American “character” in Book IV.680 This
criticism is not entirely unfair. However, if the whole of the work is taken into
consideration, an interesting ambiguity strikes the eye: from the variegated account
of so many tribes and peoples in the New World, the homogeneity of the character
depicted in Book IV appears to allow for a great deal of diversity – “gradations”, as
Burke put it – while still, by and large, remaining within the confines of that picture.
The standard which, in varying degrees, New World societies fell short of satisfying,
was  the  independent  ability  to  employ advanced methods of  cultivation,  to  pursue
industry and to maintain commercial intercourse, and to erect on these foundations a
sophisticated division of labour, social hierarchy, and a culture of social action based
not on unfettered passion but on rational calculation. In Robertson’s assessment,
there  was  only  one  exception  to  this  near-universal  underdevelopment  of  the  non-
679 Ibid., III. 12, 22-4. The point is echoed in Book VII, 208.
680 Hargraves, “Beyond the Savage Character”, 104-5.
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European world: India, where “the distinction of ranks and separation of professions
were completely established” already in ancient times (one of “the most undoubted
proofs of a society considerably advanced in progress”), and which, at the time it was
discovered by modern Europeans, was “possessed by nations highly civilized, which
had made considerable progress in elegant as well as useful arts, which were
accustomed to intercourse with strangers, and well acquainted with all the
advantages of commerce.”681 All the recognition the savage seemed to have been
entitled to receive was that while his rude manners were disparaged, they were
allowed to stem not from inherent moral blemish but from his primitive mode of
subsistence, and thus in a certain sense were judged according to their own merit.
But the same attitude towards a system of civilisation – which was different from
that of Europe, but could be considered one by the standards derived from the
science of man – implied a positive cultural tolerance and empathy, and warranted a
considerably lesser degree of political intervention by Westerners to make the
relationship mutually profitable.682
In  spite  of  the  above-mentioned  immutability  of  many  centuries  which
Robertson diagnosed in Indian civilization, the uses of the stadial frame of analysis
for this thrust of argument are obvious, and they loomed even larger in view of the
fact that unlike in the case of all others of his historical works, political narrative was
completely missing from the Historical Disquisition.
“[I]t is a cruel mortification, in searching for what is instructive in the history
of past times, to find that the exploits of conquerors who have desolated the
earth, and the freaks of tyrants who have rendered nations unhappy, are
recorded with minute and often disgusting accuracy, while the discovery of
681 Robertson, Historical Disquisition, 214, 230 ff.
682 It has been suggested that the criticism Robertson received for the negative portrayal of “savagery”
(implicitly  serving  as  an  excuse  for  European  cruelty)  and  the  dismissive  treatment  of  American
cultures in the History of America played a part in his adopting an empathetic stance in the Historical
Disquisition. In this, he relied heavily on early British “orientalist” scholars, but went further than most
of  them  in  his  positive  view  on  Indian  culture  and  in  his  opposition  to  an  interventionist  imperial
policy. Brown, “Robertson, Early Orientalism and the Historical Disquisition”, 299 f. Cf. Jane Rendall,
“Scottish Orientalism: From Robertson to James Mill”, The Historical Journal 25:1 (1982), 43-69; Michael
S. Dodson, Orientalism, Empire and National Culture: India, 1770-1880 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), 1-6.
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useful arts, and the progress of the most beneficial branches of commerce, are
passed over in silence, and suffered to sink into oblivion.”683
He decided to redress this omission in advancing his plea on behalf of Indian
civilization, with the consequence that the stadial vocabulary, once again, permeates
the whole of the text and operates as its primary unifying force. Concise
reformulations of and supplements to the history of the progress of European
navigation and commerce – again characterized as a “vigilant and enterprizing
activity” – are interspersed with reports on the stage of civility attained both in
Europe and in India. The latter’s exceptionally high level of “cultivation” at an
unusually early time is emphasized repeatedly, and is illustrated by the fact that the
cause of interest in commerce with India has always been its superior improvement
and the resulting sophistication of its manufactures. According to the stadial logic,
however, these could be fully appreciated only at times when Europeans themselves
attained to similar refinement. “In every age, it has been a commerce of luxury,
rather than of necessity, which has been carried on between Europe and India. Its
elegant manufactures, spices and precious stones, are neither objects of desire to
nations of simple manners, nor are such nations possessed of wealth sufficient to
purchase them.” This was the case with the Romans, who “were not only … in that
stage of society when men are eager to obtain every thing that can render the
enjoyment of life more exquisite,  or add to its splendour, but they had acquired all
the  fantastic  tastes  formed by the  caprice  and extravagance  of  wealth.”684 After the
subversion of their empire, “the state of society, as well as the condition of
individuals,  became so extremely different,  that the wants and desires of men were
no longer the same. Barbarians … had little relish for those accommodations, and
that elegance, which are so alluring to polished nations.” However, thanks to an
advance “from rudeness to refinement in the usual course of progression which
nations are destined to hold,” and Europeans “began to acquire a relish for some of
the luxuries of India.”685
683 Robertson, Historical Disquisition, 59.
684 Ibid., 63-4.
685 Ibid., 203.
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The relation of these developments is an occasion for Robertson to burst into
another eulogy of “the commercial genius of Europe, which has given it a visible
ascendant over the other three divisions of the earth, by discerning their respective
wants and resources, and by rendering them reciprocally subservient to one another,
has established a union among them.” But as he reminds, the enormous difference in
the  “degree  of  improvement”  of  the  societies  of  the  West  and  the  East,  made  a
profound impact on the spirit and character of trade with them. While the
Portuguese who, because of a coincidence of circumstances in European power
relations, retained a virtual monopoly of intercourse with India for about a century
after the discovery of the maritime route around the Cape of Good Hope, could
immediately engage in an “alluring trade” in “manufactures which had long been
known and admired in Europe”, for the Spaniards it took over half a century to reap
any benefit from their bloody conquests. The reason was that their new possessions
had to be rendered “beneficial by cultivation and industry;” “they found it necessary
to establish colonies in every country which they wished to improve. … Every article
of commerce imported from the New World … is the produce of the industry of
Europeans settled there.” By contrast, “[t[rade with the East was a simple mercantile
transaction, confined to the purchase either of the natural productions of the country
… or of the manufactures which abounded among an industrious race of men.”686
Europe and India are aligned together on this side of the civilizational barrier,
America helplessly looking to the tutelage received from Old World patrons.
In the remarkable Appendix of the Historical Disquisition, Robertson goes on to
assess the “genius, the manners, and institutions” that the people of India have
established upon such economic foundations. His fundamental assumption is that
“the  natives  of  India  were  not  only  more  early  civilized,  but  had  made  a  greater
progress in civilization than any other people.”687 He acknowledges that the peculiar
form of social hierarchy (always a reliable indicator of an advanced state), the caste
system, may be an obstacle of mobility for the talented among the inferior orders.
Nevertheless,  he points not only to the economic advantages that derive from early
686 Ibid., 215-8.
687 Ibid., 229.
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training in the professions assigned to respective castes, but also to the resulting
attitudes that promote acquiescence in one’s allotted “station” and thus social
stability (congenial to Robertson’s taste), and even to the restrictions which the
existence of castes imposes on the political authority of monarchs. In the absence of
“institutions destined to assert and guard the rights belonging to men in the social
state,” which “never formed a part of the political constitution in any great Asiatic
kingdom”, the fact that the monarchs are recruited from the second of the four castes
and “behold among their subjects an order of men far superior to themselves in
dignity” is a substantial check on despotic power.”688 As a further bulwark against
the encroachments of sovereign power, the kingdoms of India were too extensive for
direct governance by the monarchs, and the “members of the cast next in rank to that
which religion rendered sacred” were invested with the “superintendence of the
cities and provinces”, so that they formed “an intermediate order between the
sovereign and his subjects.” According to Robertson, not oriental despotism but
monarchy, described in recognizably Montesquieuian terms, is the characteristic
form of the Indian polity, distinguished by “equity, humanity and mildness” and
institutions found “only among men in the most improved state of society, and
under the best forms of government.”689 The Indians even had their Justinian in the
sixteenth-century Mughal emperor Akbar, who compiled a full code of Hindu laws
(thereby setting a precedent for the more recent undertaking of Warren Hastings as
governor general of the British settlements in India). “Men must have been long
united in the social state, their transactions must have been numerous and complex,
and judges must have determined an immense variety of controversies to which
these give rise, before the system of law becomes so voluminous and comprehensive
as to direct the judicial proceedings of a nation far advanced in improvement.” The
Ayeen Akbery is an eminent proof to Robertson’s mind that this was exactly the case
with India: it contains “the jurisprudence of an enlightened and commercial
people.”690
688 Ibid., 233-4, 239.
689 Ibid., 241, 244, 246.
690 Ibid., 249-53.
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Not surprisingly, Indian material culture and artistic achievement is also
interpreted according to the standards of stadial progress. Their “stupendous”
buildings “could not have been formed in that stage of social life when men continue
divided into  small  tribes,  unaccustomed to  the  efforts  of  persevering industry.  It  is
only  in  States  of  considerable  extent,  and  among  people  long  habituated  to
subordination, and to act in concert, that the idea of such magnificent works is
conceived, or the power of accomplishing them can be found.” Turning to the “fine
arts”, Robertson’s focus is the spectacular output of ancient Indian epic and dramatic
poetry, not omitting to mention the recent English translations of the Bhagavad Gita
and Shakuntala by Charles Wilkins and William Jones, respectively. In Robertson’s
judgement, especially from the latter “we must form an advantageous idea of the
state of improvement in that society to whose taste it was suited.”691 Finally, in
evaluating the Indian achievement in the realm of science and philosophy – abstract
thought, of which native Americans seemed to him altogether incapable – Robertson
again takes the opportunity to formulate the already cited generalization about the
interdependence of socio-economic progress and intellectual refinement, and the
conditioning of the latter by the former. A neat distinction between matter and spirit,
a dignified account of the human soul,  doctrines of the Stoic school before the birth
of Zeno, “Arabic” numerals, extraordinary methods and discoveries in astronomy, to
name  but  the  features  most  conspicuous  in  Robertson’s  survey  –  all  or  most  of  it
“stored” in the city of Benares, “from time immemorial the Athens of India.” The
retention of these cultural treasures of great value and antiquity also prescribes a
respectable intellectual agenda, and imposes a responsibility on those who have
access to it.
“In  an  enlightened  age  and  nation,  and  during  a  reign  distinguished  by  a
succession of the most splendid and successful undertakings to extend the
knowledge of nature, it is an object worthy of public attention, to take
measures  for  obtaining  possession  of  all  that  time  has  spared  of  the
691 Ibid.,  264,  274.  He  later  adds  “that  it  is  only  among  a  people  of  polished  manners  and  delicate
sentiments that a composition so simple and correct could be produced or relished.” Ibid., 278.
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philosophy and inventions of the most early and most highly civilized people
of the East. It is with peculiar advantages Great Britain may engage in this
laudable undertaking. … [she] may have the glory of exploring fully that
extensive field of unknown science, which the Academicians of France had the
merit of first opening to the people of Europe.”692
Robertson’s admiration of Indian civilization is only qualified in the
concluding section of the book, in which he provides an analysis of religious beliefs
and practices. His account is not confined to Indian religion but is intended as “a
sketch and outline of the history and progress of superstition and false religion in
every region of the earth,” and while it reproduces some of the thoughts advanced
on  the  subject  in  Book  IV  of  the History of America, it also reveals the influence of
Hume’s views expressed in his 1757 essay on “The Natural History of Religion”.
Particularly noteworthy is the consistent endeavour to trace parallel developments
“among the Greeks in Europe, and the Indians in Asia, the two people in those great
divisions of the earth, who were most early civilized.” Both were polytheistic, for the
same reason: in the early stages of civilization, people invented deities to preside
“over every function in civil or domestic life,” to suit their own fears and desires, and
mirroring their own manners. Monotheism arose with the advance of civilization,
when,  as  a  result  of  the  diffusion  of  science  and  philosophy,  “the  system  of
superstition  is  subjected  to  scrutiny  from  which  it  was  formerly  exempt.”  On  the
authority of “the most intelligent Europeans who have visited India”, Robertson
asserts that the learned Brahmins themselves are theists: the “principal design of the
Bhagvat-Geeta … seems to have been to establish the unity of the Godhead, and …
amidst much obscure metaphysical discussion, … we find descriptions of the
Supreme Being entitled to equal praise with those of the Greek philosophers.”693 In
view of the early rise of rationalist, philosophical monotheism among the religious
leaders of the subcontinent, however, Robertson was puzzled by the long survival of
popular religious practices that included superstitious worship, obscure and even
692 Ibid., 283-300. In the quoted passage Robertson moves freely between generic reference to the bulk
of Indian science and specifically to astronomy (to which the last sentence seems to be confined).
693 Ibid. 307 ff, 321-2.
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cruel rites and – what particularly embarrassed his Presbyterian sensibilities – the
“connection between the gratification of sensual desire and the rites of public
religion, displayed with … avowed indecency.” The solution to the puzzle was found
by him with reference to that typical Enlightenment scapegoat: “priestcraft”, i.e., the
propensity of sophisticated clerical elites to manipulate false religion as a system of
rewards and punishments whereby to retain social control over the “vulgar.” They
regard it dangerous to disseminate their wisdom to an uncomprehending, “the gross
multitude” that would revolt against any attempt to overthrow their established
opinions.  Quoting  from  Strabo,  Robertson  stresses  that  “[t]hese  ideas  of  the
philosophers of Europe were precisely the same which the Brahmins had adopted in
India, and according to which they regulated their conduct with respect to the great
body of the people. … They knew and approved what was true, but among the rest
of mankind they laboured to perpetuate what is false.”694
In Robertson’s representation, India is distinguished from the rest of the non-
European world by its capacity of being comprehended in comparable terms of
stadial progress – of material culture, of legal provisions and political arrangements,
of cultural, intellectual and spiritual pursuits – with the old continent. Even the
fallacious, truncated or deformed aspects of this development can be meaningfully
portrayed by way of a historical parallel between Europe and India. In the final
passages of his last work, these convictions are couched in a highly self-reflexive
conclusion to his life-long engagement with the problem of human-cultural diversity:
“Unfortunately for the human species, in whatever quarter of the globe the
people of Europe have acquired dominion, they have found the inhabitants
not  only  in  a  state  of  society  and improvement  far  inferior  to  their  own,  but
different in their complexion, and in all their habits of life. Men in every stage
of  their  career  are  so  satisfied  with  the  progress  made  by  the  community  of
which they are members, that it becomes to them a standard of perfection, and
694 Ibid.,  327-30.  It  has  been suggested that  in  these reflections Robertson was “coming very close to
comparing the popular Hinduism of the masses of India with popular Christianity as it existed among
the  uneducated  classes  in  much  of  Europe,  including  the  popular  Calvinism  in  Scotland.”  Brown,
“Robertson, Early Orientalism and the Historical Disquisition”, 308.
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they are apt to regard people,  whose condition is not similar,  with contempt,
and even aversion. In Africa and America, the dissimilitude is so conspicuous,
that, in the pride of their superiority, Europeans thought themselves entitled
to reduce the natives of the former to slavery, and to exterminate those of the
latter. Even in India, though far advanced beyond the two other quarters of
the globe in improvement, the colour of inhabitants, their effeminate
appearance, their unwarlike spirit, the wild extravagance of their religious
tenets and ceremonies, and many other circumstances, confirmed Europeans
in such an opinion of their own pre-eminence, that they have always viewed
and treated them as an inferior race of men. Happy would it  be if  any of the
four European nations, who have, successively, acquired extensive territories
and power in India, could altogether vindicate itself from having acted in this
manner.”695
*     *     *     *     *     *
Having provided a survey of the aspects of Robertson’s two works on the encounter
between Europeans and other civilizations that seem relevant to the German
reception  of  his  historical  thought,  there  are  three  loosely  interrelated  facets  of  the
Rezeptionsgeschichte which I propose to discuss below. The study of each of them, in
its own way, might enrich our understanding of the potentials and the limits of the
transmission of ideas across cultural and geographical boundaries, or, in terms of the
debate on the Enlightenment in versus above national context, the relationship
between the patriotic and the cosmopolitan, the local and the universal. First, besides
the pitfalls of translation ? sometimes  inevitably  resulting  from  the  nature  of  the
languages concerned ?, I shall focus on the statures, outlooks and intentions of the
individuals  involved  in  the  process  of  transmission,  and  hope  to  shed  light  on  the
ambiguous role such factors played in that process. Second, I shall also offer insights
into some of the sentiments which Robertson’s Atlantic and Mediterranean
predilection evoked in his German partners during this period of growing
695 Ibid., 332-3.
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consciousness of national identity, but also of Germano-Celtic unity, in Germany.
Finally, the fact that the most faithful interpreter and admirer of the moderatist
conservative Robertson was the later radical of the Mainz Jacobin republic Georg
Forster, makes the “Robertson in Germany” question truly a test case of the
Enlightenment in versus above national context debate. It is a testimony of the
permeability of ideological boundaries and the pervasive nature of some
fundamental concerns generally shared by protagonists of the Enlightenment until
the French Revolution made the differences between them look more pronounced.
As far as the chronology of the German reception of the History of America and
the Historical Disquisition is  concerned,  after  the  stellar  success  of  Robertson’s
previous works it is little wonder that the publication of both of them evoked eager
expectations in Germany. Göttingen led the way again. The historian Christoph
Meiners  first  borrowed  the History of America from the university library on 21
November 1777.696 However, by this time, the librarian himself – Meiners’ colleague,
the classical scholar Christian Gottlob Heyne – had already published a two part
review of the book in the Göttingische Anzeigen (18 October and 1 November), and as
Meiners was reading Robertson’s original, the German translation by Johann
Friedrich Schiller was already in press in Leipzig, too. The first borrower of the
Historical Disquisition, on 8 May 1792, was Arnold Ludwig Heeren,697 another
relatively young but distinguished member of the Göttingen historical school, who
soon  published  one  of  the  three  German  reviews  of  the Historical Disquisition.
Simultaneously, an anonymous review was also published, while by then the
polymath and circumnavigator Georg Forster had also brought out yet another
review (in the Göttingische Anzeigen, on 3 December 1791) and was busy working on a
German translation of the book.
Let  us  now  consider  how  the  translatorial  practices  adopted  in  the  German
rendering of Robertson’s last two works affected his presentation of the Transatlantic
and Eastern worlds  and Europe’s  encounters  with  them.  As I  have endeavoured to
show, the vocabulary of stadial history, ingeniously supported from some other
696 Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen. Bibliotheksarchiv, Ausleiheregister
A. Mich. 1777. f. 43.
697 Ibid., Ost. 1792. f. 49.
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sources,  provided the conceptual cement of the argument presented in them just as
well as it did in the case of the texts that I explored in Chapters 4 and 5.  The History
of America and the Historical Disquisition largely escaped the fate of those texts (which
they suffered because of unhappily chosen and incoherently used equivalents of
certain key terms, as well as in particular Remer’s ambition to be “original”), though
especially the former demonstrates a few cases of – largely unwittingly – inadequate
terminology and inconclusive usage, which are of some significance.
Among the key elements of the relevant terminology, it is again unrealistic to
expect translators to have coped with the difficulty that the semantic content of
Handel and Handlung and Sitten caused: these closest equivalents of “commerce” and
“manners”, respectively, available in the German language had a limited capacity to
convey the same meanings and evoke the same associations. The case of “industry”
became more complicated. Although the German word Industrie in this period to
some extent still retained its early-modern ambiguity and continued to denote the
propensity to assiduous application as well as actual manufacturing activity, this was
precisely the age when its meaning became increasingly confined to the latter, and
the former sense was usually rendered by Fleiß, gewerbsamer Fleiß or erfinderischer
Fleiß.698 Johann Friedrich Schiller in his translation of the History of America certainly
chose this usage.699 As with Handel / Handlung, the Robertsonian unity of inclinations
crucial for the theme of sociability and economic pursuits was again broken, albeit
now it was the other way round: the former aspect dominated at the expense of the
latter.  However,  Georg  Forster’s  consistent  use  of Industrie as the equivalent of
“industry”, in whichever meaning it occurs in the English text, and his decision to
reserve erfinderischer Fleiß for “ingenuity” in his translation of the Historical
Disquisition must have seemed somewhat archaic.700
It is interesting and instructive to examine the cluster of terms Robertson used
to  supplement  the  stadialist  vocabulary  in  the History of America and the Historical
698 Dietrich Hilger, “Industrie, Gewerbe”, IV-V, in Brunner, Conze and Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe, III. 253-69.
699 William Robertson, Geschichte von Amerika, trans. Johann Friedrich Schiller (Leipzig: Weidmanns
Erben und Reich, 1777), I. 294 or II. 399.
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Disquisition. These included “enterprise / enterprising” and “adventure /
adventurous / adventurer” as a means to suggest a transparency between the ethos
of  the  merchant  and  the  conquistador,  both  possessing  a  mindset  conducive  to
discovery; and they also included “barbarity” to highlight the paradox that the
manners of representatives of a presumably superior civilization had lapsed in
America to the level of a more primitive stage. “Enterprise” and “enterprising” was
relatively consistently rendered by both Schiller and Forster as Unternehmung and
unternehmend, respectively. “Adventure” and its derivatives, however, posed a
problem for them. In German, Abenteuer, abenteuerlich and Abenteurer cannot be
construed to evoke the mercantile connotations of “adventure”, summarized above:
they denote extravagant situations and exploits during travel or war, and agents
acting in such situations. Consequently, Robertson’s German translators do not
hesitate  referring  to  the  conquistadors  as Abentheurer,701 but refrain from using the
word when in the original “adventurous” is the adjective of “enterprise” or its
“spirit”. In such cases they are content to use kühn (bold),  or  –  in  this  case  too  –
unternehmend (and are forced to complicate the clause in order to avoid repetition).702
The  fascinating  ambiguity  of  language  in  Robertson’s  texts  is  thereby  greatly
diminished, if not lost altogether. As regards “barbarity”, Schiller reserves Barbarey
for describing the state of the two “imperfectly civilized” nations of the New World
which were just emerging from it  but still  retained some of its remainders.  When it
comes to the monstrous acts committed by the Spaniards, Schiller invariably chooses
a term that is appropriate to condemn those acts, but has no reference within the
stadial scheme: “cruelty” or “inhumanity” (Grausamkeit, Unmenschlichkeit).703
 Even more serious was the embarrassment which the terms “polished /
polite” and “police / policy” caused the German translators. As a translation of
“polished”, Schiller experimented just once with the rather infrequently used word
700 Cf. Robertson, Historical Disquisition 124 and, William Robertson, Historische Untersuchung über die
Kenntnisse der Alten von Indien, und die Fortschritte des Handels mit diesem Landevor der Entdeckung des
Wegesdahin um das Vorgebirge der guten Hoffnung, trans. Georg Forster (Berlin: Voss, 1792), 159.
701 Geschichte von Amerika, I. 169, 210, 326.
702 Geschichte von Amerika, I. 42, 168; Historiche Untersuchung, 140, 161
703 For Barbarey, see Geschichte von Amerika, II. 344,  376-7; for Unmenschlichkeit, II. 160, 203; for
Grausamkeit, II. 239.
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polizirt,704 imported  from  French  in  the  sixteenth  century,  but  he  as  well  as  Forster
mainly used geschliffen, gebildet or gesittet. These terms revolve around the notions of
Sitten, a concept fundamentally belonging to ethics, and Bildung, one in which
culture and enlightenment, the practical and the theoretical perfection of man are
combined, and which is possessed by a nation in proportion with the harmony
between its social condition and the calling of man.705 Neither of these are suitable for
establishing the etymological link supposed in contemporary English between the
standards of spontaneous human interaction (politeness) and the organised forms to
which such interaction gives rise (policy/the polity).  As for Polizey, both translators
must have realised that its traditional early modern meaning of administration,
regimentation and control by the magistrate in general (which was anyway not quite
the same as “policy”) was during their lifetime undergoing a change and became
increasingly confined to the maintenance of the internal security of the state.706
Though Schiller ? to confuse matters even more, not only for “police”, but also for
“policy” ? used  it  occasionally,  both  he  and  Forster  preferred  to  render  these
English words with a wide variety of terms as they thought suited to the particular
context: Regierung (government), Einrichtung (institution), Staatskunst (statecraft),
Staatsverfassung (constitution), even Staatswirtschaft (national/state economy).
Such anomalies notwithstanding, both translators made a valiant effort to
remain faithful to the original within the limits set by the linguistic possibilities, and
especially in the case of Forster, who was the more consistent of the two men in his
terminology, this effort was largely successful.  Also, the fact that during our period
the meaning of Verkehr – contrary to some of the examples mentioned – was
extended to include intellectual and sentimental as well as commercial intercourse,
saved quite a lot of Robertson’s associations. Finally, both Schiller and Forster
refrained from the kind of intentional revision which in many cases of the practice of
eighteenth-century translation resulted in effectively new books.
This was due to a peculiar attitude to the original text, stemming in different
ways from the status and character of these figures. At this point, as a bridge
704 Geschichte von Amerika, II. 311.
705 Cf.  above, 206 f.
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between the issues confined to language and the more substantive problems of
reception, it might be instructive to establish a typology of the translators involved in
the process. Among the translators of Robertson’s texts, the following models can be
isolated.
At one extreme, Julius August Remer represented the type of the ambitious
and learned, but pedantic and somewhat unimaginative provincial scholar who,
having  established  a  reputation  through  a  number  of  solid  if  unoriginal  works  on
history and government, conceived of his rendering of Robertson as a further
occasion to assert and enhance his own independent scholarly authority (while
obviously  benefiting  from  the  fame  of  the  text  he  used  as  his  raw  material).
Mittelstedt, Seiler and Abele, who also approached Robertson’s History of Scotland
and History  of  Charles  V with a greater or lesser degree of scholarly and literary
interest, but without the ambition of Remer, were much more concerned with
preserving the integrity of the original.  The attitude of the translators of the History
of America and the Historical Disquisition was also a more “modern” mixture of
respect for and detachment from the text, but this can be traced back to different
motivations in each case.  Before establishing himself as a bookseller in Mainz in
1784, Johann Friedrich Schiller had lived for several years in London, where he did
some professional  translation,  in  the  sense  of  merely  or  mainly  doing it  for  money.
Besides the History of America,  he produced a translation of Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations (later overshadowed by that of Christian Garve) and the work of William
Robertson’s namesake, deputy keeper of the records of Scotland, on ancient
Greece.707 To be sure, the professional attitude for him also implied, as explained in
the preface to his rendering of Smith’s work, becoming thoroughly acquainted with
the particular discipline and its terminology.708 Nevertheless,  he  was  aware  that  he
could not be considered a true expert scholar. For this reason, and because in his case
the intellectual adventure and pleasure to be drawn from the work of a translator
706 Cf. above, 213.
707 On this work, see Giovanna Ceserani, “Narrative, Interpretation, and Plagiarism in Mr. Robertson's
1778 History of Ancient Greece”, Journal of the History of Ideas 66.3 (2005), 413-36.
708 Adam Smith, Untersuchung der Natur und Ursachen von Nationalreichthümern, trans. Johann Friedrich
Schiller and Christian August Wichmann (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1776-1778), I.
Preface.
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came second to financial gain, he simply did not care to amend actual or supposed
lapses or errors. Moreover, as mentioned above, he was also not strictly scrupulous
in his care for authenticity when he encountered difficulties. Finally, the renowned
natural and social philosopher and revolutionary Georg Forster (1754?1794) did
conceive of Robertson’s original as an intellectual challenge, but – true Weltbürger as
he was with a strikingly cosmopolitan intellectual outlook – in a way quite
differently from Remer. He did not consider the book flawless, but he thought that its
merits made it deserving careful attention and committed himself to preserving the
argument in all  of its shades as accurately as possible.  He thought that Robertson’s
character as a writer – his “calm and philosophical procedure in research, his
diligence which connects him with Germans models and his taste which connects
him with French ones, his serious but perspicuous and pleasant delivery, his clear
and fluent but not flowery manner of writing” – made it all the easier to perform the
task  of  the  translator:  “It  is  sufficient  if  he  is  able  to  express  what  is  presented.”709
Criticism and independence could and should be asserted in other pursuits ? which
he did, as we shall see, to a great extent.
Before turning to the theme of the unlikely affinity between the moderate
Robertson and the restless Forster, I wish to examine a few learned German reactions
to Robertson’s two works on European encounters with the colonial world. An
outlook on the wider world and academic traditions peculiar to Germany as well as
discernible marks of incipient nationalist sentiments coloured purely scholarly
commitments in these reactions, which produced an interesting overall picture.
Shortly after the publication of the original, and before the German translation
came out (but in a vocabulary not very different from the one employed by Schiller),
Heyne’s extensive, two-part review of the History of America appeared in the
Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen. Three observations on this review seem to
be  worth  making  here.  First,  the  reviewer’s  main  regret  was  that  Robertson
postponed the discussion of British colonies in North America until after the current
709 “Man kennt Robertsons ruhigen philosophischen Gang mit seiner Nachforschungen, der Fleiß
womit er sich Deutschen, den Geschmack worin er sich Französischen Mustern nähert,den ersten,
doch deutlichen gelfälligen Vortrag, die reine, fließende, wenn gleich nicht blumenreiche Schreibart …
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disturbances were over; at the same time, he forecast that the portion of the work
which would prove most popular would be Book VIII, the analysis of Spanish
policies in the New World.710 It would be interesting to know whether Heyne would
have  shared  the  position  of  Robertson,  who  was  profoundly  interested  in  the
unfolding crisis between Britain and the colonists, and expressed his pro-government
opinions both in private correspondence and in the General Assemblies of 1776 and
1777.711 Heyne’s own views on the subject are not enunciated, nevertheless, the
remark in general seems to confirm that the main interest of the German reading
public in American history was contemporary and Europe-centred.712
At the same time – this is the second point about the review worthy of
attention –, the reviewer himself thought that the most important feature of the work
was the description of “the rude and savage state of the Americans, thus their way of
life, manners, constitution of society, etc.” (der rohe und wilde Zustand der Amerikaner,
und also ihre Lebensart, Sitten, gesellschaftliche Verfassung s. w.) as developed in Book
IV. To him, this most thorough application of the stadialist approach in the entire
work, seemed as a masterpiece of “philosophical” history.713 Dugald  Stewart  of
course was yet to coin “conjectural history”, and “stadial history” is a still more
recent  neologism,  so  for  the  time  being  any  systematic  application  of  broad
theoretical models (like the one based on the “four stages” of social progress) to
historical subject matter was not infrequently and appropriately described as a
“philosophical” pursuit. Heyne seems to echo the admiration of Burke’s better
known but identical sentiments: “The part which I read with the greatest pleasure, is
the discussion of the manners and character of the inhabitants of that New World. ...
You have employed philosophy to judge on the manners, and from the manners you
Es ist hinreichend, daß er sagen kann, was er hier darbringt …” Historische Untersuchung, translator’s
preface, viii.
710 Christian Gottlob Heyne, Review of Robertson, History of America (part 2), GAgS, Zugabe I.  1
November 1777, no. 44,  695, 699.
711 See Dalphy I. Fagerstrom, “Scottish Opinion and the American Revolution”, William and Mary
Quarterly, XI (1954), 216., 264 ff.; Sher, Church and University, 263, 270, 275; and Jeffrey Smitten,
“Moderatism and History: William Robertson's Unfinished History of British America”, in Richard B.
Sher and J. R. Smitten (eds.), Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1990), 163-79.
712 Horst Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution 1770-1800 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag,
1978), 13.
713 Heyne, Review of History of America (part 1), GAgS, Zugabe I., 18 October 1777, no. 43,  662-3.
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have drawn new resources for philosophy.”714 Viewed from this angle, the
assessment of Robertson's contribution and its significance by the German reviewer
does not seem fundamentally different from the main thrust of contemporary British
appreciation.
The third point already takes us from the issue of mere transmission to that of
direct engagement with the original text and argument in the form of expressing
doubt,  disagreement or rebuff.  If  we disregard the remark that Robertson’s method
of  annotation  fails  to  serve  the  convenience  of  the  reader,  the  only  actual  piece  of
criticism levelled against the History of America by its German reviewer is apparently
a  fairly  pedantic  one,  which,  however,  is  a  recurrent  motif  in  German responses  to
the work, and fits into the larger pattern of unhappiness with his Atlantic and
Mediterranean focus. Nearly at the same time as this review was published, Remer
complained that Robertson did not take German history and German historians
sufficiently into consideration when writing the History of Charles V.715 With the same
sense of patriotic resentment, Heyne wrote in his review of the History of America: “It
seems  that  Mr.  R.  wants  to  deny  the  mere  existence  of  Martin  Beheimb  [sic]  to  the
Germans, imputing him to be Martin de Boemia of Portugal, and here Mr. R. is
incorrectly informed.”716
We are familiar with the meticulous care Robertson took to establish his works
on the reliable foundation of archival and other sources, and the ways in which he
capitalised on his fame and influence for this end by obtaining the necessary
information. While at work on the History of America,  he devised a questionnaire of
over  fifty  items,  most  of  them  of  an  anthropological  kind  –  some  relating  to  the
physiological properties of the natives, but many more to their customs, manners
and institutions –, and even apart from the questionnaire relied on a host of
correspondents far and wide to supply him with comparative material from frontiers
between European and non-European civilizations. He received a huge volume of
replies from figures as diverse as Robert Waddilove, chaplain of the British Embassy
714 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, III. 350-1. Cf. Annual Register 19 (1777), 214-34.
715 Cf. above, 249.
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in Madrid (who translated his queries into Spanish and circulated them in the
colonies),  Luis de Pinto, the Portuguese Minister in London (who had a respectable
amount of experience in Brazil), the celebrated French travellers Bougainville and
Godin le Jeune (enlisted by Robertson’s French translator, the encyclopedist Jean-
Baptiste Suard), Thomas Hutchinson, the Governor of Massachusetts Bay, and
missionaries  such  as  Gideon  Hawley,  not  counting  the  lengthy  letters  sent  by  John
Rogerson, the physician of Empress Catherine the Great from St. Petersburg.717 But it
has been also revealed that he often relied on established prejudices, instead of the
fruit  of  his  own  labour;  and  even  apart  from  this,  he  made  mistakes.  In  the  first
edition of the History of America he was indeed in error concerning the identity of the
Nürnberger Martin Behaim (1459-1507), renowned traveller and cartographer who
was held in great honour and attained high dignity in Portuguese service. He was
knighted by King John II in 1485 and took part in several expeditions to West Africa,
though he certainly had not discovered America before Columbus, as several authors
in his native land claimed from the mid-seventeenth century onwards.718
In the eighteenth century, as Europe’s ascendancy in economic, cultural and
military terms over the rest of the globe started to become part and parcel of the
identity and self-image of the old continent, lands without actual colonial stakes also
felt the need to assert the claim to have contributed to the shaping of this identity. It
is a mere coincidence, but hardly a fortuitous one that the first scholarly biography of
Behaim, vindicating his status as the discoverer of the New World, was published by
the Nürnberger polyhistor Christoph Gottlieb von Murr (1733-1811) nearly at the
same time as Robertson’s History of America.  But  even  before  Murr’s Diplomatische
Geschichte des portugiesischen berühmten Ritters Martin Behaim (1778)  came out  of  the
press, Robertson received a letter – by way of an unknown intermediary – which
raised the same issue. Its writer stressed that whereas “[h]is lately published History
716 “Vom Martin Beheimb scheint Hr. R. der ganze Daseyn den Deutschen abläugnen zu wollen, er sey
aus dem Portugiesen Martin de Boemia entstanden, un hier is Hr. R. unrecht berichtet.” Heyne,
Rebiew of History of America (part 1), 665.
717 See Black, “The Enlightenment Historian at Work”; Duckworth, “An Eighteenth-Century
Questionnaire”; Smitten, “Robertson’s letters and the life of writing”; Lenman, “’From savage to Scot’
via the French”.
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of America very deservedly confirm[ed]” that Robertson was an “incomparable
historian,” precisely for this reason it was important to point out and correct his
errors. Robertson “represents Martin Behaim or de Bohemie as a Portuguese ?
denies him to be a German, ? lastly excludes him entirely from the honour of
discovering America.” In the correspondent’s view the first two assertions were
simply wrong, and the last one was still undecided and would remain so until the
papers of the Behaim family became accessible to the public. Robertson’s main
source Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas is then severely criticised and refuted on the
basis  of  German chroniclers,  such as  Wagenseil  and Doppelmeyer,  neglected in  the
History of America.719
The writer of the letter was the famous German scholar Johann Reinhold
Forster (1729-1798), the father of Georg. “The first polyhistor of our century, worthy
of comparison with a Conring or  a Hugo Grotius,”  as  one  contemporary  described
him,720 Forster was already renowned as a naturalist, antiquarian, linguist and
geographer by the time he resettled with his similarly multi-talented eldest son from
his native Danzig to Britain in 1766. There he embarked on a course of conscious self-
promotion on the scientific scene, which helped him, despite his notoriously
whimsical character and financial extravagance, through involvement in the famous
dissenting academy of Warrington and membership in the Royal Society, on board
the ship Resolution as the assistant naturalist of James Cook on the latter’s second
voyage around the world between 1772-1775. The appointment resulted in mutual
jealousies and resentments with some colleagues, notably Joseph Banks, Forster’s
predecessor on Cook’s first voyage, but at the same time made his status as a leading
natural historian of the South Seas unassailable (and he might have been the most
outstanding one, had he been as successful in publishing the truly immense material
718 On  Behaim  and  the  half-mythical  and  legendary  character  he  assumed  in  later  speculations,  see
Peter J. Bräunlein, Martin Behaim. Legende und Wirklichkeit eines berühmten Nürnbergers (Bamberg:
Bayerische Verlagsanstalt, 1992), esp. 15-67.
719 Johann Reinhold Forster to  Robertson  (via  an  unidentified  intermediary),  London,  16  December
1777. The National Library of Scotland. Robertson-Macdonald papers, MS. 3943. ff. 54-58.
720 Quoted in Michael E. Hoare, “Preface”, in The Resolution Journal of Johann Reinhold Forster 1772-1775
(London: Hakluyt Society, 1982), I. ix. On Forster in general see the Introduction in the same edition of
his Journal, and Michael E. Hoare, The Tactless Philosopher. Johann Reinhold Forster 1729-1798
(Melbourne: Hawthorn Press, 1976).
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he  and  his  son  collected  as  he  had  planned).  Nevertheless,  according  to  his  later
account, Forster saw his own role mainly as an anthropologist, his son and another
assistant  being  responsible  for  other  branches  of  the  encyclopaedic  project  he
conceived: “It was my particular province ... to investigate closely the habits, rites,
ceremonies, religious beliefs, way of life, clothing, agriculture, commerce, arts,
weapons, modes of warfare, political organization, and the language of the people
we met.”721
There is reason to believe that his interest in and approach to these subjects
was influenced by varieties of eighteenth-century stadial history. His vast library
contained a wealth of accounts of primitive and civilised man and his political and
material culture. Between the summer of 1771 and his departure with Cook, Forster
contributed columns of “foreign literary intelligence” to the Critical Review, reporting,
among many other works, on Über die Geschichte der Menschheit (1768, “History of the
Human Species” according to the review) by the Swiss philosopher Isaak Iselin, the
closest contemporary equivalent in German of Scottish conjectural history. Forster
praised it as “one of the most interesting performances of the present century”
concerning “the progress of mankind from the state of brutes to that of savages; and
lastly, to that of civilization.”722 He was thus certainly well-equipped to appreciate
Robertson’s work, especially the aspect also highlighted in the review of the History
of America by Heyne (who was his close friend, and later also his brother-in-law),
namely, the account of the “rude and savage state of the Americans,” which earned
his  lavish  praise  in  his  letter  to  Robertson.  Most  of  Part  Six  of  Forster’s  own
Observations Made during a Voyage Round the World, on Physical Geography, Natural
History, and Ethic Philosophy (in 1778 in English and in 1783 in German)723 – over half
of the whole book – was an analysis of the progress of the “races” of the Pacific from
rudeness to civilisation, their customs, manners and institutions relating to peace and
721 Johann Reinhold Forster, Enchiridion historiae naturali inserviens: : quo termini et delineationes ad avium,
piscium, insectorum et plantarum adumbrationes intelligendas et concinnandas, secundum methodum
systematis Linnaeani continentur (Halle: Hemmerde und Schwetschke, 1788), [4]. Quoted in Hoare,
“Introduction” to the Resolution Journal, 77.
722 The Critical Review, or, Annals of Literature, April 1772, XXXII. 340.
723 As far as Robertson is concerned, he was certainly aware of Cook's voyages, but he only used the
account of the third one (1776-1780), mainly for making observations on climate and geography. See
e.g. History of America, Book IV, note vi.
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war,  household and religious  worship,  proceeded along similar  lines  to  Book IV of
the History of America.724 Especially striking, and very much in the fashion of stadial
history, are the passages in which the empirical material collected about the peoples
of  the  South Seas  is  compared to  accounts  of  the  classics  on the  manners,  religious
and social customs and institutions of ancient and primitive Europeans. Forster, too,
ascribed whatever differences existed within a single human species to a
combination of climatic factors and ones arising from the “mode of living.” Like
Buffon, he chose procreation, the capacity to produce fertile offspring with one
another, as the criterion of taxonomical identity, also following the French savant in
referring to temperature and topography as crucial for skin colour, physical strength
etc.; while he thought, together with the Scottish students of the science of man that
the rudeness or the refinement of manners was dependent on the prevailing system
of satisfying an ever expanding range of needs.725
However, the affinity of Forster to Robertson, and, as I shall argue, the use of
the latter by the former, goes beyond this. A few years later Forster wrote a History of
the Voyages and the Discoveries made in the North, also translated into and published in
English in 1786.726 The book seems to have been intended as a stadial history of
European navigation in the northern hemisphere examined in terms of growing
commerce and ever more polished standards of civilisation. Forster’s introduction
very lucidly lays out his guiding principles.
“[V]oyages made for the gratification of curiosity, and for the extension of
commerce, seem to have greatly contributed to the promotion of knowledge,
and to the introduction of milder manners and customs into society. For it is
highly cultivated nations only, that explore distant countries and nations for
724 Johann Reinhold Forster, Beobachtungen während der Cookschen Weltumseglung 1772-1775 (Stuttgart:
Brockhaus Antiquarium, 1981), 254-531. Cf. the English edition, Observations Made during a Voyage
round the World, eds. Nicholas Thomas, Harriet Guest and Michael Dettelbach (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1996), 191?357.  See  also  the  lengthy  passages  on  comparative  ethnology  in  the
Resolution Journal, esp. III. 392-405.
725 Forster, Observations, 155, 175; cf. Resolution Journal, III. 392-405.
726 The original was published as Geschichte der Entdeckungen und Schiffahrten in Norden in 1784 and was
dedicated to Catherine the Great  in  recognition of  Russia’s  increasing role  in promoting exploration
(and in an unsuccessful effort to obtain membership int he St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences).
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the sake of commerce, in like manner as the seeking them for the gratification
of curiosity, pre-supposes a still higher degree of cultivation and refinement.”
This is then contrasted to the motivation of conquest, more characteristic of “rude
and uncivilized” nations in extending their horizons. There is an element of
providentialism, too: “All these are the varied means which an infinitely wise Being
has appointed for the purpose of humanizing mankind, of drawing them, if I may so
express myself, out of their native state of barbarism, and of diffusing amongst them
the liberal arts and the gentler courtesies of life.” Finally, there is an interesting echo
in Forster’s Introduction of Adam Smith’s claim that man, unlike all other creatures,
has constantly occasion to seek the assistance of his fellows even in his natural state
for his mere subsistence, here specifically applied to the circumstances of “long and
distant voyages” where “the bands of society and friendship ... are cemented by our
wants ...  Our mutual necessities give rise to mutual favours and reciprocal benefits,
till the gentle spirit of humanity and kindness, thus kindled from a spark of laudable
self-interest, and gradually encreasing by repeated exertions, bursts forth at last into
a glorious blaze of habitual benevolence and universal philanthropy.”727
This already resembles closely enough the project carried out by Robertson in
Book I  of  the History of America. Forster then sets out to his narrative, found by its
reviewer a “commendable and accurate compilation,” which, however, “fails both in
profundity of reflection, and philosophical investigation.”728 By  and  large,  this  is  a
fair assessment of the bulk of the work, divided into three books discussing the
voyages of ancient, medieval and modern times, respectively. However, its
intellectually most exciting part is a remarkable exception from the rule. At the same
time  as  regards  this  portion  of  the  text,  it  is  also  doubtful  whether  the  reviewer  is
correct  in  claiming  that  Forster’s  book  is  based  on  “authors  who  are  now  scarcely
read, or can seldom be found.” Book II concludes with a section entitled “General
View of the State of Affairs at this Period” (namely, the Middle Ages), an extremely
727 Johann Reinhold Forster, History of the Voyages and Discoveries made in the North (Dublin:  Luke
White, 1786), xiv.
728 [Anon.],  Review  of  Johann  Reinhold  Forster, History of the Discoveries and Voyages, The Critical
Review, 62 (November-December 1786), 330.
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skilful digest of one of the best known texts by one of the best known contemporary
historians. Without literally reproducing any part of it, Forster is actually saying his
lesson from Robertson’s “View of the Progress of Society in Europe”. The argument
of Robertson is all there, in a magisterial ten-page abstract. As the “barbarous nations
from the  North” undermined the  Roman Empire,  the  provinces  raised by them “to
the dignity of kingdoms” were marked by “great debility”, fertile lands being turned
into wilderness; especially
“[c]ities, once the seats of industry, arts, and commerce, were pillaged and
destroyed, and the few remaining inhabitants ... became the vassals of their
insolent victors. ... These petty tyrants (of which there were many) sat in their
castles and paid casual homage to a sovereign almost without power and
authority... Popery, and its superstitious rites, effectually banished religion
and its sacred influences. ... [A]ll freedom of thought was totally suppressed
by the influence of legions of Monks, and the frowns of a haughty and jealous
Hierarchy. There was no longer the least spark of knowledge or information to
be  found  in  all  Christendom.  ...  Taste,  the  arts,  decency,  and  decorum,  were
not  to  be  expected  in  the  desolation,  the  gloomy  obscurity,  and  depth  of
barbarity in which the whole of Europe was involved. ... The Philosopher – the
Philanthropist – is struck with horror, in contemplating the depth of misery
and humiliation to which, from the want of information, and in consequence
of moral as well as political corruption, mankind is capable of sinking.”
Then, however, unintended consequences, assisted by almighty Providence,
came to the rescue of Europeans, who had approached the state of near-universal
corruption.
“But, in contemplating this picture, he will naturally be led, on the other hand,
to  consider  the  means  which  an  all-wise  Providence  has,  with  more  than
parental kindness,  made use of to bring men back to that happiness in social
life, for which they were originally destined. In fact, it is these inordinate
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desires, these insatiable passions, this wild enthusiasm, and this fanatical
superstition, by which the Author of our existence conducts us again into the
paths of virtue and knowledge, and to a state of exalted felicity.”
Forster, of course, hints at the Crusades, in terms that make his tacit reliance on
Robertson unmistakable.
“These great peregrinations, however, of Christians, frantic with superstitious
zeal, who frequently marked the whole course of their expedition by the most
atrocious crimes, and the most infamous actions, and were for the greater part,
the very scum of the earth, these peregrination were the cause of a revolution
throughout all Europe, which, in fact, was attended with too great
consequences to pass unnoticed by an inquisitive mind.”
The nobles “wanted money to equip them as well as to maintain them on these long
expeditions” and “to thousands of people they gave liberty in exchange for money;
and bestowed on innumerable cities great privileges.” The ferocity of western
knights was tamed by acquaintance with the “magnanimity, courage, and gallantry”
of their Saracen counterparts.  Eastern trade became more intensive, and with the
refined commodities arrived long-forgotten achievements of science and philosophy.
Civil  peace was established, and the confident burgher not only improved arts and
trades, but also ventured “to trust his life and property to the mercy of the winds and
the waves.” These developments not only “contributed to liberate the human mind
from those fetters of superstition, ignorance, and slothful indolence, by which it had
hitherto been shackled,” but also increased the power of the “Kings and Princes, and
their endeavours to annihilate the influence of the higher order of vassals, and of the
Nobility, in matters of government ... all these circumstances have produced a great
alteration in the forms of Government in Europe. The thoughts of all the European
Princes  were  bent  on  aggrandizement,  and  that  either  by  new  conquests  or  by  the
augmentation of their power in their own states.” With the Ottoman occupation of
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Constantinople the stage was set for the great Transatlantic voyages of discovery, in
which Forster does not omit to underline the role of Martin Behaim.729
This perhaps overlong abstract of Forster’s argument is intended to illustrate
his indebtedness to Robertson. Unfortunately, it remains an unacknowledged debt.
During his career Forster and his son were occasionally accused by fellow naturalists,
if  not  with  plagiarism,  at  least  with  relying  on  the  achievement  of  others  in  ways
which were not in strict conformity with academic honesty. According to the most
recent scholarship, these charges seem to be unfounded.730 On the other hand, there
seems to be little doubt that on this occasion Forster was at least liable to suspicion.
To return to Forster’s explicit engagement with Robertson, the ultimate reason
he gave why he deemed it especially important to redress Robertson’s unfairness to
the Germans731 was  that  “the  Discovery  of  America  ought  to  be  considered  as  an
Epocha in the History of mankind, which remarkably influenced all human
transactions ? opinions, so that it is to me no matter of indifference, who should for
the future claim the honour of having discovered the new world & in a manner
should originally have occasioned these great revolutions in the History of Man.”
The discovery of America, therefore, could be considered as a heroic exploit and thus
as a source of national glory. What is more, Forster’s tone here is one of mild censure:
after all, the glory of Germany, due to ancient ethnic and spiritual community, is the
glory of the British, so by neglecting the German achievement Robertson was in a
sense acting in an unpatriotic way. “I should perhaps seem partial to the Germans;
but  I  protest  that  nothing can biass  my mind in  the  investigation of  truth”,  Forster
wrote, and added that he had special reasons for being even-handed: “I am
descended from an antient family, that lived in the North of Britain, & which in the
time of the civil commotions in the last century retired into Prussia. I therefore
consider myself as appertaining equally to the British & the German nation & have
always  preserved  a  predilection  for  these  two  Nations,  who  have  from  time
729 Forster, History of the Voyages, 232-41, 255, 258 ff.
730 Hoare, Tactless Philosopher and “Introduction”.
731 Robertson actually did so in later editions, explicitly acknowledging his debt to Forster. See History
of America, I. 372.
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immemorial been famous for men of free ? liberal sentiments.”732 George Forster, a
royalist of Yorkshire dispossessed by Parliament, left England in 1642; his late
descendant Johann Reinhold, indeed preserved a strong double identity, with
English sometimes even gaining the upper hand.733
Nearly two years later another German correspondent reported to Robertson
that  “Mr  Murr  has  published  since  my  return  some  other  pamphlets  about  Martin
Behaim, in which he seems to retreat a little from his former opinions.”734 The remark
shows that, once reminded, Robertson was not at all indifferent to German sources,
and took the opportunity of double-checking the information passed on to him by
Forster. The writer of this letter was Johann Philpp Ebeling, who was already
introduced above as the translator of Robertson’s 1755 sermon. He later collaborated
with his brother Christoph Daniel Ebeling (1741-1817 – a student of theology at
Göttingen in 1762-67), one of the important German authorities on America in his
time, in editing and publishing the travels of the Hungarian explorer-adventurer
Count Móric Benyovszky and other miscellaneous travel accounts. As such, he
belongs to the second tier of figures who, besides the outstanding ones ? the two
Forsters, August Ludwig Schlözer, Matthias Christian Sprengel and Anton Friedrich
Büsching ? who  contributed  immensely  to  opening  the  horizon  of  the  late
eighteenth-century German audience to the wider world. Also, in highly
romanticised terms he keenly emphasised the “special relation” that existed between
Scotland and Germany: besides the intellectual achievement of contemporary
Scotland, it is the supposedly close and deeply rooted cultural and ethnic ties that
make  it  an  object  of  special  interest  for  German  readers  –  as  it  were,  reversing  the
case Forster made to Robertson. “The circumstance that their Fingals, as our
Herrmanns set limits to the power-thirsty Romans, ought to make [the Scots] dear to
all Germans. ... As regards their manners, the Scots have preserved a lot of old
Germanic ways.”735
732 See n. 96.
733 “We are almost Englishmen,” he wrote to his old friend Johann David Michaelis from London on
24 August 1775. Cod. Mich. f. 322. Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen
734 Robertson-MacDonald papers, National Library of Scotland, MS. 3943. ff. 106-7.
735 “[D]er Umstand, daß ihre Fingale, so wie unsre Herrmannen den herrschsüchtigen Römern
Gränzen  setzten,  muß  sie  jedem  Deutschen  schätzbar  machen.  …  In  Absicht  ihren  Sitten  haben  die
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Such  sentiments  were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  expressed  in  the  expectation  that
they would be mutual.  Indeed, the late-eighteenth century saw in Scotland the rise,
as a powerful alternative to Gaelicism, of a robust tendency asserting the supposed
Teutonic identity of the Picts whose libertarian and industrious characteristics were
set against the vice, indolence and slavishness of Celts.736 But even if  this Teutonist
awakening had commenced by the time Forster or Ebeling were writing (A
Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of the Scythians or Goths was published by John
Pinkerton, a pioneer of the tradition, in 1787), it would hardly have influenced
Robertson, the moderate conservative, whose patriotism was of an enlightened and
cosmopolitan kind, and thought of civilisation in terms of conjectural history, rather
than racialist theory.
Learned engagement with Robertson’s Historical Disquisition on India in
Germany was even more extensive than in the case of the History of America. Besides
Georg Forster’s review and translation, two other detailed reviews were published,
both of them after Forster had first reported about the book. Still,  before turning to
Forster it will be useful to look at these.
The unknown reviewer of the Annalen der Geographie und Statistik seasoned his
fair account of the contents and structure of the book with the general
acknowledgement that the book was  a “clear and enlightening” account of the ways
in which Europeans had established communication with India, as well as highly
critical remarks as to its specific details are concerned. No historian “with a tincture
of  taste  and philosophy,”  it  is  suggested,  would challenge the  general  thrust  of  the
book, but the author had failed to bring new facts to light or even find new solutions
to  important  questions.  Robertson  was  found  to  have  neglected  a  number  of
important sources (not all, but some of them German again); especially noteworthy is
the claim that as a doctor of divinity and a great historian he ought not to display an
“almost Voltairian unfamiliarity with the Old Testament” (fast Voltairsche
Schotten noch sehr viel Altdeutscher beybehalten.” Thomas  Pennants  Reise  durch  Schottland  und  die
Hebridischen Inseln, trans. Johann Philipp Ebeling (Leipzig: Weygand, 1779-1780), I. translator’s
Preface. Pennant was one of Forster’s closest friends in Britain.
736 See Colin Kidd, “Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish National Inhibition, 1780-1880”, The Scottish
Historical Review, LXXIV (1995), 45-68.
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Unbekanntschaft mit dem Alten Testamente).737 Strikingly  enough  –  yet  another  proof
that religious conformity thus expressed was more than reconcilable with
Enlightenment – the same reviewer found Robertson’s praise for the law codes of
India, which the Scottish historian claimed to have been worthy of “an enlightened
and commercial people” (einem aufgeklärten und handelnden Volk) rather groundless,
citing the barbarous penalties for adultery.738 The review concludes by a faithful
summary and endorsement of Robertson’s closing passages.739
The other reviewer was Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren (1760-1842), who
belonged to the youngest generation of the great Göttingen historians. Heeren was
relatively unknown as yet, but the horizons and preoccupations of his future
contributions were already taking shape. In his greatest work Heeren enunciated his
“ideas about the politics and commerce of the greatest peoples of the ancient
world,”740 a  topic  far  from  being  of  merely  antiquarian  interest  to  him:  in  it,  he
suggested,  the  problem  of  the  peaceful  coexistence  of  a  large  variety  of  republican
and autocratic polities within the same state system could be examined, not at all
without relevance to the European status quo of 1793 when volume one of the first
edition was published. But he also devoted a separate work to the rise of the modern
European states system, with balance of power and liberty as ensuring a unity of
principle within diversity as its chief characteristics.741 If this singles out Heeren as an
outstanding author within the tradition of Universalhistorie as championed by
Gatterer  and  Schlözer,  it  must  also  be  mentioned  that  he  owed  a  great  deal  to  the
urge to study the Geschichte der Menschheit,  the  history  of  mankind as  conceived by
737 [Anon.],  Review of  Robertson, Historical Disquisition, Annalen der Geographie und Statistik 3 (1792),
112.
738 Ibid., 120.
739 Cf. above, 295-6.
740 Arnold Ludwig Herrmann Heeren, Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr und den Handel der vornehmsten
Völker der alten Welt, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1793-96).
741 Idem., Handbuch der Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Colonien, von der Entdeckung
beyder Indien bis zur Errichtung des Französischer Kayserthrons (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1809). For a penetrating study of Heeren’s scholarship and achievement, see Christoph Becker-
Schaum, Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft zwischen
Aufklärung und Historismus (Frankfurt-Berlin-Bern-New York-Paris-Wien: Peter Lang, 1993). See also
Horst Walter Blanke, “Zwischen Aufklärung und Historismus: A.H.L. Heerens ‘Geschichte des
Europäischen Staatensystems’”, in Horst Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer (eds.), Aufklärung und
Historik. Aufsätze zur Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft, Kirchengeschichte und Geschichtstheorie in der
deutschen Aufklärung (Waldrop: Spenner, 1991), 202-26.
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another elder contemporary, Christoph Meiners: to investigate not “what man in the
various ages did or suffered, but what he was” by adopting a quasi-anthropological
approach.  Heeren  is  also  noted  as  the  first  lecturer  on Allgemeine Länder- und
Völkerkunde in German university history in 1802 – as it were, formally lifting into the
curriculum the discipline whose beginnings are ascribed to the publication of the
Forsters’ travel accounts a quarter-century earlier.742
There was thus enough to separate Heeren from and enough to unite him with
Robertson in order to make his engagement with the Scottish historian an interesting
case, especially when it is added that Heeren, too, considered Europe’s intercourse
with the broader world as an integral part of her identity and the history of ancient
geography  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  geographic  discoveries  made  by  European
man. It was thus no wonder that the publication of James Rennell’s 1788 map of
Hindostan, which first provided a reliable representation of the territories that,
because of Alexander’s campaign, were of the utmost interest to historians of
antiquity, thrilled Heeren with the same inspiration as it  did Robertson – a parallel
the German historian hastened to point out in his review. In 1790 and 1791, no doubt
unaware of Robertson’s forthcoming work, Heeren delivered two lectures (and a
third one in 1792) for the Göttingen Society of Sciences, under almost literally the
same titles as that of Robertson’s Disquisition: of the “knowledge and commerce” of
the  Greeks  and  Romans  with  India.743 Armed with the confidence drawn from his
own erudition on the subject, Heeren criticises Robertson on account of several
imprecise or not sufficiently substantiated claims, and on one occasion even
concludes that he explored only “what is general and has an interest for everyone,
742 Heeren was also Georg Forster’s brother-in-law. Their India-related publications in the early 1790s
(together  with  the  announcement  by  both  of  them  of  books  in  the  field  never  to  be  written)  were
suggested to have been elements  of  an emulation between them for  the reputation of  India-experts.
See Christoph Becker-Schaum, “Die Beziehungen zwischen Georg Forster und Arnold Heeren und ihr
Niederschlag in Heerens Werk”, Georg-Forster-Studien 12 (2007), 211-29.
743 Commentatio de graecorum de India notitia et cum Indis commerciis (16 January 1790);
Commentatio de mercatura Indicae ratione et viis (8 January 1791); Commentatio de Romanorum de
India notitia (4 August 1792). Texts are published in the Society’s periodical, Commentationes societatis
regiae scientiarum goettingensis, X. (Göttingen, 1791), 121?56, and XI. (Göttingen, 1793),. 63-90.
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but much, or rather all is missed by the learned researcher.”744 The reviewer also
complained that  the  aspects  of  the  work that  have a  bearing on natural  history  are
superficially elaborated. Nevertheless, whatever the shortcomings of the work in
terms of antiquarian accuracy (the difference of opinion concerning the location of
the ancient capital Palibothara is set out by Heeren in cumbersome detail over a full
page), the reviewer was in fundamental agreement with the author concerning the
significance of the enterprise: whereas all nations that had ever attained a degree of
civilization maintained intercourse with India and used the articles she produced,
neither India itself nor these relations had been sufficiently well known. He also
stressed that the main results of Robertson’s research coincided with his own in a far
greater degree than it is usually the case in similar circumstances, which to him
seemed a proof of all he greater reliability of the achievement of both of them.745
Finally, Heeren was keen to acknowledge Robertson’s innovative reliance on the few
products of Indian literature already available in Europe, and to commend the
appendix about the constitution, laws, arts and religion of the Indians as answering a
newly awakened but well justified interest of Europeans.
Let us now turn to the younger Forster. Georg (or George, a spelling he used
with almost equal frequency) had lived with his father in England during his
formative years (from 1766 to 1772, and then for another three years after their return
from the Cook expedition), and took an increasing interest in non-European,
including Oriental cultures, which was further stimulated by another important stay
in London, the main intersection of European intercourse with the colonial world, in
early 1790 – at a time when the impeachment of Warren Hastings kept attention to
Indian affairs in general wide awake. To be sure, Forster’s more general fascination
with ethnology was awakened during the three years on board the Resolution:
“Natural  history  in  its  broadest  sense  and  particularly  anthropology  has  been  my
744 “… blos das allgemeine und für jeden interessante berühren wollen; dem gelehrten Forscher bleibt
hier  noch  vieles,  oder  vielmehr  alles  zu  thun  übrig.”  Arnold  Herrmann  Ludwig  Heeren,  Review  of
Robertson’s Historical Disquisition, Bibliothek der alten Litteratur und Kunst, 9 (1792), 120.
745 “Da auf diese Weise zwey Schriftsteller völlig unabhängig von einander denselben Gegenstand
behandelten, so ließ sich um so vieler Aufklärung für denselben erwarten, und da die Hauftresultate
die beyde aus ihren Receherchen zogen, genauer mit einander übereinstimmen, als in solchen Fällen
leicht zu geschehn pflegt, so müssen diese einen desto höhern Grad von Zuverlässigkeit haben.” Ibid.,
105-7.
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pre-occupation hitherto. What I have written since my voyage is for the most part
closely related to it,” he wrote in 1789.746 The exploration of non-European cultures
was  a  permanent  commitment  for  Forster  throughout  his  erratic  career  after  his
return to Germany in 1778, first as a professor of natural history in Kassel and Wilno,
then as university librarian and revolutionary in Mainz and finally in Paris. Between
1778 and 1788 he also spent shorter or longer periods of time (from September 1787, a
full year) in Göttingen, where he took his magister degree at the end of 1778, and
remained  in  close  contact  with  the  university  and  its  professors  to  the  end  of  his
career in Mainz. He was a regular reviewer for the Göttingische Anzeigen, four-fifths
of his over 120 reviews written on travel literature and descriptions of remote
lands.747 Translations, many of them works in the same field, also figured very
prominently among the products of Forster’s “Mainz writer’s workshop”
(Schriftstellerwerkstatt) – though it has also been suggested that the combination of
illness, financial distress and translator’s work also increasingly “wore him out”.748
Besides the Voyage Round the World and a few anthropological texts that will be
discussed below, mention must be made of two outstanding fruits of this interest that
do  not  strictly  conform  to  the  genre  of  travelogue.  One  of  them  is  a  long  essay  on
“Cook, the discoverer”, published in 1787 as the preface to Forster’s translation of the
account of Cook’s third Pacific voyage, in which he elaborated a point made in an
earlier article on “New Holland and the British colony in Botany Bay”: that Cook,
whose expeditions lay the ground for the establishment of these promising colonial
initiatives was a second Columbus, inaugurating another glorious epoch in the
spread of civilization.749 Generously acknowledging the superior merits of the recent
account  of  the  life  of  Cook by his  friend,  the  Göttingen polymath Georg Christoph
746 “Die Naturwisseschaft im weitesten Verstande, und insbesondere die Anthropologie was bisher
meine Beschäftigung. Was ich seit meiner Weltumschiffung geschrieben habe. Steht damit
gro?entheils in enger Beziehung.” Georg Forster, Kleine Schriften. Ein Beytrag zur Völker- und
Länderkunde, Naturgeschichte und Philosophie des Lebens, I. (Leipzig: Kummer, 1789), ii.
747 Forster’s centrality to the eighteenth-century universe of participating in and reporting on travel is
a prominent theme in Harry Liebersohn, The Traveler’s World. Europe to the Pacific (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2006)
748 Ludwig Uhlig, Georg Forster. Lebensabenteuer eines gelehrten Weltbürgers (1754-1794) (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 282.
749 Georg Forster, “Neuholland und die brittische Colonie in Botany-Bay [1786]”, AA V. 176.
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Lichtenberg,750 Forster intended to offer not so much a biography of the “hero” (an
epithet used throughout Cook, der Entdecker), but a typological discussion of the
explorer as a torchbearer of global Enlightenment. Already in his inaugural speech at
the Société des Antiquités de Cassel after his appointment at the university there, he
expressed his conviction that the whole of mankind shares a common destiny in
civilization,  which  “is  approached  by  the  same  degrees  in  every  land,  it  is  just  the
epochs that are different”751 –  a  concise  formulation  of  a  belief  congenial  to
Robertson, too, and just as the latter was convinced that in spite of all the anomalies
of European penetration into America, colonial tutelage assisted native societies in
accelerating the civilizing process, Forster also thought that the establishment of
colonies in the Pacific by the foremost nations of Europe would advance this cause.752
The portrait and “character” of Cook as the quintessential eighteenth-century
explorer and thus an agent of such advances is thoroughly embedded in a discourse
of  Forster’s  about  humanity  and  progress,  in  a  way  that  is  akin  with  the
representation of Columbus by Robertson as a discoverer suited to his own times. A
determination to fight the prejudices of his times, had been indispensable for the
former; spirit of “enterprise and adventure”, mingled with composure and
calculation, were qualities that distinguished both; but according to Forster, Cook
went beyond all of his predecessors in introducing into the practice of discovery a
methodical empiricism, which was an Enlightenment trade mark, and a disposition
unknown and unthinkable in earlier times when
750 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, “Einige Lebensumstände vom Captain Jacob Cook, größtentheils aus
schriftlichen Nachrichten einiger seiner Bekannten”, Göttingisches Magazin der Wissenschaften und
Litteratur, 1:1 (1780), 243-96. Forster and Lichtenberg were co-editors of this journal.
751 “La civilisation arrive à peu près par les memes degrees dans tout les païs, il n’y a que les Époques
qui sont différantes.” Georg Forster, “Antrittsrede vor der Société des Antiquités de Cassel am 12.
Dezember 1778”, in Georg Forsters Werke. Sämtliche Schriften, Tagebücher, Briefe, ed. Georg Steiner,
Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin [from 1974, Akademie der Wissenschaften der
DDR; from 2003, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften] (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1958-), vol. VIII: Kleine Schriften zu Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, ed. Siegfired Scheibe ( Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1991),  66.
752 For  a  contextualization  of  Forster’s  relevant  ideas  against  the  background  of  the  late  eighteenth-
century German confrontation with the problem of European expansion and encounter with human
diversity, see John K. Noyes, “Commerce, colonialism, and the globalization of action in late
Enlightenment Germany”, Postcolonial Studies 9:1 (2006), 81-98; John Gascoigne, “The German
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“[f]ormer  Pacific  travellers  dreaded  the  very  sight  of  land;  when  they
stumbled upon a shore, they hastened to move on, without even setting a foot
on it, and without investigating the size, the form, and the relationships of
their  discoveries.  If  they  did  land  somewhere,  they  rarely  took  the  time  to
attain the goal of such landing, and to take advantage of the products that
were found. Their behaviour towards the natives usually made necessary a
speedy retreat, before they could have studied the land and its manufactures,
and familiarized themselves with the peculiarities of the human species there.
Therefore their reports are often devoid of any interest …”753
By contrast, Cook “collected for his contemporaries and posterity, with devotion and
indefatigable diligence” information on all of these features of newly discovered
lands, and many more. Besides and beyond contributing to the general stock of
knowledge,  this  was  also  understood and commended by Forster  as  the  proof  of  a
practical  capacity  to  absorb  new  knowledge  –  on  how  to  fight  scurvy,  to  preserve
meat by salting even in the tropics, and so forth –, the perfectibility of a microcosmic
individual in which it was possible to detect the sum of the “general enlightenment”
that may trigger “the joint advance of our whole kind towards a certain goal of
perfection, … the prospect of a higher social happiness than has been known to the
world.”754 Forster’s  Cook  was  a  consummation  of  the  spirit  of  an  age,  just  as
Columbus  was  one  in  Robertson’s History of America.  “Only  in  the  present  century
could Cook’s burning ambition be equipped with all the means whereby he became a
Enlightenment  and  the  Pacific”,  in  Wolff  and  Cipollini  (eds.), The Anthropology of the Enlightenment,
141-71.
753 “Ältere Südseefahrer scheuten gleichsam den Anblick des Landes; wo sie Küsten fanden, eilten sie
schnell  vorüber,  oft  ohne  nur  den  Fuß  darauf  zu  setzen,  ohne  den  Umfang,  die  Gestalt  und  den
Zusammenhang ihrer Entdeckungen zu untersuchen. Landeten sie auch irgendwo, so nahmen sie sich
selten Zeit, den Endzweck einer Landung zu erreichen, und von den vorgefundenen Produkten
einigen Vortheil zu ziehen. Ihr Betragen gegen die Eingebohrnen machte gewöhnlich einen
schleunigen Abzug nothing, ehe sie noch die Beschaffenheit der Gegend und ihrer Erzeugnisse
erforschen, und mit dem Eigenthümlichkeiten der dortigen Menschengattung bekannt warden
konnten.  Daher fehlte  es  ihren Berichten so oft  an allem Interesse …” Georg Forster, James Cook, der
Entdecker und Fragmente über Captain Cooks letzte Reise und sein Ende, ed. Frank Vorpahl (Berlin:
Eichborn, 2008), 24.
754 “die  allgemeine  Aufklärung,  …  das  gemeinschaftliche  Fortrücke  unserer  ganzen  Gattung  nach
einer bestimmten Ziele der Vollkommenheit, … die Aussicht, einer höheren gesellschaftlichen
Glückseligkeit, als die Welt noch kannte …” Ibid., 106-7.
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discoverer;  and  only  he  could  do  justice  to  this  age,”  in  which  the  limits  of
progressive enlightenment are still beyond our horizon, but “human infallibility
vanishes  at  the  sight  of  the  dawn  of  sciences.”755 Cook, enlightened knowledge
practices and colonial – though not necessarily imperial – build-up are conjoined by
Forster as essentially progressive, positive phenomena, similarly to the case of
“enterprise, adventure and ambition” in the case of Robertson’s Columbus.
Forster’s other major accomplishment which does not, strictly speaking, fit
into his directly ethnological and travel related output, is his translation of
Shakuntala, the ancient Indian drama of Kalidasa. As we have seen, Shakuntala was
also invoked by Robertson as a proof of delicate “taste” among the ancient Indians.
Forster used his own translation, published in 1791, to render the passages quoted
from that work in the Historical Disquisition by  Robertson  in  William  Jones’  1785
English  translation  (which  was  the  basis  for  that  of  Forster).756 Forster’s translation
which, together with Jones’, has been described to have inaugurated the “Shakuntala
Era” in Europe’s rediscovery of India,757 was a major impact on Herder’s image of
India and the “Morgenland” more generally, which in turn was of central importance
for the latter’s highly influential thinking on history, culture and humanity.758
Forster reported about Robertson’s Historical Disquisition on two occasions
before his translation was published, and he also evaluated the work in a preface to
his rendering of it, all in the tone of general admiration. Most of the very few
negative  remarks  in  his  case,  too,  have  to  do  with  Robertson’s  neglect  of  German
sources. Forster’s short account of the Historical Disquisition in his history of English
literature in 1791 contains perhaps the most concise contemporary assessment of
Robertson’s character as a historian that recalls the themes of modern scholarship on
him: the Scottish historian is praised for his successful combination of stadial and
755 Nur  das  gegenwärtige  Jahrhundert  konnte  Cooks  brennende  Ehrbegierde  mit  allen  Hülfsmitteln
ausrüsten, wodurch er zum Entdecker ward; und nur Cook konnte diesem Zeitalter Genüge leisten. …
Vor der Morgenröthe der Wissenschaften verschwindet die menschliche Unfehlbarkeit.” Ibid., 109.
756 Robertson, Historical Disquisition, 276 ff; Untersuchung über Indien, 298 ff.
757 Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1660-1860
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 7-8.
758 Nicholas  A.  Germana,  “Herder’s  India.  The  “Morgenland”  in  Mythology  and  Anthropology”,  in
Wolff and Cipollini (eds.), The Anthropology of the Enlightenment, 119-37.
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philosophical history (without, of course, using the former of these two labels).759
While also acknowledging the same merits, the review published in the Göttingische
Anzeigen has a tincture of criticism. True, Robertson’s goal was not to write “a piece
of detailed antiquarian criticism”, but “a popular work” and “to set the greater
moments of history in a clearer light through philosophical reasoning, and to make
them more attractive through interweaving them with the most important objects of
human application.” Forster immediately added that “this explains and excuses
what, especially in Germany, needs to be excused,” and that “unfamiliarity with our
language and literature has naturally separated the author from sources that would
have earned him the honour of greater accuracy and perfection.”760 Forster took up
the  same  thread  in  the  preface  to  his  translation  of  the Historical Disquisition.
Unfortunately, he suggested, it was “the fate of our literature to be destitute of the
sympathetic attention which our own public so heartily pays to the products of
foreign learning.” This was all the more to be regretted because German scholarship
had produced valuable works which could have facilitated the research and enriched
the results of Robertson.761 The slightly resentful tone of an ever more self-conscious
national culture, though polite, is quite unmistakable again. To redress the
shortcomings of Robertson’s book, Forster even entertained the idea of writing a
more comprehensive and up-to-date one, and swiftly sent the outline of a 24-chapter
759 Georg Forster, Geschichte der Englischen Litteratur vom Jahre 1791, in Werke, vol.VII.: Kleine Schriften
zu Kunst und Literatur. Sakontala, ed. Gerhard Steiner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 253.
760 “Augenscheinlich  war  ihm  mehr  an  einer  allgemeinen  Übersicht,  als  an  einer  in  das  genaueste
Detail gehenden antiquarischen Kritik gelegen; er wollte ein populäres werk zur allgemeinen
Belehrung schreiben, und die größern Momente der Geschichte durch philosophisches Raisonnement
in ein helleres Licht setzen, und Verwerbung mit den wichtigsten Gegenständen menschlicher
Betriebsamkeit anziehender machen. Das erläutert und entschuldigt viel, was sonst, zumal in
Deutschland, einer Entschuldigung wohl bedürfe. Die Unbekanntschaft mit unserer Sprache und
Llitteratur  har  natürlicher  Weise dem Verf.  Manche Hülfsquelle  abgeschnitten,  wodurch er  sich den
Ruhm einer größern Genauigkeit und Vollständigkeit hätte erwerben können …”   Georg Forster,
Review of Robertson, Historical Disquisition (GAgS, 3 December 1791), in Werke,  vol.  XI: Rezensionen,
ed. Horst Fiedler (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1977), 295. Forster’s other main objection is that at the end
of  the  work,  suggesting  that  by  discovering  the  route  to  India  Europe  was  saved  from  the  great
misfortune of being conquered by the Ottomans, Robertson abandoned sound history and engaged in
mere speculation. Ibid., 301.
761 “… das Schicksal unserer Litteratur, im Auslande die aufmerksame Theilnahme entbehren zu
müssen, die unser Publikum dem Produkten der fremden Gelehrsamkeit so gern zollt …” Historische
Untersuchung, translator's preface, ix.
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volume on the “history, constitution, religion, literature and manners” of India to his
publisher.762
For the time being, the work Forster mentioned in particular as one whose
neglect  was  unfortunate  on  the  part  of  Robertson,  was  a  history  of  the  most
important geographic discoveries prior the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan in 1542,
written by Matthias Christian Sprengel and first published in 1783. Another key
figure in exploring the wider world for the German reading public, Sprengel (1742-
1803) was a favourite student of Schlözer at Göttingen before becoming a professor of
history and political science at Halle. His main interest shifted towards geography
and colonial history, and became an immensely prolific author in these fields.
Having joined the “Forster clan” by marrying one of Georg’s sisters, he wrote
original works on the history of Europeans in North America, on British expansion in
India and other subjects, and collaborated with the Forsters in editing multi-volume
series of travel literature and ethnography.
In  the  preface  to  the  second,  enlarged  edition  of  his  work  mentioned  by
Forster, Sprengel regretted that Robertson’s “masterpiece” had reached him too late
to have been taken into account in revising his own work. At the same time, he
admitted that he found the Historical Disquisition deficient in some particulars, and
that he might in the future write another work “which could serve as an appendix to
Robertson’s  disquisition”  (a  plan  that  was  never  realised).  As  regards  his  own
approach, Sprengel was also trying to provide a stadialist account of the discoveries.
Barbarians and savages, he wrote, having no idea of geography, believed that their
own immediate environment constituted the whole world. “It is only after long and
repeated travels, and often after several fruitless efforts, that a newly discovered land
adds to the geographical knowledge of polished nations.” Centuries might pass
before “a nation acquires about its own habitat and that of their neighbours such
knowledge as polished nations now possess about the interior of remote
continents.”763 Here,  however,  Sprengel  seems  to  part  company  with  Scottish
762 Forster to Christian Friedrich Voß, 28 May 1791. Werke, vol. XVI.: Briefe 1790 bis 1791, eds. Brigitte
Leuschner and Siegfried Scheibe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1980), 293-5.
763 “Doch erst nach langen wiederholten Reisen, und oft nach vielen fruchtlosen Untersuchungen,
vermehrt  ein  neuentdeckter  Land  die  Erdkunde  polizirten  Völker.  …  bis  ein  Volk  von  seinem
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stadialist logic, in which the driving force of history is material progress. According
to him, the successive additions to geography are
“owing exclusively to those enlightened nations which did not sacrifice the
sciences and the progress of human knowledge to commercial policy. Hunger
and feuds, the hunt and storms, the fear from foreign oppressors has certainly
chased savages or barbarian nations far enough from their homelands. But the
world and its most hidden corners have been explored only by such nations
that sent out conquerors and missionaries, argonauts and merchants.”764
This is an ambivalent passage. Commerce, which was the principal motivation of the
adventure of geographical exploration in Robertson’s account and a spur to curiosity
and the accumulation of knowledge, is represented by Sprengel as compromising
true science. “Argonauts and merchants” then reappear among the agents of
discovery, but only at the end of a list in which they are preceded by representatives
of the spirit of conquest and proselytism. Less explicitly and evidently than with
Remer and the “View of the Progress”, but in the work of the author recommended
as a basis for redressing Robertson’s omissions in the Historical Disquisition, too, the
“civilising process” seems to be ascribed to growing political vigour, intellectual-
spiritual refinement, and the stimuli they give to material progress. The remarkable
similarity of vocabulary and discursive tools were deceptive enough to lead even a
perceptive  reader,  such  as  Forster  certainly  was,  to  believe  and  propose  that  two
authors like Robertson and Sprengel could be viewed as counterparts.
Wohnorte und seinen Nacbaren solche Kenntnis erlangt, als polizirte Nationen jetzt vom Innersten
entfernter Welttheile besitzen.” Matthias Christian Sprengel, Geschichte der wichtigsten geographischen
Entdeckungen bis zur Ankunft der Portuguisen in Japan 1542, 2nd ed. (Halle: Hemmerde und Schwetschke,
1792),  6, 15.
764 “Dergleichen Erweiterungen der Erdkunde haben wir nur aufgeklärten Völkern zu danken, welche
der Handelspolitik nicht die Wissenschaften, und Fortschritte menschlicher Kenntnisse aufopfern.
Hunger  und  Fehden,  Jagd  und  Sturmwinde,  Furcht  vom  fremden  Bezwingern  haben  freilich  Wilde
oder  barbarische  Völker  weit  genug  von  ihrer  Heimat  zerstreuet.  Doch  nur  solche  Völker,  welche
Erobern  unf  Missionärien,  Argonauten  und  Kaufleute  aussenden  haben  die  Erde  und  ihre
verborgensten Winkel ausgekundschaftet, Ibid., 23. The Germans, on account of their medieval
swarming into the Baltic and Slav areas are also confidently mentioned among such nations, along
with the ancient Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, medieval Arabians and Norsemen, and modern
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So  far,  this  chapter  has  attempted  to  show  how  the  peculiarities  of  the
languages involved in the transmission of Robertson’s ideas into German thought, as
well  as  factors  of  national  sentiment  and  attitudes  in  contemporary  German
scholarship, affected the way his historical works on Europe’s encounter with the
Transatlantic and Oriental worlds were understood in Germany. It remains to assess
the significance of the rather different characters of Robertson himself and his
keenest  and  most  sympathetic  reader  in  Germany,  Georg  Forster,  who  also
surpassed  most  of  the  other  German  figures  mentioned  so  far  (with  the  possible
exception of his own father and Heeren) in overall intellectual stature. This also
implies an analysis of Forster’s own texts relevant to European encounter with non-
European peoples, and holds out the promise of some more general conclusion.
A full assessment of Forster’s place and importance on the contemporary
German intellectual scene is beyond the scope of the present paper.765 What is worth
pointing out here is that hardly could two characters, careers and outlooks have been
more divergent than those of Robertson and Forster. Embedded in the intellectual,
religious and political establishment, Robertson had a natural predilection towards
authority, hierarchy and subordination, never losing the faith that authority and
hierarchy could in all circumstances be infused with sobriety and enlightenment, in
which case subordination to it was the only sober and enlightened – therefore,
acceptable  –  kind  of  conduct.  This  could  also  be  translated  into  the  terms  of
intercourse and relationship between different cultures. Convinced about the
ultimate community of the human kind, he did not judge the natives of America in
Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, English, Russians and the papal missionaries. Behaim is also quite
proudly referred to.  Ibid., 42.
765 The literature is  very extensive.  In earlier  scholarship,  he was mainly appreciated as  a  dominant
figure  in  the  revolution  of  the  Rhineland  after  the  French  invasion  of  1792  and  as  a  deputy  to  the
French Convent ? in  other  words  as  a  leading  German  ‘Jacobin’.  Recently  there  has  been  more
emphasis on his character as a ‘philosophical traveller’, his intellectual achievement and his exchanges
with  dominant  figures  of  contemporary  German  thought ? Kant,  Herder,  Goethe,  Wilhelm  von
Humboldt. See especially Ludwig Uhlig, Georg Forster: Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit in seiner geistigen
Welt (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1965); Detlef Rasmussen (ed.), Weltumsegler und seine Freunde.
Georg Forster als gesellschaftlicher Schriftsteller der Goethezeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1988); for
a recent biography, see Uhlig, Georg Forster. Lebensabenteuer; all the diverse pursuits of Forster are set
in a comparative context in the valuable studies in Claus-V. Klenke, Jörn Garber, Dieter Heintze (eds.),
Georg Forster in interdisziplinären Perspektive (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994). A series, Georg-Forster-
Studien (fifteen volumes and several special issues to date, edited by Horst Dippel and Helmut
Scheuer) is published by the Georg-Forster-Gesellschaft with Kassel University Press.
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racial terms. Nevertheless, his stadial logic and its combination with providentialism
also suggested it to Robertson that natural right only entitled them to compassion
and instruction by their superiors.766 On the other hand, in the case of the inhabitants
of  India  it  was  a  sort  of  prescriptive  right,  accruing to  them from the  fact  that  they
possessed a civilisation, that earned them Robertson’s respect. He certainly
acknowledged “the natural rights of man,”767, but in most circumstances the
civilisational context significantly coloured his interpretation of these rights, and the
sort  of  cultural  tolerance  he  urged western powers  to  display was  in  the  first  place
due to civilised man. This is how two important routes to and perceptions of
Enlightenment were amalgamated in Robertson’s hand. There was, first, the recovery
of European self-confidence after the “crisis of the European mind:”768 the
consciousness that eighteenth-century Europe was, after all, “superior” to its
predecessors  in  the  old  continent  and  its  contemporary  alternatives  –  not  in  moral
terms, as the Christian paradigm would have it, but in terms of material civilisation
and the superstructure of manners, sensibilities and institutions, as both the outcome
of the querelle of the ancients and the moderns, and stadial history and political
economy suggested. Second, there was the notion of universal toleration, generally
accepted as a “smallest common denominator” by all the makers of enlightened
opinion. All of this of course also corresponded to the emphasis on “manner as well
as matter” in the attitudes of Robertsonian Moderatism.769
The earlier glimpses into Forster’s itinerant life may have already created the
impression that he was a person ill at ease with establishments and authority; and
while Robertson, initially puzzled by the ire of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in
France, soon changed his mind and turned against the revolution, Forster’s initial
enthusiasm for what appeared to be a peaceful triumph of reason over tyranny –
which many German writers shared with him – was strong enough to remain a
766 Cf.  David  Armitage,  “The  New  World  and  British  Historical  Thought.  From  Richard  Hakluyt  to
William Robertson”, in Karen Ordahl Kupperman (ed.), America in European Consciousness (Chapel Hill
and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 68-70; Brown, “An Eighteenth-Century
Historian on the Amerindians”.
767 As  most  importantly  in  his  sermon  on  the  centenary  of  the  Glorious  Revolution  in  1788.  NLS,
Robertson-MacDonald Papers, MS. 3979. For an analysis of the sermon, see “1688 and 1788”.
768 Cf. Hazard, The European Mind.
769 Smitten, “The Shaping of Moderatism”, esp. 290-2.
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lasting commitment.  As he explained to Heyne in a dramatic letter in June 1792, no
party in revolutionary France was “faultless”, but as the situation had come to a
breaking  point,  one  was  under  the  obligation  to  declare  either  for  or  against  the
Jacobins. Not for a moment did he hesitate: “Without them [the Jacobins] the
counter-revolution would have already broken out in Paris, inevitably restoring the
situation of 1789.”770 He became vice president of the Mainz Jacobin Club and
member of the city’s revolutionary government in 1792, and the “for or against”
mentality just described still kept him an adherent of the revolution into its terrorist
phase and until his death in Paris in the beginning of 1794. This was because, in spite
of all of the anomalies of the Revolution, on Forster’s view the Enlightenment
reached its apotheosis in it. Forster used the notions of public spirit and public
opinion as the expressions of a force overruling individual agency – in spite of his
reservations concerning Rousseau on other topics, resembling the volonté générale – to
make sense of the whole of the revolutionary phenomenon as one whose significance
was not confined to the momentary and local context. An analysis of Forster’s
account  of  its  course  in  his  “Parisian  sketches”  (Parisische Umrisse, 1793) and other
writings apparently confirms the vision of the all-pervasive significance of Paris for
the  entire  process.  However,  while  public  opinion  as  it  underlies  the  French
Revolution, occupies the status of a universal explanatory category of the progress of
modernity, it is also a means for Forster to arrive at a realistic estimate of the chances
for the transmission of the revolution, and thus to assign a significance to the
revolution which is strongly local in its practical consequences. The proposition that
the  revolutionary  idea  could  be  exported  from  France  to  the  whole  of  Germany  is
rejected  by  him,  in  view  of  the  rather  different  conditions  that  prevail  in  both
countries,  which are,  again,  explained by reference  to  the  notion of  public  opinion:
770 “Ohne  sie  wäre  offenbar  die  Gegenrevolution  in  Paris  schon  ausgebrochen  und  mit  dieser  die
unbedingte Zurückbringung des Zustandes von 1789.”Forster to Christian Gottlob Heyne, 5 June
1792, Werke, vol. XVII: Briefe 1792 bis 1794 und Nachträge, ed. Klaus-Georg Popp (Berlin: Akademie
Verlag, 1989). 126. Cf. Uhlig, Georg Forster,  283  ff,  and  more  broadly  the  whole  of  ch.  XXI-XXIII  for
Forster’s revolutionary engagement.
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Forster argues that,  in the lack of it,  even anti-French propaganda will  fail  to evoke
any substantial resonance in Germany.771
Georg Forster’s reflections on public opinion at the end of the period concern
one of the fundamental questions raised by the supposed universalism of the values
hailed by the Enlightenment: whether those values and the related practices can
indeed be made universal, or, whatever the effort, they must remain heavily context-
dependent and of limited “translatability”. Given his status as a world traveller,
natural philosopher and ethnologist, it is small wonder that Forster struggled hard
with  the  problem  of  the  local  and  the  universal  even  apart  from  his  revolutionary
experience. Pronouncements in a short fragment on Indian poetry in 1791, around
the time when he was also busy working on his translation and review of the
Historical Disquisition,  provide a good starting point for re-emphasizing the kindred
nature of the intellectual positions of these two diverging characters – and perhaps
an indication that Forster took inspiration and reinforcement for his own positions
from Robertson’s old age expression of self-critical cosmopolitanism.
“The local, the specific, the peculiar must vanish into the universal, if the
prejudices of partiality are to be vanquished. Universality has taken the place
of the particular European character,  and we are on the way of becoming an
idealized people, abstracted from the whole of the human kind, which on
account of its knowledge and, may I add, its aesthetic as well as moral
perfection, can be styled as the representative of the entire species.”772
This passage is as elegant an adjustment of Euro-centrism to the requirements of
cultural  tolerance  as  the  statement  of  Robertson  at  the  end  of  the  Appendix  of  the
771 Hans Erich Bödeker,  “’  … l'instrument de la  Révolution et  en même temps son âme :’  ‘L’opinion
publique’ chez Georg Forster”, European Review of History / Revue européenne d’histoire 13:3 (2006), 373-
83.
772 ‘Das Lokale, Spezielle, Eigenthümliche mußte im Allgemeinen verschwinden, wenn die Vorurtheile
der Einseitigkeit besiegt warden sollten. An die Stelle des besonderen europäischen Karakters ist die
Universalität getreten und wir sind auf dem Wege, gleichsam ein idealisirtes, vom Ganzen des
Menschengesclechts abstrahirtes Volk zu werden, welches, mittelst seiner Kenntnisse, und, ich
wünsche hinzusetzen, seiner ästetischen sowohl, als sittlichen Vollkommenheit, der Repräsentant der
gesamten Gattung heißen kann.’ Georg Forster, “Über lokale und allgemeine Bildung”, in Werke, VII:
Kleine Schriften, 48.
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Historical Disquisition,  quoted  earlier.  It  captures  in  a  strikingly  concise  formula  the
thinking  of  an  open,  restless  and  critical  mind,  at  that  time  one  of  the  most
committed German adherents of the ideas of liberté-égalité-fraternité, about the
processes of the consolidation of Europe’s global hegemony and the structural
transformation of a Euro-centric approach.  In Forster’s view, European man was
obliged  to  accept  his  own  universality,  because  his  “character”  was  the  most
successful accomplishment of the potentials inherent in human nature. Universality
in this sense, however, also implied for him responsibility, even humility:
abandoning prejudice and “vanishing” into the universal was an imperative
precisely on account of his excellence.773
This was the overall attitude that informed Forster’s contributions to the
debate on “humanity” and “race(s)” with Immanuel Kant and Christoph Meiners774
in the mid-1780s and the early 1790s. At the same time, this was an attitude and a
generalization which Forster – unlike the vast majority of his philosophical
contemporaries775 –  was  in  a  privileged  position  to  anchor  in  three  years  of
773 For  a  fuller  treatment  of  this  essay  by  Forster,  see  Joseph  Gomsu,  ‘Über  lokale  und  allgemeine
Bildung’, in Georg-Forster-Studien, 11:1 (2006), 323-334.
774 Christoph Meiners (1747-1810) was, precisely on account his racism, the most controversial figure
of the famous Göttingen historical school in the later eighteenth century. Forster was not the only one
to polemicize with the views expressed in his ethnographically and anthropologically informed works
of  cultural  history  whose  topics  ranged  from  general  ‘histories  of  mankind’  through  the  history  of
women and the history of  constitutions,  learning and language (mostly their  decline)  and luxury in
the states of classical antiquity, to comparative studies of  ‘manners, constitutions, laws, crafts,
commerce, religion, learning and education in the Middle Ages and in our times’. See Lotter, “Meiners
und die Lehre”; Susanne Zantop, Colonial Fantasies. Conquest, Family and Nation in Precolonial Germany
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), 66-97; Martin Gierl, “Christoph Meiners,
Geschichte der Menschheit und Göttinger Universalgeschichte. Rasse und Nation als Politisierung der
deutschen Aufklärung”, in Bödeker, Büttgen and Espagne (eds.), Die Wissenschaft von Menschen, 419-
33; Carhart, The Science of Culture, chs. 6-8. On the Meiners-Forster debate, see further Marino,
Praeceptoers Germaniae, 110-20.
775 Importantly,  however,  the  contrasting  positions  of  the  philosophical  traveller  and  the  sedentary
scholar were already inherent Forster’s and Meiners’ age, and soon became the object of an interesting
debate between Georges Cuvier and Alexander von Humboldt: according to the former, the
expeditionary scientist passed too quickly over a terrain to provide reliable testimony, and it is only
the ‘bench-tied naturalist’  who can calmly spread out  species  and specimens and reorder them into
taxonomic clusters never visible in the field. See Dorinda Outram, “New spaces in natural history”, in
Nicholas Jardine, James Secord and Emma C. Spary (eds.)., Cultures of natural history (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 249-65; idem, “On being Perseus: new knowledge, dislocation, and
Enlightenment exploration”, in Donald N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers (eds.), Geography and
Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 281-94. Robertson, of course, was a
sedentary scholar too who has been shown to have made strenuous efforts to obtain primary evidence
from  ‘the  field’  but  preferred  to  these  the  frameworks  he  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  narrative
sources he perused. Duckworth, “An Eighteenth-Century Questionnaire”. For a discussion of Forster
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experience from personal observation of minute detail, related in his Voyage Round
the World in His Britannic Majesty’s Sloop, the Resolution (1777), also published in
German in the following year and making the young man a celebrity. Throughout
this  book,  Forster  makes  consistent  efforts  to  give  observed and observer,  or  rather
their civilizational contexts, their due: one might easily construct a eulogy of both
rudeness and refinement from diverse passages in the two volumes, and the balance
is made perfect by recurrent reflections on what Forster considered as universal
properties of the human kind, regardless of the specific circumstances in which men
found themselves. This was made possible by his methodological choices. He was an
empiricist who rejected both mere fact-finding and system-building for its own sake,
while he firmly believed that experience will lead to a sufficiently abstract grasp of
human nature – provided that all cultural phenomena are studied “in their own
right”, i.e., in the context of their specific developmental stage. While he did not
share the assumption of the a priori or ‘given’ unity of mankind, he believed that such
unity  was  demonstrated with  his  methods.  In  the  given case,  his  main interest  was
the status of a “natural” condition of life from the vantage point of civilization –
without assigning a normative function to the prejudices of the “refined world”.776
Forster frequently claims the moral excellence of the natives, at least some
communities, and such claims are almost invariably formulated in comparative
terms. One might observe “the most generous and exalted sentiments among them,
that do honour to the human race in general... for one villain in these isles, we can
shew at least fifty in England, or in any civilized country.”777 Because of this upright
and unaffected character, whereas “we are too often taught to be ashamed of [our
emotions, and] we unhappily conquer them by custom”, “the simple child of nature,
who inhabits these islands, gives free course to all his feelings, and glories in his
affection towards his fellow-creature.”778 The failure of the savage to apply reason to
and  Meiners  in  these  terms,  see  Michael  Carhart,  “Polynesia  and  polygenism:  the  scientific  use  of
travel literature in the early 19th century”, History of the Human Sciences, 22:2 (2009), 58-86.
776 See Jörn Garber, Wahrnehmung – Konstruktion – Text. Bilder des Wirklichen im Werk Georg Forsters
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2000), 4-6, 12-6, 203-5.
777 Georg Forster, A Voyage Round the World in His Britannic Majesty’s Sloop, the Resolution, commanded
by Capt.  James  Cook,  during the  Year  1772.  3,  4,  and 5 (London:  White,  Robson,  Elmsly and Robinson,
1777), I. 386.
778 Ibid., I. 417.
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the conquest of passion, acknowledged as a marker of humanity since at least
Aristotle and, as we shall see, also adopted as such by Forster in his discussion of
other subjects, does not at all appear to be a shortcoming in this representation.
Forster also expressed his surprise at the natives’ “hospitality in so poor a country,
especially when we compare it  to the custom of civilized nations, who have almost
entirely laid aside all tender feelings for the wants of their fellow creatures.”779 In
light of such contrasts, it is no wonder that Forster sometimes lamented the impact of
European civilization on “the little uncivilized communities”: “the loss of a number
of innocent lives” which they suffered “is trifling when compared to the irretrievable
harm entailed upon them by corrupting their morals.” He concluded that “hitherto
our intercourse has been wholly disadvantageous to the nations of the South Seas,”780
and claimed that
“[i]t were indeed sincerely to be wished, that the intercourse which has lately
subsisted between the Europeans and the natives of the South Sea islands may
be broken off in time, before the corruption of manners which unhappily
characterizes civilized regions, may reach that innocent race of men, who live
here fortunate in their ignorance and simplicity.”
He ended on a pessimistic note: “But it is a melancholy truth, that the dictates of
philanthropy do not harmonize with the political systems of Europe.”781
Nevertheless,  one  might  just  as  easily  reconstruct  a  straight  “progress-and-
refinement” narrative by highlighting passages of Forster’s work which stress the
superior merits of the civilized state. He wrote about Dusky Bay in New Zealand:
“The superiority of a state of civilization over that of barbarism could not be
more clearly stated, than by the alterations and improvements we had made
in  this  place.  ...  [T]his  spot,  we  had  converted  into  an  active  scene,  where  a
hundred and twenty men pursued various branches of employment with
779 Ibid., I. 575.
780 Ibid., I. 211.
781 Ibid., I. 302.
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unremitting ardour. ... [A]ll around us we perceived the rise of arts, and the
dawn  of  science,  in  a  country  which  had  hitherto  lain  plunged  in  one  long
night of ignorance and barbarism!”782
But Forster immediately added a note of scepticism: he was sure that the natives
would soon abandon cultivating the  land which had been cleared,  so  that  in  a  few
years “it must return to its original chaotic state”. He was equally certain that the
domesticated animals left behind by the voyagers would not long survive their
departure, “as their [the natives’] inconsiderate and barbarous temper would not
suffer to make any reflection on the advantages which future ages might reap from
the propagation of such a valuable race of animals.”783 New Zealanders seemed to
Forster to live “in a state of barbarism ... which generally hearkens to no other voice
than that of the strongest”; this “warlike disposition” and “irascible temper” caused
that “[a]ll the disputes of savage people commonly terminate in the destruction of
one of their parties.”784 Forster  returns  to  this  feature  of  rude  nations  on  several
occasions and explains it in terms of “self-preservation [which] is doubtless the first
law of nature”: “among savages every man rights himself, and anger and revenge are
implanted in his breast, to repress the injuries and oppressions of others.” It is from
the account of “civilized communities [where] we have tacitly consented to laws and
regulations” that it is clear that Forster attributes the violence of savages to the
prevailing circumstances of scarcity and a rudimentary mode of subsistence: the
“rule of law” emerges in “a nation, which ... by applying to agriculture, has arrived
to a degree of opulence, luxury, and civilization, and acquired new and refined ideas
of philanthropy, [and therefore] is unaccustomed to the sudden overflowings of the
bile, and slow to resent an affront.”785
The idea that in modern times the “private vice” of selfishness may be
reconciled with “public benefit” because the enlarged opportunities of consumption
have accelerated the domestication of violent passions, was already central to
782 Ibid., I. 177-8.
783 Ibid., I. 221-2.
784 Ibid., I. 173.
785 Ibid., II. 315.
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Mandeville’s analysis of commercial society in The Fable of the Bees in the 1720s, and it
subsequently inspired much of eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy and
political economy, too. Almost immediately after the passage just quoted, another
cherished idea of contemporary social theory, thrown to prominence by the Glasgow
civil law professor John Millar’s Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in
Society786 in the year preceding the embarkation of the Resolution, also appears in
Forster’s text: the idea that the state of society is accurately reflected in the treatment
and status of women.
“It is the practice of all uncivilized nations to deny their women the common
privileges  of  human  beings,  and  to  treat  them  as  creatures  inferior  to
themselves. The ideas of finding happiness and comfort in the bosom of a
companion, only arise with a higher degree of culture. Where the mind is
continually occupied with the means of self-preservation, there can be but
little refined sentiment in the commerce of the sexes and nothing but brutal
enjoyment is known.”787
Both  in  regard  of  barbarity  in  war  and  rudeness  of  manners  in  peace  that
characterize the savage man in contrast to his civilized counterpart, textual parallels
of these passages abound in Book IV of Robertson’s History of America, published in
the  same  year  as  Forster’s  account  of  the  circumnavigation.  “That  women  are
indebted to the refinements of polished manners for a happy change in their state, is
a point which can admit of no doubt. To despise and degrade the female sex, is the
characteristic of the savage state in every part of the globe,” Robertson emphasized in
addressing the familiar subject of the commerce of the sexes; he went as far as
claiming that “servitude is a name too mild to describe their [women’s] wretched
state.”788 As regards martial habits,  for him the dichotomous contrast of refinement
and savageness could not be more striking:
786 Revised and made famous as The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1777).
787 Forster, Voyage Round the World, II. 324; cf. I. 510.
788 Robertson, History of America, II. 103, 105
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“War, which between extensive kingdoms is carried on with little animosity,
is prosecuted by small tribes with all the rancour of a private quarrel. … When
polished nations have obtained the glory of victory, or have acquired an
addition  of  territory,  they  may  terminate  war  with  honour.  But  savages  are
not satisfied until they extirpate the community which is the object of their
hatred.”789
While it is impossible to demonstrate any direct reliance of either the elder or the
younger Forster on Robertson’s History of America, hot out of the press while they
were both busy working on the final draft of their accounts of the voyage round the
world, the atmospheric similitude between their views on the above topics would be
difficult  to  overlook.  They were  also  in  agreement  in  associating with  the  “savage”
state of society an often astonishing degree of primitiveness of mind. “Surrounded
continually with danger, or struggling with hardships, they had little leisure, and
less capacity, for any speculative enquiry,” Robertson wrote of the native
Americans.790 Languishing as they are “in an unthinking situation ... it is hardly to be
expected that these savages will attend to the domestication of animals [something
that, as we have seen, was also a decisive element for Robertson in emerging from
the savage state]”, Forster reported about the natives of Queen Charlotte Sound. But
their condition was still quite blessed when compared to that of the inhabitants of the
Tierra  del  Fuego,  who  only  had  on  their  faces  “that  vacant  stare  which  is  the
characteristic of the most consummate stupidity.”791 Forster described the latter as
“dull, hungry, deformed savages ... having their mental faculties reduced to that
miserable situation which places them next to brutes,”792 and concluded that
“[i]f ever the pre-eminence of a civilized life over that of the savage could have
reasonably been disputed, we might, from the bare contemplation of these
miserable people, draw the most striking conclusions in favour of our superior
789 Ibid., II. 146.
790 Ibid., II. 54. See also 88 ff.
791 Forster, Voyage Round the World, II. 507.
792 Ibid., II. 606.
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happiness. Till it can be proved, that a man in continual pain, from the rigour
of the climate, is happy, I shall not give credit to the philosophers, who have
either had no opportunity of contemplating human nature under all its
modifications, or who have not felt what they have seen.”793
One  of  the  closing  remarks  of  the  whole  book  is  indeed  that  “[f]rom  the
contemplation of these different characters [of the peoples observed], the advantages
and blessings which civilization and revealed religion have diffused over our part of
the globe, will become more and more obvious to the impartial inquirer.”794
It is important to remind ourselves that these sentiments were to Forster not
only fully compatible with the peculiar criteria of “participant observation” (placing
the observer both into and outside the situation), but to a certain extent stemmed
from it and were confirmed by it.795 The efforts made in order to dispel the suspicion
of the inhabitants of Tanna are described in some detail: it was “[o]ur cool deliberate
conduct,  our  moderation,  and  the  constant  uniformity  in  all  our  proceedings”  that
“conquered their jealous fears.”796 It  took  some  time  for  the  natives  to  realize  that
“inoffensiveness” was not necessarily “despicable” because cowardly, but then “they
who had been used to see in every stranger a base and treacherous enemy, now
learnt from us to think more nobly of their fellow-creatures.” This experience “taught
them to relish the sweets of society...  In a few days they began to feel a pleasure in
our conversation, and a new disinterested sentiment, of more than earthly mould,
even friendship, filled their heart.” In other words, a type of conduct initially
designed to remove the obstacles of studying the characteristics of native society,
triggers a process whereby the natives start to adopt attitudes characteristic of
793 Ibid., II. 503. Without being mentioned by name, Rousseau is obviously the targeted “philosopher”.
794 Ibid., II. 606.
795 On  the  ethnological  approach  of  the  Forsters,  see  Hans  Erich  Bödeker,  “Aufklärerische
ethnologische  Praxis:  Johann  Reinhold  Forster  und  Georg  Forster”,  in  Hans  Erich  Bödeker,  Peter
Hanns  Reill  and  Jürgen  Schlumbohm  (eds.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis 1750-1900 (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 227-53; idem., “Die ‘Natur des Menschen so viel möglich in mehreres
Licht […] setzen’. Ethnologische Praxis bei Johann Reinhold und Georg Forster”, in Jörn Garber and
Tanja van Hoorn (eds.), Natur – Mensch – Kultur. Georg Forster im Wissenschaftsfeld seiner Zeit
(Hannover: Wehrhahn, 2006), 143-70.
796 Forster, Voyage Round the World, II. 349.
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civilized society, thereby giving occasion for Forster to fall “in a reverie on [its] pre-
eminence”.
To Forster, “civilized society” seems to have been a broad concept, which
embraced not only the contemporary European West, but also, for instance, “the
happier tribes of the Society Islands, beautifully formed, in a delightful climate,
which supplies all their wants; sensible of the advantages of a well-ordered society,
affectionate towards each other, and accustomed to gratify the senses, even to the
excesses.” But these criteria should be met by any society that was to earn Forster’s
praise: there is no virtuous middle way between lawless barbarism and civilization.
There are certainly different levels of development, but the superior virtue of the
stage between brutish rudeness and corrupt refinement is a “pleasing fancy” in
which one cannot but be ultimately disappointed.797
It is not a distinct stage in the progress from rudeness to refinement that
bridges the distance between the two extremes, but a number of sociological
phenomena that seem to Forster, the ethnographic empiricist, to be universally
shared by humans. For instance, the white colour does not possess any intrinsic
qualities that relate it to the notion of peace, yet it is universally adopted as
symbolizing peaceful intentions.798 Even though “the ideas of ornament of different
nations agree” to a very little extent, the fact that they have generally adopted “such
aids to personal perfection” gives occasion to contemplate the unity of mankind
amidst the wide diversity,799 and the same can be legitimately claimed about “the
taste  for  music  ...  so  general  around the  world,  when the  ideas  of  harmony among
different nations are so distant.”800 Finally, perhaps most importantly, a “simple and
only just conception of the Deity, has been familiar to mankind in all ages and in all
countries” (similarly to the abuse of such a conception which has led to idolatry and
superstition).801
A very complex picture is emerging from Forster’s presentation and
commentary of his experience of human communities, one in which there is an
797 Ibid., I. 296. The implicit polemic with Rousseau is unmistakable again.
798 Ibid., I. 168.
799 Ibid., I. 256.
800 Ibid., I.  290.
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unmistakable developmental element: it is in terms of progress that the sometimes
dramatically different character of the peoples he had the occasion to observe are
pointed out, and yet many features seem to indicate the ultimate identity of the
human kind.
“Accustomed to look on all  the various tribes of men, as entitled to an equal
share of my good will,  and conscious, at the same time, of the rights which I
possess in common with every individual among them, I have endeavoured to
make my remarks with a retrospect to our general improvement and welfare;
and neither attachment nor aversion to particular nations have influenced my
praise or censure,”
 Forster wrote in his Introduction.802 This  is  a  rather  peculiar  vindication  of  the
unitary character of mankind. What Forster claims is not, strictly speaking, the
equality of all races of men, but their equal worth or dignity: neither of them is
inherently either superior or inferior, but their essentially different character is taken
for  granted  precisely  as  a  condition  of  an  unbiased  look  at  the  features  that  are
specific and unique to them.
This subtle position obtained a new dimension in Forster's polemic with Kant
and Meiners several years after the Voyage Round the World had been published, but
obviously with the decisive experience of the Pacific explorations in mind. This
engagement started with Forster's response in the journal Teutscher Merkur in 1786 to
Kant’s two essays on the “concept of a human race” and on “conjectures on the
beginnings of human history;”803 it continued with a review of several 1789-1790
issues of the Göttingisches historisches Magazin,  co-edited  (and  largely  written)  by
Meiners and devoted to the same question, in the Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung in
801 Ibid., I. 308.
802 Ibid., vol. 1, xiii.
803 Kant  first  addressed  the  subject  in  lectures  at  Königsberg,  published  in  1775  (“Von  den
verschiedenen Rassen des Menschen”), but the targets of Forster’s reaction were his “Bestimmung des
Begriffs einer Menschenrasse” and “Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte”, published in the
Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1786. (These essays were themselves responses to the views advanced by
his former student Johann Gottfried Herder in the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit in
1784, rejecting the very concept of race as ignoble and unworthy of humanity.)
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1791.804 In these articles Forster occupied a precarious middle ground between the
two  other  authors.  Kant,  whose  role  in  the  rise  of  the  modern  concept  of  race  has
received considerable attention in recent literature,805 argued that while four human
races can indeed be distinguished according to the colour of the skin, they can all be
traced back to a common origin, and the differences between them are the products
of several millennia of separation, during which certain properties (Keime: “seeds”),
initially possessed in equal proportions by each of them, became dominant among
some peoples, and others among others. In Kant’s essays this classification was
adopted as an apparently value-free heuristic device, answering his own reminder
that “one finds what one needs in experience only when one first knows what to look
for” (man findet in ihr, was man bedarf, nur alsdann, wenn man vorher weiß, wornach man
suchen soll),806 and “whiteness” itself appeared in them as both a race and beyond
race,  a  summation  and  circumvention  of  race  on  the  ground  that  it  was  “only  the
development of one of the original predispositions” (nur die Entwicklung einer der
ursprünglichen Anlagen die, nebst den übrigen, in jenem anzutreffen waren) – that one
which disposed men to make the entire globe their home. While,  however, this has
led some scholars to recognize a detachment of Kant’s theory of race from his
judgements on particular races, these judgements – which described the peoples of
804 The  topics  of  the  relevant  issue  of  the Göttingisches historisches Magazin included the “differences
between the Germanic and other Celtic peoples”, “the nature of African Negroes”, “the rightfulness of
the slave trade” etc.  It  ought  to  be added that  Forster’s  polemic with Meiners  –  with whom he had
been personally acquainted and kept a relatively friendly contact since 1778 – can also be traced back
to the publication of the latter’s Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit (1785).  See  Lotter, Christoph
Meiners, 51-6, 64-75; Marino, Praeceptores, 111 ff.
805 See,  among  others,  Robert  Bernasconi,  “Who  Invented  the  Concept  of  Race:  Kant’s  Role  in  the
Enlightenment Construction of  Race”,  in  Robert  Bernasconi  (ed.), Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 11-
36; idem, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism”, in T. Lott and J. Ward (eds.), Philosophers on Race
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145-66; Muthu, Enlightenmen Against Empire, Ch. 4; Pauline
Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 57:229 (October 2007), 573-
92; Mark Larrimore, “Antinomies of race: diversity and destiny in Kant”, Patterns of Prejudice, 42:4-5
(2008), 341-63; Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 4 on the debate with Forster.
806 Immanuel Kant, “Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace”, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Königliche Preußische (Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. VIII: Abhandlungen nach 1780
(Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1912), 91. In developing his system of philosophical anthropology, Kant
virtually ignored a sizeable body of recent literature on ethnography/Völkerkunde and
ethnology/Volkskunde in  Germany (especially  at  the University of  Göttingen)  and Austria-Hungary.
Han  T.  Vermeulen,  “The  German  Invention  of  Völkerkunde.  Ethnological  Discourse  in  Europe  and
Asia, 1740-1798”, in Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore (eds.), The German Invention of Race (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2006), 136-7.
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Africa and India as lacking a “drive for activity” and thus the mental capacities to be
self-motivated and successful; and those of America as “incapable of any culture” –
clearly bespoke a conviction of a racial hierarchy with European whites on its top.
This  looked  disturbing  to  Forster,  to  whom  it  served  also  as  a  reminder  that
monogenism as professed by Kant does not necessarily imply a benign universalism
or egalitarianism.
As for Meiners, having published in 1772 a successful restatement of German
“popular philosophy” which earned him both a professorial chair at Göttingen and
the early antipathy of Kant,807 and contributed several works to the then much
discussed issue of “rise and decline” (mainly in ancient history), in the 1780s he
turned to developing an anthropology which he styled Geschichte der Menschheit,
“history of mankind.” Building on academic antecedents available in the work of
eighteenth-century Göttingen philologists and classical scholars, this was to be a
discipline which differs from universal history (Universalgeschichte) in going beyond
the study of acts and events in “great nations” and their causal relationships, and
which also transcends philosophical conjecture in regard of analytical rigour by
investigating scientific evidence for the uniqueness of all peoples around the globe.808
“The history of mankind teaches not what man in different ages did or
suffered,  but  what  it  was  or  still  is.  …  [it]  considers  the  main  preoccupation
exactly  the  savages  and  the  barbarians  of  all  continents  …  because  a  single
small horde of savages and barbarians may contribute more to the knowledge
of human nature than the most illustrious nations that have subjugated and
devastated whole continents.”809
807 John Zammito,  “Policing Polygeneticism in Germany,  1775.  (Kames),  Kant,  and Blumenbach”,  in
Eigen and Larrimore (eds.), German Invention of Race, 38 ff. The conflict between Meiners and Johann
Friedrich Blumenbach,  who took a  position similar  to  Forster’s  in  the later  debate,  may similarly be
traced  back  to  the  time  of  Blumenbach’s  famous  dissertation  “On  the  Natural  Variety  of  Mankind”
(1775), when Meiners himself started to publish essays on ethnographic subjects. Ibid., 44-5, and Frank
Doughterty,  “Christoph  Meiners  und  Johann  Friedrich  Blumenbach  im  Streit  um  den  Begriff  der
Menschenrasse,” in Günter Mann and Frany Dumont (eds.), Die Natur des Menschen: Probleme der
Physischen Anthropologie und Rassenkunde (1750-1850) (Stuttgart and New York: Gustav Fischer, 1990 =
Soemmering Forschungen VI), 89-111.
808 See for details Carhart, The Science of Culture, Introduction and Ch. 7.
809 ‘Die  Geschichte  der  Menschheit  …  lehrt  uns  nicht  so  wohl  was  der  Mensch  in  verschiedenen
Zeitalter that oder litt, sondern was er war, oder noch jetzo ist. … [es] würdigt gerade die Wilden und
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The main objects of this “new science” were the bodies, the spirits and the cultures of
peoples around the world, an inquiry which had been made possible only recently
by the proliferation of travel literature – earlier regarded mainly as material for
pleasant  diversion,  but  now  also  discovered  by  the  reading  public  as  a  source  of
knowledge.810 Meiners spoke reverently about the “more or less valuable
contributions” (mehr oder weniger wichtige Beiträge) to developing the field by some of
his Scottish contemporaries (Millar, Ferguson and Kames, besides James Dunbar), as
well  as  Iselin  and William Falconer  –  all  of  whom,  however,  he  found liable  to  the
charge of still relying too much on “conjecture” (Muthmaßung). Robertson’s History of
America was often cited, too. But Meiners’ real heroes were Antoine-Yves Goguet,
who in his De l’Origine des Loix, des Arts, et des Sciences (1758) offered an analysis
of savagery and civilization that also influenced Gibbon,811 and de Pauw, whose
ideas pointing towards “enlightened racism” were briefly mentioned above. Inherent
differences between human groups were indeed essential to Meiners’ own
engagement with the topic of human “bodies, spirits and cultures.” In contrast to
Kant, he was a polygenist,812 claiming that “Caucasians” (further subdivided into
Celts and Slavs – the latter being “not only much weaker of body and mind, but also
more poorly formed and destitute of virtues”) and the “Altaic” Mongols were
distinguished from one another by innate character marks, which became further
accentuated by cultural development, and thus could be directly translated into
permanent relations of superiority and inferiority among them.813 Although he did
Barbaren aller Erdtheile … ihrer vorzüglichen Aufmerksamkeit, weil oft eine einzige kleine Horde von
Wilden oder Barbaren zur Kenntnis der menschlichen Natur mehr Beyträge liefern kann, als die
glänzendsten Nationen, die mehr als einen Erdtheil unterjocht und verwüstet haben.’ Meiners,
Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit, 13.
810 Ibid., 18.
811 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, IV. 37-64.
812 This  term  was  not  consistently  used  to  denote  the  theory  that  mankind  takes  its  origins  from
several  pairs  of  ancestors  created by God through multiple  separate  acts  until  after  it  appeared as  a
counterpart of “monogenism/monogenist” in the work of the Philadelphia school of anthropology in
1857. However, the idea itself had been in currency since at least Isaac la Peyrère’s Pre-Adamitae (1655),
with  sixteenth-century  antecedents  including  the  work  of  Paracelsus,  Water  Raleigh  and  Giordano
Bruno. Claude Blanckaert, Monogénisme et polygénisme, in Patrick Tort (ed.), Dictionnaire du darwinisme
et de l’évolution (Paris: PUF, 1996)  II. 321-37; Sebastiani, “Race and national characters”.
813 Meiners, Grundriß, 20 ff.
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not become “fully committed” to polygenism until late in life,814 the binary
classification adopted in his 1785 Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit already
annoyed Forster to an extent that in a letter to his friend Johann Gottfried Herder he
described the work as “Göttinger erudition applied to an untenable hypothesis”
(Göttingische Belesenheit, auf eine unhaltbare Hypothese angewendet).815
Forster thought that neither Kant’s nor Meiners’ position was capable of proof
beyond doubt, and did not exclude the possibility of polygenesis, which, however,
threw him into the ? to him ? embarrassing company of Meiners. Although racial
superiority was an idea difficult to reconcile with both Christianity and natural law,
in the light of contemporary empirical sciences it was far less obviously fallacious.
The idea of polygenesis, with which it became combined in Meiners’ works, was not
antithetical to Linnaeus’ very influential system, which realigned the accents of the
approach of the Great Chain of Being (once man and ape were classified in the same
order on the basis of anatomical similarities, there could be no reason to dismiss the
idea  that  different  races  of  man  could  be  classified  there,  too).  Henry  Home,  Lord
Kames relied on the idea very ingeniously in his Preliminary Discourse to the
Sketches on the History of Man,816 published in 1774, when Forster was literally making
“sketches” of all sorts of natural phenomena in the South Seas. Forster was from the
outset fully aware of the risks involved in embracing the theory of polygenesis, and
did his best to erect proper bulwarks in order to avoid the charge of anti-humanism.
Experience was the only basis he was willing to adopt for his reasoning, although it
must be added that he employed a notion of experience that was very different from
Kant’s. Being an ethnologist who observed and described phenomena, he
understood empirical science as a process of abstraction from data and subsequent
synthesis,  and the ordering of observation results within a nominalistic system. For
814 Carhart, “Polynesia and polygenism”, 61.
815 Forster to Herder, 21 January 1787 (the former’s first extant pronouncement on Meiners’ views),
quoted in Werke, vol. XI: Rezensionen, 416.
816 In the very opening sentence, Kames claimed that “[w]hether there are different races of men, or
whether  all  men  are  of  one  race  without  any  difference  but  what  proceeds  from  climate  or  other
external cause, is a question which philosophers differ widely about,” and after a criticism of Buffon
concluded that “effects so regular and permanent [in national character] must be owing to a constant
and invariable cause” and that “the character of that greater part [of a nation] can have no foundation
but  nature.”  Henry  Home  Lord  Kames, Sketches of the History of Man,  ed.  James  A.  Harris
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), I. 30.
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Kant, on the other hand, empiricism meant the discovery of the causal regularities of
scientific cognition, not to be derived from experience but, conversely, constituting
the preconditions of (proper) experience.817 Forster therefore was compelled (or so he
felt) to acknowledge that mankind is conspicuously divided into the black and the
white races, so that had they may have emerged in an autochtonous manner,
whereas by making, in the footsteps of Buffon, the ability to produce fertile offspring,
rather  than  origin,  the  criterion  of  community  between  these  races,  he  still
maintained a bridge between them.818 More  importantly,  he  insisted  that  even
though genetically separate,  by virtue of the “spark of reason” common (in varying
degrees) to all men, they still are of equal “worth”. It was beyond any controversy in
Europe that “the sciences and the arts have been raised to a level of perfection
unattained anywhere else... and [we Europeans] rule over other continents and
embrace the whole of the globe with our superior knowledge.”819 But this was hardly
owing to superiority in genetic terms, and Meiners had had better attempted to be
equitable to his own race without applying arbitrary premisses to others. Superiority
is not innate but is brought by improvement: “The ability to make more refined
distinctions between the perceptions of the senses is no peculiar property which is
lacking in rude men, as Mr. M. generally claims, but an aesthetic sentiment
transformed into a mechanism, which is the most closely related to enlightenment
and the accuracy of notions.”820
817 Forster set out his principles in a 1781 lecture, “Ein Blick in das Ganze der Natur”, in Werke, VIII:
Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, 77-97. It has been suggested that his outlook resembles that
of Adam Ferguson, with whose German translator Christian Garve Forster got acquainted in the same
year. See Annette Meyer, “Von der ‘Science of Man’ zur ‘Naturgeschichte der Menschheit’. Einflüsse
angelsächsischer Wissenschaft im Werk Georg Forsters”, in Garber and van Hoorn (eds.), Natur  –
Mensch – Kultur,  47.  For  the  contrast  between  the  Forster  and  Kant  in  this  regard,  see  Wolfdietrich
Schmied-Kowarzik, “Der Streit um die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts. Gedanken zu Forster,
Herder und Kant”, in Klenke, Garber, Heintze (eds), Georg Forster, 124 ff.
818 To be sure, in cases in which this approach was combined with a thesis of degeneracy, as it did in
Buffon,  it  was  still  capable  of  supporting  a  theory  of  racial  superiority  /  inferiority.  See  Phillip  R.
Sloan, “The idea of racial degeneracy in Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle”, in Harold E. Pagliaro (ed.), Racism
in the Eighteenth Century (Cleveland and London: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973), 293-
321.
819 “In Europa sind die Wissenschaften und die Künste bis zu einer anderwärts nicht erreichten Stufe
der  Vervollkommnung  gelangt  …  wir  herrschen  auch  in  anderen  Welttheilen,  und  umfassen  mit
unserer vollkommneren Erkenntnis die ganze Erde. Georg Forster, Review of Göttingisches historisches
Magazin, vols. 4-7 (Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 8 and 10 January 1791), in Werke, XI: Rezensionen, 240.
820 “Seine Fertigkeit, zwischen sinnlichen Eindrücken feiner zu unterscheiden, ist daher keine
besondere Anlage, welche dem rohen Menschen fehlt, wie Hr. M. durchgängig behauptet, sondern ein
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Forster, equipped as he was with an incomparable amount of empirical
knowledge about the subject, in his critique of Kant felt entitled to make the cautious
distinction that while he was unable to “unambiguously answer in the affirmative
the question whether there are several original human races” (Ich erlaube mich dennoch
keineswegs die Frage: ob es mehrere ursprüngliche Menschenstämme giebt? entscheidend zu
bejahen), it was “at least not improbable or inconceivable” (wenigstens nicht …
unwahrscheinlich oder unbegreiflich)  that  this  was  the  case.  Also  thanks  to  his  vast
experience, he found himself in an intellectually and morally far more challenging
predicament than Kant in his seclusion at Königsberg or Meiners at Göttingen. His
background laid a greater amount of responsibility on his shoulders, and he did not
fare poorly. He felt the moral imperative involved in the whole issue, and decided to
shift the very ground of the discussion:
“But in separating the Negro from the white man as an originally distinct race,
are we not severing the last bond that tied this much abused people to
ourselves,  and  which  still  provided  for  it  some  protection  and  mercy  in  the
face of European cruelty? Let me rather ask the question whether the thought
that Blacks are our brothers has anywhere even once led a slave driver to put
down the whip he had raised?”
Whether mankind is a single species or not is not the central issue; that Blacks are
there for Whites to cultivate capacities of their own while they cultivate theirs, is.
Otherwise, “[w]here is the bond that could prevent the degenerate European from
dominating  over  his  white  fellow  men  in  as  despotic  a  fashion  as  over  the
Negroes?”821 Remarkable questions, especially if one recalls some of the quotations
in Mechanismus übergegangenes ästetisches Gefühl, welches mit der Aufklärung und der
Bestimmtheit der Begriffe im genauesten Zusammenhange steht.” Ibid., 246.
821 “Doch indem wir die Neger als einen ursprünglich verschiedenen Stamm vom weissen Menschen
trennen, yerschneiden wir nicht da den letzten Faden, durch welchen dieses gemishandelte Volk mit
uns zusammenhieng, und vor europäischen Grausamkeit noch einigen Schutz und einige Gnade
fand? Lassen sie mich lieber fragen, ob der Gedanke, daß Schwarze unsere Brüder sind, schon
irgendwo ein einzigesmal die aufgehobene Peitsche des Sklaventreibers sinken hieß?... Wo ist das
Band, wie stark es auch sey, das entartete Europäer hindern kann, über ihre weissen Mitmenschen
eben so despotisch wie über Neger zu herrschen?” Georg Forster, “Noch etwas über Menschenrassen”
(Teutsche Merkur, October and November 1786), Werke, VIII: Schriften zu Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte,
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above which show Forster, the “civilized” European occupying the vantage point of
the unbiased observer, to have discovered very little community between himself
and the natives of the Tierra del Fuego. At the bottom of these questions there lay a
profound dilemma, and an implicit embracing of an egalitarian and universalist
position dictated by moral considerations; a position which, however, was
permanently challenged by the indelible memory of the immensely “various
modifications of mankind” which he had personally experienced. For the sake of
adopting this position, Forster was willing to surmount the experiential evidences (a
decision whose significance in his case can hardly be over-emphasized). This is the
background to the fact that he could claim within the same breath that “both in
regard of internal and external constitution, the Negro has much more in common
with the race of apes than the white man does”, and that “[t]he most ape-like Negro
is  so  akin  to  the  white  man  that  when  the  two  races  are  mixed,  the  distinguishing
features of both are combined and melt into one another in the hybrid. ... An ape-like
man is not an ape.”822
Because  of  Forster’s  choosing  procreation  as  the  criterion  whereby  to  assess
relatedness, which suits the older, descriptive-comparative study of nature and
ethnography, it has been suggested that he failed to take the step, as Kant did
according to the testimony of his concentration on common origin, towards a more
dynamic, true natural history.823 I should like to conclude this chapter with two
remarks on this suggestion.
First, Forster’s amalgamation of the viewpoints of a civilizing process and
those of race824 should be sufficient to demonstrate his commitment to study “the
152-4. It has been suggested, though, that “privately” Forster shared Sömmering’s opinion that blacks
are more closely related to apes than to whites. Ulrich Enzensberger, Georg Forster. Ein Leben in
Scherben (Frakfurt and Main: Eichborn, 1996), 158.
822 “[D]er Neger sichtbarlich so wohl in Rücksicht äusserer als innerer Gestaltung weit mehr
übereinstimmendes mit dem Affengeschlecht habe, als der Weisse. … Der affenähnlichste Neger ist
dem weissen Menschen so nahe verwandt, daß bey der Vermischung beyder Stämme, die
auszeichnenden Eigenschaften eines jeden sich in einander verweben und verschmelzen. … Ein
affenähnlicher Mensch ist also keine Affe.” Ibid., 141-2. Cf. Takahashi Mori, “Zwischen Mensch und
Affe. Anthropologische Aspekte in Forsters Reise um die Welt”, GFS X/2, 359-72.
823 Schmied-Kowarzik, “Der Streit um die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts”, 122 ff.
824 For an interesting discussion of this amalgamation and its relevance to Forster’s method,
demonstrated on a circumscribed subject, see Manuela Ribeiro Sanches, “Dunkelheit und Aufklärung
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natural history of man” in the strictest contemporary sense. In this regard it is again
important to stress the “family resemblance” between the approach adopted by him
and  that  of  the  Scottish  science  of  man.  This  is  a  subject  that  has  received  some
attention by scholars in generic terms, both with an affirmative and a more skeptical
attitude. Ludwig Uhlig has emphasized the need to understand Forster’s travelogue
and his whole anthropology in the context of Scottish “theoretical or conjectural
history,” focusing mainly on Ferguson’s observations on “art itself [being] natural to
man” and on the Smithian theory of stages (together with the implicit as well as
explicit polemic of both with Rousseau), while Annette Meyer has reminded that
“conjectural history” is a posterior construct of Dugald Stewart which obscures more
than it explains. She has also attempted to explore Forster’s indebtedness to Scottish
theoretical models of scientific reflection in  spite  of his reservations vis-à-vis
philosophical conjecture (made explicit at several points in the Voyage as  well  as  in
his response to Kant’s “Muthmaßlicher Anfang”, and recorded by Uhlig, too).825 What
is noteworthy in these valuable studies, as well as the entire corpus of Forster
scholarship, is their near-complete neglect of Forster’s relationship with the single
figure among the Edinburgh literati whose work he engaged directly and in depth by
translation and commentary: William Robertson.826 The  two  men  shared  an
intellectual-moral stance whose peculiar composition was rather unique within their
respective  environments:  a  deep  perplexity  caused  by  the  recognition  of  the
challenge which evident empirical facts of human diversity constituted for a
universalism formulated in terms of a theory of socio-cultural progress; a perplexity,
however, which was resolved in the personal conviction of self-reflexive
– Rasse und Kultur. Erfahrung und Macht in Forsters Auseinandersetzungen mit Kant und Meiners”,
GFS VIII (2003), 53-82.
825 Ludwig  Uhlig,  “Theoretical  or  Conjectural  History.  Georg  Forsters Voyage Round the World im
Zeitgenössischen Kontext”, Germanisch-Romantische Monatsschrift 53 (2003), 399-414; idem., Georg
Forster, 85-95; Meyer, “Von der ‘Science of Man’ zur ‘Naturgeschichte der Menschheit’”, 35 ff.
826 Similarly, and quite astonishingly, Robertson’s name is not even mentioned in most of the
Forsteriana addressing “translation as inter-cultural communication,” “processes of civilization and
global commerce,” or “Forster and India.” Cf. Jörg Esleben, “Übersetzung als interkulturelle
Kommunikation bei Georg Forster”, Georg Forster Studien 9 (2004), 165-80; Ruth Stummann-Bowert,
“Zivilisationsprozesse und Welthandel bei Georg Forster”, Georg Forster Studien 10:1 (2006), 147-175;
Jörg Esleben, “Forster und Indien”, Georg Forster Studien 10:2 (2006), 407-426. For an exception, see
Katsami Funakoshi, “Dupaty’s Reisebeschreibung und Forsters Ansichten vom Niederrhein”, Georg
Forster Studien 10:2 (2006), 427-42.
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cosmopolitanism and cultural tolerance still built, in the final analysis, on the
foundations of their scholarly investigations. The distinctive flavour of Forster’s
position in the German context, just as that of Robertson in his own, arises exactly
from the features of their thought which demonstrate an elective affinity.
A second point arises from this observation. From the purely philosophical
point of view, Forster may have been incoherent, and in spite of his adventurous
general and intellectual disposition, a captive of the limits of contemporary
paradigms. Yet he stretched the limits of the scientific paradigm to their extremity,
and had the courage to transcend them morally. From one angle, in view of this latter
step Forster’s “politics of ethnology” is rightly described as “radically partisan” in
contrast to Meiners, whose views may have been “ugly”, but were founded in the
socially conservative but realistic assumption that culture is “greater” than
morality.827 Yet  the  community  between  the  future citoyen Forster and the
establishment conservative Robertson seems to introduce a puzzle into this cleavage.
As hinted above, recently a distinct identity has been claimed by Michael Carhart for
a “science of culture” emerging in Germany in the 1770s and 1780s, referring to a
shift of the basis for understanding humanity and society from nature to culture, a
rejection of philosophical conjecture as not sufficiently rigorous, and a preference for
anthropological empiricism based on ancient philology and on the scientific use of
travel literature. Meiners and other members of the “Göttingen School” are identified
as the chief agents in this development. Forster was an empiricist whose
contributions to philology as well as to the scientific use of travel literature are
indisputable, but who – in spite of rhetorical dismissiveness about “conjecture” –
admired the theoretical history of the Scottish conservative Robertson and broadly
shared his perspective on humanity, while clashing with the Göttingen conservative
empiricist Meiners on the same issue. Contemplating these complexities introduces
further distinctions into our understanding of the Enlightenment “science of man”
and the Wissenschaft vom Menschen.
827 Carhart, Science of Culture, 270-1.
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Conclusion
Between 1760 and 1795, Robertson’s five historical texts of varying length and style
that have been investigated in this book saw a total of eleven German translations
and editions. Both these and the English originals, with the exception of his virgin
publication, the Situation of the World, were reviewed without delay and in decent
detail in the Göttingische Anzeigen, one of the most authoritative critical organs of the
German periodical press,  and some of them in other journals as well.  A respectable
amount of indigenous German scholarship on themes of central concern to
Robertson,  too,  was  recognized  –  rightly  or  wrongly  –  to  have  employed  a modus
operandi similar to his. An impressively broad array of men of letters participated in
producing the several thousands of pages of written text in the German language
that can be associated with the name of Robertson. The interlocutors include humble
artisans of the book business; professionals from the theological, legal, and medical
fields who took to Robertson’s histories out of interests outside their own profession;
real bores, as well authoritative lights and astonishing eccentrics, each of them
holding professorial chairs in history, philology, philosophy, jurisprudence, political
science and natural history at lesser and greater German universities; sedentary
scholars and intellectual vagabonds.
 Thus, without doubt, “reception” took place intensively and extensively. The
extent to which there was also “impact” could be a different matter. The
“Robertsonian” histories planned by Abbt on Braunschweig, by Remer on post-
Reformation times, or by Schiller on universal history, were, after all, never written.
As historians threatened with perishing rather than publishing know all too well, the
insufficiency of inspiration by the Scottish master may have been but one of the
reasons, perhaps not even the most powerful. But there could be further reasons for
the apparent discrepancy between reception and impact, to be discovered in the
nature of Enlightenment print communication, and the fact that questions shared
across linguistic and cultural frontiers in enlightened Europe called for answers
suited to the local environments in which they were diversely posed.
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Even irrespective of any scholarly or literary merit in Robertson’s historical
works, there was almost an inevitability in the level and breadth of attention they
received in Germany, thanks to the logic inherent in the activity of collecting books
and reporting on them at  the  Georgia  Augusta  in  Göttingen.  This  activity  has  been
aptly characterized as quasi-encyclopaedic by virtue of its aiming at
comprehensiveness and order: the teaching and – significantly – research of all
academic  subjects  represented  in  the  curriculum  of  the  university  were  to  be
supported with the full range of up-to-date international literature, and the items
appearing on the library’s shelves were to be promptly reviewed by the professorial
staff in the Göttingische Anzeigen. While almost part of their job description, this was
also  a  matter  of  academic  ethos  for  them:  the  Swiss  polymath Albrecht  von Haller,
who reported on both the History of Scotland and the History of Charles V in 1760 and
1770, respectively, remained a devoted and highly prolific reviewer for the journal
long after his departure from Göttingen. Besides Haller,  Robertson was fortunate to
have further  emblematic  scholars  of  the  university  as  his  German commentators  in
the persons of Heyne and Heeren (and we may well add Forster, too, as an
“honorary Göttinger”).
What is more, the reviews which Robertson received were distinctive on
account  of  the  amount  of  substance  and  detail  they  addressed.  This  is  where  the
reception of Robertson through the pages of the Göttingische Anzeigen moves beyond
the “inevitable,” mentioned above. The encyclopedism of the endeavour embodied
in the  journal  made it  an  uphill  battle  for  the  relatively  small  academic  staff  of  the
Georgia Augusta: the sheer bulk of the material often took the better of them, and the
ideal of full coverage could only be pursued more or less consistently if the ideal of
critical depth were to be occasionally compromised.  Hollow praise for, or evident
signs of a mere browsing of the reviewed work are recurrent and symptomatic
features of the “critical” pieces published in the journal. The fact that, as we have
seen, the reviews on Robertson’s works tended to be serious pieces of sometimes
minute criticism, points beyond the above-mentioned mechanism inscribed in the
nature of the production and communication of enlightened academic knowledge.  It
points towards the specific merits which the learned German public found in
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Robertson; towards the question what he “was” and what he had to “say” from their
perspective.
To  them  as  well  as  to  other  European  readers  of  the  time,  Robertson  was  a
respectable, moderate Protestant (“Arminian”), “philosophical” historian of some of
the most important challenges of emerging modernity to his nation and their own, in
a European and global context. To them as well, such challenges seemed to include
the problem of the integrity and safety of political societies that were increasingly
pluralistic in their values – mainly, but not exclusively, from the religious point of
view; the international aspect of the same development, namely, the processes of
European state formation and the coagulation of those states into a system of
dynamic emulation, ever balancing on the thin ridge between cooperation and
conflict; and, finally, Europe’s geographic expansion, the rise of the commercial-
colonial system, the confrontation with other – exotic – peoples and civilizations, and
the mutual influences through which the idea of “mankind” emerged and became
immediately historicized. From the Göttingen, and indeed the larger German point
of view it may not be insignificant that Hanover-Braunschweig was, like Scotland in
the period inaugurated by the one explored in Robertson’s history, both a partner of
England in a personal union, and an electorate of the German Reich, whose character
as a “state” had long been known to be largely fictitious, but whose “constitution”
was a subject of avid investigation and much veneration as a system of religious and
political “liberty” during a time which it is only with the benefit of hindsight that we
now recognize as its swan-song. Germany, of course, could also be easily
conceptualized as Europe writ small, with its kaleidoscope of smaller and larger
sovereignties, with differing denominational and political allegiances and internal
arrangements, in a precarious balance always threatened with and often brought
down in armed fight. As regards the subject of contact with the non-European world,
Germany’s land-locked geographic character and lack of actual colonial stakes did
not deprive it from – on the contrary, somewhat paradoxically but understandably, it
encouraged – an ambition to contribute to “appropriating” that world
epistemologically by participation in “scientific travel,” by processing the harvest of
specimens and other empirical data collected, as well as by a philological and
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philosophical confrontation with the heritage of literate civilizations. Reading and
contemplating Robertson assisted them in doing so.
For these reasons and more, Robertson’s questions sounded congenial and his
endeavours seemed sympathetic to his German audience, which, however, was
occasionally uneasy with some of the authorial and intellectual strategies he
employed in pursuing them. The depiction of character and the weaving of a plot
were paramount to the literary merit justly ascribed to Robertson’s histories, and in
order to arrive at historical generalization from the representation of such
particularities, as a pattern of contextualization he relied on a system of historical
causality assembled out of a Christian providentialism moulded together with the
socio-cultural analysis of “stages” in the progress of mankind. At this point it is
important to remember, first, that the moral psychology crucial for Robertsonian
characterization and thus his narrative techniques, and the historical materialism
which supported his analytical rigour, were both heavily indebted to one and the
same vast intellectual project: the contemporary Scottish “science of man”. Therefore,
the often mentioned distinction, even discrepancy between the “narrative” and the
“stadial” or “conjectural” sections of Robertson’s texts is hardly as dramatic as it may
seem: it is of some relevance from the formal-technical point of view, but as a tool for
better understanding those texts it obscures more than it explains.  Second, while
none of the composite parts of this assemblage were theoretically novel, their
combination proved highly effective, and could not but exert a magnetic influence on
contemporary German – for that matter, any – readers and interlocutors. However, it
was foreign to the indigenous practices of historical research, imagination and
composition  in  Germany.  There  the  most  fundamental  and  lasting  legacy  of
humanist historical inquiry was not its preoccupation with the intricacies of political
action and the way they affected human frailty or dignity, which is a recurrent
though highly contextualized theme in Robertson’s texts,  but its tendency to seek a
prestigious (national) pedigree in the past as the vindication of a distinctive status in
the present, and a concern with philological accuracy in exploring (predominantly
legal, but also other) documents that shed light on this history of distinctiveness. The
refinement of philological criticism in mid-eighteenth-century German historical
               dc_444_12
351
scholarship was as “modern”, and as crucial to the rise of a “scientific”
historiography as Robertson’s endeavour to refresh the discipline with the
approaches of up-to-date social science. But while in confronting the sensitive issues
of the national past, highlighted by recent developments in Anglo-Scottish relations
as well as transformations on the broader European scene, he turned these
approaches to cautiously questioning a tradition of constitutional nostalgia, many of
his “moderate” counterpart historians in Germany like Pütter or Schmidt, prompted
by the similarly far-reaching transformations in intra-German relations taking place
before their eyes, relied on the methodological advances in their own historical
culture in order to formulate a discourse about the constitution of the Reich and its
latest entrenchment in the settlement of Westphalia, which, while certainly not
nostalgic, was strongly vindictive. The differences in the civic functions of history for
Robertson on the one hand and for his German interlocutors on the other, thus also
mutually translate themselves into differences of the theoretical-methodological
apparatus and expressive features of the texts emanating from their hands.
Close to the end of the seventeenth century, Samuel Pufendorf had both
written about the past and the present of the imperial constitution in a highly critical
spirit, and penned works which proved to be foundational for the Scottish students
of the science of man as well as for the eighteenth-century German debate between
“civil” and “metaphysical” philosophy. But even when both Pufendorfian threads
were  first  taken  up  by  professional  historians  like  Schlözer  and  to  some  extent
Heeren a good century later,  the narrative flair that distinguished Robertson’s texts
was still highly unusual among the German practitioners of the craft.  Here it is
helpful to recall  the chronological gap, proposed in Chapter 2,  between the Scottish
and the German intellectual scene both in regard of the rise of a more or less
integrated science of man anchored in a philosophical anthropology as well as
political economy, and in regard of the rise of an appetite for literary merit in
historical works.
If  history is a branch of learning which owes much of its modern identity to
the Enlightenment, this identity was obviously highly complex. In turn, this very
complexity should serve as a reminder of the multiple character of the
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Enlightenment as a whole, and a study of the reception of Robertson’s historical
works in late eighteenth-century Germany has furnished a great deal of evidence on
the  ways  in  which  this  became  manifest  in  the  reality  of  contemporary  texts.  The
sheer  volume  of  response  to  these  works  in  German  illustrates  the  strong  sense  of
these responses as well as the respondents themselves belonging to a shared
intellectual and discursive universe that we are justified in styling enlightened
according to the criteria put forward in the Introduction, even though several readers
may well call into question the classification of at least some of the figures mentioned
on the pages of this book as such.  At the same time, equally obviously, there were
fissures in this universe, in whose perpetuation the barrier constituted by the
difference of the natural languages involved in the process of transmission was one,
but only one important factor. Most of the jurists, philosophers, philologists, political
scientists and others whose names, besides the historians, became connected with the
history of the German reception of Robertson during the last third of the eighteenth
century, could be plausibly categorised – pace Pocock, with a degree of inaccuracy –
as “moderate Arminians” who, however, were kept at a respectful distance from the
Scottish master by the linguistic, cultural, professional and other features of the
environment  in  which  they  were  raised  and  in  which  they  were  active.  But  just  as
their “conservatism” did not by itself ensure a smooth translation, in the
comprehensive sense, of Robertson’s meaning, nor was a disparity in ideological and
political outlook necessarily an obstacle to the development of a strong empathy
between enlightened intellects indebted to a generally shared system of values
concerning humanity and of criteria concerning useful knowledge. The unlikely
affinity between Robertson, the establishment moderate and Forster, the restless
radical places the issue of unity versus diversity in the Enlightenment into yet
another angle, and suggests that the differences which separated such figures did not
inexorably divide enlightened opinion until the French Revolution proceeded
beyond the stage of benign constitutional improvement. Before then, even to
Robertson,  Edmund Burke –  one of  the  borderline  characters  whose  case  speaks  so
strongly  in  favour  of  the  open-ended concept  of  the  Enlightenment  adopted in  this
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book –  had seemed eccentric  in  his  desperate  admonitions  that  the  “rights  of  man”
tended to undermine the rights of civilised man.
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